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A Dim Object, a Bright Object 
When photojournalist Lynsey Addario came back home to New York 
City in 2000, having traveled to Afghanistan still under the rule of the 
Taliban, she had trouble finding a venue for her photographs. She writes: 
“For a long time no newspaper or magazine bought them. In the year 2000 
no one in New York was interested in Afghanistan” (77). At that time, 
Afghanistan was what object-oriented philosopher Levi R. Bryant would 
call a dim object—it emitted no light, attracted no attention, and the eyes 
of the world were not on it. This “dim” period lasted more or less from 
1989—the year when the Soviet government made the decision to with-
draw from Afghanistan (an event that marked the end of the Cold War, 
preceding the dissolution of the Soviet Union by two years)—to 2001, 
the year when the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City 
shook the world. In the weeks following 9/11, as the United States was 
preparing to embark on Operation Enduring Freedom, the previously dim 
object suddenly became bright. As reporters rushed into Jalalabad, Kabul, 
Kandahar, and Herat, media outlets around the world were flooded with 
images of Afghanistan and its people. 
What started with the brief operation to remove the Taliban regime 
was to become the United States’ longest war yet.1 Historian Robert D. 
Crews estimates that more than a million American military and mili-
tary support personnel have cycled through Afghanistan since 2001, not 
including the coalition forces or third-party nationals hired in droves 
by private military contracting companies.2 This number also excludes 
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hundreds of thousands of other foreigners—writers, historians, anthro-
pologists, reporters, doctors, reconstruction experts, election observers, 
political analysts, public relations professionals, and various other advisers 
and humanitarians—who went in and out of Kabul and other Afghan cities 
during the years following the American intervention. Many were idealis-
tic and went to Afghanistan to be a part of the collective rebuilding effort. 
Others were opportunistic and predatory, eager to take advantage of recon-
struction money.3 Billions of dollars have been poured into Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction and development project—an amount that, when adjusted 
for inflation, exceeds the Marshall Plan for postwar Western Europe; 
however, this incredible influx of cash somehow failed to deliver similar 
results. Paradoxically, for many westerners, a stint in Afghanistan was a 
chance for a career break or a welcome respite from their first-world econ-
omies marked by neoliberal austerity and unemployment. “Kabul . . . is 
one of the few places where a bright spark just out of college can end up in 
a job that comes with a servant and a driver,” wrote Canadian politician 
Michael Ignatieff in 2003.4 These expats—some mingling and even living 
with the locals, and others self-segregated in the loosely knit multicultural 
expat scene—left their marks on Afghanistan’s urban cultures, affected 
the economy (sometimes drastically, and usually for the worse), and were 
themselves transformed through this encounter, prompting a transcul-
tural cross-pollination. The two decades following the attack on the Twin 
Towers will enter history textbooks as an era of the global West’s intense 
cross-cultural encounter with Afghanistan.5 Now is the moment to reflect 
upon this encounter—not just from a historical or a political perspective, 
but from a cultural point of view that takes stock of what transpired in 
this meeting of the worlds. 
The brightness of Afghanistan in the years following 9/11 affected 
not only mass media but also other forms of cultural production, birthing 
an array of cultural texts set in the country. This book offers a close look 
into the vast cultural ecosystem—novels, films, graphic novels, memoirs, 
and drama—that was brought into existence by the American invasion 
of Afghanistan—the corpus that takes Afghanistan as its object or its 
setting. In the early years of the US-led war, the demand for knowledge 
about Afghanistan exceeded the supply; in 2007, Corinne Fowler—a pio-
neering scholar who provided an early overview of mass media coverage 
of Afghanistan—spoke of “the paucity of narratives produced in recent 
years. There is not as yet a sufficient body of post-Operation Enduring 
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Freedom narratives about Afghanistan” (215). As I am writing this, in 
2019, a vast body of written and visual texts is available to anyone who has 
interest in stories set in Afghanistan. In fact, all it takes is a quick search on 
Amazon for book or film titles that feature Afghanistan, Kabul, Kandahar, 
or Herat in their titles to realize that Afghanistan has become a cultural 
franchise. As such, this corpus has its own sets of rules, laws of probability 
and improbability, its sets of veritable characters, its obsessions and com-
mon themes. It also has its gaps, silences, elisions, and absences that are 
just as important as what is present. This set of cultural texts, mostly but 
not exclusively Anglophone, predominantly Western- or NATO-centric, 
makes some things visible, just as it condemns others to invisibility; it 
opens some discussions while foreclosing others. These gaps and absences, 
just as its revelations, are the subject of the subsequent chapters.6 
Chronology does not play a large role in this book—the chapters are 
organized around several thematic clusters that I outline below. Yet the 
three distinct “waves” of writing and screening Afghanistan in the after-
math of September 11, 2001, deserve at least a brief mention. The first wave 
of post-9/11 texts set in Afghanistan, published between 2001 and 2007, 
brought into view the humanitarian crisis in the country while replicating 
some of the Cold War conventions of writing about Afghanistan and even 
making use of British colonial imagery. Texts by European travelers Åsne 
Seierstad and Rory Stewart, who journeyed to Afghanistan as soon as its 
borders were opened to westerners by the US-led Taliban ouster, exemplify 
this phase, as well as its neo-imperial investments. For most foreigners who 
visited Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 the trip was an exotic adven-
ture of a lifetime, so claims to an extraordinary experience abound in these 
early works. Vestiges of this colonial mode of writing about Afghanistan 
persist even in some texts of the second decade of the 9/11 wars. For 
instance, Edward Girardet, a European American correspondent with 
two decades of experience in Afghanistan, evokes the British colonial era 
profusely in his memoir Killing the Cranes published in 2011, a decade 
after the invasion: “Working in Afghanistan was like being a character in 
Rudyard Kipling’s The Man Who Would Be King” (6). Other writers of the 
first wave, such as early Khaled Hosseini and Atiq Rahimi, positioned 
Afghanistan as a generalized zone of suffering in need of Western pro-
tection and rescue. They also deployed the tropes of Soviet barbarity as a 
shortcut to explaining the Afghan tragedy, suggesting that communism 
was the sole cause of the country’s undoing. By the end of the first decade 
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of the War on Terror, however, claims to an extraordinary (and solitary) 
experience were no longer the rule, and the urge to portray Afghans as vic-
tims subsided. In turn, a more complex panorama of Afghanistan emerged 
in texts that were nuanced and multidimensional, of significant didactic 
and philosophical value. Exemplary of this period are Hosseini’s second 
novel, A Thousand Splendid Suns (2007), Kamila Shamsie’s intensely lyrical 
Burnt Shadows (2009), and Nadeem Aslam’s philosophical The Wasted Vigil 
(2008)—all of which I discuss in this book.
Finally, a third wave of texts—well into the second decade of the 
US-led war—dramatically expands our view of Afghanistan by making 
visible its transnational history and transcontinental connections. No longer 
exoticizing the Afghan people, these more recent texts draw attention to 
the global problems as seen from and through Afghanistan. Portraying 
Afghanistan as an outlandish, medieval, isolated locale by now seems like a 
tiresome cliché; representations of the country’s recent history have become 
much more nuanced, historically grounded, and self-reflective. Exemplary 
of this wave are novels, graphic texts, films, and memoirs that I turn to 
in chapters four through six. Many texts of this period do not focus on 
their authors’ solitary experiences, but by contrast, draw attention to the 
humanitarian community that gathered in Afghanistan post-9/11, and in 
American journalist Kim Barker’s words, “behaved badly” (The Taliban 
Shuffle 78). The gaze is no longer on the “exotic Afghan” but on poorly 
behaving, opportunity-seeking foreigners in Afghanistan—members of 
a new international creed produced by a combination of neoliberalism-
triggered hyper-competition for diminishing resources in the global North 
and US militarism. 
When defining the corpus of texts that comprise the object of study 
in this book, I propose the term “global Afghanistan cultural production” 
to capture the specific nature and address of these works; these texts were 
not written or produced by Afghans for the Afghan public but were created 
by foreigners for a global audience. This book is not about Afghan national 
literature or film produced in Dari or Pashto by Afghan authors; a reader 
with an interest in Afghan national literature should look elsewhere, such 
as to the collection of stories Afghanistan in Ink that provides a timely 
and insightful overview of Afghan national and diasporic writing. Among 
the authors in Imagining Afghanistan are American, British, French, 
Canadian, Norwegian, Algerian, and Pakistani cultural producers— 
all foreigners with their own agendas and geopolitical positioning. 
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A few works by Afghan-born authors are treated, such as works by Khaled 
Hosseini, Qais Akbar Omar, and Nelofer Pazira; however, all three are 
bicultural exiles residing in the United States and Canada and writing 
for Anglophone publics. Many of the cultural producers that comprise 
the global Afghanistan corpus in this book are intimately familiar with 
Afghanistan, having spent years there or having traveled extensively in 
the country. There are many texts, however, that were produced by for-
eigners who admit to having never been to Afghanistan; by setting their 
stories in Afghanistan, they engage in the act of imagining the country 
as befitting their own desires and agendas.7 The texts examined here thus 
are windows upon Afghanistan only in a very specific sense: They are 
windows not onto Afghanistan and its culture, but onto the shared world 
of global cultural producers (mostly NATO-centric), as they capitalize 
on their (mostly Western) publics’ appetites for cultural otherness and 
curiosity about a distant war. 
Global Afghanistan writing and film are often in conversation with 
the set of works that has been referred to as “the 9/11 novels and film”8—
cultural texts produced in response to the attacks on September 11, 2001. 
While there are many overlapping themes, the global Afghanistan cor-
pus has distinct features that are often in tension with the 9/11 cultural 
production. In contrast to the 9/11 works with their deep investment in 
national trauma, memorialization, the issues of representability, and US 
national recovery, the texts I discuss in this book are examples of transna-
tional cultural production insofar as they do not prioritize a single national 
perspective and are not focused on helping the American nation heal. In 
fact, while in the 9/11 texts the exceptional event of the attacks typically 
constitutes the affective and symbolic nerve, in the works I discuss in this 
book, 9/11 remains largely absent. If addressed at all, the event of the 
attacks is usually described indirectly and is registered from afar, as the 
reverberations make their way to distant places, such as Afghanistan or 
Pakistan, in the form of the War on Terror. Or, just as often, the attacks 
themselves are featured as a result of prior historical developments, in the 
form of an echo of a remote catastrophe—the collapse of the Afghan state. 
As Georgiana Banita notes in her book on the 9/11 novel, the attacks on 
the Twin Towers have been presented as a complete rupture from the 
past: “Global historical events that may have prefaced or prefigured the 
terrorist attacks were quickly forgotten in post-9/11 cultural discourse, 
while a vociferous counterdiscourse emerged around how 9/11 ushered 
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in, seemingly out of the blue, a new transnational era” (44). By contrast, 
global Afghanistan works seek to inscribe optics that makes 9/11 legible 
as a consequence of prior historical tragedies that require commemoration.
Taken as a whole, “global Afghanistan” cultural texts exhibit a spe-
cific sensibility and flavor that are an expression of the shared historical 
condition in which they are situated. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, 
this corpus registers the global, ever-expanding state of war, and conveys 
a sense of vulnerability and crisis, mapping the landscapes of victimhood 
and terror. There is a sense of global interconnectedness in all these texts as 
they oscillate between close-ups that reveal the violence inflicted on indi-
vidual bodies caught in the mayhem of localized wars and the planetary 
scale that frames these acts of violence. As a corollary to registering and 
dramatizing the crisis of wars without end, many of these texts convey an 
interest in finding pathways to transnational reconciliation and peace, with 
Afghanistan figuring as an imagined site of such reconciliation. In sum, 
the texts grouped in this book register a sustained commitment to finding 
a language to describe what defines the post-9/11 contemporary—the era 
journalist Jason Burke calls “the 9/11 wars.” This impulse positions the 
global Afghanistan corpus as a hermeneutics of the present—an effort to 
find the meaning of the events we collectively experience and to situate 
ourselves in relation to them. 
Burke’s term “the 9/11 wars” captures the period defined by a series 
of deadly conflicts in various parts of the world that followed the 9/11 
attacks.9 The 9/11 wars encompass the global War on Terror declared by 
George W. Bush along with its Obama-era reformulations; they also com-
prise the cultural wars, terrorist attacks, and low-level military conflicts in 
Europe, Russia, Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Indian 
subcontinent, among other places, resulting in massive, albeit distributed, 
loss of life, dislocation of millions, the redrawing of the borders in the 
Middle East, and other changes in the global configuration of power. 
The 9/11 wars era is seemingly the era of wars without end; dubbed a 
“forever war,” an “everywhere war,”10 it exhibits “a pattern of wars without 
objectives, exit strategies, or geographical boundaries” (Wood 71).11 My 
preference for the term “the 9/11 wars,” as compared to the War on Terror 
(Bush’s strategy) and the Age of Terror (Don DeLillo’s phrase), is related 
to its capacity to capture the broad geographical distribution of post-9/11 
conflicts, affecting lives in the global North and in the global South. In 
contrast to these other terms, Burke’s term gestures toward an era that is 
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infinitely complex and does not easily lend itself to the East/West binaries 
or to the metaphors of the epic struggle between good and evil, implied in 
both Bush’s and DeLillo’s designations. Additionally, it resists the excep-
tionality of the United States as the prime actor (and the prime victim) 
of the era, drawing attention to the multiple non-US participants and 
casualties of these wars. Rather than being an epic struggle of good versus 
evil, the 9/11 wars come into view as the era of largely invisible yet per-
sistent conflicts, with an epicenter that is constantly moving.12 The 9/11 
wars capture the ubiquity of trauma in an age when violence becomes as 
globalized as it is random and when military invasions, masquerading as 
humanitarianism, continue unabated. By bringing into visibility a distrib-
uted community of those affected by the 9/11 wars worldwide, the global 
Afghanistan novels, memoirs, and films mediate the complex experiences 
of people of multiple nationalities trapped in these wars. By examining the 
frames of cultural reference, images, themes, and aesthetics that emerge 
in these texts, this book will contribute to a richer understanding of the 
post-9/11 global cultural production and the place of Afghanistan in the 
global imaginary. 
A Contested History of a Global Nation 
Considered within the frame of its history, Afghanistan is a paradoxi-
cal site. Deprived of major mineral wealth (this changed recently with 
the world’s new thirst for lithium, abundant in Afghanistan), landlocked 
and surrounded from all sides by three formidable mountain ranges, it 
nevertheless has been a locum of sustained international interest for two 
hundred years, culminating in the forty-year-long era of social upheaval 
and bloodshed fueled by external meddling and global rivalries. Its tur-
bulent history renders the fantasy of linear progress problematic, exposing 
the limitations of both twentieth- and twenty-first-century developmen-
talisms. Its contemporary state epitomizes halted development, the ruins 
of its recent past mocking the dreams of Afghan modernity. Almost two 
decades after the US-led invasion, it remains a zone of contention for 
multiple militarisms, a site where the dreams for liberal democracy’s reach 
are tested, and found wanting, as they collide with the interests of radical 
Islamist groups and opium producers who seek to maintain Afghanistan 
as their enduring base, not to mention the varied needs and demands of 
tribal and ethnic groups. These new rivalries are superimposed upon stark 
ideological and class divisions in the nation that now ranks 169/187 on the 
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Human Development Index.13 And yet, as this book shows, Afghanistan’s 
recent history is not merely a chronicle of war, but a gripping story that tells 
of incredible leaps forward and shocking setbacks, a history of building 
and dismantling, and of utopian dreaming. As such, it continues to fasci-
nate travelers and vagabonds, humanitarians and historians, and above all, 
writers and readers who seek to make sense of the country’s tempestuous, 
radical, utopian, and often violent past. 
“There is a country so in the heart of the world that the world has 
forgotten about it,” writes Tony Kushner in his play Homebody/Kabul (28). 
The image of Afghanistan in post-9/11 global writing and film is part 
myth, part history, part fantasy, and part collective hallucination, and the 
book is set to unpack its meaning. This book’s title, Imagining Afghanistan, 
thus reflects the intellectual pursuit of the project: to understand how 
Afghanistan figures in the global imaginary and how the world, in turn, 
is imagined from and through this country. The interlacing of Afghanistan 
and “the global” is a persisting theme in all the texts discussed in this book; 
it is multilayered and requires an explanation. To begin with, Afghanistan 
is a global place quite literally; its history is intertwined with the history 
of the world perhaps more than any other nation-state.14 An entire gener-
ation of refugees, exiles, migrants, and transnational militants was created 
as a direct result of what Oona Frawley calls “global civil war”—the war 
between the Soviet Union and the United States fought on Afghanistan’s 
soil.15 Moreover, by 1979 (the year of the Soviet intervention that marks the 
moment of intensification of the Cold War in the area), Afghanistan was 
already global—an argument I develop in chapter two. And yet, westerners 
continue to traffic in images of Afghan isolation and barbarity, portraying 
it as “a hermit kingdom”16 or a land of medieval thinking and practices. 
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, Afghanistan—as it 
emerges in post-9/11 transnational texts—is sutured to the globe on the 
level of symbol and image: Its tragedies and successes often metonymically 
stand in for the globe at large. In Afghanistan in the Cinema, Mark Graham 
writes: “Afghanistan is more than a place; it is a global situation, like all 
wars, a seismic catastrophe that shatters and scatters all in its wake” (114). 
As a synecdoche for the world—a site where global trends emerge, come 
to fruition, and meet their demise—Afghanistan serves as a figure for the 
shared experience of loss, and potentially, as a figure of redemption, an 
opportunity for healing from the losses suffered. Burke brings attention 
to Afghanistan’s post-9/11 symbolic role as the measure of the Western 
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superpowers’ global reach, their capacity to impose their will upon the 
rest of the world, and their ability to neutralize and absorb local difference 
in the process of reshaping the invaded countries.17 Afghanistan’s recon-
struction era, or more precisely, its failures, ultimately exposes and serves 
as a figure of the limits of this capacity. Afghanistan thus functions as an 
imagined object of cathexis of multiple, often contradictory hopes, desires, 
or fears—serving simultaneously as a lens for deciphering the present, 
imagining the future, and for reinterpreting the past (an idea that I develop 
further in chapters two and three). 
Historian Timothy Nunan likens Afghanistan’s history to a palimp-
sest: “Here, sediments of history lay stacked upon one another like the 
sheaves of the Persian, Pashto, and Turkic manuscripts Orientologists jeal-
ously poached” (19). Yet the very layered nature of Afghanistan’s recent 
past, as well as its interlacement with the larger global history of the late 
Cold War era, makes this history a contested subject. The seduction to flat-
ten these layers into a simplified image of a third-world humanitarian crisis 
has been great in early post-9/11 global Afghanistan texts. Critics right-
fully observed that US mainstream media and White House-sponsored 
political rhetoric projected a version of Afghan history that was essentially 
diphasic: the spell of timeless, medieval oppression to be broken through 
a liberation from the West. This became particularly obvious in relation 
to women’s rights and the way in which the burqa—made mandatory for 
all women by the Taliban regime—became a signifier of cultural barbar-
ity requiring an intervention. In this, the West saw itself as a benevolent 
force, a progressive agent of world history, an altruistic humanitarian who 
intervenes on behalf of the oppressed. Struggles over the country’s recent 
history and the legacy of its various parts comprise a prominent theme 
in global Afghanistan cultural production. Each work discussed in this 
book projects its own vision of this history, competing, if not violently 
clashing, with other visions. Although I make references to various periods 
in Afghanistan’s recent past in various chapters of this book, it might be 
useful to provide a brief summary of the basic chronology of events here. 
Afghanistan enters the twentieth century as a British puppet state, 
with a history of two Anglo-Afghan wars prompted by the British Crown’s 
anxiety about Russian advances in Central Asia. The First Anglo-Afghan 
War (1839–1842) culminated in the famous ambush and slaughter of 
16,000 British troops, cementing the image of Afghans as wild, brutal, 
and unconquerable, which, in the more recent context, led to Afghanistan’s 
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mythologization as “the graveyard of empires.”18 During the Second 
Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), however, the British were successful in 
installing a subservient regime in Kabul, effectively gaining control of the 
country. But not for long. In 1919, the British Empire, weakened by World 
War I, was evicted from Kabul and Afghanistan became independent—“a 
sovereign postcolonial state before it was fashionable” (Nunan, 11). Almost 
coeval with the Russian Revolution, Afghanistan’s independence was rec-
ognized and celebrated by Lenin and the new Soviet State, with whom 
the Afghan king promptly signed a treaty of friendship. The mid-twenti-
eth-century period of King Mohammed Zahir Shah’s rule from 1933 to 
1973 was marked by stability, peace, and the steady work of modernization 
characterized by advances in education, infrastructure development, and 
women’s rights.19 During this period, Afghanistan developed strong links 
with Europe, the United States, and the USSR, with many elite members 
going to universities in these countries. In 1959, female members of the 
royal family went in public unveiled, encouraging modern Afghan women 
to follow suit, prompting a brief veil war in Afghanistan—a religious back-
lash promptly suppressed by the monarchy committed to modernization. 
The years between 1960 and 1970 saw the rise of social justice movements 
that engaged in utopian dreaming and organization. Kabul University, 
with its large base of first-generation students, became the epicenter of such 
movements, home to both radical leftist socialist (and feminist) groups 
and ultraright radical Islamist groups. Nur Muhammad Taraki (the first 
socialist head of state), as well as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (an ultraright 
Islamist and later a militant known for his violence against civilians) found 
their base and their audience there. 
Afghanistan’s history since 1973 can be likened to a video viewed in 
fast-forward mode—a lot happened in a short period of time. In 1973, 
the monarchy was overthrown in a coup d’état and Afghanistan became 
a republic under the leadership of Mohammed Daoud Khan—the former 
king’s cousin. In 1978, Daud was overthrown by the socialist party of 
Afghanistan, and Taraki—the party leader—became the head of state. 
Forging ahead with land reform and women’s education, and facing chal-
lenges to these changes in the countryside, the new socialist government 
requested Soviet military support, which was denied. Following Taraki’s 
assassination in 1979, however, fearing the further unraveling of the 
Afghan’s new and unstable socialist state, USSR’s head of state Leonid 
Brezhnev decided to send troops to help Babrak Karmal, the leader of 
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the moderate socialist party wing, assume leadership. From 1979 to 1989, 
Afghanistan was a socialist state, its security managed by the Soviet troops 
who remained in Afghanistan, but who were increasingly harassed by the 
ever-growing groups of mujahideen20 (jihad fighters), who received exten-
sive Western and Saudi support. In 1989, Soviet troops withdrew, ending 
the era of the Soviet-Afghan War and marking the advent of civil war. 
Improbably, the socialist government of Afghanistan persisted even after 
the withdrawal of the Soviet contingent, falling in 1992 to the ultraright 
mujahideen forces who finally surrounded and seized Kabul. From 1992 
until the arrival of the Taliban in 1996, warring factions of various radical 
Islamist groups destroyed the infrastructure of the country, unleashed war 
on civilians, and engaged in ethnic cleansing, all of which lead to the col-
lapse of the state and massive population displacement. After fifty years of 
steady modernization, Afghanistan was reduced to ruins. While the arrival 
of the Taliban in 1996 restored a degree of law and order, it also solidified 
gender inequalities already in place, and did little to alleviate the poverty 
and breakdown of infrastructure. The US arrival in 2001 brought another 
change, with the creation of a fragile, unstable democracy propped up by 
Western money and NATO military personnel. To conclude this overview, 
if in 1880 Frenchman James Darmesteter could write, “The Afghans do not 
have a history, because anarchy has none,”21 today a historian might observe 
that the Afghans, for a small nation, have a uniquely rich global history, 
mirroring, in many ways, the turbulent history of the twentieth century. 
The Book’s Key Arguments 
A site in which colonial, socialist, fundamentalist, and neo-imperialist 
histories collide and grate against each other, Afghanistan poses representa-
tional difficulties for cultural producers. Writing or screening Afghanistan 
in the twenty-first century involves reckoning not only with the issues of 
human rights, women’s rights, and transnational terror, but also brings with 
it contentious legacies bequeathed by the Cold War. Afghanistan, I argue 
throughout this project, serves as a lens through which contemporary cul-
tural producers contend with the moral ambiguities of twenty-first-century 
humanitarianism, interpret the legacy of the Cold War and the defeated 
socialist project, recognize (or obscure) the role of the United States in the 
rise of transnational terror, and grapple with the long-term impact of war 
on both human and nonhuman ecologies. An object of desire, as much as 
the object to be deciphered, Afghanistan’s history serves as a screen upon 
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which fantasies of the future—images of the world to come—are projected 
and debated. Interpretations of Afghanistan’s socialist history, its radical 
Islamist past, and its neoliberal present collide to lay claims upon the world 
that is emerging at the end of the second decade of the 9/11 wars. 
This book makes three interventions. First, using Afghanistan as a 
case study, it offers a critique of the humanitarian imaginary—a culturally 
specific mode of global relationality and engagement that has become 
dominant in the global North after the Cold War’s end. Second, the book 
shows an imbrication of the humanitarian narrative with post-Cold War 
aphasias, ranging from a virulent anti-socialist stance to Left melancholy 
that presents, mostly, as inconsistencies and gaps in representation. And 
finally, through an examination of a growing archive of writing and film 
that emerged in the second decade of the 9/11 wars, the book maps a way 
out of the humanitarian imaginary. Let me dwell on each of the three 
points here. 
In its critique of the humanitarian imaginary, the book takes as a point 
of departure contemporary analyses of humanitarianism as exemplified by 
Joseph M. Slaughter (Human Rights, Inc.) and Didier Fassin (Humanitarian 
Reason), among others. While Slaughter’s readings are based on a different 
archive—the world-spanning array of novels that came out during the 1990s 
human rights era—his analysis of the humanitarian narrative is useful to this 
project. Specifically, Slaughter views the humanitarian narrative as a literary 
technology that solidifies global hierarchies, “recenter[ing] the traditional 
subjects of history now as the subjects of benevolence, humanitarian 
interventionist sentimentality, and human rights” (324). Moreover, 
Slaughter underscores the juncture between the cultural logic of literary 
humanitarianism and the Realpolitik of imperialism, demonstrating how a 
human rights best seller can preempt and legitimize a real humanitarian-
military intervention. My focus on Afghanistan allows me to render more 
concrete such critique of the humanitarian narrative by bringing into view 
the very specific problems and impasses that result from an adoption of 
the humanitarian mode for writing about Afghanistan. On the one hand, 
screening and writing Afghanistan after 9/11 can serve as an ultimate case 
study in humanitarian imaginary, exemplifying precisely the interventionist 
logic Slaughter critiques. On the other hand, however, Afghanistan’s 
uniquely nonlinear history makes problematic a humanitarian reduction 
of its past to a biphasic formula that traces a trajectory from oppression to 
the subsequent access to dignity and personal development—a hallmark of 
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the human rights best seller as described by Slaughter. When writers and 
filmmakers attempt such a reduction, multiple problems ensue. Afghanistan’s 
revolutionary socialist project, albeit defeated, also poses a challenge to the 
liberal notion of emancipation insofar as it privileges collective, rather than 
individual, empowerment. This socialist past thus proves to be resistant 
to either cooptation or incorporation into a human rights-based mode of 
representation. And as such, it becomes unrepresentable. 
Therefore, the second task of this book is to bring into view the 
multiple anti-socialist biases endemic in NATO-centric contexts and to 
show their imbrications with humanitarian tropes. The book argues that 
many prominent cultural texts, especially those published during the first 
decade of the 9/11 wars, are marked by an uncritical investment in anti-
communism as a shortcut to explaining Afghanistan’s tragedy. In these 
works, the ruins of Afghanistan are proffered as the ruins of communism: 
Sites of socialist history figure as ruined sites, meant to exemplify the 
violence that the socialist state, and in particular the Soviets, unleashed 
on bodies, buildings, and nature. In these texts, Afghan people figure 
almost exclusively as (albeit defiant) victims of Soviet barbarity. While most 
cultural theorists, since Edward Said, have been attuned to the dangers of 
Orientalism, they are less conscious of the long-term othering strategies 
that originated in the Cold War that cast socialism as an unnatural force, 
communists as sexual predators, and the socialist state (especially the Soviet 
Union) as an unflinchingly totalitarian, destructive presence in any region. 
The archive of global Afghanistan works that I put together in this book 
reveals that in NATO-centric contexts, anti-socialist (and by extension 
anti-statist) tropes are pervasive on both sides of the political spectrum, and 
frame both the cultural production and its reception by critics. These modes 
of representing and seeing, as I demonstrate, result in redacting indigenous 
Afghan Leftist history and the complete erasure of the Afghan revolutionary 
subject. The framework of Orientalism alone is thus not sufficient in relation 
to Afghanistan writing and film; postcolonial approaches are similarly 
insufficient insofar as postcolonial critiques reduce the socialist era in 
Afghanistan to the Soviet occupation, viewed as a neocolonial endeavor, 
similarly erasing Afghanistan’s radical Leftist tradition and its revolutionary 
history. I thus suggest that we add to the human rights, postcolonial, and 
Orientalist critiques a critique of anti-socialist bias—which ranges from 
virulent anti-Sovietisms to forms of bias that are much more subtle, such 
as “Left-wing melancholy” and “capitalist realism.” 
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“Capitalist realism”—a term introduced by Mark Fisher (2009)—cap-
tures the presence of “a widespread belief that there is no alternative to 
capitalism” (19), a view that presumes that alternatives to capitalism are 
unnatural, no longer imaginable, or always a priori doomed to failure. 
Afghanistan, for capitalist realists, serves as a prime example of the inev-
itability of socialist failure. “Left-wing melancholy” is a phrase coined by 
Enzo Traverso in his eponymous book that captures a similar sentiment; 
it refers to a sense of disorientation and loss that is a residue of the defeat 
suffered by the global Left at the end of the twentieth century (xiv). Both 
capitalist realists and Left-wing melancholics suffer the loss of utopia (the 
future) while haunted by memories of the past that evade understanding 
and mourning. History appears to them as a pile of ruins whose meaning is 
inexplicable and thus ungrievable: “Deprived of its horizon of expectation, 
the twentieth century appears to our retrospective gaze as an age of wars 
and genocide” (Traverso 10). Cultural producers (and critics) whose views 
align with these subtle forms of bias, as discussed in this book, might not 
reduce Afghanistan’s tragedy to an image of Soviet atrocity; however, since 
they do not have the language to talk about Afghanistan’s revolutionary 
past in such a way that would redeem it by remaining faithful to its eman-
cipatory dream, they often choose to simply omit it, thus contributing to 
the collective work of erasure. And so, Afghan socialist modernity remains 
unmourned, condemned to the rubble of history. 
Finally, my third intervention in this book is to suggest a way of mov-
ing beyond the horizon defined by the juncture of humanitarianism and 
anti-socialism. Chapters four through six move beyond critique and offer, 
instead, paths toward alternative imaginaries. The Afghanistan corpus of 
cultural texts, I argue, indexes both an endemic quality of melancholic 
humanitarianism as a mode of representation and a push to move beyond 
this imaginary. At the end of the second decade of the 9/11 wars we are 
witnessing, I argue, the emergence of new vocabularies and frameworks 
that allow writers and filmmakers to bring into view traumatic histories 
without succumbing to the humanitarian tropes. The humanitarian wager, 
I believe, is losing its appeal. New modes of representing traumatic histories 
include, first and foremost, a shift of attention from the suffering human 
figure (the traumatized survivor) to conditions and infrastructures of vio-
lence, with the intent to capture slow and distributed violence. Capturing 
slow or massively distributed violence requires a long-term witness or a 
nonhuman witness. In addition, debates over the Anthropocene, coeval 
 Introduction 15
with the 9/11 wars, have brought into focus deep time as a framework for 
thinking and action. The global Afghanistan corpus of works registers 
this shift: Viewing Afghanistan in deep time—as a geological object—
opens up new ways of writing about human and nonhuman suffering, 
recovery, and resilience. Finally, many works of the second decade of the 
9/11 wars stage a comedic reversal where humanitarian tropes are put on 
their head and the very idea of a humanitarian invasion is ridiculed. In 
terms of the book’s trajectory, chapter three serves as a hinge as it begins a 
transition from critique to constructive work, from exposing the limits of 
humanitarianism (and anti-socialism) to considering these new modes of 
representation. The book thus makes an argument about the progressive 
disillusionment with humanitarianism as a moral framework over the two 
decades of US-led wars as evidenced through novels and memoirs set in 
Afghanistan. While we do not yet know what is coming, it is evident that 
the age of humanitarian reason is showing multiple fissures that might be 
impossible to patch. 
The Trajectory of the Book 
When putting together my “global Afghanistan” archive, I made a deliber-
ate effort to include both popular works (blockbuster films and best-selling 
novels) and more obscure texts. The resulting array thus contains bright 
objects and dim objects. One may expect that bright objects tap into the 
dominant cultural imaginary and strengthen it, and this is often true. And, 
in turn, one might anticipate that obscure texts will have more freedom 
to challenge our belief systems, pushing the boundaries of our vision. 
However, for both bright and dim objects, this is not always the case. 
Some blockbusters undo themselves by containing unbearable tensions 
and contradictions, while obscure works often channel hegemonic beliefs 
uncritically. These difficulties notwithstanding, I believe that a combina-
tion of visual and written texts and a mix of high and low culture will offer 
a veritable snapshot of how Afghanistan has been imagined, and reimag-
ined, over the span of the two decades since the fall of the Twin Towers. 
Chapter one, “Humanitarian Sublime and the Politics of Pity: Writing 
and Screening ‘Afghanistan’ Circa 2001,” looks at three examples of rep-
resenting Afghanistan during this time period—Mohsen Makhmalbaf ’s 
film Kandahar (2001); Yasmina Khadra’s novel The Swallows of Kabul 
(2002); and Tony Kushner’s acclaimed play Homebody/Kabul (2002). The 
importance of this cluster of works, aside from providing early examples of 
16 IMAGINING AFGHANISTAN
post-9/11 cultural representations of Afghanistan, lies in its role in framing 
Afghanistan as a zone of immense suffering (especially women’s suffering) 
and humanitarian crisis, which in the post-9/11 context served to give 
legitimacy and purpose to the US-led invasion. These works exemplify 
post-Cold War humanitarian imaginary by their reliance on empathetic 
identification with distant suffering, in their extensive medievalization of 
Afghanistan, and finally, in a dramatic flattening of the country’s history. 
The chapter’s key metaphor, “flat earth,” draws attention to this act of lev-
eling in which Afghanistan’s deeply palimpsestic, eventful recent history 
is reduced to the shallow, two-dimensional chronology of the most recent 
crisis (the Taliban), into which western audiences then feel compelled to 
intervene. The chapter exposes the limitations of representing Afghanistan 
in a humanitarian mode and introduces the term “humanitarian sublime” 
to capture the deployment of humanitarian affect in response to distant 
suffering. 
Chapter two, “Imagining the Soviets: The Faustian Bargain of Khaled 
Hosseini’s Kabul ‘Trilogy’,” unveils the paradoxical place of the Afghan 
socialist era in the post-9/11 imaginary. As such, it sheds light on how 
Cold War-era biases continue to shape representations of Afghanistan’s 
history in NATO-centric contexts in the age of the 9/11 wars. Animated 
by a desire to recover the image of socialist Afghanistan from its historical 
(and cultural) ruins, the chapter inscribes much needed ambiguity into 
the narrative of “ruination via the Soviets” by engaging the literary proj-
ect of Afghan American writer Khaled Hosseini. By throwing Hosseini’s 
best-selling The Kite Runner (a virulently anti-Soviet text) against the back-
ground of a late-Cold War novel by an American writer M. E. Hirsh, 
Kabul (1986), as well as by staging a dialogue between The Kite Runner and 
Hosseini’s two subsequent novels—A Thousand Splendid Suns (2007) and 
And the Mountains Echoed (2013), the chapter demonstrates that Hosseini 
strikes a Faustian bargain that both accounts for his success and forces 
him into a number of representational stalemates that, as of yet, remain 
unaddressed by critics. 
Chapter three, “Humanitarian Jihad: Unearthing the Contemporary 
in the Narratives of the Long 1979,” argues that in the post-9/11 con-
text, 1979 (a “dark” threshold of the contemporary), must be viewed as a 
genealogical point of origin that is more important than 1989 (a “bright” 
threshold connoting the presumed triumph of liberal democracy). The 
year 1979 marks a “hot” moment in the Cold War: Soviet intervention in 
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Afghanistan and the onset of US-led covert “Operation Cyclone” (a.k.a. 
the Afghan jihad)—a proxy war against the Soviets and the largest covert 
operation in CIA history. What were the costs of defeating what Ronald 
Reagan called “the Evil Empire”? How do we make visible the hidden 
histories of transnational terror? Nadeem Aslam’s The Wasted Vigil (2008), 
Sorayya Khan’s City of Spies (2015), and Didier Lefèvre’s visual account of 
his journey to Afghanistan in The Photographer (produced with Emmanuel 
Guibert and Frédéric Lemercier, 2009) help us imagine our way into these 
CIA-orchestrated “ghost wars”—largely invisible, yet deadly.22 Lefèvre’s 
graphic memoir, unwittingly, offers important insights into the role that 
European humanitarians, such as Doctors Without Borders and European 
reporters (such as Lefèvre himself), played in the anti-Soviet jihad in the 
mountain ranges of 1980s Afghanistan. This chapter’s key term, “human-
itarian jihad,” points to how humanitarian images—such as the famous 
image of the Afghan girl of the 1985 National Geographic—were put to use 
in support of the jihad against the Soviets and the Afghan socialist state. 
The suffering child is a signifier of crisis, but which crisis? In Lefèvre’s 
graphic memoir, the suffering child is, unambiguously, a victim of Soviet 
barbarity; in Aslam’s and Khan’s works, the suffering child becomes a 
figure for US interference in the region. 
Chapter four, “Witness: Modes of Writing the Disaster,” discusses 
three texts written by South Asian writers—Kamila Shamsie’s Burnt 
Shadows (2009), Qais Akbar Omar’s A Fort of Nine Towers (2013), and 
Zia Haider Rahman’s In the Light of What We Know (2014). These works 
conjure divergent, powerful ways of inscribing the Afghan disaster as an 
object of memorialization, foregrounding its key role in late twentieth-
century history, and situating it as a site of convergence of multiple 
global forces (USSR, United States, Pakistan, and others). They provide 
a compelling alternative to the humanitarian mode of writing traumatic 
histories by constructing three modes of witness, and therefore three 
modes of making legible the Afghan disaster. Both Omar’s and Shamsie’s 
texts offer a long-term witness as a main device that allows them to 
document the crises that would enfold several generations. The focus of 
the long-term witness permits these writers to document the processes of 
slow violence and the delayed effects of war, such as mass displacement, 
habitat destruction, and toxicity, which take years or even decades to 
manifest. By contrast, Rahman’s novel, through both its plot and its 
formal aspects, argues against the primacy of eye-witnessing. As the 
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ontological indeterminacy at the very core of the world continuously 
thwarts our epistemic thrust, the disaster, Rahman’s novel suggests, calls 
for a nonhuman witness. 
Chapter five, “The Deep Time of War: Nadeem Aslam and the 
Aesthetics of the Geologic Turn,” further maps the landscape of global 
Afghanistan writing (especially modes of witnessing and mediation of the 
catastrophe) by turning to deep memory, while further exploring the idea 
of a nonhuman witness. Aslam’s Afghanistan-based novels exemplify the 
affordances of the geologic turn for writing traumatic histories in the era 
of the Anthropocene—the era that, paradoxically, decenters the human. 
Aslam’s writing positions Earth (seen as a rich landscape populated by mul-
tiple species and nonliving objects) as a nonhuman witness (geo-witness) 
to human catastrophe—a medium of memory that registers the disaster 
of war at a scale that surpasses the human. Aslam’s works channel species 
memory, insect perception, and geological inscription of the war-borne 
toxicities that slip into millennia-old geological strata. By bringing into 
focus the deep time of history’s material sedimentations, Aslam dramatizes 
the long-term consequences of the wars waged in the region—that alter 
landscapes and change multispecies ecologies. Seen from the perspective of 
deep time, Aslam’s Afghanistan is not a humanitarian scene—it emerges 
as a habitat of demoiselle cranes and snow leopards, a land of slow-forming 
gemstones and Buddhism, mapping the deep history of Eurasia, human 
and nonhuman. 
The last chapter, “The Kabubble: The Humanitarian Community 
Under Scrutiny,” offers an overview of writing and screening Afghanistan 
in the second decade of the 9/11 wars by examining French illustrator 
Nicolas Wild’s Kabul Disco (a graphic novel series, 2009; 2013), journalist 
Kim Barker’s The Taliban Shuffle (a memoir, 2011), and American comedian 
Tina Fey’s 2016 blockbuster Whiskey Tango Foxtrot (a feature film based 
on Barker’s memoir). These cultural texts use comedy to depict westerners’ 
experiences in Afghanistan and index the general waning of belief in the 
success of US-led military interventions in the name of democratic and 
humanitarian aims. They bring into stark relief the limitations (and the 
hubris) of the humanitarian mode of representation by mocking and paro-
dying it. These works illustrate the complicated journey from an uncritical 
investment in humanitarianism as an amelioration to Third World suf-
fering to the realization of the disconnect between the global West’s 
humanitarian agendas, and the realities of the late neoliberal moment 
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that determine the attitudes and desires of the transnational humanitarian 
workers (and other expats) who partake in the financial bubble in the after-
math of the military operation. These late-arriving narratives dramatize 
the “Kabubble”—foreigners’ Kabul—as a surreal place of transnational 
career-building and individual risk-taking spurred by neoliberal competi-




Humanitarian Sublime and the  
Politics of Pity: Writing and  
Screening “Afghanistan” Circa 2001 
On March 5, 2016, Tina Fey’s blockbuster Whiskey Tango Foxtrot—a 
film described by a New York Times reviewer as “Live from Kabul, It’s a 
Feminist Comedy”1—premiered in US theaters. The film revealed, among 
other things, that during the fifteen years after the start of the US-led 
intervention in Afghanistan, the global West and its pundits have learned 
something important, although what that is may not be easy to pinpoint. 
For instance, Fey’s film followed none of the conventions that structured 
representations of Afghanistan in the cultural texts that emerged in the 
early days of Operation Enduring Freedom, around 2001–2002. Instead 
of drawing attention to the cultural, religious, and moral difference (and 
inferiority) of the Afghan “other,” as compared to the deeply sympathetic, 
ethical, selfless humanitarians or saviors from the West (a frequent trope in 
the early works), Fey’s film accomplished a 180-degree reversal, subjecting 
the international community in post-9/11 Kabul to a scrutiny worthy of 
a trained cultural anthropologist. These substance-abusing, death-drive-
obsessed, transnational humanitarian workers are an oddity observed 
and studied, akin to zoo animals, by the curious and cross-culturally 
competent Afghan residents of Kabul. The expats, in the film, represent a 
distinct breed of rather unscrupulous thrill-addicts who seek personal and 
22 IMAGINING AFGHANISTAN
career advancement as they gather in reconstruction-era Kabul—deemed 
“Kabubble” in the film to underscore the community’s solipsism and vanity. 
In this savvy rendition, the Afghans are situated as the subjects rather 
than the objects of the gaze, marveling at, and judging in various ways, 
members of this humanitarian cohort, as well as lusting after them, flirting 
with them, manipulating them, educating them, and protecting them from 
various dangers.2 
The film comes on the heels of several other cultural texts that describe 
the humanitarian cohort that flocked to Afghanistan in the aftermath 
of the US-led invasion and sought to take advantage of the billions of 
dollars in reconstruction money pledged by the international community. 
The most notable of them include French illustrator Nicolas Wild’s Kabul 
Disco graphic novel series (2009–2013)—a humorous portrayal of a cross-
culturally incompetent graphic designer’s (presumably, the author) residency 
in Kabul. In similar vein, Kim Barker’s memoir The Taliban Shuffle (2011), 
which served as an inspiration for Fey’s film, uses comedy to portray her 
misadventures in the Afghan capital as she navigates her first assignment 
as a foreign correspondent. These self-deprecating texts deploy humor, 
rather than humanitarian imagery, to portray life in Kabul, and refuse to 
take their narrators’ work too seriously—the designer in Wild’s series, for 
instance, is not very successful, either in France or in Afghanistan. When 
compared to their agile, multilingual Afghan guides and fixers, members 
of the international cohort in these texts seem ill-adapted, lacking in skill 
as well as in purpose, skeptical about their role in Afghanistan but not 
having much going on back in their austerity-stricken home countries 
either. These narratives portray “Kabubble” as a theater of the absurd, 
where self-professed humanitarians from the global North congregate in 
temporary walled-off communities to compete for a piece of the pie in 
the transnational job market (that now includes Afghanistan). These texts 
thus are reflective of the later stages of the US-led war in Afghanistan; 
they mine the disparity between the rhetoric of humanitarianism (such 
as the perceived need to save Afghan women) and the harsh realities of 
neoliberalism that prompt Western professionals’ flight to a war zone in 
search for job opportunities.
It is from this perspective that I will revisit, in this chapter, the early 
days of the War on Terror and cultural texts that emerged around 2001–
2002. Quite consistently, with some variation across genres, in these early 
representations, Kabul figures as a humanitarian disaster: a nonspecific 
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zone of suffering that requires an intervention from the West—a landscape 
of suffering so extreme that it becomes sublime. Understanding these early 
texts’ deep investment in unequivocally benevolent humanitarianism as a 
mode of global engagement as well as as a mode of writing and screening 
traumatic histories will allow us to trace a trajectory of the global West’s 
learning, disillusionment, and self-critique from 2001 through the second 
decade of the 9/11 wars. 
The Onset: Operation Enduring Freedom 
Corinne Fowler calls the time following the start of Operation Enduring 
Freedom in the fall of 2001 the period of a “scramble for knowledge on 
Afghanistan” pointing to the lack of public knowledge about the distant 
country with which the West was now at war (23). This chapter deals 
with the cultural texts that, while written and produced just prior to 9/11, 
were destined to fill the void of knowledge about Afghanistan—a country 
that was suddenly propelled into media hypervisibility on a global scale. 
While mass media offered gripping, albeit decontextualized images—of 
the Taliban, of ruined buildings in Kabul, of burqa-clad women, and of 
orphaned Afghan children begging in the streets—available literary and 
cinematic texts were called upon to perform a much finer task: to educate 
the Western audience about the country’s recent history, thus making the 
images circulated by mass media legible. However, there was little cultural 
material of this sort available. Since the withdrawal of the Soviets from 
Afghanistan in 1989, and with the subsequent collapse of the Afghan state 
and the civil war that led to the rise of the Taliban in 1996, Afghanistan 
was a dark void, entirely outside of global attention. Feminist playwright 
Eve Ensler, who traveled to Afghanistan in 1999, tried to start public dis-
cussion of Afghan women’s plight, but her efforts were stymied by the lack 
of public curiosity: “With the exception of one magazine, Marie Claire, I 
could not engender any interest in the story,” Ensler complained later (36). 
The events of September 2001 changed everything. 
Just after the attacks on the Twin Towers, two works about 
Afghanistan were available and thus in great demand—the film Kandahar 
by Iranian film director Mohsen Makhmalbaf and Tony Kushner’s play 
Homebody/ Kabul. Kandahar was produced in 2001 and premiered at the 
Cannes Film Festival in May 2001. It did not receive much attention 
prior to 9/11; subsequently, however, this minor flick became a runaway 
hit. In December 2001, a New York Times reviewer stated that Kandahar 
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“may be the only film whose name gets more mentions than Harry Potter 
on CNN.”3 It was listed in Time magazine as one of 100 all-time mov-
ies.4 Kushner’s play Homebody/Kabul has a similar history. While it was 
written over the course of a few years (1997–2001), it premiered in New 
York on December 19, 2001, ten weeks after the start of the US-led 
military operation in Afghanistan, and in the words of one critic, “gen-
erated enormous publicity for its political topicality and the playwright’s 
uncanny ability to anticipate history.”5 It was published as a book in 2002. 
Post-9/11, Kandahar and Homebody/Kabul often appeared side-by-side. 
In 2003, for instance, Seattle’s Intiman Theater hosted a screening of 
Kandahar after staging Kushner’s play.6 Both texts thus greatly benefited 
from a certain kairos—a fortuitous moment of media frenzy and public 
curiosity sparked by a distant war. That fall, phrases such as “the battle 
for Kandahar” (the Taliban’s stronghold) and “the fall of Kabul” were 
on everyone’s minds. The third cultural text I engage with in this chap-
ter—Yasmina Khadra’s The Swallows of Kabul—was released in 2002 in 
French with the explicit aim of familiarizing the Western audience with 
the tragedy of Afghanistan. The author of the novel—a former Algerian 
army officer named Mohammed Moulessehoul, took a female pen name, 
allegedly to avoid censorship by the army. He says, in relation to The 
Swallows: “I wanted to bring a new look from a Muslim on the tragedy of 
Afghanistan, and to bring to it a western perspective at the same time—I 
have written a western tragedy, but also a book that is filled with eastern 
storytelling.”7 
In line with the title of this book, the makers of these cultural 
texts engage in the act of imagining Afghanistan from their particular 
geo-cultural perspectives. All three texts were produced in the era of 
Afghanistan’s relative inaccessibility to foreigners. Kandahar was shot in 
its entirety outside of Afghanistan, in Iran along the Iran-Afghanistan 
border. Neither Kushner nor Moulessehoul (a.k.a. Khadra) traveled to 
Afghanistan, and thus had to defend their credibility by engaging with this 
question when talking to journalists: “I have never been to Afghanistan 
but I met a lot of journalists who worked there who told me that they read 
the book and said, ‘I see these incidents all the time, but I never noted 
them,’” said Moulessehoul.8 In turn, Kushner defended his credibility 
with “it’s not the easiest place to get to, after all”9 and “there was no need 
for me to be in the middle of a war.”10 Positioned not only as outsiders, 
but entirely outside the country they attempt to portray, these authors 
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thus rely less on observation and experience than on conventions guiding 
representation of zones of conflict and humanitarian crisis. Specifically, 
they draw upon the legacy of human rights literature—a body of works 
that emerged in the 1990s and relied heavily on empathy—a sentimental 
mode of reading that depends on the reader’s imaginary identification with 
the suffering other.11 Aware of their role as readers’ guides into unknown 
cultural territory, Kandahar, The Swallows of Kabul, and Homebody/Kabul 
deploy powerful, often hyperbolic images of distant suffering focusing 
on the long-lasting humanitarian crisis that preceded the US invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001. These stories functioned, in a way, as a prequel to 
the liberation narrative associated with the invasion. Specifically, all three 
texts expose the stark poverty of 1990s Afghanistan, the plight of women, 
and human rights violations under Taliban rule. As such, these texts were 
promptly conscripted into the post-9/11 media ecology that centered on 
framing and justifying the US invasion of Afghanistan as a humanitarian 
effort. The narrative scaffolding of these three works relies on the trope of 
rescue—specifically, a rescue of a woman from the grips of death for which 
the Taliban regime is held responsible. 
All three texts are NATO-centric: although Makhmalbaf, the direc-
tor of Kandahar, is Iranian, Nelofer Pazira, who plays the lead role in 
Kandahar and on whose story the plot of the film is based, is an Afghan 
Canadian. In addition, as film scholar Mark Graham explains, Iranian 
cinema is produced for global consumption, which results in “a careful 
tailoring of stories and images to appeal to Western audiences’ precon-
ceived notions” (65). Such films’ destination—the Western film festival 
circuit—means that “[a]ny politically sensitive issues that might offend 
Western viewers tend to be carefully excised in the cause of higher profit 
and greater distribution” (65).12 Khadra is of Algerian origin; however, 
he resides in France and his audience for this novel was unmistakably 
European.13 Kushner is an American playwright who during the 1980s 
supported Reagan’s anti-communist intervention in Afghanistan.14 Taken 
together, these three cultural texts became part of the moral assemblage 
that provided a context for, justified, and made legible the US-led coali-
tion’s operation in Afghanistan as an ethically necessary humanitarian 
endeavor—and more specifically, a mission to rescue Afghan women from 
the grips of an intolerable life under a repressive regime. Or as Laura Bush 
said, famously, “The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and 
dignity of women.”15 
26 IMAGINING AFGHANISTAN
The ways in which women’s rights were co-opted by the George W. 
Bush administration to justify the invasion of Afghanistan have been well 
documented by feminist critics and I will not reiterate these critiques here.16 
Instead, I will bring into the foreground what remains rather hidden in 
these timely and insightful critiques. Taking as a point of departure Didier 
Fassin’s critique of humanitarian reason, I posit the three texts discussed 
in this chapter as acts of deployment of a humanitarian imaginary—a 
repertoire of images and tropes that came to define the way in which we 
were (and still are) invited to imagine global engagement in the aftermath 
of the Cold War’s end. It is critical, in my view, to understand the human-
itarian imaginary as a symptom and as a symbol of what Enzo Traverso 
calls “Left melancholia”—a sense of hopelessness and unlocalizable despair 
that accompanied the demise of the socialist world, experienced even by 
those who generally supported this demise. The focus on Afghanistan—a 
country that is universally referred to as “third world,” but that was in fact, 
during its key era, a part of the second (socialist) world, provides us with a 
lens with which to sharpen, through localizing, our understanding of the 
logic and limitations of the humanitarian (or human rights) narrative as 
well as its imbrications with post-Cold War impasses. 
I propose the term “humanitarian sublime” to designate the specific 
mode of representation all three texts employ. Humanitarian sublime is 
an act of freezing an image of suffering by removing it from the historical 
process that brought it on. Subtracting history from the scene sediments 
a timeless figure of despair that then depends on a hyperbolic mode 
of representation to have effect. While Kandahar and The Swallows of 
Kabul demonstrate a wholehearted investment in the conventions of the 
humanitarian narrative, creating a moral universe where the reader/viewer 
is invited to feel compassion toward the suffering other and outrage at 
the perpetrators of violence, Kushner’s Homebody/Kabul problematizes 
humanitarian sentiments and offers a critique of humanitarianism as a 
mode of relating to distant tragedy. Yet, while exposing and critiquing 
the limits of “the pedagogy of pity”17 that is a hallmark of the post-
Cold War liberal empathy project, Kushner’s play remains trapped 
inside the humanitarian imaginary, unwittingly reenacting the tropes 
of humanitarianism. His text can be said to suffer from a humanitarian 
unconscious and thus performs the same role as the other two—creating 
a victim and an object of humanitarian intervention. As such, all three 
texts illustrate the particular impasses of the post-Cold War cultural 
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obsessions with human rights—they bring into visibility the suffering of 
distant others without being able to name its causes or point to solutions. 
They suffer paradoxical amnesias and aphasias when engaging Afghan 
socialist histories and thus prefer to bracket them out. They do not yet have 
a language in which to talk about the US role in creating the conditions in 
which forces such as the Taliban were able to thrive. In sum, they already 
are in the double-bind, or the Faustian bargain, that will become most 
vivid in the works of best-selling Afghan American physician-turned-
writer Khaled Hosseini, which I analyze in chapter two. 
Humanitarian Narrative 
Operation Enduring Freedom officially began on October 7, 2001; posi-
tioned more broadly as the global War on Terror, it started as a US-led 
military operation to invade Afghanistan with the purpose of removing the 
Taliban regime, striking at the territorial base of the Al-Qaeda network, 
and installing a US-friendly client democracy. The invasion of Afghanistan 
was presented by the US government as a humanitarian act—a concerted 
effort to free Afghan people from the suffering and oppression they endured 
under the Taliban rule. This “humanitarian” war was to become a model 
for the many invasions and interventions of the subsequent two decades, 
in which military aims were made indistinguishable from humanitarian 
aims. Indisputably, humanitarian images disseminated in fiction and film 
proved useful as they played a key role in legitimizing such efforts. 
As Joseph R. Slaughter points out in Human Rights, Inc., the very act of 
reading a human rights novel can be construed as a kind of a humanitarian 
intervention in itself, preempting and foreshadowing a fair international 
order “still to come” by recognizing the rights and dignity of the charac-
ters who endure suffering (33–34). The decade preceding the 9/11 attacks 
can be dubbed the era of human rights (and the high point for the human 
rights novel) insofar as it saw a proliferation of stories that made distant 
suffering their central focus. Didier Fassin describes the period spanning 
from mid-1990s to mid-2000s as “the humanitarian moment in contem-
porary history” (13). It is not coincidental that human rights discourse 
gained traction as a moral framework in the wake of the collapse of the 
communist bloc. “Human rights finally triumphed in 1989,” states Costas 
Douzinas in his critical account of what he calls “human rights imperial-
ism” (32). Fraught with contradictions, the humanitarian imaginary as it 
manifests today is a distinctly post-Cold War phenomenon, ripening in 
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the era characterized by disillusionment and the waning of equality-based 
projects spearheaded by socialism.18 It is noteworthy that Richard Rorty’s 
influential essay in praise of empathy (as a preferred mode of relating to 
the “other”) was published in 1993—two years after the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union and the same year as Samuel Huntington’s provocative 
and widely cited “The Clash of Civilizations”—an essay that foretells the 
coming of the era of inter-civilizational wars—was published in Foreign 
Affairs. There is a connection there, as well as a link to Francis Fukuyama’s 
1989 thesis about the end of history: The clash of civilizations produces 
suffering, but because history has ended, there is nothing that can be done 
about it, aside from the more fortunate ones offering humanitarian aid to 
(and empathizing with) the victims of suffering. After the end of history, 
transnational empathy replaces comradeship—a relation of solidarity in 
the common struggle. In the ideological vacuum spurred by the break-
down of the USSR (which Odd Arne Westad calls the “empire of justice” 
because of its commitment to eliminating economic and social injustice) 
that had rivaled the United States (or the “empire of liberty”), the language 
of human rights promised to offer a new moral framework capable of cre-
ating vectors of connection across lines of difference. 
It is commonplace now for critical thinkers to underscore that while 
humanitarianism has a border-defying impulse that seems to be orthogonal 
to the logic of the clash of civilizations, it also maintains, often explic-
itly, that the separations and inequalities that define the globe today are 
inevitable. Luc Boltanski, whose field-defining book Distant Suffering also 
appeared in print (in French) in 1993, notes that the politics of pity, which 
form the basis of remedial humanitarian action, involves clear lines of such 
separation.19 A distant spectator becomes a witness to suffering occur-
ring elsewhere while herself being untouched by this suffering, aside from 
the feeling of pity itself. This act of humanitarian spectatorship thus cuts 
differential lines across humanity, as it involves “observation of the unfor-
tunate by those who do not share their suffering, who do not experience 
it directly and who, as such, may be regarded as fortunate or lucky people” 
(Boltanski, 3, emphasis in original). Similarly, Fassin, in his Humanitarian 
Reason offers a Foucauldian view of humanitarianism as a mode of affective 
governance. While subtended by the idea of radical equality between all 
humans, humanitarianism, he contends, preserves hierarchies of humanity, 
and instead of seeking to eliminate injustice, offers aid to merely palliate 
the suffering of the subjects construed as victims. Fassin writes: 
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in contemporary societies, where inequalities have reached an unprec-
edented level, humanitarianism elicits the fantasy of a global moral 
community that may still be viable and the expectation that solidarity 
may have redeeming powers. (xiii) 
Unlike comradeship, it should be noted, solidarity espoused by humani-
tarianism is a weak, attenuated form of solidarity: humanitarians seek to 
remedy extreme forms of suffering (through charity) without addressing 
the causes of injustice (such as global economic inequality, for instance) 
and without destabilizing the widely criticized hierarchies of humanity.20 
Signaling the end of utopian politics, post-Cold War humanitarianism 
and the humanitarian imaginary that accompanies it heralds the advent 
of liberal “capitalist realism” that concedes that things are as they are and 
that there are no alternatives to the existing world order.21 It thus harbors 
within itself deep pessimism, disavowed, however, through a mobiliza-
tion of affect—specifically, empathy toward a distant other that creates a 
sense of imagined community, even communion, with the suffering world. 
Humanitarian reason’s central paradox is that while conjuring vectors of 
identification across lines of difference, it serves to sustain the regimes of 
what I call humanitarian containment—keeping the suffering other at bay, 
and more generally, keeping both the victim and the sympathetic observer 
in their proper places. 
This book argues that while circa 2001 writers and filmmakers under-
stood and depicted Afghanistan almost exclusively through a humanitarian 
mode, the allure of human rights rhetoric began to wane considerably in 
the second decade of the 9/11 wars, when the horrific failures of the two 
US-led wars (in Afghanistan and in Iraq) that were framed as humanitar-
ian interventions became widely understood. The implosion of Iraq and 
the stalemate in Afghanistan following these interventions has shaken 
the liberal belief in human rights and humanitarianism as a vehicle for 
alleviating suffering, bringing into view the many tensions and paradoxes 
of humanitarianism as a moral framework.22 The Afghanistan corpus of 
cultural texts thus serves as one of the prime examples of the humanitarian 
imaginary while also indexing this imaginary’s progressive fracturing and 
destabilization. The three texts discussed below emerge in the cultural 
context of the human rights era and exemplify its paradoxes as they seek to 
portray the country that they all assert, in various ways, has been forgotten 
by the world: Taliban-era Afghanistan. In these texts, humanitarianism 
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figures as the dominant framework for global action, and empathy serves 
as the moral response par excellence to distant suffering. The discussion 
of these texts will serve as a starting point for tracing the specific limita-
tions of the humanitarian imaginary, and for bringing into view its deep 
embeddedness in the post-Cold War melancholia and its many impasses. 
This discussion is also key if we are to understand the ways in which 
writers, critics, filmmakers, and other cultural producers try to navigate 
these impasses and double-binds as they begin to write their way out of 
the humanitarian imaginary during the second decade of the 9/11 wars. 
Humanitarian Sublime 
Kandahar opens with an image of a solar eclipse that fills the screen 
ominously, the black disk indexing the unnatural quality of what will be 
represented in the film. It is followed by an image of a woman facing the 
camera in a burqa—the protagonist—who then lifts the burqa to reveal her 
face and state her name. The conjoining of the eclipse and the burqa-clad 
figure conjures a metaphoric equivalence of the solar eclipse lifting to reveal 
the sun and the lifting of the burqa to reveal the identity of the woman 
hidden beneath. The voiceover explains that the protagonist—an Afghan-
born journalist living in Canada—is traveling to Afghanistan to save her 
sister who tragically was left behind when the family was escaping the 
country years prior. Set on committing suicide on the day of the last solar 
eclipse of the twentieth century, the protagonist’s sister in her letter blames 
the horrific conditions endured by Afghan women under the Taliban for 
her resolve to end her life, urging her more fortunate sibling to enjoy 
her life in the West, cherishing the freedoms she is allotted. A narrative 
of an attempted rescue, Kandahar thus equates the Taliban’s oppression 
of women to a solar eclipse—positioning it as a temporary yet horrific 
humanitarian crisis to be relieved by outside intervention, suggesting that 
women’s liberation will follow the Taliban’s fall just as the sunlight is 
restored when the eclipse ends. Via this sequence, the viewer is conscripted 
into desiring to grant visibility to the burqa-clad characters—the desire 
that is articulated by the aphorism issued by the American doctor who the 
protagonist meets later in the film: “For a woman living under full cover 
hope is the day she’ll be seen.”23 
Immediately after the opening, a new sequence features a Red 
Cross helicopter flying low above what appears to be a small refugee 
camp at a desert site. On the ground, miniature figures recognizable 
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as people missing limbs are seen running on crutches toward the 
helicopter as it passes over them, making it seem as if the helicopter 
missed its aim. The next shot, however, reveals the purpose of the 
flight: prosthetic legs of various shapes and sizes have been dropped 
on parachutes in singles and pairs. The camera lingers on the image 
of the parachuted prosthetics descending—a peaceful image against a 
clear blue sky—before showing again the people on the ground in a 
race toward them. The scene thus congeals into a humanitarian image: 
a glimpse of suffering on the ground to be relieved, via distance, by an 
aid package; a distant lack corrected through foreign assistance. This 
Figure 1.1. Kandahar’s opening images.
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scene metonymically constructs Afghanistan as a body with missing 
parts, as a site of dismemberment and privation, while inserting into the 
frame a humanitarian apparatus designed to provide a remedy, a way of 
filling this lack. The film unfolds in this idiom, offering the figure of 
helper (a humanitarian) as a proxy for the viewer, thus mediating the 
viewer’s access to the site of suffering. 
The film offers a number of these helper figures. In the opening scenes 
at a refugee camp, humanitarian workers educate the children about the 
dangers of landmines, distribute dollar bills, take photographs of the 
refugee families, and instruct them on the value of keeping hope alive. 
Other helpers include the Red Cross nurses who distribute the prosthetic 
limbs delivered by the helicopter to those waiting, and an American “doc-
tor”24—a former jihad fighter who stayed in Afghanistan to help the needy 
after the jihadists’ victory over the communists. All of these characters are 
one-dimensional figures defined entirely by their function as donors. They 
distribute money, dispense medication, offer food to the starving—with-
out wanting or needing anything back. Most importantly, the protagonist 
(called Nafas) herself is a humanitarian proxy; the film follows her journey 
from an Afghan refugee camp in Iran into Afghanistan in a desperate 
attempt to reach Kandahar before the solar eclipse to prevent her sister, 
Diana, from committing suicide. 
The role of spectacle in conjuring humanitarian response to distant 
suffering is key.25 To paraphrase Laura Mulvey who wrote, famously, that 
sadism requires a story, one can argue that humanitarianism requires a 
scene to render distant (and thus abstract) suffering proximate and con-
crete through putting a suffering body to work, telling the story of its 
misfortune and displaying its wounds. Luc Boltanski observes: “Pity is 
not inspired by generalities . . . a picture of absolute poverty defined by 
means of quantitative indicators” will not inspire this sentiment (11). He 
continues, “To arouse pity, suffering and wretched bodies must be con-
veyed in such a way as to affect the sensibility of those more fortunate” (11). 
Suffering, in other words, must be exhibited, made scenic; distant atrocity 
viewed from above has to become a tragedy unfolding in a close-up take 
on the ground. Makhmalbaf ’s film offers the viewer precisely this close 
view. First, disguised as one of the wives of a returning refugee family and 
later accompanied by various other guides, Nafas journeys through the 
devastated terrain, proffering a cornucopia of humanitarian scenes to the 
audience, along with dispensing dollar bills to the locals. Although she 
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fails to reach her destination, she is reintroduced to the land she left behind 
many years prior, getting a firsthand view of the unimaginable poverty, 
devastation, hunger, and despair of Taliban-era Afghanistan. The film 
conjures a “humanitarian triangulation” (Slaughter’s term)—a structure 
common in a humanitarian narrative, where the protagonist serves as an 
aucteur, a proxy figure who mediates between the suffering characters and 
the spectator who observes them.26 Positioned as capable of both observ-
ing and acting (relieving some of the suffering observed), the aucteur’s 
function is to compensate for the viewer’s necessary passivity; in addition, 
the aucteur’s selflessness serves to assure the reader of the moral nature 
of partaking in the spectacle. In Kandahar, Nafas is presented as utterly 
selfless and willing to sacrifice everything to save her sister. As the opening 
scenes document her flying into the Afghan refugee camp on the Iranian 
frontier, we hear the voiceover: “I’d always escaped from the jails that 
enslave an Afghan woman. But now I am a captive in every one of those 
prisons, and only for you, my sister.” 
The plot of Kandahar is thin and seems to be an excuse for staging a 
spectacle of extreme suffering in a place that is entirely unfit for living. The 
film delivers a cascade of scenes of ruination and human misery. After the 
refugee family Nafas travels with is robbed of all their meager possessions 
and decides to return to Iran, she is left to fend for herself, having to rely 
on incompetent or reluctant guides: a young illiterate boy she hires, the 
“doctor,” and a poor disabled man who suggests they both join the pro-
cession of burqa-clad women on their way to a wedding in Kandahar—a 
suggestion that results in them being discovered by the Taliban, bringing 
their journey to an inconclusive end. Most of the scenes featuring Afghan 
characters seem sloppily choreographed and convey a sense of artificiality 
as they employ a slew of figures who move around each site in a somewhat 
circular fashion, creating an impression of purposeless frenzy. While the 
protagonist supposedly advances in the direction of Kandahar, the scenery— 
desert—remains unchanged and the same background of distant mud 
houses is presented several times over. While this visual paucity and 
monotony most probably results from the crew shooting the entire film 
in the same location on the deserted stretch along the Iran-Afghanistan 
border, it creates an aesthetic in which the frenzied movement of bodies has 
to compensate for the landscape’s and the plot’s monotony. This seemingly 
circular motion also serves to further solidify an atmosphere of entrapment 
evoked by the storyline. 
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It is not coincidental that the film presents Afghanistan as culturally 
and geographically isolated, rather than as the geopolitical hotspot that it 
has been since the days of the Cold War. Surveying the piles of rubble and 
debris that make up the setting of the film, its dust and visual dreariness, 
it is hard to imagine this country as the site of the epic battle between 
socialism and capitalism—the battle in which the state-of-the-art Soviet 
helicopter met with the slick and compact US-developed and sponsored 
anti-aircraft Stinger missile, wielded by the jihad fighters who often came 
from lands far from Afghanistan. As Edward Girardet and Jonathan 
Walter observe, “no country in the modern era has been the victim of such 
outright foreign interference by superpowers and its regional neighbors as 
Afghanistan” (16). Afghanistan’s landscape still contains ample evidence 
of this global conflict, with new layers superimposed. Kandahar steers 
clear of this global history almost entirely, as addressing it would take the 
viewer’s attention away from the realm of affect (compassion toward the 
suffering Afghans) to stir up uncomfortable questions of culpability and 
global interconnectedness, which would implicate the Western viewer into 
the scene of crisis. By refusing to do so, the film is unable to enter into an 
ethical milieu, remaining instead in the rigidly defined moral universe of 
humanitarianism.27
Yet the film’s reluctance to engage with the history of the crisis 
presented on the screen means that a certain perspective is sold to the 
viewer implicitly. Specifically, the viewer’s perspective is most closely 
aligned with the two westerners who mediate our access to the site of 
suffering: Nafas herself and the African American “doctor,” Tabib Sahib. 
This humanitarian “doctor” is a former mujahid—a mercenary who came 
to Afghanistan from the United States to kill communists (or “to find 
God,” as he proclaims in the film). The actor who plays the doctor is a 
profoundly controversial figure. David Theodore Belfield (a.k.a. Dawud 
Salahuddin, a.k.a. Hassan Tantai)—a North Carolina native who 
converted to Islam at age eighteen—assassinated an Iranian politician 
in 1980 in his Maryland home, on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
subsequently fleeing to Iran to escape arrest.28 In the 1980s, Belfield 
went to Afghanistan to join the jihad against the “godless” socialist state. 
Nelofer Pazira, who plays Nafas in the film and on whose family story 
the plot of the film is based, was herself an active participant in the anti-
communist jihad movement in the 1980s, as she describes in her memoir, 
A Bed of Red Flowers, written after the film was made. Thus, although 
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the socialist era is not discussed at all in the film, anti-communism 
subtends the film in subtle but powerful ways, by aligning the perspective 
of the viewer with these two westerners—an African American-turned-
Islamist-fighter and a jihad enthusiast who later immigrated to Canada. 
The victory of the radical Islamist movement over the “godless” socialist 
state in 1992, however, brought forth precisely the crisis the film exposes: 
the collapse of the state infrastructure and the patriarchal restoration 
of women’s subjugation embodied in the burqa—four years prior to the 
arrival of the Taliban in 1996. The particular melancholy exhibited in 
the film is the one of victors—with the Afghan socialist state defeated, 
humanitarianism seems to be the only way of ameliorating the resulting 
crisis, and the global West figures as the only imaginable site of progress 
and liberation. 
Both Makhmalbaf ’s and Pazira’s accounts of filming Kandahar shed 
light on the paradoxical position of what one could call a “humanitarian 
filmmaker.” In his essay “Buddha Was Not Demolished in Afghanistan, 
It Collapsed out of Shame,” Makhmalbaf describes the process of filming 
Kandahar, as well as the difficulties associated with accessing Afghanistan 
during the Taliban rule. Makhmalbaf ’s initial approach was to enlist the 
help of the United Nations. The film director contacted Bangladesh native 
Dr. Kamal Hossain, at the time the UN special rapporteur (adviser) on 
Afghanistan, for help with obtaining permissions from the Taliban gov-
ernment, as well as with getting access to the areas not under Taliban’s 
control—ideas to which Dr. Hossein was receptive. However, Taliban 
officials repeatedly refused to grant Makhmalbaf permission to film 
in Afghanistan, in spite of the director’s insistence that his “subject is 
humanitarian, not political” and that his subjects would be the victims 
of starvation and drought, not of the regime (Makhmalbaf, “Buddha”). 
Perhaps these Taliban officials wisely ruled that humanitarianism is always 
political. To Makhmalbaf ’s plea that he needed to make visible the victims 
of hunger, the officials replied that there were “2.5 million Afghans in Iran. 
Why not film them?” (Makhmalbaf, “Buddha”). The crew then resigned to 
shooting the film in Niatak, a refugee camp in Iran, where, indeed, many 
Afghans were starving. 
However, this too was fraught with difficulties. Pazira’s account of 
filming Kandahar in A Bed of Red Flowers provides further details on the 
humanitarian filmmaker’s paradoxical positioning. A passing presence, 
the crew cannot change the lives of the refugee families they encounter— 
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and try to employ—as they are shooting the film. Pazira recounts con-
siderable difficulties associated with finding actors for the movie, as the 
refugees were resistant to the crew’s requests and promises. She describes 
the problem with actors showing up for a few days of shooting but then 
defecting and expresses her frustration in having to track them down and 
plead with them to return:
Sado [a young boy] is upset and doesn’t want to work with us anymore. 
Mullah Qader manages to convince him to finish the sequence. Sado 
is making more money by working with us than by crossing the border 
[selling dates], but he is unhappy, he says. “You’ll leave,” he contem-
plates, “and I’ll have to deal with the insults.” The pressure from people 
in the community—who are at best ignorant and at worst jealous—is 
very strong. (309) 
Makhmalbaf similarly describes difficulties the crew experiences when 
trying to convince the refugee community to participate in their project. 
He writes: 
Once when we had asked an Afghan woman to be in the film, her 
husband said: “Are we unchaste to expose our wives?” I told him that 
we would film his wife with her burqa on but he said that the audience 
knew that it was a woman under the burqa and that would be unchas-
tity. (Makhmalbaf, “Buddha”)
The humanitarian filmmakers thus have to contend with the fact that their 
cameras are as invasive as they are ephemeral. The tension between the 
crew and the refugee community highlights the disconnect between the 
reality of daily suffering in the refugee camp brought forth through a his-
torical process, on the one hand, and the spectacle of suffering manifested 
in the film, on the other. It also posits the uncomfortable question of the 
crew’s exploitation of the suffering bodies—the question neither Pazira nor 
Makhmalbaf are able to fully articulate in their accounts on the production 
of the film. Pazira’s memoir makes evident, however, that it is clear to the 
prospective film actors that the filmmakers will shoot their scenes, pack up 
their equipment, and leave their subjects behind, on their way to Cannes, 
to Canada, and to the world, taking the spectacle of suffering with them, 
while the world of the refugees will remain unchanged. 
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Pazira describes several attempts made by the crew to intervene, which 
are as futile as they are random. On one occasion, the filmmakers buy food 
for the starving families they find in the ruins of an abandoned building. 
The sight of them will haunt the crew for a while, but ultimately, they 
are unable to help as they are a temporary fixture in this landscape, and 
because they have to keep on filming. “Please leave us in peace,” pleads the 
father of a girl selected to play a role in the film. “Please let us be” (303). 
Actors join in for a day or two, but fail to return to the set, leaving the crew 
to have to contend with wasted footage. Pazira can’t help but blame the 
community for being jealous and the actors who fail to return to the set for 
being unreasonable—after all, they are making money on the set—a spec-
tacle for dollar bills, a story for sympathy. Pazira’s account, unwittingly, 
betrays a crucial bit of information: The community is resistant to the 
filming project and payment is not a sufficient incentive for engagement, 
which is in tension with the plot of the film, where, when the protagonist 
proffers her dollar bills, the characters cooperate. 
The film culminates in a scene of humanitarian sublime—a vivid dis-
play of choreographed suffering that dramatizes the central contradiction 
of humanitarianism—the conflict between the immensity of need and the 
insufficiency of assistance. The scene takes place at a Red Cross station—a 
few tents in the desert—staffed by two Eastern-European nurses who 
appear exhausted and desperate, besieged by a crowd of people needing 
medical help. The camera offers close-ups of the injuries displayed to nurses 
by the exasperated patients—Afghan men who lost their limbs to land-
mines—accompanied by the soundscape of overlapping voices narrating 
the experience of suffering: “I haven’t slept in months,” one man complains. 
“There are no legs, no medication,” complains another. “It hurts all the 
time,” echoes a third man. The nurses examine the wounds, ask how bad 
the pain is, and explain that the men will have to wait for up to a year for 
an available prosthesis. 
This scene then erupts into comedic relief as the patients spot a Red 
Cross helicopter flying above them, which prompts them to move toward 
it. In a sequence that mirrors the scene at the beginning of the film, the 
viewer is treated to a choreography of mutilated bodies that appear to be 
moving synchronously, as if dancing, in their race for succor. Unable to 
run, the disabled men hop awkwardly up and down, looking up to the sky 
from which prosthetic legs are descending, their dance accompanied by a 
quickening musical tune. The image of parachuted legs that captivates and 
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mobilizes the men on the ground is as obscene as it is sublime. Allegorizing 
Afghanistan’s post-Cold War relation to the global North, the ruined 
bodies on the ground dance for the viewer as they are waiting to receive 
aid, while the prosthetics—a figure for humanitarian assistance—descend 
slowly—too slowly—against the backdrop of the beautiful, peaceful sky. 
The concrete image of the parachuted prosthetics—captivating yet insuffi-
cient and always too late—also can be said to represent, as in the Kantian 
version of the dynamic sublime, the failure of imagination to grasp the 
magnitude of suffering, thus bringing its immensity into the foreground. 
By viewing the choreography of need and aid, and their incommensurabil-
ity, the spectator indulges in a sense of humanitarian sublime—a negative 
pleasure in which the spectator has to come to terms with her ineptitude 
while recognizing herself a part of the moral community of viewers who 
feel eager to help yet equally powerless in the face of enormous suffering. 
The Aesthetics of Enclosure 
Akin to Kandahar, The Swallows of Kabul is a novel steeped in the human-
itarian imaginary: while staging the conditions that enable an affective 
resonance between the victim and the reader, the author erects boundar-
ies that limit such identification. Published in 2002 in French under the 
female pen name Yasmina Khadra, the novel was written by Mohammed 
Moulessehoul, an Algerian army officer who claims to have taken his wife’s 
name as a pen name to avoid censorship. As Moulessehoul explains, The 
Swallows was the first novel in a trilogy in which he sought to explore the 
key issues that plague the contemporary world. Set, respectively, in Kabul, 
Tel Aviv, and Baghdad, this trio of novels portrays the landscape of reli-
gious extremism and repression, examines East and West tensions, and 
investigates the causes of terrorism and violence. The trilogy, according to 
the author, is set to correct “the tremendous ignorance in the West about 
Arab and Islamic culture.”29 An English translation of The Swallows was 
published in the United States in 2004, following the dizzying success of 
Khaled Hosseini’s The Kite Runner in 2003. As in Kandahar, the plot of The 
Swallows is set in the Taliban era, exploring the near complete breakdown 
of social relations and the plight of women under their rule. 
In the early post-9/11 context, the novel was well positioned to 
become a didactic text through which Western readers would learn about 
Afghanistan. Upon its publication in France, the novel, no doubt, bene-
fited from the public believing it to have been written by a woman, which 
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may have positioned it as a feminist critique of the Taliban coming from 
the Arab world. The novel’s plot follows two couples—a barely literate 
Taliban jailor, Atiq, and his terminally ill wife, Musarrat, and Mohsen and 
Zunaira, educated, former middle-class residents of Kabul who suffer the 
loss of status, the daily humiliation of poverty, and a sense of hopelessness 
under the Taliban regime. Zunaira, a champion of women’s rights who 
aspired to be a magistrate in the past, suffers bitterly from the removal of 
rights and what she sees as the utter denigration of women as a group under 
the Taliban. When she is accused of her husband’s murder (his death is an 
accident but occurs while the two have a fight) and is about to suffer the 
Figure 1.2. Humanitarian sublime in Kandahar.
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utmost punishment—death by stoning—she is saved by Atiq’s dying wife, 
who, seeking to speed up her own death, volunteers to take Zunaira’s place. 
Concealed within their burqas, the two women’s interchangeable identities 
prove to be an asset in carrying out this ploy and Zunaira’s life is saved. 
The central image of a woman’s stoning in the novel reflects the post-
9/11 interest in featuring the Taliban’s violence against women both as a 
casus belli and raison d’être of the international community’s presence in 
Afghanistan.30 There was little interest in Afghan women’s plight under 
the Taliban prior to 9/11. Fowler observes that, in the aftermath of 9/11, 
there was a sudden increase in international attention and interest in the 
documents compiled by the Revolutionary Association of the Women 
of Afghanistan (RAWA)—an organization in existence since 1977. She 
reports: 
a RAWA film, posted on the association’s website, of a woman being 
executed in Kabul Stadium was offered to media outlets two years pre-
viously, including the BBC and CNN, but it was turned down on the 
grounds that it was too shocking to show to news audiences. After 
September the 11, however, the Pentagon took the film from the web-
site without permission, and brought it into the public domain to justify 
military action against Afghanistan. (191) 
This was the same footage, shot secretly by Freshta, a RAWA member, that 
feminist playwright Eve Ensler brought back to the United States from 
Afghanistan in 2000. “No one could understand [back then] what the 
terrible plight of Afghan women had to do with their own interest, their 
own comfort and security,” Ensler writes (36). As Carol A. Stabile and 
Deepa Kumar remark, “until Afghan women proved rhetorically useful, 
their tragic circumstances merited little coverage in the mainstream media” 
(771). They also report that only fifteen newspaper articles on Afghan 
women appeared in media in the period between January 1, 2000, and 
September 11, 2001 (eighteen months). By contrast, ninety-three such arti-
cles appeared between September 11, 2001, and January 1, 2002 (six times 
more in three months than in the eighteen months). The contrast in broad-
cast programs is even more telling: thirty-three programs in the period 
between January 1, 2000, and September 11, 2001 (eighteen months), 
as compared with a staggering 628 broadcasts in the three months after 
September 11 (771–772). 
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On the cusp of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, high-profile 
feminist organizations, such as the Feminist Majority Foundation and Ms. 
magazine made public their support of the US-sponsored “liberation” of 
Afghan women31 and were in turn criticized by RAWA spokeswomen. The 
suffering of Afghan women, as well as the mystery of Afghan society as a 
whole, became embodied in the burqa—a tomb-like symbol of a captive, 
circumscribed, and ultimately ruined life. Exemplifying westerners’ fas-
cination with and wholesale reprobation of the burqa are columnist Rob 
Norland’s New York Times essay that described Kabul as “a misogynistic 
desert,” or The Scotsman’s similarly toned indictment: “The Afghan female 
is one of the most maltreated beasts of burden in the world.”32 Jasbir Puar 
observed that in the post-9/11 climate, “[t]he head scarf . . . (along with 
the burka and the hijab, often decried as masks), has become a perverse 
fetish object—a point of fixation—a kind of centripetal force, a strange 
attractor through which the density of anxiety accrues and accumulates” 
(“Queer Times” 133). Positioned as battlefields for human rights and dig-
nity, women’s bodies became synecdoches of the global West’s victory or 
defeat in the months following Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2002, 
The Swallows added to the repertoire of images rehearsing Muslim women’s 
victimhood and proffering victims in need of saving. 
As in Kandahar, Afghanistan in The Swallows appears as a cultural 
wasteland—ruined by decades of incomprehensible war that it appears to 
have brought upon itself. Free of outsiders or outside influence, Khadra’s 
Kabul is quarantined from the rest of the world and suffers the agony of 
decay, which is presented as a result of a self-imposed enclosure: “Kabul, 
the old sorceress, lying there at his feet in the grip of her torments, twisted, 
disheveled, flat on her stomach, her jawbones cracked from eating dirt” 
(105). Khadra’s corpse-like Kabul is a dangerous city seeming to have 
mystical powers that make its residents succumb to depravity and barba-
rism, unleashing violence upon each other. While the Taliban are singled 
out as the culprit, the causes of the rise of the Taliban are mysterious and 
are described only vaguely. Zunaira, for instance, says: “We’ve had some 
privileges that we didn’t know how to defend, and so we forfeited them to 
the apprentice mullahs” (76), implying that the liberal Afghans who now 
suffer under the repressive regime have only themselves to blame for the 
loss of rights to religious extremists. Similarly, her husband, Mohsen, con-
trasts the oppression of the regime with the good old days when he studied 
political science at the university and “when children sang in public squares 
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now besmirched by dirt and disfigured by gallows” (72), without explain-
ing the causes of this change. While the former middle class yearn for the 
unspecified past era (“the good old days” [75]), Atiq, a former mujahid and 
now a Taliban jailor (thus belonging to the group in power), cannot make 
sense of history at all. The following passage is telling: 
He can’t figure out why he has survived two consecutive decades of 
ambushes, air raids, and explosive devices that turned the bodies of doz-
ens of people around him into pulp . . . to wind up like this, vegetating 
in the dark, inhospitable world, in a completely disoriented city studded 
with scaffolds and haunted by doddering human wreckage—a city that 
mistreats him, damages him, day after day, night after night, whether 
he’s in the company of some wretch condemned to die and awaiting her 
fate in his stinking jail or watching over his tormented wife, doomed to 
an even crueler death. (50) 
In Atiq’s inner monologue, the city of Kabul is personified as an 
active force oppressing him. As in Kandahar, Khadra’s removal of history 
from the narrative naturalizes the disaster borne by a historical process 
by turning it into a feature of landscape. It makes the nature of the cri-
sis illegible, explained only through repetition and tautology: “Things in 
Kabul are going from bad to worse, sliding into ruin . . . a chaos within 
chaos, a disaster enclosed in a disaster” (71). Such poetic refrains cycling 
through Khadra’s prose create a sense of entrapment, stagnation, and 
claustrophobia, as well as induce a psychic stupor that prevents the reader 
from asking questions about the cause of the disaster.33 Images of endless 
circulation of trapped matter (dirt and dust) conjure a vision of violence 
as a jammed repetition. The very first sentence in the novel invokes the 
whirlwind as a figure of enchantment and petrification that locks the 
terrain into a timeless figure of despair: “In the middle of nowhere, a 
whirlwind spins like a sorceress flinging out her skirt in a macabre dance; 
yet not even this hysteria serves to blow the dust off the calcified palm 
trees thrust against the sky like beseeching arms. [. . .] A deathly silence 
pervades the dereliction as far as the eye can see” (1). As in Kandahar, 
the aesthetic of circularity is poignant; a figure of meaningless rotation 
and entrapment, the whirlwind is a useless frenzy that fails to advance or 
enact even a small change, as a regular wind gust might, such as clearing 
the dust from the palm trees. 
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The elision of history by Khadra and his resulting reliance on 
hyperbole and repetition creates an image of suffering so immense that 
the reader feels immune to it. The novel unfolds in the atmosphere of 
humanitarian containment. The reader is invited to witness the loss of 
humanity experienced by the characters while shielded from seeing the 
interconnected global histories that contributed to Afghanistan’s demise. 
Once again, the decades of global rivalry and intrigue reaching their 
nadir during the Soviet-Afghan war; the US’s, Saudi Arabia’s, Iran’s, and 
Pakistan’s meddling; as well as the presence of internationally sponsored 
terrorist networks in Afghanistan are erased in gestures through which 
the desolate terrain is supposed to stand in for an explanation: “It seems 
that the whole world is beginning to decay, and that its putrefaction has 
chosen to spread outward from here, from the land of the Pashtuns, where 
desertification proceeds at a steady, implacable crawl even in the con-
sciences and intellects of men” (2). Instead of the world coming to fight 
in Afghanistan, in Khadra’s text we have the image of Afghanistan con-
taminating the world—its decaying matter breeding death that spreads 
from its core.34 
While Kandahar offers several humanitarian proxy figures that 
mediate the viewer’s access to the site of suffering, The Swallows removes 
such mediation from the scene, portraying Afghanistan as a zone of total 
abandonment and desertion. Even humanitarian workers, it seems, cannot 
pierce Afghanistan’s self-enclosure. The aesthetic of containment is used 
strategically by Khadra, seeking to create a sense of catharsis when the 
novel ends. In his interview to The Guardian (2005), the author says: “I gave 
a talk in Amsterdam recently, and a woman said to me, ‘Monsieur Khadra, 
when I finished the novel and left that world I felt I was re-entering 
the light. Could you tell me why I felt that?’ I said the light is the luck 
you have in not being an Afghan.”35 The humanitarian narrative model 
employed by Khadra offers his readers characters who are victims—the 
four suffering Afghans who no longer know themselves abiding in the 
zone of mass sacrifice brought forth by mysterious forces. It also seeks to 
provide therapeutic effects to the reader, who is invited into that world of 
suffering not only to emerge unscathed, but to feel relieved, feeling the 
luck of “not being an Afghan.” The therapeutic effect depends both on the 
strong hierarchies between the suffering Afghans and the reader, and on 
the invitation to feel empathy. It is further noteworthy that the breakdown 
of empathy in the novel (the characters’ succumbing to barbarism and 
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violence) is compensated for by surplus empathy expected from the 
global community of readers. As the novel describes the diminishing 
compassion of characters toward each other—Atiq’s resentment toward 
his dying wife, Mohsen’s moral fall as he participates in the stoning of 
a woman, Zunaira’s resulting contempt toward Mohsen, and so on—the 
reader’s empathy is bound to grow stronger. The characters are meant 
to be forgiven for their loss of compassion for each other because of the 
magnitude of their suffering.
This empathy indexes the reader’s moral positon, her or his belonging 
to the global community of moral subjects who condemn violence and 
express moral outrage toward the perpetrations of suffering. Indeed, while 
the novel’s explanatory arsenal is inadequate, its affective reach is impres-
sive. This is evidenced most vividly by reader responses posted online. 
As of May 2019, Goodreads features 6,516 ratings and 751 narrative 
responses to The Swallows of Kabul by readers from around the globe, and 
most responses convey a sense of being affected by the suffering described. 
Reader-reviewers call it “a heart-piercing book” (Kim Allen-Niesen) that is 
important to read because of the truth expressed in it (“Reading Swallows 
is like reading science fiction without the fiction part,” writes William), 
valued because of its capacity to “make you think” (Alisson). It is praised 
for its imagined ability to raise the consciousness of the reader: “I think 
it’s important for the rest of us to realize how priviliged [sic] and pampered 
we have become living here in our safe and secure little corner of the world 
where we are free to live the way we choose,” writes Trisha. Along the same 
lines, another reader (Kay) writes, emphatically: “It is about men, by a 
man, and I wanted to weep for all of them,”36 while Fantasy4Eva confesses: 
“Despite the fact that I sat among others in the library, my urge was so 
strong to shout that I had to put the book down for a minute.” 
These reader testimonies are important. According to Boltanski, what 
distinguishes a (moral) humanitarian reader from self-serving readers who 
consume scenes of violence for their own pleasure (akin to consumers of 
pornography) is a membership in the moral community of like-minded 
readers constituted through an actual or imagined public expression of 
moral outrage. He writes: 
The criterion of public speech or conversation is precisely what enables us 
to distinguish a way of looking that can be characterized as disinterested 
or altruistic, one that is oriented outwards and wants to see suffering 
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ended, from a selfish way of looking which is wholly taken up with the 
internal states aroused by the spectacle of suffering: fascination, horror, 
interest, excitement, pleasure, etc. (21) 
In other words, an altruistic way of looking is differentiated from a quasi-
pornographic gaze through public testimony (“This is unacceptable!”), as 
if, through testimony, a hailed reader can confess and be absolved from the 
guilt caused by her morbid fascination, and then feel as if meaningful action 
has been taken through the act of publicly condemning the perpetrators 
of violence.
In sum, The Swallows succeeds as a therapeutic text while falling short 
of the didactic mission envisioned by its author. By relying on hyper-
bole in its descriptions of suffering, by evading history and geopolitics as 
frameworks for explaining the Afghan tragedy, and by offering, instead, 
phantasms of landscape-induced violence, The Swallows fails at making 
such suffering apprehensible. In fact, the deployment of humanitarian 
imagery serves to create a form of affective governance in which the hier-
archies of humanity, such as the hierarchy between the reader and the 
suffering other, are preserved and strengthened (“the joy you feel of not 
being an Afghan”), which in turn create a context and justification for the 
unfolding “humanitarian” invasion. 
Humanitarian Unconscious 
Kushner’s celebrated play premiered in New York in the early winter of 
2001, shortly after the start of US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan, with its print version released in 2002. The play, however, was 
not a response to the 9/11 attacks; Kushner began writing it in the late 1990s 
when Afghanistan and the strife of its people seemed largely irrelevant 
to the majority of Western actors. Composed over the course of several 
years, with the events of the play set in 1998 (the height of the Taliban 
era), the play seemed prescient in that it sought to position Afghanistan, 
improbably, as central to global affairs, attempting to bring the forgotten 
country into mainstream visibility. The play’s uncanny positioning as a work 
that in some ways predicts and foreshadows the attacks on the Twin Towers 
has come to define its post-9/11 reception. Among other things that seem 
clairvoyant in retrospect, the play contains a line: “You love the Taliban 
so much, bring them to New York! Well, don’t worry, they are coming to 
New York!” (85).37 Notably, the play offers a critique of the humanitarian 
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mode of representation that relies on empathy as a vector of relating to the 
suffering other; it also opposes the practice of turning distant suffering into 
spectacle. While exposing the guilt and melancholy as the psychic malaise 
that subtends the liberal empathy project, the play proposes, instead, a quasi-
religious action plan of seeking repentance through sacrifice. An alternative 
to empathy’s impotence and an antidote to melancholic withdrawal from 
action, such sacrifice is imagined to have curative powers. And yet, as I will 
demonstrate, the play suffers from the same set of ailments as the previous 
two works—the omission of history and the resulting mythologization of 
Afghanistan—that prevent it from bringing its critique to a meaningful end. 
The play centers on an English woman referred to as “homebody” 
who is stifled by her domestic existence—a life of perpetual, self-inflicted 
confinement in her apartment in London. A voracious reader, she 
develops an obsession with Afghanistan, especially as it was represented 
in discarded travel guides (obsolete and useless today) as they depict the 
country as it once was: a beautiful, serene place framed by the snowy peaks 
of the Hindu Kush mountains—a tourist hot spot and a site of successfully 
implemented modernization.38 This image of a peaceful past, as contrasted 
with homebody’s knowledge that Kabul since then has become a site of 
violence, bloodshed, and modernity’s failure, is deeply troubling for her, 
and it makes her decry the present as “an awful place to be” (11).39 Rejecting 
the actual present as a site of “wreckage rack and ruination” (25) and, 
more enigmatically, as “the scene of our crime” (11), homebody suffers 
in her confinement, presented to the audience through her fragmented, 
semi-coherent monologue that comprises the entire first act of the play.40 
Homebody’s protracted oration is an example of neurotic speech, pulled 
in different directions by profound yet unknown psychological forces. 
Homebody’s psychic suffering exemplifies what Enzo Traverso calls “Left 
melancholia”—a background feeling that arises in the world that has lost an 
expectation for a better future and is haunted, simultaneously, by the past 
imagined as wreckage. As if echoing homebody’s lamentations over the 
canceled future of Afghanistan as she peers over mid-twentieth-century 
guides, Traverso writes: “Utopia seems a category of the past—the future 
imagined in a bygone time—because it no longer belongs to the present of 
our societies. History itself appears as a landscape of ruins, a living legacy 
of pain” (7). Homebody’s melancholy turns into a neurotic obsession over 
unidentifiable losses and into the hunt for a shimmering image of the 
ruined past that might contain something akin to a cure. 
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Homebody allegorizes excessive empathy—being an obsessive yet 
distant witness to the “wickedness perpetuated now, in August 1998, 
now now now, even as I speak and speak and speak” (Kushner 17) leaves 
her exhausted and succumbed to compassion fatigue. That homebody’s 
state indexes a generalizable condition is supported by the fact that all 
other Western characters in the play are represented as psychologically 
ill, requiring psychotropic medication. Both homebody and her husband, 
Milton, abuse antidepressants, their daughter, Priscilla, attempts to com-
mit suicide by overdosing, and the only westerner to be found in Kabul 
(in act two)—a shifty embassy worker, Quango—is depicted as an opium 
addict. Self-medication figures as a necessary numbing—a price that these 
westerners have to pay for their “luxury” and safety (10)—more generally, 
for their privileged position in the hierarchy of humanity (the hierarchy 
of grievable lives).41 Homebody is vaguely aware of the causes of her mal-
aise, saying, here “stands homebody, safe in the kitchen, on her culpable 
shore, suffering uselessly watching others perishing in the sea, wringing 
her plump little maternal hand, oh, oh. Never joining the drowning” (28, 
emphasis in original).42 
Homebody’s psychic suffering is interrupted by her encounter with an 
Afghan salesman while buying exotic hats for her party, which marks the 
end of act one. Preparing to pay for the purchase, she suddenly notices the 
merchant’s hand—a piece of mutilated flesh. She observes: “three fingers 
on his right hand had been hacked off, following the line of a perfect clean 
diagonal from middle, to ring, to little finger” (21). The transaction exposes 
homebody’s placement within global consumer capitalism, bringing into 
focus her privilege (she is shopping for postcolonial exotic), as well as 
potentially implicating her in the violence unleashed on the merchant’s 
body.43 Conventional treatments of suffering as spectacle, typical of the 
humanitarian narrative, are disrupted by Kushner describing the injury 
in a way that pays attention to its specificity, akin to a forensic report. 
Additionally, the play brings attention to the mutilated hand turning up 
where it is not supposed to: While exotic commodities (the hats) are seen 
as belonging in England, the hand that proffers them must remain hid-
den from view. Homebody’s exclamation—“Here, in London, that poor 
ruined hand” (21)—implies that the mutilated body’s proper place is in 
Afghanistan—a cordoned-off zone of suffering. The ruined hand’s man-
ifestation in London turns it into a grievable injury, one that is subject 
to an investigation: How did this happen? The hand then “speaks.” In a 
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trance-like state at the shop, homebody imagines hearing: “Look, look at 
my country, look at my Kabul, my city, what is left of my city? The streets 
are as bare as the mountains now, the buildings are as ragged as mountains 
and as bare and empty of life, there is no life here only fear . . . you will never 
understand” (23–24, emphasis in original). An Afghan body—usually an 
abstract signifier of distant suffering—here appears in central London, 
challenging homebody’s ability to comprehend or relate to its suffering. 
The encounter with the merchant is visceral and is described as a 
touch (“being touched by the mutilated hand” [24]). As such, it closes 
the gap between spectator and scene, and propels homebody from empa-
thetic passivity to action, resulting, in act two, in her decision to travel to 
Kabul, where, according to one account, she is murdered and, according to 
another account, finds redemption and healing. By turning up at the heart 
of London, the ruined hand globalizes Afghanistan’s tragedy, which in 
turn causes homebody to “provincialize” her European body by leaving her 
“culpable shores” and going to Kabul, thus traveling to the epicenter of suf-
fering. Homebody’s excessive, melancholic empathy prior to the encounter 
with the merchant is exposed as detached from the scene of suffering and 
thus lacking—“a touch that doesn’t understand” and thus “corrupts” (28). In 
this encounter, however, the touch of the ruined hand opens up new paths 
for affinity, action, and understanding. In act two, homebody’s response 
becomes illiberal and exits the domain of feeling (empathetic or melan-
cholic); it is taken into the public sphere—the dangerous streets of Kabul. 
Homebody’s physical presence in the Afghan capital as a body is an act of 
solidarity and sacrifice. Her silence in act two implies a psychic cure—the 
melancholic monologue seizes and we never hear her speak again. 
While humanitarian narrative conventions frequently portray or call for 
a rescue mission in which the suffering is relieved by the victim being trans-
ported to the West, Homebody/Kabul, at least in acts one and two, insists on 
the Western body’s relocation to mayhem’s headquarters. By staging this 
transfer, Kushner seems to suggest that, instead of melancholic witnessing 
from afar, the Western body has to partake in the violence in which it is 
implicated. Homebody’s unpublicized yet baffling relocation proclaims, 
much more loudly than her neurotic orations, the radical equality of all 
lives—an idea that subtends the humanitarian project while being erased 
in it—and exposes the hierarchy of grievability. Homebody’s subsequent 
alleged death in Kabul—reported by Reuters and documented in a (ques-
tionable) forensic report—brings to the fore the invisibility of the suffering 
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of the Afghans whose deaths are not reported or documented. The foren-
sic, profoundly anti-sentimental mode of documentation here, once again, 
features as an alternative to spectacularized portrayal of suffering designed 
to induce compassion. Homebody’s corporeal sacrifice, the play suggests, 
conjures a politics of solidarity as an antidote to the politics of pity; the 
insistence on the radical equality of bodies capable of suffering paves a path 
out of the empathy-induced melancholy that requires medication. 
While in Kandahar and in The Swallows, Afghanistan figures as just 
another zone of suffering, Kushner tries to present Afghanistan as a point 
of intersection for multiple global forces, thus inviting a conversation about 
its role in global rivalries. At the end of act one, homebody says, “There is 
a country so at the heart of the world the world has forgotten it, where one 
may seek in submission the unanswered need” (28). Homebody’s statement 
signals a connection between her location (London) and Afghanistan—a 
dotted line between the two sites that the play promises to explore. 
Gesturing toward historical complicity or guilt, Kushner’s invocation of 
culpability in act one has the potential to disrupt a simplistic narrative of 
West-instigated liberation, in which the forces of democracy bring freedom 
to the Afghan people suffering the barbarism and cruelty of an archaic 
and incomprehensible Taliban. Similarly, the insistence of Afghanistan’s 
centrality, the idea of needing to seek answers in Afghanistan, positions 
Afghanistan as key to the West’s questions, a way of cure for the melan-
cholic psyche, and a place of atonement where the Western subject must 
travel to be absolved of its historical sins. By tracing homebody’s trajectory 
as she seeks such atonement via a trip to Kabul, the play issues a moral 
imperative for engagement, remembrance, and reparation, reminding the 
world of its unfinished business in Afghanistan. Such need for repair and 
remorse also comes through in the following dialogue between homebody’s 
daughter, Priscilla (who traveled to Kabul along with her father, Milton, 
to collect her mother’s remains) and Khwaja, an Afghan poet: 
Priscilla: We’ve brought our misery to your city, my family, I’m sorry. 
Khwaja: (Angry) What have you ever brought us besides misery? Gharbi? 
Ferengi? The West? And many among us would like to give your misery 
back to you. (He stands to leave) You have to take home with you noth-
ing but the spectacle of our suffering. Make of it what you will. (115, 
emphasis in original)44 
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This dialogue, as many others in the play, is both evocative and enigmatic. 
While Priscilla is apologizing to Khwaja about bringing their family drama 
to Kabul, the poet himself speaks of a broader historical connection. It 
is not clear from Kushner’s text alone how the West and the world more 
generally are implicated in the Afghan suffering or why repentance is 
needed. Kushner’s references to history and historical events in the play are 
plentiful, but they are always vague. The play mentions, for instance, the 
coalition strikes of 1998 authorized by the Clinton administration—the 
strikes that, according to the play’s Taliban official, made the people “very 
angry against Western aggression-disrespect-disregard” (33); on several 
occasions Kushner gestures nebulously toward the Cold War hostilities. 
These equivocal invocations are not sufficient, however, to ascertain his-
torical culpability or prescribe reparations. 
When it comes to history, the play leaves much to be desired, which is 
especially surprising given the sheer plentitude of historical material that 
Kushner brings in, both from the travel guides, and presumably, from his-
tory books. In fact, it is precisely such excessive quotation and enumeration 
of historical data that renders history meaningless. Here is an example of 
such enumeration: 
In the middle of the second century bc, during the Greco-Bactrian 
Confusion, a Chinese tribe, the Hsuing-Nu, attacked a rival tribe, the 
Yueh-Chih, and drove them from their homes to what is now southern 
Afghanistan. Then the Hsuing-Nu, displaced from their new homes by 
another Chinese tribe, also migrated to Afghanistan and once again 
displaced the Yueh-Chih, who emigrated to the Kabul Valley. (16) 
Paradoxically, these historical facts and stories do not add up to a narrative 
that has meaning; they do not cohere and fail to make an impression. 
Instead, we are left with a repository of facts that explain nothing. An 
agglomeration of data reveals a succession of catastrophes; stories pile up, 
negate each other, while contradictory accounts coexist and clog up the 
avenues of meaning-making. Kushner is Benjaminian (and melancholic) 
in his view of Afghanistan’s history as “pile of wreckage upon wreckage” 
brought forth by an unknown force—akin to Benjamin’s storm blowing 
from paradise (Benjamin, “On the Concept of History”). This clogged 
up history lends itself to circularity and jammed repetition, which is the 
domain not of history, but of myth. When Priscilla, guided through the 
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city of Kabul by Khwaja, is shown a pillar indicating the spot where 
hundreds of British soldiers were slaughtered, she wonders whether they 
were going in circles, since they have already passed such a pillar. To this, 
Khwaja replies, cryptically: “There are many pillars, many slaughtered 
British soldiers” (55). Where Priscilla is looking for a linear chronology 
and a conventional map, she is presented with a circular, disorienting 
geometry, designed to obfuscate, rather than explain. This circularity is 
reminiscent of Khadra’s whirlwind as a figure for entrapment, as well as 
of the frenzied choreography in Kandahar. Just as in Khadra’s novel and in 
Makhmalbaf ’s film, the play’s landscape appears petrified. While suppos-
edly using history to grant Afghan suffering greater visibility, Kushner’s 
actual use of it produces a condition of illegibility, where meaning col-
lapses, faced with the sheer magnitude of wreckage. “But in Kabul now 
there is no history. There is only God,” as the Mullah in the play solemnly 
declares (36).45
And this indeed is true. As Kushner’s history is flattened into wreckage, 
Kabul, in turn, becomes the very figure of history as catastrophe. It is 
described simply as mountains of rubble (111), as a city of death (107), 
wreckage rack and ruination (25), holocaustal effacement (25), “great 
heaps of rubble” (21), and unlucky city (114). Its landscapes are nothing but 
“rubble-strewn streets,” “piles of bomb debris” (31), beautiful to the extent 
to which Hiroshima after a nuclear explosion could be beautiful (as Priscilla 
declares [56]). Afghanistan is offered as the very figure of disaster: “the fifth 
worst country on earth . . . not a country, really, a . . . populated disaster” 
(53). Here, again, we have humanitarian sublime—an overpowering image 
of destruction that obfuscates a social and political relation. 
This neutralization of history and the resulting resort to the human-
itarian sublime are disappointing, especially after Kushner’s gesture, in 
act one, toward the rich potential contained by old travel guides that dis-
rupt and problematize conventional chronology. The guide that homebody 
extensively quotes from was published in 1965. As such, it harkens back 
to the era when Afghanistan was a rapidly modernizing monarchy that 
espoused education, women’s freedom, and global connectivity. In fact, 
women were granted the right to vote in 1964—a year before the guide 
was published—which spurred the era of women’s active participation 
in governance and social movements. Because of the country’s proxim-
ity to the USSR, modernization of mores often had a distinct socialist 
tint as many elite members studied in the Soviet Union. The year 1965 
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was a landmark year for the consolidation of Afghanistan’s social justice 
movements: Afghanistan’s socialist party (the People’s Democratic Party 
of Afghanistan or PDPA) was formed that year. The first women’s group, 
the Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (DOAW) was created 
that year as well with the objectives to improve women’s educational levels 
and ban forced marriages.46 A closer look at the old travel guides thus has 
the potential to deconstruct both the idea of linear progress and the idea of 
Western “liberation” as a long-awaited delivery from the grip of Oriental 
darkness. An in-depth look at the historical moment captured by a 1965 
guide could problematize a vague but neat, diphasic history timeline that 
both Kandahar or The Swallows offer—a timeline in which the Afghan 
people (and especially Afghan women) oppressed by a seemingly timeless 
fundamentalist regime are then liberated (or expected to be liberated) by 
the global West. Instead, and disappointingly so, the play leaves us with an 
image of spectral pasts (what once were) and spectral futures (what could 
have become but did not) as additional images of ruination that remain 
abstracted from the actual historical process. 
This removal or neutralization of history is present in many scenes, and 
the scene in which homebody examines the mutilated hand of the merchant 
provides, possibly, one of the most vivid examples of such neutralization. 
As homebody imagines the merchant speaking in response to her silent 
question, his answer renders all historical explanations insufficient and 
ultimately meaningless. This effect is achieved though an agglomeration 
of mutually exclusive possibilities: 
I was with the Mujahideen, and the Russians did this. I was with the 
Mujahideen, and an enemy faction of the Mujahideen did this. I was 
with the Russians, I was known to have assisted the Russians, I did 
informer’s work for Babrak Karmal, my name is in the files if they haven’t 
been destroyed, the names I gave are in the files, there are no more files, 
I stole bread for my starving family, I stole bread from a starving family, I 
profaned, betrayed, according to some stricture I erred and they chopped 
off the fingers of my hand. (23, emphasis in original) 
It becomes clear that while embedding historical actors into the storyline 
(such as the mujahideen or communist party leader Babrak Karmal), 
Kushner simultaneously divests them of significance through a piling up 
of incompossible scenarios that amount to nothing in the end. The injury 
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is thus beyond historical explanation; for Kushner, to assign a causation 
is to take away from its significance. This is a strategic choice. Through 
this gesture, Kushner positions Afghanistan as a site of an ontological 
rather than an ontic (historical) trauma.47 This ontological valence crystal-
lizes most vividly in Kushner’s mythologization of Kabul as a place where 
Cain—Adam’s son—was buried. 
As historical injury (ontic trauma), is transposed into ontological 
injury, homebody’s travel to Kabul acquires mythological significance. 
What initially seemed to be a political statement (asserting the radical 
equality of all bodies) instead turns out to be a pilgrimage—a trip to a 
site that may contain answers to an ontological question: the origin of 
violence itself. To designate a site as a pilgrimage destination is to insist 
on the place’s worth as a heritage site. To imagine Afghanistan as a site 
of global pilgrimage is a difficult task, since Afghanistan, at least in the 
1990s, when the play was written, was seen as a place of no significance 
(and hence a zone of abandonment). After all, what can one expect to find 
in a place almost completely destroyed by war? To assign such significance, 
Kushner amplifies and strengthens the legend that he claims to have found 
in one of the guidebooks, about Kabul being the gravesite of Cain, Adam’s 
first son—a biblical character who brings murder into the world by killing 
his brother, Abel, when God rejects his sacrifice. Tracing the journey of 
her mother, Priscilla discovers homebody’s fascination with Cain’s grave, 
along with evidence that she had prayed at the site. Presumably, while 
Cain sowed the seeds of murder, homebody travels to his gravesite to 
repent, seeking atonement and forgiveness for humanity as such. Early on, 
in London, homebody remarks: “Murder’s grave. Would you eat a potato 
plucked from that soil?” (22, emphasis in original). Her dismemberment 
(her body was allegedly torn into pieces by a street gang in Kabul) could be 
then seen as ritualistic act—a sacrificial reseeding of the land that breaks 
the cycle of violence Cain started.48 
This plot twist further solidifies Kushner’s interest in Afghanistan 
as a mythological, rather than historical, location. In proximity to Cain’s 
gravesite, Kushner’s prose becomes denser, offering an agglomeration of 
images that connote danger and destruction, becoming hyperbolic, almost 
Heart of Darkness-like at times, suggesting that the site contains the key 
to the central questions asked in the play. It is described as “[a]n open 
place, mountains of rubble. Terrible fighting took place here. There are 
signs posted warning of the danger of undetonated mines” (111). Once 
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there, Priscilla exclaims: “Look up there! Look at that sky! Black! Black! 
Those stars! Crikey. We could be on the moon! Oh sweet Christ it’s. . . . 
Unearthly!” (112). Kushner then explains the religious and political sig-
nificance of the site: 
[Cain] was many years older than a thousand years old when he arrived. 
His heart was worn out with regretting, after so many centuries of 
remorse, it must have been. And Kabul has always been welcoming of 
strangers, weary travelers. Even so, it was a great mistake, burying him 
here. Unlucky man. Unlucky city. (114) 
The biblical reference turns the rubble of Kabul (“terrible fighting took 
place here,” 111) into a ruin of a globally significant past, into a heritage 
site (“the genesis of evil,” 148). Cain’s grave, therefore, holds the key not 
only to the tragedy of Afghanistan, but to the larger metaphysical questions 
of the origin of violence, the possibility of repentance, and the means of 
atonement. The sheer negativity of the rubble, the minefield, and a depres-
sion in the earth that is Cain’s grave thus acquire positive value as a ruin 
of world heritage. Reimagined as Cain’s gravesite, Afghanistan’s piles of 
rubble turn into a portal, a gateway into a shared past—a global ruin to 
be revered and preserved, even though it is the darkest heritage one can 
imagine (“Would you eat a potato plucked from that soil?” 22). 
There is an important difference between ruins and rubble. The ruin is 
an affectively invested site of belonging, while rubble is a place of disper-
sal and shattering—a no one’s place. Cultural anthropologist Gastón R. 
Godrillo points out that one’s desire to see rubble as ruins is never politi-
cally innocent. He writes: “Rubble is matter that belongs to everyone and to 
no one” (265), while, in turn, “ruins are rubble that has been fetishized. . . . 
[B]eyond the fenced perimeter [of the ruin] lie constellations of rubble 
created by ongoing forms of disruption” (9). Ruins are rubble that has 
been singled out as significant while the remaining debris lies unclaimed. 
There is a long history of European colonial fascination with ruins that 
foregrounds the fact that ruins are profoundly constructed objects, being 
situated as high up on what Godrillo calls “the hierarchy of debris” (9): they 
are superior to rubble, trash, fragments, or useless matter insofar as they 
are perceived to be remnants of significance (26). Ruins are affect-inducing 
objects, fecund in their incompleteness. In The Aesthetics of Ruins, Robert 
Ginsberg eulogizes the ruin as a freeing, creative force: 
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The ruin liberates matter from its subservience to form. As the chains of 
form are smashed, matter emerges in our presence, reformulating itself 
for our refreshed experience. [. . .] The destruction of the structure is 
rewarded with the resurgence of the substance. (1)
Forces of destruction, unleashed by the ruin, are thus seen as creative in their 
essence. Destruction here is sutured to resurgence, rejuvenation, and refor-
mulation. The materiality of ruins is thus profoundly spiritual, and a source of 
insight into the deepest regions of our psychic being: “the ruin bares what is 
hidden in ourselves. [. . .] The durable and creative stuff shines forth through 
the transitory and broken patterns applied by human beings” (Ginsberg 2). 
This history of valorization of ruins explains why Kushner uses the ruin as a 
way of writing Afghanistan’s rubble into the global (and ultimately, Western) 
imaginary. Restored from its rubble and imagined as a ruin, Kabul can then 
become a node of collective identification, indexing the dormant forces of 
resurgence, rejuvenation, and spiritual rebirth. As such, the Afghan past can 
be recast as significant to world history and spirituality—a site of pilgrimage 
important for three world religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. 
The adherence to the logic of the ruin exposes the limitation of Kushner’s 
project, however. Ultimately, Kushner’s Afghanistan as a myth and a site of 
ontological trauma remains in tension with Afghanistan as a site of a com-
plex historical processes (the ontic trauma) throughout the entire play. What 
remains foreclosed in this approach is Afghanistan’s specificity as a site of 
historical breakdown and shattering in which the West is implicated in very 
specific ways, and which I will discuss in subsequent chapters. Here, the reader 
remains uninformed about the extent of this implication, although Kushner 
refers to it in vague, indirect ways throughout the play. The last section of the 
play features Mahala, an Afghan woman, whom Priscilla and Milton smuggle 
out of Afghanistan and bring to England, thus rescuing her, presumably, from 
death or at least from impending madness. As if having seamlessly exchanged 
lives with homebody, Mahala is depicted in homebody’s yard gardening. The 
play concludes, enigmatically, with her words: “In the garden outside, I have 
planted all my dead” (140). This last line evokes T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land, a 
work concerned with the question of concealment and resurfacing of the past:49 
That corpse you planted last year in your garden, 
Has it begun to sprout? Will it bloom this year? 
Or has the sudden frost disturbed its bed? 
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Why does Mahala plant her Afghan dead in the English garden? Why 
do they belong there? What do we do when the past resurfaces? What are 
we called to address, who is culpable, and why? The reader is left uncer-
tain as what to make of Afghanistan’s tragic history, its ontic trauma. 
The play’s focus on the corpse of Cain, supposedly buried (planted) in 
Kabul, takes our attention away from the landmines that powerful global 
players have planted in Afghan land. It remains unclear, at the end of 
the play, whether we are to ponder and redeem the primordial “Act of 
Violence” (Cain’s) or the violence we find ourselves implicated in, by virtue 
of historical processes. While attempting an excavation (and as I show in 
subsequent chapters, an excavation of Afghanistan’s history is required 
if we are to understand our contemporary post-9/11 moment), Kushner’s 
play digs in the wrong place, excavating the sentimentally charged ruins 
of Biblical history. As such, it ends up using Afghanistan as a mere set-
ting for the Western subject’s search for forgiveness—and for the abstract 
original sin—rather than for historical wrongdoings. The radical potential 
for transnational solidarity glimpsed in homebody’s relocation is replaced 
in the end by a weak version of solidarity through cross-cultural fertiliza-
tion (planting the Afghan dead in the English garden) and a recourse to 
a shared mythical past.50
In Human Rights Inc., Slaughter observes: “In the contemporary con-
text of the ‘War of Terror’ in Afghanistan and Iraq . . . the trigger finger 
of military invasion is justified by the projective human rights ink of the 
‘purple finger’ of popular democratic elections” and other humanitar-
ian concerns, primarily literacy and women’s rights (121). Kandahar and 
The Swallows of Kabul enter the post-9/11 Operation Enduring Freedom 
moral universe by crafting images of extreme victimhood that require 
an intervention from the West. The Afghanistan they imagine figures as 
flat Earth—a land of no history, inhabited by people trapped in a cycle of 
medieval oppression that have been caused, these works suggest, by the 
landscape itself. In chapter five, we shall see how this flat view is disrupted 
and redefined by Nadeem Aslam who excavates not only Cold War legacies 
(the short durée of recent history), but insists on seeing Afghanistan from 
the perspective of deep time. In the absence of such historically grounded 
framework, Kandahar and The Swallows function as weaponized narra-
tives51 (inscribing the US invasion as liberation and thus legitimizing it). 
The universe they construct is morally unambiguous as they fail to examine 
the ethical quandaries posed by humanitarianism as a representational 
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mode that relies on turning distant suffering into a spectacle, as well as 
failing to loosen the hierarchies of humanity entrenched in the humani-
tarian imaginary. 
By comparison, Kushner’s play is much more nuanced insofar as it 
offers an examination of the humanitarian imaginary, issuing a critique of 
melancholic empathy and resisting representing Afghanistan as an object 
of empathetic humanitarian intervention. As such, Homebody/Kabul can 
be seen as diagnosing our “humanitarian present”52—defined by compas-
sion fatigue, melancholy, self-medication, postcolonial exotic, preservation 
of inequality in humanitarian sentiments, and hierarchies of grievable/
ungrievable lives. The play contains a strong imperative for engagement 
and remembrance that is not based on the idea of humanitarian inter-
vention, but is framed as sacrifice and repentance. In addition, Kushner’s 
Afghanistan is no longer an insular, cordoned-off zone of suffering. The 
play inscribes Western culpability and global interconnection, as well as 
(vaguely) reminds the world of its unfinished business—the corpse bur-
ied in its backyard (Afghanistan is often referred to as the graveyard of 
empires). However, there are significant limitations to Kushner’s project 
as well. By focusing too much on the sublime global ruin, a site cursed 
by the presence of Cain (an ontological trauma), it turns away from the 
rubble that is a product of a concrete historical process. This, paradoxically, 
results, once again, in a historical flattening and illegibility of suffering 
similar to Kandahar and The Swallows. While offering a critique of the 
humanitarian mode of relating to distant suffering, the play can be said 
to suffer from a humanitarian unconscious, at the end resorting to the 
domain of myth. Proffering the ancient biblical ruin as an antidote to the 
unease triggered by the rubble and other residues of failed Afghan moder-
nity, Homebody/Kabul also dehistoricizes, aestheticizes and mythologizes 
the Afghan crisis. Symptomatic as well is the desire in all three works to 
inscribe the Afghan woman as an object of rescue—even Kushner’s play 
ultimately cannot resist the temptation to save a Muslim woman, Mahala, 
by having his characters bring her to London—contributing to the 2001-
era obsession over rescuing Afghan women critiqued most famously in Lila 
Abu-Lughod’s piece, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?” 
Ultimately, the underlying tone in all these works is melancholic inso-
far as the suffering they portray seems beyond redemption—a jammed 
repetition from which there is no escape. No amount of mourning, it seems, 
will ever be adequate to sufficiently grieve the victims of the atrocities 
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committed. Salvation will be available, but to a select few—Mohsen’s 
wife, perhaps Diana (Nafas’s sister in Kandahar), or Mahala. Even in 
Kushner, the liberal West figures, at the end, as the only imaginable site 
of progress and liberation. Without historical depth, without indigenous 
social justice movements, with no valid claim to modernity, Afghanistan 
as presented in all three works has to appeal to the West—not only for 
physical rescue but for everything else, too, including ideas and dreams. 
It is noteworthy that the three cultural texts discussed in this chapter are 
silent about Afghanistan’s socialist past—when they gesture in its direc-
tion, they provide no context or framework for making it legible.53 These 
glaring omissions are fascinating as they reveal the absence of a language 
in which to talk about the defeated socialist projects in the aftermath of the 
Cold War’s end. Ultimately, it is this very erasure of Afghan revolutionary 
history that results in a humanitarian capture of Afghanistan’s present. 
The next two chapters extend the critique of the humanitarian mode of 
representing Afghanistan by bringing into focus the relation between the 
humanitarian imaginary and post-Cold War impasses. These impasses, in 
contemporary NATO-centric cultural texts, present as aphasias—gaps in 
representation that signal the work of erasure. An inability to speak about 
histories of real existing socialism outside of the discourse of failure, we 
shall see, makes it impossible to represent the Afghan revolutionary sub-
ject, and Afghan socialist modernity, in a positive light (or at all). 
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Imagining the Soviets: The 
Faustian Bargain of Khaled 
Hosseini’s Kabul “Trilogy” 
Bad Soviets 
Circa 1980, Joseph Brodsky—dissident poet and Soviet exile—wrote 
a poem entitled “Lines on the Winter Campaign, 1980.” In this poem, 
Brodsky condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that began 
on December 27, 1979, painting a dramatic picture of a ruthless Northern 
Empire that used the heavy machinery of war to subsume—and ruin—the 
stark and delicate beauty of an Oriental landscape. From this encounter, 
the poet recoils in horror and shame. Shame is something that the Soviets 
are supposed to feel, according to the Nobel Prize-winning poet, but are 
no longer able to—“the color of shame has all gone to the banners.” The 
poem then warns its reader of the coming of the new Ice Age, the cold wave 
of totalitarianism whose “moraines” are spreading from the North to the 
South, bringing with them nothing less than enslavement of peoples and 
destruction of cultural memory: “The Ice Age is coming—slavery’s ice age 
is coming / oozing over the atlas. Its moraines force under / nations, fond 
memories, muslin blouses.”1 In his passionate condemnation of the Soviets, 
who intervened on behalf of the unsteady communist regime that came 
to power in Kabul in April 1978, Brodsky was not alone; by 1980, politi-
cians, ideologues of all persuasions and castes, humanitarians, reporters, 
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writers, poets, and activists joined each other in a thick chorus of voices 
urging the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan. Many of these voices 
belonged to members of the global Left who saw in the Soviet intervention 
an occasion for their final disenchantment with real existing socialism 
and its world-making project. Characteristically of that period, a group of 
left-wing intellectuals in France devoted an entire issue of 1980 Les Temps 
Modernes to the situation in Afghanistan, denouncing Soviet actions.2 
Of all the socialist superpower’s twentieth-century misadventures, 
nothing, arguably, received as wide a condemnation as the intervention in 
Afghanistan in 1979. By 1989, pressured from within and from without, 
the Soviet government of the USSR—the last Soviet government as it 
turned out—decided to end the almost-ten-year-long affair and pulled its 
armed forces out of its southern neighbor’s territory. The Cold War was 
over. The Soviet Union itself disintegrated two years after the end of its 
Afghanistan mission, outlived by the Afghan socialist state by one year. In 
1992, Kabul and its last socialist government fell to Islamist fighters—the 
mujahideen—and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the world’s 
youngest socialist state, became the Islamic State of Afghanistan. 
In post-9/11 NATO-centric cultural texts set in Afghanistan, the 
Soviet invasion occupies a key role. It figures even more prominently than 
the recent US-led invasion, being an object of scrutiny, denunciation, con-
tention, blame, and ongoing reassessment. The US-led war in Afghanistan 
following the 9/11 attacks led to a reissue and republication of Cold War-era 
anti-communist narratives that depict and condemn the Soviet interven-
tion, such as Atiq Rahimi’s Earth and Ashes—a Cold War-era story that saw 
its first publication in French in 2002 (also turned into a film in 2004 and 
published in English in 2010), along with his A Thousand Rooms of Dreams 
and Fear (2007). M. E. Hirsh’s little-known Cold War-era Kabul—a novel 
I discuss later in this chapter—was first published in 1986 and then repub-
lished in 2002. Edward Girardet’s memoir Killing the Cranes (2011) and 
Didier Lefèvre’s (with Emmanuel Guibert and Frédéric Lemercier) graphic 
memoir The Photographer (2009)—the texts I discuss in detail in chapter 
three—are stories based on their authors’ experiences in the 1980s as war 
reporters “embedded” with the anti-Soviet Islamist fighters. While laden 
with post-9/11 ruminations on global terror and revamped for post-9/11 
consumption, these memoirs furnish a typical Cold War-era anti-Soviet 
perspective, indexing the sentiments of bewilderment and condemnation as 
their authors face real, existing socialism from the jihad fighters’ mountain 
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bases. Svetlana Alexievich’s Cold War-era account Zinky Boys, first pub-
lished in English in 1992 and bringing “the truth of the Soviet-Afghan 
war” to the Anglophone audience, was propelled into renewed visibility by 
the author winning the Nobel Prize in literature in 2015.3
Moreover, aside from recycled material from the Cold War era, there 
also are numerous new texts that tackle the matter of communism’s legacy 
in Afghanistan. While it is easy to understand the polarizing moralisms 
of the 1980s Cold War rivalry—the war in which writers, scholars, and 
humanitarians often had to take a side—representations of the Soviet 
intervention in post-9/11 texts often betray a more complex, paradoxical 
set of investments in seemingly contradictory ideas. What is at stake in 
post-9/11, post-Cold War stories of the Soviet invasion? Most immedi-
ately, for fiction writers as well as politicians, the Soviet invasion provides 
an explanatory matrix that renders the more recent, US-led invasion legible 
and legitimized. For instance, Donald Rumsfeld, in his memoir Known 
and Unknown (2011), invokes the Soviet invasion when describing his 
first impressions of Afghanistan in the first weeks of Operation Enduring 
Freedom. He contrasts the USSR’s “failed conquest” and the US-led “suc-
cessful liberation” of the country: 
On December 16, 2001, I made my first visit of many to a liberated 
Afghanistan. . . . We landed at Baghram Airfield, a decaying facility 
built by the Soviet Union. . . . MiG fighter jets, battered and unus-
able, lay scattered along the tarmac, vestiges of the Soviet occupation. 
Parked alongside them were American C-130 transport planes, AC-130 
gunships, Black Hawk and Chinook helicopters, and rows and rows 
of supplies. I was struck at seeing symbols of these two different eras 
side-by-side—one of failed conquest, the other of successful liberation. (404, 
emphasis my own) 
The triumphalist juxtaposition of the two interventions—Soviet occupa-
tion and US-led liberation—in Rumsfeld’s unapologetically US-centric 
account provides both justification for the American mission and comfort 
in remembering a prior victory—the victory over socialism that now is only 
visible in socialism’s rubble and wreckage, vestiges of its once powerful 
past. In the background of such triumphalist accounts, nevertheless, there 
lurks the persistent lingering question—are we in as much trouble as the 
Soviets yet?—which fuels some of these comparisons. Girardet, reflecting 
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on the decade of the post-9/11 coalition mission in Afghanistan, remarks 
on the similarities between the two invasions by noting that, “[n]ot unlike 
their Red Army counterparts during the 1980s, the Americans and their 
military allies are increasingly perceived by ordinary Afghans as an unwel-
come foreign occupation force” (3). To this, he adds: 
Often, while examining how the Americans, British, and other NATO 
forces are fighting this latest Afghan conflict, I am reminded of the 
uncanny resemblance to the anti-Soviet jihad. Coalition efforts to hunt 
down the guerillas by “clearing” areas only to find out that the insurgents 
slip back in again once they have left hark back to similar efforts by the 
Red Army. (8, emphasis my own) 
Here, the stark difference between a failed conquest and a successful liber-
ation gives way to the “uncanny resemblance” between the two. After all, 
the vestiges of the Soviet era mentioned by Rumsfeld look a lot like the 
artifacts brought to Afghanistan by the Americans, suggesting the possi-
bility that the new empire will meet a similar fate (consider the frequency 
with which the heavily mythologized idea of Afghanistan as “a graveyard 
of empires” is invoked in post-9/11 Anglophone texts).4 
Yet perhaps the most important stake in representing the Soviets in 
Afghanistan and, even more importantly, portraying socialist Afghanistan 
of 1978–1992 lies in the controversial issue of representing socialism in the 
aftermath of its historical failure, or rather, its historical defeat. That the 
past of formerly socialist countries cannot be effectively articulated in the 
contemporary NATO-centric context has been noted by many research-
ers.5 After the end of the Cold War, the second world disappeared, and 
the postsocialist space became a silent non-region.6 These difficulties are 
further compounded when it comes to minor socialisms, such as Central 
Asian socialism, as compared to the more prominent Eastern European, 
Cuban, Chinese, or Soviet socialisms. While the best studies of nostalgia 
emerged out of considerations of how people in Eastern Europe and the 
former USSR dealt with their loss, addressing the possibility of communist 
nostalgia in Afghanistan has been a topic hard to breach. The post-9/11 
attempts to tell the story of socialist Afghanistan exemplify, perhaps, what 
Ananya Jahanara Kabir calls “post-amnesias”—the collective work of era-
sure of the Afghan socialist dream, a dream that solidified around 1965 
and by 1992 was ruined. Socialist Afghanistan is only conceivable as a 
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ruin—its inception, its existence, its troubled attempt at survival, its end, 
and finally, its complete erasure readable only through jumbled fragments 
and gaps in discourse, through its spectral remnants and toxic residue. 
And yet, these fragments and residue power up many narratives I examine 
in this book. Traces of such are detectable in many accounts, although 
mentioned only in passing: “While some [residents of Kabul] formerly 
supported [mujahid commander] Massoud, I detected a distinct nostalgia 
for the Soviet occupation days,” writes Girardet, known for his sympathies 
for the anti-Soviet mujahideen with whom he traveled throughout the 
Soviet-Afghan War era (Killing the Cranes 296). 
Furthermore, in the 1980s and beyond, the failures of state-sponsored 
socialism in Afghanistan, resulting in the Soviet-Afghan War, have become 
“a global symbol for the failure of Moscow’s Third World policies” (Westad 
378)—a figure for Soviet political, economic, and moral bankruptcy, as 
well as the insolvency of its world-making project. The violent end of 
socialist Afghanistan is thus not only a historical event in its own right, 
but a potent symbol of socialist ideology’s absolute and final defeat—a 
symbol that, when invoked, must remain so unambiguous that it settles 
all disputes about the future, and socialism’s potential role in that future. 
More than the end of Eastern European socialisms, the failure of the 
Soviets in Afghanistan continues to function as a global symbol of Soviet 
insolvency, even in the post-9/11 climate. International relations scholar 
Anthony James Joes, in his 2010 book aptly titled Victorious Insurgences, 
writes, characteristically: 
the Afghan struggle was more than an embarrassing colonial defeat for 
the world’s last multinational empire. By successfully refusing to be bul-
lied into a Central Asian imitation of Ceausescu’s Romania, the Afghan 
freedom fighters inflicted the first (but not the last) indisputable reverse on 
the “historical inevitability of Marxism-Leninism” in which Brezhnev 
had so devoutly believed. This double defeat helped stimulate the pro-
found pressures for change that were already building inside the Soviet 
empire, hastening its process of decomposition. (228, emphasis my own) 
The Soviet failure in Afghanistan here is proffered as an indisputable 
argument against socialism as such; it is presented as something that any 
freedom-loving people would have to be “bullied” into. In Joes’s text, 
we have what Alain Badiou calls “the propagandist use of the notion of 
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failure”—one invoked to foreclose a horizon of possibility, not only for 
the past, but for the present and future (6). Here is another characteristic 
quote from Joes: 
indisputably, by their resistance to the Soviet invasion, the brave, sorrow-
ful, martyred people of Afghanistan helped to alter the course of world 
politics. Thus Trotsky’s aphorism about the connection between Central 
Asia and Europe was vindicated with supreme irony: the cries of battle 
in the Afghan mountains found an echo in the shouts of freedom at the 
Berlin Wall. (229, emphasis my own) 
A psychoanalyst might argue that the almost compulsive rhetorical empha-
sis on indisputability in both paragraphs quoted from Joes’s book reveals 
a deep-seated anxiety precisely about such a dispute: What would hap-
pen if we started questioning the rhetorical uses of socialism’s failure in 
Afghanistan? How would it change our view of post-Cold War world 
politics, our view of ourselves and the values to which we subscribe? As 
Badiou argues: 
What really remains of the great ideological machinery of freedom, 
human rights, the West and its values? It all comes down to a simple 
negative statement that is as bald as it is flat and as naked as the day it 
was born: socialisms, which were the communist Idea’s only concrete 
forms, failed completely in the twentieth century. (3–4) 
Here I seek to call into question this indisputability by suggesting that, 
when it comes to writing about Afghanistan in NATO-centric contexts, 
we succumb to what writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie in her TED 
talk calls “the danger of a single story.” This chapter (and the next one) 
seeks to open a space for a different story, recovering the image of Afghan 
socialism from its ruins and restoring Afghan revolutionary history 
and the Afghan revolutionary subject to visibility. This effort is needed 
to correct a set of deeply entrenched Cold War-era biases that exist on 
both ends of the political spectrum and lead one to equate “the brave, 
sorrowful, martyred people of Afghanistan” (Joes 228) only with those 
who fought against socialism, condemning to historical invisibility those 
other Afghans who shared in the dream of universal emancipation and 
social justice. In truth, the people of Afghanistan, like any other people, 
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were divided among many lines of difference—traditionalist, monarchist, 
nationalist, anti-imperialist, fundamentalist, communist, and so forth. 
Afghanistan’s revolutionary era is a testament to how these differences, 
and the corresponding political projects, played out on Afghanistan’s soil. 
Given the symbolic value of Afghanistan as a ruin of communism, it 
is not surprising that the first properly didactic narrative on Afghanistan 
to emerge in the NATO-centric world after 9/11—Khaled Hosseini’s The 
Kite Runner (2003)—proffered the ruins of Kabul as resulting from “the 
communist coup d’état” and the subsequent Soviet invasion, pointing at the 
Soviets as the sole culprit and cause of destruction (36). In The Kite Runner, 
the Soviet invasion heralds the “official end” when “Russian tanks would 
roll into the very streets where Hassan and I played, bringing the death 
of the Afghanistan I knew” (36). In this immensely successful global best 
seller, the invasion by the Soviets is described as a grisly, macabre, over-
night takeover by a savage force from the North (Brodsky-style), comprised 
of bulldog-faced, shameless soldier-rapists led by corrupt officers. In the 
wake of the invasion, the novel’s protagonist promptly flees the country 
with his father to resettle and start a new life in Freemont, California, 
only to return to Kabul in 2000. The scene of the return is situated per-
fectly just a few months prior to the NATO-led invasion. Overwhelmed 
with the landscape of ruination that welcomes him, and noticing that 
Kabul’s formerly lush, tree-lined streets are now stripped, Amir, the main 
character, asks his local guide what happened to the trees. “The Shorawi 
[communists] cut a lot of them down,” the guide explains—leaving out the 
entire era of civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal, the era during 
which entire orchards were destroyed by the four years of rocket shelling 
by the warring militants who took Kabul in 1992 (246).7 This grisly story 
of Kabul’s protracted siege by the mujahideen is told by another Afghan 
writer, Qais Akbar Omar, whose work I discuss in chapter four. In the 
2007 cinematic version of The Kite Runner, the phrase morphs into an even 
more stark charge: “The Russians chopped them down” (Figure 2.1). 
Why does Hosseini—a debut novelist seeking to break into the post-
9/11 NATO-centric literary market—as well as the film director who 
further condenses the message for greater effect—resort to such gaudy 
anti-Sovietisms? Is it because one might expect that, in NATO-centric 
contexts, the audiences are well primed to see the Soviets as evil—ones who 
would chop down the trees in Kabul out of sheer hatred for nature, per-
haps? In her aptly titled article, “‘The Russians Acted Like the Russians,’” 
66 IMAGINING AFGHANISTAN
Joanne P. Sharp suggests that the othering of the Soviet Union in main-
stream US media in 1980–1990s was extreme. Her analysis of Reader’s 
Digest during this time period, reveals homogenizing, unsympathetic rep-
resentations, reinforcing “the picture of a homogenous population” (62), 
timelessness (“unchanging Soviet character,” 63), the trope of degenera-
tion (64), irrationality (64), “a moral void” (69), and an insistence of the 
radical difference between Americans and the Russians. Capitalizing on 
the legacy of the Cold War-era anti-Soviet bias is thus an easy shortcut 
for a writer seeking to make Afghanistan legible for the American public. 
What happens if we accept, for a minute, that the Soviets portrayed 
in global Anglophone contexts, during the Cold War and beyond, are just 
an image born out of fear, a figure of the global West’s own anxiety that 
persists, improbably, beyond the Cold War and into the 9/11 wars? While 
literary theorists today are deeply conscious of the dangers of Orientalism, 
and are resistant to both the generalization and the abstractions that may 
result from it, they are much less aware of the entrenched power of the 
deeply rooted Cold War tropes associated with the portrayal of social-
ism—abstractions of “red terror” that today, no doubt, serve to stave off 
any possibility of socialism’s revival. The cultural imaginary that proffers 
the image of what Jodi Dean calls “our Soviets” marks the Soviets as 
an abstract force of destruction, as the very figure of “authoritarianism, 
prison camps, and the inadmissibility of criticism”—a constellation that, 
Figure 2.1. Amir returning to Kabul in the 2007 film by Marc Forster.
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according to Dean, has little explanatory or historical valence but has 
tremendous consequences as it attempts, again and again, “to repress the 
communist alternative” as a vehicle of futurity and hope (29–32). This 
demarcation of socialism as a figure of total oppression circumscribes 
NATO-centric cultural imaginary in such a way that it is hard, if not 
impossible, to imagine socialism as an object of desire. And yet, in 1970s 
Afghanistan, socialism was precisely such an object. In his 1978 New Left 
Review article, historian Fred Halliday wrote that the 1978 communist 
revolution “at least temporarily embodied the hopes of a wide section of 
the population. . . . The novel character of the new regime soon became 
even more apparent. It committed itself to land reform, to equality of 
nationalities, to emancipating women, to a solution to the nomadic ques-
tion” (4).8 
In this chapter, via my analysis of Khaled Hosseini’s literary works 
on Afghanistan, I seek to bring into view Afghan socialism as an object 
of Afghan people’s desire, restoring to visibility the Afghan revolution-
ary subject doubly erased: first, by erasing the difference between Afghan 
socialism and the Soviet invasion, and second, by reducing the Afghan 
people to those who fought against communism. I also seek to inscribe 
the much-needed ambiguity into the heart of the narrative of the demonic 
Soviets, as well as into the corresponding narrative of the helpless Afghan 
victim conjured in Cold War-era texts (such as Brodsky’s poem) and per-
petuated in post-9/11 writing.9 I argue that, by summoning anti-Soviet 
cultural capital, and thus taking advantage of the accumulated bad press 
that the Soviets and the invasion received in the NATO-allied world 
during the Cold War and beyond, Hosseini, in The Kite Runner, strikes a 
Faustian bargain that both makes the text easy to consume (in NATO-
allied contexts), and simultaneously, forces him into a representational 
stalemate from which his subsequent two novels struggle to find a way 
out. To capitalize on the Soviet defeat and the Evil Empire as a literary 
commodity that would help the novel in the global literary market, The 
Kite Runner has to foreclose the possibility of Afghan agency, casting the 
Afghans as passive sufferers rather than revolutionary dreamers engaged 
in their own project of world-making. To bring the Faustian bargain 
of The Kite Runner into further relief, I juxtapose it with M. E. Hirsh’s 
Kabul (1986)—a long-forgotten, Cold War-era novel that focuses on the 
same period of Afghanistan’s history—the socialist revolution and the 
subsequent Soviet invasion—but results in a very different portrayal of 
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these events with very different consequences in terms of representing 
Afghan political agency. I also demonstrate that Hosseini’s choices in The 
Kite Runner result in a highly distorted, flawed narrative of Afghanistan’s 
recent history, thus betraying the novel’s didactic-realist premise. One 
of the main distortions was the author’s choice to not describe the forces 
(the US- and Saudi Arabia-sponsored Islamist fighter groups) that actu-
ally caused the destruction of Kabul in 1992, three years after the Soviet 
withdrawal and one year after the collapse of the USSR. I demonstrate 
how his following two novels—A Thousand Splendid Suns (2007) and And 
the Mountains Echoed (2013)—struggle to correct and amend the earlier 
narrative by including parts of history omitted in The Kite Runner and 
reframing the legacy of the Soviet period. These subsequent two novels at 
times exemplify, and at other times break through, post-Cold War apha-
sias, mapping the writer’s quandaries as he tries to articulate the project of 
Afghan socialist modernity and its place in the country’s history. 
From the perspective afforded by the second decade of the 9/11 wars 
(which led to the proliferation of failed states in the aftermath of US-led 
“humanitarian” invasions) and the widespread economic crisis, Hosseini’s 
novels’ ideological vacillations look particularly intriguing as they might 
index the changing zeitgeist. The market crash of 2008 and the Occupy 
Wall Street movement of 2011 exposed the crises of capitalism, forcing 
many to wonder whether the idea of communism as an alternative to mar-
ket capitalism that privileges the one percent is not without merit. More 
notably, the void left by the defeated Left becomes palpable as the specters 
of fascism rush to fill that space. While I was writing this book, even in 
NATO-centric contexts the question of the future was no longer bound 
by the promise of liberal capitalist democracy only. If in 1989, Fukuyama 
wrote about “the total exhaustion of viable alternatives to Western liberal-
ism” (1) and contended that “the class issue has actually been successfully 
resolved in the West” (8), by the onset of the second decade of the 9/11 
wars, a wave of massive economic and political crises enveloped the global 
North and the phrase “we are the 99%” indexed the return of class politics. 
To add, residents of the post-socialist world continue to suffer from what 
has been discussed by many as “communist nostalgia”—a nostalgia for the 
past but also a nostalgia for a particular vision of the future enabled by 
socialist dreaming. As Svetlana Boym puts it, “[c]ommunist teleology was 
extremely powerful and intoxicating; and its loss is greatly missed in the 
post-Communist world” (59). 
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As I trace Hosseini’s initial staging, and subsequent revisions, of his nar-
rative of Afghanistan’s recent history, as thrown against the background of 
Hirsh’s work, I deploy the concept of time as a shortcut to signal each text’s 
investment in a particular mode of inscribing Afghanistan’s revolutionary 
era. The first temporal mode (exemplified by Hosseini’s The Kite Runner) 
is an ahistorical (frozen) time of trauma; the second—a messianic, revolu-
tionary time, as depicted in M. E. Hirsh’s Kabul; the third is the nostalgic 
mode of A Thousand Splendid Suns in which the revolutionary era is seen, 
retrospectively, as women’s time. Finally, in And the Mountains Echoed, the 
revolutionary era disappears from view completely, as if time itself vanished 
inexplicably. By suturing the notion of socialism to the imagery of sexual 
violence (ahistorical trauma), as I will demonstrate, The Kite Runner attempts 
to write the socialist leftist project out of history, disallows an articulation of 
Afghanistan’s political diversity and subsequently, its agency, and justifies US 
interventionism and neocolonial ambitions. By contrast, Hirsh’s Kabul situ-
ates the invasion as a moment (one among many) within rich, revolutionary 
(messianic) time during which the people of Afghanistan are propelled into 
major political changes. By describing the diverse revolutionary forces that 
flourished in pre- and post-1979 Kabul, Hirsh’s novel resists issuing a call for 
rescue, suggesting that Afghans have a unique political history and culture 
that will allow them to find their own way to liberation and peace. Hosseini’s 
A Thousand Splendid Suns inscribes the Soviet period in Afghanistan’s history 
as women’s time, revising the simplistic narrative of ruination-via-the- 
Soviets of The Kite Runner and offering, paradoxically, a version of commu-
nist nostalgia—a nostalgia for the interrupted project of Afghan modernity. 
Yet this nostalgia dissipates in the last novel, as Afghanistan’s revolutionary 
history vanishes from view, leaving us with a vision of a bleak, corrupt, 
violence-ridden world without any hope for a better future. 
Before proceeding with the analysis of the novels, a brief note on 
the history of the events that unraveled in Afghanistan in 1978–1979 is 
in order. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred in December 1979, 
eighteen months after the Saur (April) Revolution of 1978, through which 
the Nur Muhammad Taraki-led faction of the socialist party (the People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan or PDPA) came to power. Afghan social-
ists overthrew the regime of Mohammed Daoud Khan, a member of the 
royal family, who had himself deposed his cousin’s kingdom and abolished 
the monarchy in 1973, coming to power with the help of multiple revolu-
tionary groups, including the PDPA. Contrary to a commonly held belief, 
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declassified historical documents now clearly show that the revolution was 
not orchestrated by the USSR, and in fact, it caught the Soviet political elite 
off guard. Furthermore, the Soviets were extremely loath to send their troops 
to assist the revolution unfolding in Kabul.10 The USSR’s reluctance is well 
documented. In response to Taraki’s repeated requests for military backing 
in the months following the revolution, Leonid Brezhnev—“by temper-
ament a cautious and circumspect man on international issues,” was not 
taking the idea of a military intervention lightly (Crews 319). He is known 
to have warned the newly minted leader that full Soviet intervention “would 
only play into the hands of our enemies.”11 Brezhnev also advised Taraki to 
slow down, seek support for his regime in the villages, and reconsider the 
timeline for his ambitious social reforms that were becoming increasingly 
unpopular, especially in the countryside. Alexei Kosygin, USSR chairman 
of the Council of Ministers, also criticized Taraki for his methods and 
warned him that Soviet “troops would have to fight not only with foreign 
aggressors but also with a certain number of your people. And people don’t 
forget such things.”12 
The Politburo’s attitude started to shift, however, after a protracted 
time of anxiously watching Taraki’s brutal means of enforcing reform com-
pliance in the countryside, which caused major uprisings, as well as the 
purges that resulted in hundreds of party members being imprisoned. The 
Soviets urged Taraki to broaden the regime base by setting up a coalition 
government, which would include not only members of the rival factions 
of the PDPA, but also members of the old regime (Westad 311). They 
also urged the new government to stop purges of the party and to release 
political prisoners. The final decision to send troops was made as the result 
of the assassination of Taraki by Hafizullah Amin—an even more radical 
member of the PDPA.13 Paradoxically, the Soviets intervened in December 
1979 not on behalf of but against the radical left-wing regime, deposing 
Amin and installing a much more moderate leader of the other wing of 
the socialist party (Pagram, “banner”) Babrak Karmal, who they believed 
could work successfully with the countryside and with the opposition. 
The Soviet invasion quickly led to even more resistance in the rural areas 
and the rise of jihad fighters (mujahideen), who were subsequently armed 
and supported financially by the United States and trained by the CIA.14 
The resulting civil war between the Soviet-supported Afghan state and 
the (increasingly transnational) jihad groups resulted in loss of life and 
displacement for millions of Afghan people. 
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The Time of Trauma 
Arguably, no one has done as much as Khaled Hosseini to popularize 
the image of Afghanistan within the global Anglophone context. The 
Kite Runner was published just eighteen months after the US invasion 
of Afghanistan, and propelled Hosseini into fame by explaining to the 
US-based and subsequently global audience curious about Afghanistan’s 
history and culture why the country was in such sorry shape. As Timothy 
Aubry points out, readers “seem to approach The Kite Runner either as 
an accurate record of Afghanistan’s recent history or as a preferable 
substitute for such record” (34). The most successful novel ever writ-
ten about Afghanistan and written entirely in the humanitarian mode, 
The Kite Runner seeks to make Afghanistan relatable, that is, empa-
thetically consumable by global, primarily Western audiences. As of the 
year 2018, it has been published in 46 languages. Teachers around the 
globe use the novel to introduce their students to the culture and his-
tory of Afghanistan. The film version of the story was screened in the 
White House upon its release in 2007. Laura Bush recommended The 
Kite Runner as one of her and her husband’s favorite books.15 Criticized 
by some scholars,16 it is lauded by others as a didactic narrative useful 
for teaching.17 My reading here brings into view something that existing 
literary criticism does not address, but that, in my view, constitutes the 
crux of the novel—the set of distortions and omissions that I refer to as 
Hosseini’s Faustian bargain. 
The Kite Runner constructs pre-1979 Kabul as a simplistic geogra-
phy of imagined social cohesion, free of political dissent—a beautiful 
city spoiled only by the racism of the few. By contrasting the images of 
beautiful pre-war Kabul with the images of bone-chilling destruction and 
violence that the Soviets initially bring and the Taliban complete, the 
novel issues, post-2001, a powerful call for a humanitarian (presumably 
US-sponsored) intervention that would restore the city to its former glory: 
“I dream that lawla flowers will bloom in the streets of Kabul again and 
rubab music will play in the samovar houses and kites will fly in the skies” 
(218). The narrative arc of the first part of the novel unfolds in one of 
Kabul’s wealthy neighborhoods—the artfully chiseled site of Amir’s (the 
protagonist’s) childhood sold to the reader with a pinch of Orientalist spice. 
The exoticism of the bazaars, along with descriptions of mysterious desert 
nomads caravanning with their camels through the streets of Kabul are 
pleasantly contrapuntal to the scenes depicting Amir’s protected, rather 
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modern life in his father’s mansion. In the narrator’s memory, pre-war 
Kabul emerges as a peaceful, provincial, yet strikingly beautiful place— 
“a perfectly encapsulated morsel of good past” (123): 
Friday afternoon in Paghman. An open field of grass speckled with 
mulberry trees in blossom. Hassan and I stand ankle-deep in untamed 
grass, I am tugging on the line, the spool spinning in Hassan’s calloused 
hands, our eyes turned up to the kite in the sky. [. . .] From somewhere 
over the low brick wall at the other end of the field, we hear chatter and 
laughter and the chirping of a water fountain. And music, something old 
and familiar. I think it’s Ya Mowlah on rubab strings. Someone calls our 
names over the wall, says it’s time for tea and cake. (122–123)
In this sentimental sketch, Kabul is presented as a tranquil paradise of 
an Oriental variety through a rather extreme agglomeration of positively 
coded imagery that appeals to all of our senses: an open field, blue skies, 
trees in blossom, the chirping of a fountain, chatter and laughter, music, 
a friend’s calloused hands, tea and cake. Such descriptions work well to 
conjure the image of pre-war Kabul as a city of social cohesion almost 
completely free of social antagonisms and conflict. 
Racism is foregrounded as the main, perhaps the only, issue that trou-
bles pre-socialist Kabul. It is presented as an exception to the general 
rule of social harmony, and becomes central to the novel’s plot. Racism is 
examined through Amir’s relationship with his best friend and servant, 
Hassan. The issue of race is a clever device employed to solidify the con-
nection between the Afghan protagonist and an American reader.18 I use 
the term racism instead of the term ethnic difference because The Kite Runner 
strategically reduces Afghanistan’s ethnic diversity to a binary vision of 
race that an American reader will find easy to grasp: Amir, the master’s 
heir, is a Caucasian-looking Pashtun, and Hassan, a servant, is an Asian-
looking Hazara. What is being erased by the binary depiction of race is 
Afghan specificity; the ethnic structure of Afghanistan is in no way binary 
but consists of four major ethnic groups: Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and 
Hazaras. The complex web of ethnic differences (including linguistic and 
religious, such as Sunni and Shia differences) would be harder to explain 
to a Western audience and would interrupt a seamless process of identi-
fication with the characters. The racist binary the novel constructs serves 
to exemplify all that is “bad” in pre-socialist Afghanistan.19 In the novel’s 
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central scene, the narrator watches Hassan get raped by a sociopathic racist 
named Assef and becomes implicated in the crime when he does nothing 
to rescue his friend. Hassan’s racialized body (“He is just a Hazara,” says 
Assef [76]) is also a feminized, penetrable body that connotes passivity, 
powerlessness, and a silent acceptance of its fate. The logic and the vocab-
ulary deployed in the description of Hassan’s rape are then redeployed in 
the descriptions of the Soviet invasion and later in Amir’s encounter with 
the Taliban. 
It is hard to overstate the centrality of the image of rape in Hosseini’s 
book. Its efficacy lies in its visceral nature; Hosseini’s messages about 
Afghanistan’s history are organized and maintained around the imagery 
of sexual violence. The act of rape Amir witnesses scrambles the narrative 
flow, causing it to become fragmented; the scene is recounted through a 
mix of flashbacks and disjointed associations that take the narrator in and 
out of the event, back into the past and forward into the future. Perception 
becomes fragmentary, erratic, and the senses themselves unreliable: 
I stopped watching, turned away from the alley. Something warm was 
running down my wrist. I blinked, saw I was still biting down on my 
fist, hard enough to draw blood from the knuckles. I realized something 
else. I was weeping. From just around the corner, I could hear Assef ’s 
quick, rhythmic grunts. (77) 
The image that Amir’s memory blasts out of the sensory shock of having 
witnessed an act of sexual violence is the image of Hassan’s face. Hassan’s 
face resembles the face of a sacrificial lamb—an image of resignation, 
ritual sacrifice, and above all, purity (76). Profoundly good-natured, loyal, 
and chaste, yet lacking the power to resist the thugs, Hassan metonym-
ically stands for the country itself—also “good,” yet passive, feminized, 
and unable to resist its invaders. Hassan’s fate is linked to the fate of 
Afghanistan, and his rape serves as an allegorical representation of the 
fate suffered by the nation at large. 
The underlying image of Kabul as a “good” (even if tragically flawed) 
place frames the novel’s representation of the Soviet invasion of 1979—a 
pivotal event of Amir’s childhood that propels him and his father away 
from the country into exile in California. Visceral images of sexual vio-
lence are used to frame and explain the event to the reader. The Kite 
Runner mobilizes a Western reader’s preexisting set of beliefs pertaining 
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to socialism as an illogical and an unnatural system, depicting the arrival 
of the Soviets as a “rape” of the pristine terrain by foreign forces seeking to 
impose an incomprehensible political system upon an internally coherent 
culture. Reminiscent of Brodsky’s poem, the novel dramatizes and explains 
the invasion as the rape of Kabul—tanks are ripping through the streets 
of a sleeping city at night, Kalashnikov-wielding (phallic) soldiers march-
ing up and down the boulevards, “their turrets swiveling like accusing 
fingers” (113). In his representation of the invasion, Hosseini employs a 
variety of Cold War-era “othering” strategies best captured, for lack of a 
better word, as Cold War Orientalisms.20 In Hosseini’s text, the Soviets 
are presented as both the destroyers of the Oriental landscape but also 
as themselves Oriental. This depiction reveals the novel’s NATO-centric 
position, a cultural location from which both Afghanistan and the Soviet 
Union appear to be Oriental “other”—the first constructed strategically 
as benign orient, a passive feminized victim in need of saving; the second 
depicted as aggressive, malevolent orient, a ruthless sexual predator. Sharp, 
in her review of late Cold War-era representations of the USSR, asserts 
that while there are many similarities between Orientalism as described 
by Edward Said and the set of tropes that serve to frame representations 
of the Soviet Union, they diverge when it comes to the issue of gender-
ing. Specifically, “the gendering of the USSR seems to be the opposite to 
that of the Orient. RD [Reader’s Digest] articles [about the USSR] do not 
evoke the West’s penetration or subjugation of its Other. Instead the Soviet 
Union is pictured as the aggressor or the forceful masculine courter” (67). 
One can trace the residue of this framing in the more recent obsession in 
the US culture with Vladimir Putin’s masculinity, leading, at times, to 
rather absurd anxieties about feminized America.21 
The Soviet invasion in Hosseini’s book is depicted quite literally as 
an instance of an inexplicable, sudden violence inflicted on virgin land 
by a stranger, with no connection to the history of Afghanistan. It occurs 
in the “frozen” time of trauma—time outside of a historical process, as a 
singular event without a cause that creates a rift in the continuity of the 
protagonist’s psychic life and in the coherent narrative of national history. 
Amir’s memories of that time are fragmented, inconsistent, and do not 
cohere into a continuous narrative. They form a constellation of jumbled, 
gut-wrenching sensations, all of which are unwelcome intrusions into the 
psyche, and importantly, into the body of the narrator. They are convul-
sions caused by sonic waves, acrid fumes, and nausea: 
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scattered bits and pieces of memory that come and go, most of it sounds 
and smells: MiGs roaring past overhead; staccatos of gunfire; a donkey 
braying nearby; the jingling of bells and mewing of sheep; gravel crushed 
under the truck’s tires; a baby wailing in the dark; the stench of gasoline, 
vomit, and shit. (123) 
The implicit link between socialism and rape becomes explicit in the 
scene where Amir and his father are being smuggled out of Afghanistan. 
The Soviet soldier who searches the truck wants to rape an Afghan woman 
(a nursing mother with a baby on her lap and a terrified husband by her 
side), and Amir’s father heroically saves her. In this powerful, viscerally 
gripping scene, the Afghan family assumes the status of the Holy Family 
while the Soviet soldier is cast as a pervert who interrupts the heteronor-
mative family structure seen as indigenous, proper, and sacred: 
The soldier wanted a half hour with the lady in the back of the truck.
The young woman pulled the shawl down over her face. Burst into tears. 
The toddler sitting in her husband’s lap started crying too. The husband’s 
face had become as pale as the moon hovering above. He told Karim to 
ask “Mister Soldier Sahib” to show a little mercy, maybe he had a sister 
or a mother, maybe he had a wife too. The Russian listened to Karim and 
barked a series of words. [. . .] “Agha Sahib,” Karim said, “These Roussi 
are not like us. They understand nothing about respect, honor.” (115) 
The description of the soldier is packed with images of sexual predation: 
he is “bulldog-faced,” “grinning,” with a “cigarette dangling from the side 
of his mouth,” has a barking voice, and is humming a wedding song as he 
expresses his wish to rape the young mother (114). “There is no shame in 
war,” he says (115)—a phrase evocative of Brodsky’s “the color of shame 
has all gone into banners.” The narrator finds himself hypnotized by this 
terrifying scenario, experiencing a sense of disassociation and shock rem-
iniscent of the moment he witnessed the rape of Hassan (Figure 2.2). 
Hosseini deploys sexual imagery consistently and to a great effect to 
outline the contours of the enemies of the land—the Soviets and later the 
Taliban, who are, not surprisingly, also the enemies of the Anglo-American 
geopolitical axis. If communism is explained through the image of a sol-
dier-rapist, the Taliban are later explained through Assef, who has grown 
76 IMAGINING AFGHANISTAN
up to become a child molester and a Talib commander. Thus, the fanatical 
Taliban is, paradoxically, positioned as a successor to the atheist Soviet rule. 
In turn, Afghanistan’s continuous victimization is explained through the 
continuity of suffering endured by Hassan, and during the Taliban era, by 
his son, Sohrab: both innocent children, they are likened to sacrificial lambs 
in the hands of their assailants. The body of a communist is thus sutured to 
the Talib body through the idea of perverse sexual violence that disrupts het-
eronormative family structures by preying on children and nursing mothers. 
Figure 2.2. A scene from the 2007 film. The truck is pulled over during Amir 
and his father’s escape from Afghanistan and the refugees are confronted by a 
Soviet soldier.
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In doing so, the narrative also sutures the notion of heteronormativity to 
the vision of the nation, and the idea of the child’s purity to the image of 
Afghanistan, trafficking in what Elizabeth Anker calls “patronizing fictions 
of Third World purity” (Fictions of Dignity 41). This is not entirely surprising. 
As Jasbir Puar explains, “queerness is always already installed in the project 
of naming the terrorist; the terrorist does not appear as such without the con-
current entrance of perversion, deviance, deformity.”22 To this one can add 
that queerness is also installed in the project of naming a communist, who 
cannot be articulated outside of the discourse of failure: moral failure, the 
failure of heteronormative family structure, and ultimately, historical failure. 
The imagery of sexual violence punctuates the narrative strategically; it 
decontextualizes the key developments in Afghanistan’s history, rendering 
them ahistorical and illogical. For instance, upon Amir’s brief return to 
the land of his childhood, Kabul is a spectral city, a mere skeleton of what 
it used to be: 
The cratered streets were flanked by little more than ruins of shelled 
buildings and abandoned homes. We passed the rusted skeleton of an 
overturned car, a TV set with no screen half-buried in rubble, a wall 
with the words ZENDA BAD TALIBAN! (Long live the Taliban!) 
sprayed in black. (251) 
This spectacular destruction is blamed on the Soviets (246) and the 
Taliban where both are presented as mythical forces of violence, leaving 
the narrator, along with the reader, bewildered at the sheer scale of Kabul’s 
ruination. 
The way in which the Soviet invasion is represented in The Kite Runner 
is troublesome for three distinct reasons. First and foremost, it betrays the 
impossibility of narrating socialism other than as failure, aberration, and 
perversion, foreclosing the prospect of any discussion of any transformative 
potential it might have contained. In doing so, it forecloses the possibility 
of discourse of and about socialism as a political project that has any kind 
of validity in the future. Second, by presenting the Soviet invasion as 
the prime cause of the destruction of the country, Hosseini conveniently 
avoids all mention of the CIA-trained mujahideen (the jihad fighters),23 
and therefore absolves the US of its key role in arming, financially sup-
porting, and coaching the jihad fighters, a legacy that continues to create 
instability worldwide today and that came to bear on 9/11. Hosseini’s 
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omission of the mujahideen and their chief role in the complete destruction 
of Kabul in 1992 is so glaring that the author had to address and correct 
this misrepresentation of the country’s recent history in his second and 
third novels. Finally, The Kite Runner perpetuates the Orientalist idea of 
a third-world nation’s purity and passivity, which has long-reaching con-
sequences. Afghanistan appears as having no political history or political 
culture of its own, and thus no agency and no role in its own history other 
than that of a victim or a pawn. The novel thus renders invisible the Afghan 
revolutionary subject—a gesture that is brought into relief through a com-
parison with a late Cold War-era novel by M. E. Hirsh: Kabul. 
Revolutionary Time 
Hirsh’s text describes the same time period and serves as an important 
counterpoint to Hosseini’s international best seller. It was originally pub-
lished in 1986 by St. Martin’s Griffin and seems to have received very 
little attention that year.24 It was reissued in the aftermath of 9/11 (June 
2002) when the reading public developed an interest in Afghanistan due 
to the events of 9/11 and subsequent US-led invasion. A survey of reader 
responses on Amazon and Goodreads reveals two facts: Kabul boasts a much 
smaller readership as compared to The Kite Runner, and the readers of 
Kabul are self-selecting as they disclose that they had a preexisting interest 
in regard to the history and culture of Afghanistan as a result of their prior 
exposure to other texts, often The Kite Runner.25 
The novel Kabul is similar to The Kite Runner in many ways. Written 
in English and for the Anglophone, NATO-centric audience, it offers 
descriptions of the Afghan capital by focusing on the very same period: 
1973–1980. However, it avoids many of the pitfalls of Hosseini’s text. For 
instance, it carefully contextualizes the Soviet invasion by describing a 
series of internal sociopolitical transitions that occurred in Afghanistan in 
the years preceding the invasion (1973–1979), from monarchy to republic 
and then from republic to Afghan socialist rule. Specifically, it describes 
the protagonists’ discontent with monarchy and later the republic and 
follows them in their fascination with the promises of nationalism and 
socialism. It also examines the reasons why students in Kabul favored and 
put their hopes in the socialist party of Afghanistan (PDPA). 
Critically revisiting a novel from 1986 (that in many ways serves as 
a ghost image to the more popular The Kite Runner) allows for an artic-
ulation of the Afghan socialist project from a historical “elsewhere”—the 
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moment before its historical failure, when it was still a real possibility 
for the future. The novel is Afghan nationalist in its political orientation 
(postcolonial nationalist) and speaks powerfully against the invasion 
by the Soviets. It is also a Cold War-era text published in the United 
States—all of which contribute to its anticommunist pathos. At the 
same time, however, the novel manages to accommodate a multiplicity 
of voices and political perspectives. The characters’ identities are com-
plex and paradoxical: the main character, Mangal, is a “nationalist who 
couldn’t tie his own turban” (12)—a royal minister’s son and a journalist 
for Kabul Times (an official newspaper), who now conspires against the 
monarchy by coordinating the production of a revolutionary newspaper 
called The New Homeland. Roshana, Mangal’s fiancée, is a feminist whose 
face features a scar from an acid attack, but who puts on a burqa to con-
ceal her identity when she goes to the underground political meetings 
held at a bazaar shop. Mangal’s father is a royalist and works for the king. 
He says, “If the monarchy falls, that’s the end” (53). Mangal’s brother, 
Tor, a perpetual troublemaker and a college dropout, will eventually join 
the mujahideen in the mountains. 
The socialist perspective is represented by Mangal’s younger sister, 
Saira, who has legitimate reasons to be skeptical of Afghan nationalism, 
since she is driven into exile because of the culture’s double standard 
regarding women’s and men’s premarital sexual behavior. The author is 
thorough in describing this double standard: both siblings—Mangal and 
his sister—attend college in the West (Europe and the United States), 
and each have a lover during their college years. While Mangal remains 
unscathed by his premarital sexual escapades, his sister’s marriage is 
called off when her personal diary containing evidence of her premar-
ital affair in the United States is discovered. Later, while in exile in 
the United States, Saira dates a communist, Andrew, a Soviet official 
working for the embassy of the Soviet Union. The novel thus brings into 
view the various characters’ emancipatory desires; specifically, socialist 
ideology with its emphasis on women’s rights, represents, for Saira, an 
alternative to the patriarchally inflected Afghan nationalism her brother 
subscribes to. 
In stark contrast to the works discussed in chapter one, Hirsh’s Kabul 
is featured as a global city and an active participant in global conversations. 
Tensions between the Kabul-Moscow and the Kabul-New York axes are 
foregrounded, but the agency of the Afghan people is never diminished. 
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The novel unfolds in a messianic, revolutionary time—a point in time when 
various futures seem equally possible. If in The Kite Runner Afghanistan’s 
capital city is presented as peaceful and provincial, Hirsh’s novel depicts 
Kabul as a global place that is mercurial, unstable, and ripe with possibili-
ties, with various underground political movements trying to capitalize on 
the unsteadiness of the king’s regime. While The Kite Runner inscribes the 
Soviet invasion as an ahistorical trauma, Kabul positions it as a moment 
in the revolutionary period in Afghanistan. The novel’s beginning chap-
ters capture the moment in time when various futures hang suspended in 
potentiality (1973), giving way to a quickly unraveling era of revolutionary 
changes (from 1973 on). 
In his “On the Concept of History,” Benjamin introduces the notion 
of a messianic time that he views as true historical time.26 Messianic time 
is contrasted with empty, homogenous time that is inseparable from the 
idea of repetition. The “new” is forever destined to reproduce the “old,” 
that is, until the advent of a “zero hour”—a messianic moment that is 
nonlinear and open-ended, “blasting open” the continuum of repetition 
and fate. In a similar gesture, Fanny Söderbäck positions revolutionary 
time as “a movement of return that, through displacement and alteration, 
generates renewal while acknowledging the unpredictable status of the 
future (that we are ‘still to come’).”27 Messianic time has an affective 
quality to it. It is pregnant with the promise of redemption, the aptitude 
for making things right. In such a time, the past exerts pressure upon the 
present, while the present becomes molten, plasma-like, and the future 
unpredictable. 
Hirsh’s portrayal of this remarkable period in Afghanistan’s history 
is consistent with contemporary historical research that emphasizes the 
extent to which Afghan revolutionary movements were both self-conscious 
of their role in shaping the country’s history and bound with global polit-
ical movements. In Afghan Modern, Robert D. Crews writes of Afghan 
political actors’ 
conviction that something truly momentous and universal was underway 
in Afghanistan from the late 1970s. “Revolution” was the key word that 
seemed to capture the political moment. From left to right, these [rev-
olutionary] thinkers resembled so many others in the twentieth century 
who saw themselves as participants . . . in an entangled drama of war 
and revolution that was “of cosmic significance.” (231) 
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Fred Halliday, in his analysis of the events that predated the Saur Revolution 
of 1978, talks about “a highly charged atmosphere in Kabul” in 1970s (24); 
he notes that “by the early seventies, an air of suppressed but intense mili-
tancy existed at least among the intelligentsia” (25). The revolutionary time 
described in Kabul is characterized by a sense of a crisis of the old royalist 
regime and a sense of potential for change. Reminiscent of Lenin’s descrip-
tion of a revolutionary situation, the ruling elite is depicted as weak and 
corrupt while powerful forces gain prominence and influence from below, 
such as nationalist groups, right-wing Islamist, and left-wing socialist and 
feminist groups.28 In Hirsh’s Kabul, traditional structures of society are 
set into motion, and even family loyalty—so central in traditional Pashtun 
life—is not exempt from this sense of rupture and crisis. Mangal, a king’s 
minister’s son and an aspiring bureaucrat himself, is depicted in his fasci-
nation with the idea of the regime change. On the eve of the coup of 1973 
that ends the monarchy in Afghanistan, he agrees to join Prince Daoud in 
his takeover and becomes a member of his government, effectively betray-
ing his royalist father who loses his post as a result of the coup. 
Kabul explores the city’s internal geography to expose sites of differ-
ence and political diversity, revealing a complex geography of dissensus. 
This geography forces the reader to suspend judgment and interrupt the 
deployment of stereotypes about what Kabul, or Afghanistan, ought to be: 
The bazaar edged the old quarter—a labyrinth of mud-brick houses 
climbing the rock face in ragged tiers. Stooping as if to adjust a sandal, 
[Mangal] glanced behind him, then slipped down the alley in back of 
Khalid’s tea shop. 
Six tense faces looked up from the table as he came into the room. 
Tonight only a fraction of the group would participate, to minimize the 
risk, and except for Ahmed they had all arrived before him. Since tea 
shops were still a male preserve, Roshana always carried a basket, like 
a delivery, and it stood filled with peaches in the center of the table. A 
pleated gray silk chadri was folded over the back of her chair. (20) 
Here the bazaar—an Orientalist stock image—is just a façade, a prop for 
underground political life, a complex geography of conspiratorial activity 
and political agitation. And so is the burqa (chadri) that Roshana wears—it 
is also just a front that conceals her revolutionary identity. The market and 
the identities of the characters are not what they seem to be; impenetrable 
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for an outsider, they reveal their meaning to those who know how to read 
their secret code. The bazaar, perhaps the most unmodern of all places, 
here figures as a space where different projects for the Afghan modernity 
are discussed, disputed, dismantled, and put together again; a place where 
political alliances are forged, transnational connections are made, and var-
ious possibilities for the political future of the country are rehearsed. By 
describing the city’s microgeography of political dissent, the novel manages 
to demonstrate how the global political conversations and struggles tra-
verse Kabul, turning it into a global city in the epicenter of a transnational 
ideological battle for the hearts and minds of both the workers and the 
intellectual elite. 
Because the city’s internal geography of political diversity and dissent 
is so thoroughly described, the ways in which certain pivotal events are 
interpreted changes as well. For instance, the Soviet invasion is depicted 
as a consequence of a series of political upheavals, one of many, rather than 
the main cause of everything that has gone wrong. This, again, is in line 
with historical research; Westad, among other contemporary historians 
of the Cold War, explains that by the late 1970s, US elites were “seeing 
revolutions [in the Third World] as the result of Soviet involvement rather 
than a cause of it” (332, emphasis in original). Contrary to this notion, as 
Westad, Crews, and Maley demonstrate, the April revolution was unex-
pected by the Soviets and caught them off guard. Crews writes: 
The successful 27 April 1978 Khalq coup in Kabul was . . . as much 
a surprise to Alexandr Puzanov, Soviet ambassador since 1972, as to 
other diplomats in the Afghan capital. In his first comprehensive report 
to Moscow after the coup, Puzanov gave a sober assessment of the new 
regime and its coming to power. The coup had been badly prepared, 
Puzanov explained, and its main figures—Taraki and Amin—were both 
given to ultra-left initiatives. (302) 
While in Hosseini’s novel, the Soviet invasion of 1979 (an event he 
does not distinguish from the Afghan homegrown socialist revolution of 
1978) figures as the ultimate trauma; in Hirsh’s text, the events that are 
traumatic differ for each character because of their political affiliations. 
For the father—a royalist—the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973 signals 
catastrophe. For the older son, Mangal, who joins the king’s overthrower, 
Prince Daoud, the downfall of the monarchy is a good thing, but the 
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coup by the socialist party of Afghanistan (1978) signals ruination. As 
Daoud’s government is deposed, Mangal loses his post and eventually 
his life. The “tanks in Kabul” image, although chilling, is contextualized 
as well. The reader learns that the arrival of the tanks marks an internal 
revolution in which the left-wing Afghan socialists come to power—the 
Saur Revolution of 1978. The Russian tanks that surround the palace, 
although built in Russia, are piloted by the Afghan military that allied 
itself with the socialist revolutionary forces, and so are the Russian-built 
MiGs that traverse the sky.
The novel is didactic: It explains why the reluctant Soviets eventually 
do send their troops in December 1979, not to install communism, but 
to depose Hafizullah Amin, an Afghan communist who seizes power in 
September 1979 and who is seen by the Soviets as too radical for a tra-
ditional society such as Afghanistan. The Soviets install a much more 
moderate leader, Babrak Karmal. The Soviet invasion (although the author 
condemns it passionately) is thus presented not as an exceptional event, 
but one among many political transformations, coups, and upheavals that 
take place in Afghanistan in the 1970s—during its “messianic,” revolu-
tionary era. By uncoupling homegrown Afghan revolutionary identities 
from the Soviet troops,29 and by allowing various visions for Afghanistan’s 
modernity to be articulated, the novel resists the ideological closure present 
in The Kite Runner and complicates the dominant modes of consuming 
Afghanistan’s history, ultimately bringing into visibility the Afghan revo-
lutionary subject. As such, this text from a historical “elsewhere” provides 
an alternative model for imagining Afghanistan in twenty-first-century 
Anglophone literature. 
Communist Nostalgia 
Given the intensity of Hosseini’s anti-communist sentiment in The Kite 
Runner, it is remarkable that, in his second novel, he undertakes a revi-
sion of his narrative of Afghan socialism and conjures a cautious vision of 
communist nostalgia. This revision not only dislodges the symbolic value 
of Afghanistan as a ruin of communism, but also inscribes the Afghan 
socialist era as the high watermark for women’s rights in Afghanistan. 
This positive image of socialism is unstable, as Hosseini, in this novel 
as well, is anxious to distance himself from communism in general, and 
various complaints about communist repression are found throughout 
the novel. And yet, Hosseini must be credited for breaking through the 
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post-Cold War aphasias that result in Afghan socialism’s complete era-
sure (or its reduction to a Soviet imposition). The inscription of socialist 
modernity as the era of women’s emancipation also dislodges the status 
of the pre-socialist past as the golden age. Where The Kite Runner finds 
an idyllic landscape of social cohesion, A Thousand Splendid Suns reveals 
geographies of pervasive gender and class inequality, which the socialist 
project is meant to interrupt. Additionally, Hosseini’s sophomore novel 
revises the prior narrative of Afghanistan’s history by describing in detail 
the atrocities committed by mujahideen forces in Kabul and contextualiz-
ing the mujahideen rule, more generally, as an era in which the advances 
of women’s rights were halted, and then dramatically reversed. These 
revisions indicate that Hosseini is serious about his didactic-realist project 
of educating Western publics about Afghanistan’s history and culture. 
However, even these efforts contain elements of the Faustian bargain: 
Afghanistan is still represented primarily in the humanitarian mode, and 
questions of historical complicity—ones that implicate Western audiences 
in the very scenes of Afghan women’s crisis—are still largely bracketed 
out. The mujahideen are presented as a violent, but an autochthonous 
force, and questions of Western involvement in this patriarchal restoration 
are left unaddressed. 
Published in 2007, A Thousand Splendid Suns, although failing to 
achieve the success of its predecessor, nevertheless boasts significant read-
ership and the status of a top New York Times best seller. By centering on 
the lives and fates of two female characters—Mariam and Laila—the novel 
capitalizes on the success of the specific genre that gained ascendance in 
the era of the 9/11 wars: stories written about the plight of third-world 
Muslim women—“women of cover,” as George W. Bush referred to them.30 
The novel begins in the same time period as its predecessor—the golden 
age of Afghanistan (prior to revolutionary changes), which is now pre-
sented less favorably, due to the differences in the class and the gender of 
the protagonists. Whereas Amir (The Kite Runner) is a privileged son of a 
prominent businessman in Kabul, Mariam—the older of the novel’s two 
central characters—is a harami: an illegitimate child fathered outside of 
wedlock, a daughter of an unmarried, poor, mentally unstable mother who 
commits suicide when Mariam is still a youth. Such unfavorable circum-
stances result in Mariam’s early marriage to a man in his forties who takes 
her from her native and provincial Herat to metropolitan Kabul. Socially 
and religiously conservative, Mariam’s husband insists on her wearing a 
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burqa in the rapidly modernizing city where many women choose not to 
wear any head coverings, adopting a modern look during the last years 
of the monarchy—a trend that becomes the new state-sponsored norm 
during the socialist era that follows. Mariam’s world is one of confinement 
and submission; lacking education or practical skills that would enable 
her independence, Mariam is resigned to her fate as a captive housewife. 
When multiple miscarriages prove her useless to her older husband, she 
finds herself trapped in a relationship that is physically and emotionally 
abusive. The issue of class is addressed not only via Mariam’s lack of oppor-
tunities for personal development, but also through her husband’s response 
to the news of the socialist revolution. When Afghan communists come 
to power in Kabul, Mariam asks her husband whether this is good or bad. 
“Bad for the rich, by the sound of it,” her husband responds. “Maybe not 
so bad for us” (102). Her husband, who is a shoemaker earning a modest 
income through his craft, neither fears the communists nor expects his life 
to change with the advent of the new regime. 
The changes brought forth by the revolutionary government are 
exemplified by the novel’s second main character, Laila (Mariam’s 
neighbor), who belongs to a new generation of Afghan women—those 
who grew up during the socialist era. Laila embodies the Revolution 
most literally. She is known at school as Inqilabi Girl (Revolutionary 
Girl) because she was born on the day of the socialist revolution in April 
1978 (112). Raised to believe in her limitless potential realized through 
education and hard work, Laila comes of age in a world that not only 
tolerates but actively promotes gender equality. Laila’s timid and loving 
father, a university-educated man and a vocal advocate of women’s rights, 
says: “This is a good time to be a woman in Afghanistan.” He insists 
that she put all her energy into learning: “Marriage can wait, education 
cannot . . . a society has no chance of success if its women are uneducated, 
Laila. No chance” (114). A generation apart, Laila and Mariam have 
dramatically different experiences as Afghan women. Laila is born into 
a world where women see a radical expansion of their rights and enjoy 
full access to public life. Laila’s world is also one in which strong Afghan 
women who can serve as role models for independence and success are 
abundant. While in The Kite Runner, sexual assault and phallic, harassing 
Soviet soldiers served as figures for socialism, in A Thousand Splendid Suns, 
the socialist era is captured via a completely different figure, one of an 
empowered Afghan woman: 
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[Laila’s teacher] was a sharp-faced young woman with heavy eyebrows. 
On the first day of school, she had proudly told the class that she was the 
daughter of a poor peasant from Khost. She stood straight, and wore her 
jet-black hair pulled tightly back and tied in a bun so that, when Khala 
Rangmaal turned around, Laila could see the dark bristles on her neck. 
Khala Rangmaal did not wear makeup or jewelry. She did not cover and 
forbade the female students from doing it. She said women and men 
were equal in every way and there was no reason women should cover 
if men didn’t. (111) 
This passage serves as a counterpoint to claims—found in many over-
views of the Afghan socialist era—about the unbridgeable divide between 
Afghan city and Afghan countryside that resulted in the defeat of social-
ism. Such difference, no doubt, existed and proved to be a considerable 
obstacle to both the literacy program and the land reform initiated by 
Taraki’s and Karmal’s governments; however, it is also true that many 
Afghans who supported the socialist project were first-generation students 
whose parents had been peasants. Additionally, the social mobility created 
by the socialist state’s endorsement of the universal literacy program and its 
investment in higher education country-wide cannot be overstated. The key 
role of the state in promoting gender equality and thus empowering wom-
en’s flight from patriarchy are exemplified by scenes from Laila’s school; her 
teacher’s rhetoric of personal emancipation reflects the official position of 
the Afghan socialist party that in its first declaration proclaimed that one 
of its chief aims was “ensuring the equality of the rights of women and men 
in all social, economic, political, cultural, and civil aspects” (Westad 399). 
While Hosseini supplements his portrayal of the positive aspects of 
socialist educational reforms with critical remarks that seek to expose 
other aspects of the regime that he sees much less favorably (for example, 
Laila’s progressive father was fired from his position as a schoolteacher 
by Afghan communists), this revision of the narrative of Afghanistan’s 
history is significant. The Afghans in this sophomore book are presented 
as active adopters rather than passive sufferers of the new ideology. This 
is consistent with historical accounts of that era. Describing the changes 
in gender relations during the socialist period, Timothy Nunan, a histo-
rian of Cold War-era Afghanistan, argues, that “Soviet ideas about ‘the 
woman question’ found fertile soil in Kabul. The more women attended 
Kabul University and Soviet-sponsored Kabul Polytechnic University, the 
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wider their worlds grew” (186). Indicative of the changes occurring during 
this time period is the following anecdote that serves well to illustrate 
the cultural climate in the Afghan capital, in which women’s growing 
participation in public life grated against some of the commonly held 
assumptions: 
One alumna saw a team of five Soviet engineers—four men, one 
woman—moving into an apartment in the Mikrorayon neighborhood. 
Reared on stories about the evils of Communism, she assumed that the 
woman was the men’s shared property. Only later did she discover that 
the woman was their supervisor. (Nunan 186, emphasis in original) 
In her Narrating Post/Communism, Nataša Kovačević reminds us of 
the historical significance of Marxist ideology and communism as “a line 
of flight” from colonial dependence upon Western Europe, from “the 
stigma of economic and cultural inferiority, escape from the logic of cap-
ital and the logic of being the ‘other’” (17). Similarly, Marxist ideology 
served as a “line of flight” from patriarchal oppression endemic in many 
traditional societies. Women’s advancement during the socialist decade in 
Afghanistan was unprecedented. Shahnaz Khan writes that, by the end of 
the 1980s, Afghan women occupied 
prominent positions in urban areas and in the PDPA government as 
members of the National Assembly, members of the Revolutionary 
Defense Group militias, chief surgeons in military hospitals, and con-
struction workers and electrical engineers who often supervised male 
staff. Ariana Airlines employed female as well as male flight attendants. 
And the female announcers who read the news were neither veiled nor 
wore a headscarf. Women were members of trade unions and worked as 
printers, soldiers, parachutists, and veterinarians. (par. 29)
Signaling a notable departure from the earlier narrative of Afghanistan’s 
history, the pre-socialist “golden age” idealized in The Kite Runner is super-
seded in Hosseini’s second novel by the socialist era that represents “the 
golden age” for women’s rights. As Laila’s father puts it:
Women have always had it hard in this country, Laila, but they’re probably 
more free now, under the communists, and have more rights than they’ve ever 
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had before . . . it’s a good time to be a woman in Afghanistan. And you can take 
advantage of that, Laila. Of course, women’s freedom—here, he shook his 
head ruefully—is also one of the reasons people out there [in the countryside] 
took up arms in the first place. (135, emphasis in original) 
The prior “golden age” no longer seems idyllic but filled with social antag-
onisms along the axes of gender and class. The insurgents—hailed by 
Washington as freedom fighters—here, according to Laila’s father, take up 
arms to fight against women’s freedom and seek a patriarchal restoration. 
The novel brings into relief the oppressive customs that limit Mariam’s 
(the older character) participation in public life—her lack of access to 
education (she received basic literacy classes from a village mullah), her 
lack of options for professionalization and employment (her husband does 
not think that women should work), and the resulting lack of confidence 
that leads to her compliance with her husband’s demands, including the 
demand to wear a burqa, even during the time when most women in Kabul 
opt to roam the streets uncovered. All of these factors compound to seal her 
fate leading to her tragic death during the Taliban era. By contrast, Laila, 
the “Revolutionary Girl,” has the confidence to dream of a future unhin-
dered by the constraints of her gender, even during the times that turn 
“bad for women”—the mujahideen era (1992–1996), and later, during the 
Taliban’s rule (1996–2001). Laila’s nomination as the Inqilabi Girl estab-
lished a historical continuity. The spirit of Saur Revolution, it is suggested, 
survives in young women whose fate will be to live through the unbearable 
oppression of the subsequent fundamentalist regimes. In a curious paral-
lel, Taraki (the leader of the Saur Revolution and the first head of state 
in socialist Afghanistan) liked to tell those around him that he had been 
born in October 1917, during the days of the Russian Revolution.31 The 
emancipatory lineage—from 1917 to 1978, and into the future—marks 
an alternative history that survives in spite of many defeats, in Afghan 
women’s hearts. 
In this new narrative of Afghanistan’s history, the destruction of 
Kabul—one of Hosseini’s persistent themes in all three novels—is no 
longer blamed on the Soviets but placed in a more historically grounded 
context and explained in great detail. The novel’s title—A Thousand Splendid 
Suns—refers to a seventeenth-century Iranian poem “Kabul” in which the 
sun reflected in the myriad of Kabul’s rooftops connotes the beauty and 
cultural richness of the Afghan capital city. In Hosseini’s novel, the image 
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also connotes a shattering—a shattering of an image in a multitude of its 
reflections—thus foreshadowing the destruction of Kabul in 1992 by the 
warring militants—the mujahideen—who pillage the city after they defeat 
the last socialist government. 
“Ask Afghans when the worst period of time was in Kabul,” writes jour-
nalist Kim Barker, “and they’ll never mention the Soviets or the Taliban. 
They’ll talk about this time, the civil war, when chaos and crazy ruled. 
They’ll talk about the warlords” (The Taliban Shuffle 57). The Revolutionary 
Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) members are espe-
cially outspoken in condemning the fundamentalist takeover that followed 
the Soviet withdrawal: “the darkest period in our history began when fun-
damentalists took power in 1992. . . . They turned Kabul into a graveyard, 
where you could only see tears, fear, destruction, and blood.”32 Mujahideen 
were the jihad fighters, and to use the language of the revolutionary Left, 
counterrevolutionaries. They were comprised of various groups of insur-
gents who formed an armed resistance to the socialist government as early 
as 1978, sabotaging the state through ambushes and bombing of both 
military and civilian targets. Cold War-era historians Ralph H. Magnus 
and Eden Naby point out that during the Reagan era, the mujahid (a jihad 
fighter) in the US context was a positively charged term that held appeal 
for the US Christian Right and that served as a “legitimizing concept” 
across the political spectrum (259). The phrase “legitimizing” is surely 
an understatement; the mujahideen were widely celebrated in the West 
by both right-wing and liberal observers. Tony Kushner’s case is symp-
tomatic: A liberal, queer, left-leaning Jewish American playwright, he 
admits that, during the Soviet-Afghan War, he found himself, improbably, 
supporting Ronald Reagan because of his heavy-handed approach to the 
Soviet problem in Afghanistan and his backing of the fundamentalist 
Afghan jihad fighters.33 In Homebody/Kabul, Kushner states, via Mahala, 
that the ultraright mujahideen are preferable to other forces who have 
been in power in Afghanistan since the 1970s. In the eyes of the West, 
the mujahideen stood for the people of Afghanistan in general, as in Joes’s 
quote, where he speaks of them as “the brave, sorrowful, martyred people 
of Afghanistan” (229). I will discuss this mythologizing of the mujahi-
deen as “the real Afghans” in detail in the next chapter. The mujahideen 
were divided along ethnic lines (consider, for instance, the intense rivalry 
between Ahmad Shah Massoud and Burhanuddin Rabbani, both Tajiks, 
and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Pashtun) and competed with each other 
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for funding that came from the West and the Arab world. Magnus and 
Naby, overall sympathetic to the mujahideen cause, nevertheless note 
that “wholesale destruction of villages, irrigation works, and agriculture” 
by the mujahideen were hallmarks of that period (147). Contemporary 
historians offer a more somber assessment of mujahideen methods of 
warfare, pointing out that mujahidin “had butchered pro-PDPA tribal 
elders” and massacred entire villages along the Soviet border, bombed 
symbols of Afghanistan’s modernization, such as Kabul University and the 
Polytechnic Institute, and conducted attacks on women’s schools.34 Nunan 
quotes a Soviet adviser who recalls the following: 
Mujahidin bombed stalls in Jalalabad’s bazaars, and once, when Wahidov 
[a Soviet advisor] visited Jalalabad’s main market, he had to dive for 
shelter as a fully loaded camel with a bomb surgically implanted into its 
stomach exploded, leaving gore and mayhem behind. (159) 
Mujahideen also boasted an extensive agenda designed to halt and dra-
matically reverse the progress of women’s rights in Afghanistan. Shahnaz 
Khan observes that, in contrast to the position of women in the socialist 
state, in the mujahideen resistance movement, there was “no public space 
for women as ideologues or as spokespersons nor in any other form. . . . 
[Women were meant] to serve the needs of the community through giving 
birth to future warriors” (par. 30). 
In its second half, A Thousand Splendid Suns dramatizes the loss of 
rights and freedoms suffered by women in the aftermath of the socialist 
government’s fall in 1992, and describes the incredible violence unleashed 
upon Kabul and its residents as the mujahideen enter the city. The tragedy 
of that period is captured by the novel’s most unforgettable image of the 
body of a child ripped apart by an explosion of a missile blasted by one 
group of the mujahedeen fighting another in the streets of the city. In an 
expository passage, Hosseini explains how the word mujahid during this 
era becomes an insult, used as a synonym to “warlord”: 
[Laila learns that] this road, up to the second acacia tree on the left, 
belonged to one warlord; that the next four blocks, ending with the bak-
ery shop next to the demolished pharmacy, was another warlord’s sector; 
and if she crossed the street and walked half a mile west, she would find 
herself in the territory of yet another warlord and, therefore, fair game 
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for sniper fire. . . . Riflemen. Others still called them Mujahideen, but, 
when they did, they made a face—a sneering, distasteful face—the word 
reeking of deep aversion and deep scorn. Like an insult. (176) 
The Soviet modernity described in the first half of the novel is thus 
short-lived and followed by a period of unraveling and violence, along 
with the redefinition of Afghanistan’s identity and a transition from a 
secular to a theocratic rule, from women’s empowerment to a patriarchal 
restoration. The fall of the socialist government—the secular (“godless”) 
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan—heralds the advent of the Islamic 
State of Afghanistan that reverses women’s gains achieved during the 
socialist era: 
The freedoms and opportunities that women had enjoyed between 1978 
and 1992 were a thing of the past now—Laila could still remember Babi 
saying of those years of communist rule, It’s a good time to be a woman in 
Afghanistan, Laila. . . . The Supreme Court under Rabbani [the mujahi-
deen head of state] was filled now with hardliner mullahs who did away 
with the communist-era decrees that empowered women and instead 
passed rulings based on Shari’a, strict Islamic laws that ordered women 
to cover, forbade their travel without a male relative, punished adultery 
with stoning. (260, emphasis in original) 
During this era of mujahideen-induced violence, and to her father’s great 
sorrow, Laila stops attending school as it becomes too dangerous. Laila’s 
life course is then even more dramatically changed when she loses her 
parents to a rocket fired by the mujahideen and has no other option but 
to seek shelter in Mariam’s house, which means becoming Mariam’s hus-
band’s second wife. The era of opportunity for women has closed. After 
four years of incessant violence, Kabul is “liberated” from the mujahideen 
by the Taliban forces, and women’s oppression becomes enshrined as law. 
As the husband’s behavior turns progressively violent toward both women, 
and the misogynist laws offer the women no protection or escape, Mariam 
takes matters into her own hands by murdering their husband to protect 
her and Laila’s life, and is subsequently executed by the Taliban. Laila 
remarries, and with her new husband, flees to Pakistan, only to return to 
Afghanistan following NATO’s arrival. At the onset of the American era, 
Laila “hears of schools built in Kabul, roads repaved, women returning to 
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work,” which brings back to life the memory of her father’s voice that says: 
“You can be anything you want, Laila” (389, emphasis in original). Seen from 
the perspective of women, the socialist period—the golden age of women’s 
rights—is thus sutured to the NATO-led era as the two periods in the 
country’s history during which women were encouraged to be free. In the 
new Afghanistan, Laila can get back to her childhood dream nurtured by 
the socialist teachers—the dream of being somebody, being successful, and 
working for the greater good. 
The suturing of the Soviets to the Taliban as the two evils in The Kite 
Runner thus gives way to the symmetry of the Soviet and the American-
sponsored visions of gender equality and personal liberation. The promise 
of Soviet modernity is hereby rescued—and restored from its ruins, para-
doxically, by the American intervention that revives women’s emancipatory 
longings halted by a theocratic intermission. This is an important revision 
of Hosseini’s prior narrative as well as a notable intervention into the post-
9/11 discussions of Afghan women’s plight. The legacy of the Soviet period 
in relation to women’s rights was poorly understood by westerners who 
came into Afghanistan during the reconstruction era. Overwhelmingly, 
they saw the burqa as a timeless symbol of Afghan women’s oppression 
rather than an unstable marker of the recent political change from secular 
to religious government form. Historian Robert D. Crews writes: “Most 
of these foreigners subscribed to the conventional wisdom that they were 
pioneers entering ‘a forbidden land,’ whose landscapes and people were 
reminiscent of biblical times” (282). 
There were indeed many similarities between the ways in which 
the socialist and the American-sponsored regimes sought to promote 
gender equality. The focus on literacy was central to both the social-
ist and the US-led program. Additionally, both regimes measured the 
success of their policies in Afghanistan more generally by monitoring 
women’s presence in the public domain. “Unwittingly,” Crews contin-
ues, “[Americans] revived many of the promises that Afghan socialists, 
the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, had made in 1978. . . . 
Schools for girls became the measure of Afghan reconstruction” (282). 
Crews explains that during the socialist period, “[t]o many Afghans and 
foreigners alike, the most striking change in the revolutionary capital 
was the mobilization of women. The first thing a European anthropol-
ogist noticed upon arrival in Kabul in 1979 was ‘the large number of 
unveiled women in the streets’” (244). Quite similarly, as Jason Burke 
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points out, the number of unveiled women in the streets of Afghanistan’s 
cities became a measure of progress during the American occupation era. 
Burke calls it the “burqa ratio”: 
One key element that became rapidly woven into the post-war project 
for Afghanistan was the issue of women and women’s rights . . . to the 
point of becoming a casus belli in itself. . . . [T]he concentration on the 
rights of women had the effect of establishing the “burqa ratio,” as one 
senior European diplomat in Kabul cynically put it, as a key metric 
for success in Afghanistan with domestic opinion in the West. (82–83, 
emphasis in original) 
When seen from Afghan women’s perspectives, the socialist era no 
longer appears demonic; on the contrary, it comes into view as a unique 
period in Afghanistan’s history during which women were propelled into 
the public sphere and gained relief from traditional customs and gender 
roles that relegated their lives to the private domain. Laila’s embrace of 
the American people’s arrival signals a nostalgia for socialist modernity. 
Revived and redeemed by NATO’s resolve to “save” Afghan women, the 
socialist prelude is rescued from the ruins of history. Women’s time, alive 
in Laila’s and other revolutionary women’s hearts, promises to return 
to Afghanistan with the American troops, both prompting a nostalgia 
for a socialist era and a new hope for women’s emancipation. Instead of 
Rumsfeld’s socialist “conquest” versus US-led “liberation,” we have two 
emancipatory visions that are separated in time by a fundamentalist 
interlude. This version of Afghanistan’s history is intriguing, and in the 
NATO-centric context, countercultural. It is certainly problematic, as the 
dream of US-borne restoration pins any idea of an acceptable future for 
Afghanistan on foreigners’ intervention. It also fails to acknowledge the 
Western sponsorship of the very fundamentalist regimes that the United 
States then intervenes to topple. 
The Time of Disappearance 
In his third novel, Hosseini revisits Afghanistan’s recent history once 
again, covering a time span of sixty years, beginning in 1952, during the 
age of the monarchy, and ending somewhere around 2010–2012, during 
the NATO era. Published in 2013, And the Mountains Echoed is much more 
skeptical in its assessment of NATO’s ability, or willingness, to “rescue” 
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the Afghans. It no longer believes that the United States will resuscitate 
the halted modernization project in Afghanistan. This revisitation of 
Afghanistan’s history is, once again (for the third time), a revision. In this 
iteration, the devastation of Kabul is blamed entirely on the mujahideen; 
they are presented as “vandals” and mobsters who come back, after the 
Taliban’s ouster, to rule the Afghanistan they had looted in the 1990s, 
with the support of NATO forces. More importantly, as far as this chapter 
is concerned, both Afghan revolutionary history and the Soviet invasion 
vanish from view—the socialist period is neither condemned nor figures 
as an object of hope, but simply disappears from Afghanistan’s timeline, as 
if it were nothing of significance. The vanished Soviets in this third novel 
are mystifying, given the emphasis on their brutality and the intensity 
of condemnation of socialism in The Kite Runner. Gone, also, is a quest 
for a better social order or any hope for a future that is more just. The 
American era, in this novel, signals a return not of socialist modernity, but 
of mujahideen-borne corruption and violence, which in the end cancels all 
hope for a better future. 
This reassessment of the NATO period—which by 2013 was a nota-
ble twelve years—is a significant divergence from the previous novels. 
As others have pointed out,35 The Kite Runner calls for a rescue opera-
tion that would liberate the country from the evil Taliban, thus not only 
implicitly justifying Operation Enduring Freedom, but depicting it as the 
ultimate moral act. The second novel, through tracing Laila’s trajectory, 
asserts that the new NATO-led Afghanistan, in spite of some difficulties 
associated with the transition to peace, is a good place to come back to, 
and that is it once again “a good time to be a woman” in Afghanistan 
(A Thousand Splendid Suns 260). By contrast, And the Mountains Echoed 
offers vignettes from US-led reconstruction-era Afghanistan that is 
swarming with foreigners—doctors, nurses, volunteers, journalists, and 
expats who return to claim their properties that have risen in value—to 
offer a verdict that attests to the era’s fatal failures. It tackles the issues of 
entrenched corruption, security problems, interpersonal violence, the drug 
economy, and widespread uncertainty about the nation’s future, despite 
the presence of international troops and thousands of NGO workers. The 
most self-reflective of the three novels, it also explores the issue of ethics 
inherent in narrating tragic histories, critiquing the Western desire to 
vicariously experience Afghanistan’s suffering via texts, such as Hosseini’s 
own previous two novels, as voyeuristic and self-serving. In this novel, 
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Hosseini seems to begin to search for alternatives to the humanitarian 
mode of narrating Afghanistan, its impetus similar to other texts written 
in the second decade of the 9/11 wars (see chapters four through six). 
The novel is written as a collection of overlapping stories told from 
the varied perspectives of its characters who belong to three different 
generations of Afghans. It effectively represents the continuity between 
Afghanistan’s violent period after the fall of the last socialist government 
(1992–1996) and its neoliberal, yet also troubled present. Reconstruction-
era Afghanistan is riddled with violence and corruption reminiscent of the 
civil war. In NATO-era Afghanistan, the most striking acts of cruelty are 
prompted by property disputes rather than by political divisions. Economic 
inequalities are extreme. The international community, while there, lacks 
the willpower to remedy the situation, and even worse, supports the wrong 
people. Forestalling the narrative of American-sponsored redemption, the 
novel highlights the injustices and the violence that not only persist in the 
aftermath of the NATO invasion, but are a direct result of NATO’s alli-
ance with the warlords. It dramatizes the fact that the former mujahideen 
militants (a.k.a. the Northern Alliance) whom the Taliban forces kept 
at bay in the northern provinces of the country until 2001, were brought 
back by NATO troops as allies and were allowed to take over the cities 
they had ruled in the disastrous 1990s. The novel’s criticism of NATO’s 
unsavory dealing amplifies the complaints voiced by many Afghans. As 
one Afghan feminist Sonali Kolhatkar writes in “Saving Afghan Women”: 
“Afghan women are perfectly capable of helping themselves if only [your] 
governments would stop arming and empowering the most violent sections 
of society” (par. 5). 
In this third attempt by Hosseini to dramatize Afghanistan’s history, 
the mujahideen period acquires utmost importance and its dark legacies are 
foregrounded. While in The Kite Runner, Hosseini explains the destruction 
of Kabul as an act of Soviet brutality, here the mujahedeen are singled out 
as the cause of the city’s destruction: 
The 1980s [the Soviet period], as you know, Mr. Markos, were actually 
not so terrible in Kabul since most of its fighting took place in the coun-
tryside. [. . .] It was in the 1990s that fighting at last broke out within 
the city limits. Kabul fell prey to men who looked like they had tumbled 
out of their mothers with Kalashnikov in hand, Mr. Markos, vandals 
all of them, gun-toting thieves with grandiose, self-given titles. (122) 
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The mujahideen are presented in this novel as “vandals,” “mobsters,” and 
“thieves.” Their reinvented selves—Land Rover-cruising, self-aggrandizing 
narco-barons who now rule the land—are described with great scorn. 
Exemplifying this continuity is a vignette that centers on a former mujahid 
commander who is now a powerful political figure and a drug lord. Hosseini 
views his “heroic” past with great skepticism and links the violence that 
he perpetuates in the present to his history as an anti-Soviet jihad fighter. 
His fiefdom—the village of Shahbad—now features a monument to the 
jihad fighter—“a nine-foot tall black stone mujahid, looking east, turban 
gracefully atop his head, an RPG launcher on his shoulder” (244). The 
statue has been commissioned by the narco-baron himself; everyone in 
town calls him “commander” to recognize his role in the jihad against the 
Soviets. The narco-baron’s son, Adel, goes through a consciousness-raising 
moment in the aftermath of a traumatic event in which his friend’s father, a 
poor man from the village, is killed by his father’s mobsters. Adel realizes 
that the villagers’ “respect” for the “commander” masks their fear of his 
brutality. By the end of the story, Adel sees “for the first time his father’s 
house for the monstrosity, the affront, the monument to injustice, that it 
privately was to everyone else” (274–275). 
Hosseini’s obsessive revision of history in his trio of novels is symp-
tomatic—signaling the hidden tensions and aphasias found not only in 
his writing, but in other NATO-centric texts that take Afghanistan as 
its object. The point of view assumed in The Kite Runner deploys Cold 
War-era tropes, which results in a distorted version of Afghanistan’s 
history. Its narrative of rescue legitimizes the US invasion while casting 
Afghan socialism as foreign-borne barbarism—a trauma inflicted on the 
country by its powerful northern neighbor. As a result, the Afghan rev-
olutionary subject is reduced to a third-world victim—a helpless “other” 
in need of a humanitarian intervention. The second novel, while in line 
with the global West’s resolve to “save Afghan women,” seeks to break 
through post-Cold War aphasias and does not demonize the socialist 
period; it is unambiguous, however, in its celebration of NATO’s arrival 
to Afghanistan in 2001. The socialists, therefore, are viewed as “good” 
insofar as they subscribe to the same causes as the Reconstruction-era 
US-led humanitarians: that is, women’s liberation. The third revision in 
And the Mountains Echoed offers a critique of the US’s role in Afghanistan. 
More than ten years after the beginning of the War on Terror, in the 
wake of the Iraq War disaster, it is difficult to see the US operation in 
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Afghanistan as an unambiguously “good” humanitarian mission and to 
be blind to the impending dangers that await the country in the after-
math of NATO’s withdrawal. 
However, even this latest version of Afghanistan’s history contains 
elements of Hosseini’s early Faustian bargain. When it comes to “imag-
ining the Soviets,” Hosseini’s vacillations are symptomatic; indexing the 
failures and impasses that haunt the NATO-centric political discourse 
in the twenty-first century, these best-selling texts at times make use 
of the vast repertoire of anti-Soviet tropes, at other times resist them, 
before finally rendering socialist-era Afghanistan illegible. In that, this 
third novel mirrors Mark Fisher’s pronouncement that the contemporary 
capitalist-realist era is “haunted not by the apparition of the specter of com-
munism, but by its disappearance” (Ghosts 19). How does one speak about 
the failed revolutions of the past? What did the Afghan revolutionary era 
amount to? In the end, Hosseini does not have an answer. As a result, 
the story of Afghanistan’s recent past cannot be told. It does not cohere 
into a narrative but breaks into fragments that, like jumbled ice, cannot 
be put back together and jam narration. Communist nostalgia, Nataša 
Kovačević suggests, is useful insofar as it works to interrupt the process of 
post-socialist spaces’ transformation into “dependent economies, highly 
stratified societies, and sources of cheap labor” (18)—their relegation to 
a neocolonial space, one of global capitalism’s many resource frontiers. 
In Hosseini’s last novel, even this specter disappears—nothing interrupts 
Afghanistan’s relegation to global capitalism’s resource frontier now. The 
future seems predetermined and bleak; there is no recourse or respite from 
omnipresent violence. 
Moreover, presenting the mujahideen as “vandals” and “thieves” who 
turned into “mobsters” and narco-barons, once again, fails to tackle the 
issue of US systematic involvement in funding, arming, and training the 
mujahideen in the 1980s—the issue I will explore in the next chapter. 
Hosseini’s word choice—“vandals”—invokes recklessness, the lack of care, 
and cultural illiteracy, presenting Afghanistan’s tragedy as a war between 
those who appreciated culture, stability, and peace and those who lacked 
such appreciation having benefited, in turn, from instability and conflict. 
What is subsumed in this word choice is the Cold War context in which 
this conflict unfolded. Hosseini’s “vandals,” who had been referred to as 
“holy warriors” and “freedom fighters” by the Reagan administration, were 
anything but a disorganized group of pillagers and looters. Cold War 
98 IMAGINING AFGHANISTAN
historians Magnus and Naby explain that the mujahideen did not exist 
in isolation, but were embedded in the vast transnational network that 
supported the anti-Soviet jihad with billions of dollars spent on training, 
weapons, and favorable coverage by the international press. By 1989, they 
write, mujahideen 
field commanders communicated via satellite phones, and [state-of-the-
art anti-aircraft] Stingers were the elite weapon of the day. The fighter 
in the field had to be supported by an array of others, he had to be sup-
plied, and materiel had to be donated or purchased, the donor had to be 
convinced of the justness of the advantage of the mujahideen cause, and 
an army of journalists, diplomats, spies, and aid workers had to be kept 
informed and sympathetic. (149)
Hosseini’s novel thus still contends with the impossibility of articu-
lating the role of the US, and the West more generally, in cultivating the 
jihad fighter it now fears. This best-selling author’s inability to talk about 
the role of the West in fueling the Soviet-Afghan War also forecloses 
the possibility of understanding the dark origins of twenty-first century 
wars that we are witnessing today. Terrorism today signifies something the 
West recoils from in utter horror, failing to recognize its own complicity 
and its own role in creating conditions for war’s proliferation. Hosseini’s 
didactic project, while set to explain Afghanistan’s tragic history to global 
audiences, thus fails to bring into view or make legible the “dark histories” 
of covert operations and ghost wars that played a key role in Afghanistan’s 
unraveling. This is something that the texts discussed in the next chapter 
attempt to do. 
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Humanitarian Jihad: Unearthing 
the Contemporary in the 
Narratives of the Long 1979 
The Devil’s Kitchen 
Destined to provoke humanitarian outrage, the instantly famous 1985 
National Geographic cover was a high-profile ad for the bustling Afghan 
jihad against the Soviets. From the outskirts of Peshawar’s Afghan refu-
gee camp in northern Pakistan, a preadolescent Afghan girl with piercing 
green eyes condemned the viewers who failed to do their share to protect 
her, and others like her, from the atrocities of the brutal socialist regime. 
In the same high-impact issue, journalist Debra Denker, a member of 
the crew who traveled to the city of Peshawar to report on the suffering 
of the Afghan refugees, did not hide the excitement and admiration she 
felt toward the rugged Afghan jihad fighters—young men who coura-
geously opposed the abuses of the authoritarian state by taking up arms and 
fighting back. In fact, she believed this excitement was universally shared. 
“[E]veryone loves the legendary young hero who began fighting when he 
did not yet have a beard,” she exclaims (776). After providing a vague yet 
gripping overview of the scenery—a deserted valley (“all gray and brown”) 
with a few ruined buildings, allegedly bombed by the Soviets, and “the fly- 
encrusted remains of a camel,” allegedly killed by the Soviets—she con-
cludes with a scene of the jihad fighters’ prayer—a tranquil, hypnotic image 
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that connotes harmony and peace, as opposed to Soviet-borne violence. 
“The holy warriors,” she writes, “Ishaq among them, spread their pattu 
on the ground, their weapons before them, and stand and bow and stand 
again. In the silence I feel their strong and quiet faith, and wish only for a 
swift and happy end to the struggle forced upon them” (797). 
During the 1980s, journalists from the Western bloc and Afghan jihad 
fighters enjoyed a torrid love affair that was supported by cash flowing 
voluminously from various sources—primarily the United States, Saudi 
Arabia, and Western Europe. The city of Peshawar became a nerve center 
for the anti-Soviet jihad—a hub for intelligence staff, international jihad 
recruits, humanitarians, journalists, and random adventurers. Peshawar’s 
economy became bloated with cash. Western reporters, mostly, though not 
exclusively, male, were drawn to the romance of anti-statist insurgency and 
traveled with the Islamist fighters into Afghanistan, functioning essentially 
as embedded reporters with the mujahideen. Edward Girardet, in his 2011 
memoir, recalls his encounters with some of the most prominent Afghan 
and Arab commanders in Peshawar. He eulogizes commander Ahmad 
Shah Massoud as “the Che Guevara of Afghanistan” (Killing the Cranes, 
16); of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a radical Islamist known for his extreme 
brutality and indiscriminate violence against Afghan civilians during the 
civil war, Girardet writes: “One could not help but be impressed. With 
their turbans, beards, and hawk-nosed faces, these Afghans looked utterly 
wild, yet dignified” (46). In Western media of the 1980s, use of the word 
“terrorism” was discouraged and the violence of the mujahideen’s attacks 
on civilians was downplayed. As Salman Rushdie remarks in Shalimar the 
Clown, westerners often referred to these fighters as the “Muj”—which, 
Rushdie observes, with sarcasm, “sounded mysterious and exciting and 
concealed the fact that the word mujahid meant the same thing as the word 
jihadi, ‘holy warrior’” (270–271). As Cold War historian Robert D. Crews 
notes, “[i]ndiscriminate attacks by the mujahideen on Kabul and the civil-
ian casualties resulting from a campaign of bombings and assassinations 
had to be given new labels”—“resistance” and “freedom fighters” (261). 
This language is exemplified by Ronald Reagan himself who stated in 1983 
that “the resistance of the Afghan freedom fighters is an example to all the 
world of the invincibility of the ideals we in this country hold most dear, 
the ideals of freedom and independence.”1 The Islamic fundamentalists, 
in short, embodied the American spirit, and Western journalists reported 
favorably on their operations. 
 Humanitarian Jihad 101
In the previous two chapters, I discussed the difficulties Khaled 
Hosseini faced when writing about the mujahideen insurgency. Specifically, 
Hosseini cannot find a way to talk to his Western readers about the US’s key 
role in creating conditions for the rise of transnational terror that haunts 
the world today, by setting up, in the mountains along the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border, what Fred Halliday called “the devil’s kitchen in which 
the ailments and criminal practices that would later be unleashed on the 
world were first brewed” (Political Journeys 52). It is, in fact, impossible 
to understand the Afghan tragedy, as well as the rise of transnational 
terror in the 1990s (leading up to the twenty-first-century crisis), without 
understanding the legacy of the CIA-led covert Operation Cyclone (a.k.a. 
the “Afghan” jihad). Appropriately titled, Operation Cyclone drew into its 
whirlpool Pakistani intelligence, Saudi radicals, and European humani-
tarians, among many other sympathizers, bystanders, and supporters. The 
covert US support and funding of the radical Islamist forces started in 
1978, several months prior to the Soviet intervention (in fact, contributing 
to the panic in the Soviet camp that might have led to the USSR’s decision 
to intervene).2 It continued until the fall of the last socialist government of 
Afghanistan in 1992. In this chapter, I will discuss fiction and nonfiction 
texts that bring into view and help us imagine, vividly, the West’s role in 
fueling the flames of the Afghan crisis. These texts illuminate dark his-
tories and shed light on ghost wars, drawing attention to the significance 
of what I call “the long 1979” as the key moment in the genealogy of the 
post-9/11 contemporary. And so, they make visible the prehistory of the 
9/11 wars.
In what follows, I outline my reasons for proposing to designate 1979 
as the threshold of the contemporary—a genealogical point of origin for 
the world we inhabit in the first quarter of the twenty-first century. I 
then discuss Sorayya Khan’s novel City of Spies (2015), set in 1978–1979 
Islamabad, Pakistan—a book that draws attention to the rapid global-
ization of Islamabad that became a spy capital of the world (along with 
Peshawar) and a hub for the CIA during these years. The book centers on 
eleven-year-old Aliya whose childhood is defined by the epochal events 
that reverberate across the region: the coup d’état and the resulting military 
dictatorship in Pakistan, the Iranian Revolution, the socialist revolution in 
Afghanistan, and the subsequent influx of spies and CIA agents into the 
Islamabad area. Focusing on the period spanning 1978–1979, the novel 
examines the interlacing of personal, collective, and global histories as 
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seen through the eyes of an adolescent. I then turn to Nadeem Aslam’s 
haunting, philosophical novel The Wasted Vigil (2008); set in post-9/11 
Afghanistan, this text excavates hidden histories of terror and dramatizes 
connections between CIA involvement in the Afghan jihad and the 9/11 
attacks. Both Khan and Aslam seek to open the long 1979 to a variety of 
conflicting interpretations, offering a vision of history as open-ended and 
of memory as multidirectional, thickly layered, and staged through multi-
ple colliding accounts of the past.3 These texts’ retrospective dimensions are 
framed by their epistemological commitment to understanding the endless 
post-9/11 present, illuminating the recent past as key to understanding 
the 9/11 wars. 
Khan and Aslam are critical of the US ghost wars waged in the region 
in 1980s; however, the other two accounts I discuss in this chapter—
memoirs by photographer Didier Lefèvre (with Emmanuel Guibert and 
Frédéric Lemercier) and by reporter Edward Girardet—are steeped in 
the romanticization of the anti-statist insurgency, their admiration 
for the rugged jihad fighters they met in the 1980s mostly unchanged 
by the crisis of 9/11. It is important to read these texts with a critical 
eye, and the chapter will provide a framework for contextualizing their 
accounts. Lefèvre’s story is an acclaimed photo-reportage based on his 
journey through the fringes of socialist Afghanistan with Doctors 
Without Borders. Girardet’s memoir documents his clandestine trips into 
Afghanistan in the 1980s both with jihad fighters and with European 
humanitarian teams. These striking accounts are of relevance to scholars 
and readers interested in the history of embedded reporting as well as in 
the genealogy of the military-humanitarian alliance we see today. The 
term “humanitarian jihad” in this chapter’s title captures the convergence 
between late Cold War humanitarian work and humanitarian imaginary, 
best exemplified by the famous National Geographic Afghan girl image, on 
the one hand, and the radical Islamist insurgency, on the other. Within 
that context, the jihad fighter figured as a human rights defender while 
the Afghan state and the Soviet forces were positioned as prime human 
rights offenders. Lefèvre’s graphic memoir in particular sheds light on the 
role of human rights reportage during the Soviet-Afghan War as well as 
the part Doctors Without Borders played in the Afghan jihad. The grave 
contradictions at the core of the humanitarian-military assemblage (which 
included reporters, fighters, and doctors) become visible, in retrospect, if a 
reader is willing to suspend, at least temporarily, the deep anti-communist 
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bias that permeates the narrative. Considered together, all these texts 
make evident that “the long 1979”—marking the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan, the onset of CIA’s Operation Cyclone, and the arrival of 
European humanitarians to the area—is a multidirectional point of origin 
for many contested histories, and that the meaning of this era remains 
disputed, the stakes increasing rather than diminishing during the era 
of the 9/11 wars. These four texts provide a complex, multifaceted view 
that complicates the meaning of the term “Afghan jihad,” contextualizes 
the humanitarian imaginary of the late Cold War era, and brings into the 
foreground the dark histories of ghost wars and covert operations.
The Long 1979: Contesting the Primacy of 1989 
In Ghosts of My Life, the late Mark Fisher writes: “It has become increas-
ingly clear that 1979–80 . . . was a threshold moment—the time when the 
whole world (social democratic, Fordist, industrial) became obsolete, and 
the contours of a new world (neoliberal, consumerist, informatics) began 
to show themselves” (50). His dissenting voice is drowned, however, by the 
slew of other voices who insist, collectively, on the global significance of 
1989 as the imagined point of origin for the world that we inhabit today— 
a threshold of the contemporary. The concept of a threshold indicates a 
landmark date that marks a profound transformation, a phase change, 
an onset of a new condition or a disruption of an existing equilibrium of 
forces.4 In assessments of the history of the twentieth century, two such 
moments are widely accepted: 1945 and 1989. These moments are seen 
as related to each other. If 1945 marks the year of liberation and postwar 
reckoning, contending with the reality of concentration camps and nuclear 
weapons unleashed on civilians, 1989 is seen as a year that marks the end 
of the Cold War, the coming down of the Berlin Wall, and the triumph 
of liberal democratic regimes. Some scholars add a third date—1968—to 
the widely accepted 1945 and 1989.5 The Eurocentric character of the three 
accepted thresholds is intriguing, with the epicenter of 1945 and 1989 in 
Berlin and 1968 in Paris and Prague. 
In this tripartite lineage, 1989—the year frequently referred to as an 
annus mirabilis (a miracle year)—is arguably the most important date. 1989 
is an established moment not only in historical studies,6 but also interna-
tional relations,7 political theory,8 art history,9 and literary studies,10 among 
other disciplines. Political scientist George Lawson observes that “both 
academics and policy-makers tend to use 1989 and its surrogate frames 
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(such as Cold War/post-Cold War) as the principal normative, analytical, 
and empirical shorthands for delineating past and present” (“Introduction” 
1). Art historians Alexander Dumbadze and Suzanne Hudson theorize 
contemporary art as emerging after 1989, linking “aesthetic change to the 
geopolitical changes of 1989” (2). Debjani Ganguly, in her study of the 
contemporary world novel, argues for the renewed significance of the 1989 
threshold in the light of post-9/11 sensibilities (This Thing Called the World). 
In his insightful account of the contemporary novel, which he dubs the 
“literary anthropology of the contemporary,” Amir Eshel argues for the 
specificity of literature written after 1989 “in the light of the debate about 
‘the end of history’” (10).
The year 1989, the ultimate spectacle, thus looms large in our collective 
imagination, and it seems almost pointless to argue against its prominence. 
Yet a threshold is never universally relevant, but always contested, since it 
is always someone’s threshold. A 2010 collection of essays by international 
relations scholars, titled The Global 1989, introduced a much-needed note of 
discord into the Fukuyama- and Rorty-inspired triumphalist narrative of 
liberal democracy’s victory in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the fall of the Berlin Wall. While liberal democracy did emerge victo-
rious in several Eastern European countries, this was generally not the case 
in the global South. Richard Saull, in his contribution to The Global 1989 
volume, states firmly that “1989 is not the historical root of contemporary 
world politics tout court, at least not when viewed from the vantage point 
of the global South” (181, emphasis in original). It is necessary to provin-
cialize 1989 as a European threshold. Moreover, the era we refer to as the 
contemporary is never static; it unfolds in the opening between the recent 
past and the immediate future that constitute its immediate horizons.11 
These horizons are always shifting. We can only know our own recent past 
through its traces in the present—traces that make manifest that past as 
exerting pressure upon the present. Given the point of view of the 9/11 
wars, after the 2008 global financial crisis, and in the midst of the rise of 
the right-wing regimes across the world, we might be less eager to accept 
the triumphalist narrative of the 1989. 
It is worth remembering that in 1989, as Europeans celebrated the 
tearing down of the Berlin Wall and Eastern European countries hoped 
for their own Marshall Plan (which never materialized), many countries 
in the global South faced the fallout of the Cold War’s end in the form of 
reactionary governments coming to power, often through violent means.12 
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In 1989, an Islamist government was established in Sudan, Hamas was 
rising to prominence in Palestine; the Islamic Salvation Front became 
a party in 1989, and a few months later won elections in Algeria; soon 
after, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan allowed ultra-conservative 
Islamist forces to close in on Kabul, putting an end to the secular gov-
ernment form. Assessing the outcomes of the “miracle year” in the global 
South, Saull writes: 
In two formerly communist countries, Afghanistan and South Yemen, 
grotesque forms of social regression, violence against women and cor-
ruption prevailed, as they did in combat-plagued Iraq, and, even more so, 
in Somalia. Meanwhile in West Africa, the formerly vanguard socialist 
state of Guinea-Bissau, the country that produced the outstanding rev-
olutionary leader Amílcar Cabral, fell from 1989 increasingly under the 
control of corrupt military leaders, with the result that in 2008 it had 
become the main transit state for Colombian drugs en route to Europe. 
[. . .] In other words, one of the main legacies of the collapse of com-
munism was the disappearance not only of social provision and a rough 
commitment to social equality, but of the basic order-providing state. 
Any balance sheet of the “failure” of communism must, therefore, be 
matched by acknowledgment of the “failure” of its replacement. (132)
Here, from the view of the global South, a very different narrative of 
1989 emerges, connoting not the unequivocal and irreversible triumph 
of liberal democracy, but the collapse of the state, the loss of rights, the 
loss of emancipatory expectations and dreams, the end of modernizing 
efforts, the onset of corruption, narco-trafficking, and infrastructural 
breakdown. The very insistence on the spectacle of 1989 is an act of 
erasing these histories of suffering. Upon closer inspection, it becomes 
obvious that 1989 was the moment of manifestation, not the moment 
of origin, of multiple developments that took place in the time period 
around 1979. These developments became manifest in the post-9/11 
world. The nomination of 1979 as a point of origin maps a genealogy that 
signals the rise of transnational terror; the threat to women’s rights; the 
privatization of warfare with the increasingly covert nature of its conduct; 
and the emergence of the humanitarian-media-military assemblage that 
manifests today as humanitarian violence—a near complete convergence of 
the humanitarian and military apparatuses.13 Yet in our current imaginary, 
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1979, I contend, figures only as a specter—a figure of our anxiety about 
the present we find ourselves in—a present defined by increased risk, by 
progressive militarization of everyday life, and by securitization that does 
little to calm our fears about the dangers that are erratic and unpredictable. 
It is also the specter of what Tony Kushner in Homebody/Kabul calls our 
“culpability”—the vague sense that the global West has played a role in 
destabilizing the very societies it now fears the most, such as Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq, among others (24). This vague sense of culpability 
translates into fears of the West’s own survival—fears that are reminiscent 
of nineteenth-century worries of barbarians at the doorstep. As a threshold 
of the contemporary, 1979 thus connotes the looming disaster—a future 
moment of reckoning that cannot be averted.
In the spirit of provincializing the Eurocentric 1989, the narratives I 
examine in this chapter ask us to turn our gaze to Islamabad and Peshawar 
(in Pakistan), as well as the mountains of Badakhshan (in Afghanistan) as 
the epicenters of change that occurs around 1979. I call for a recognition of 
the global significance of these places, all of them sites of profound political 
and cultural transformation. I also argue for the significance of the long 
1979 as an index of these tectonic changes. Seen from the point of view of 
the Islamic world, there is little doubt that the year 1979 marks a thresh-
old. The axis of change lies in the Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan (Tehran, 
Kabul, Peshawar) triangle. “The long 1979” is a period that starts in 1978 
and continues through the early 1980s. By the end of 1978, the geopolitical 
map of Central Asia and the greater Middle East was in flux. The April 
1978 socialist revolution in Afghanistan was well underway, and faltering 
somewhat, with Taraki’s government meeting resistance to land reform 
and the enforcement of women’s rights in the countryside. On September 
16, 1978, in Pakistan, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq became presi-
dent, having come to power through a military coup, banning all political 
parties by 1979. Zia’s ascent to power presented a unique opportunity for 
the United States, promising access to the underbelly of the Soviet camp 
in Afghanistan. On January 16, 1979, the Iranian shah, a longtime ally of 
the United States, was overthrown by the most popular revolt in known 
history. At the end of March 1979, Iran became an Islamic Republic led 
by a spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, heralding the emergence of a 
third way—an Islam-based alternative to both socialism and capitalism. 
On November 4, 1979, the widespread anti-American sentiment bore on 
the hostage crisis, where 52 Americans were held captive in Iran for 444 
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days. The unprecedented siege of the Great Mosque of Mecca by a group 
of radicals on November 20, 1979, led to the burning down of the US 
embassy in Islamabad the day after (Americans were suspected of hav-
ing been involved in the siege, which was proven not to be true). A few 
weeks later, on December 27, 1979, Soviet planes landed on the Bagram 
Airfield in Kabul in an operation to support the struggling socialist gov-
ernment. Within a few days, Soviet troops crossed the northern border 
of Afghanistan, thus beginning a full-scale intervention on the ground 
(Operation Storm-333). 
In 1980, Ronald Reagan came to power in the United States and his 
administration was to become an active supporter of Zia’s military regime, 
declaring it a frontline ally in its war with the Soviet Union. To subvert the 
Soviet stronghold in Afghanistan, the CIA intensified its covert operations 
in the region. The CIA’s Operation Cyclone (1979–1992), with its nerve 
centers in Islamabad and Peshawar, was massive in scale and fallout. It was 
the most extensive and best-funded covert operation in the organization’s 
history, leaving in its wake Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as well as, arguably, 
the ruins of socialism. Yet these submerged histories of ghost wars and 
secret operations have attracted attention only recently, in the wake of 9/11. 
Books by Mahmood Mamdani (Good Muslim, Bad Muslim) and Steve Coll 
(Ghost Wars) made these histories accessible for popular audiences, drawing 
thick lines between the Soviet-Afghan War and twenty-first-century ter-
ror. Khan and Aslam’s novels illuminate the significance of the long 1979 
as the dark threshold of the post-9/11 contemporary. Both novels—City 
of Spies and The Wasted Vigil—are investigations; their plots are arranged 
around finding out the truth about the past. These novels’ epistemological 
thrust is determined by the desire to understand the conflictual logic of 
the present, its long wars and humanitarian crises, through mapping its 
genealogy. And so, they return to 1979. 
A Prelude to Unraveling 
In a playful inversion of Francis Fukuyama’s claim about history hav-
ing ended in 1989, I propose to accept, provisionally and with Sorayya 
Khan’s eleven-year-old protagonist, that history began in 1979. In her 
novel that narrates the process of a coming into political consciousness, 
written for the young adult audience, Khan makes obvious that what I call 
“the long 1979”—in her case the months preceding the Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan in December 1979—are nothing short of what Benjamin 
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would call “messianic time”—not just in Afghanistan, but across the entire 
region. While in the previous chapter I drew attention to 1978–1979 as 
a messianic era in Kabul, Khan, similarly, brings into view the epoch of 
change from her setting in Islamabad. Time itself—pregnant with permu-
tation, saturated with political rivalries, thick with animosities that spill 
into violent rage—is the subject of Khan’s fictionalized account of history 
as perceived through the adolescent eyes of her narrator. This messianic 
time is felt locally, spurring a slew of changes in Pakistan, and affects 
the entire region. With remarkable clarity, the young narrator observes 
the global significance of the events that unfold in Pakistan’s vicinity. 
The messianism is evident in the events of the Saur (April) Revolution 
in Afghanistan, in the revolution in Iran, in the rage of Iranian students 
who take American hostages in Tehran, and in the fury of the students in 
Islamabad who attempt (and fail) to do the same. Having described the 
thirty months of rapid, unpredictable change (“phase change” as a phys-
icist might call it), Khan ends her book, dramatically, on December 27, 
1979—the day the Soviet troops began their intervention in Afghanistan, 
acting on behalf of the flailing communist government. Aliya overhears a 
television news program reporting on the event while in her family home in 
Islamabad. This framing positions the prior thirty months as a prelude, an 
introductory chapter to the new epoch that was about to begin. Skillfully, 
Khan stages a dense interlacing of personal, national, and global histories, 
demonstrating that the affairs of one’s life cannot be separated from the 
larger epoch-defining events that determine them. “[W]e are all defined 
by the wars we have lived,” Khan writes in the Prologue, “the war of my 
story . . . is the Cold War” (1). 
The novel is marked by a sense of unease and anxiety that is the result 
of the narrator’s progressive realization of the global interconnectedness: 
[T]he world was a small place and what happened in one place affected 
the other. I was suddenly reminded of Klackers, the game of two balls 
suspended on a string. When one ball hit the other, the klick-klack sent it 
careering. Countries were connected to each other the same way, which 
made our world a very scary place. (208) 
“Clackers”—the toy the narrator evokes in the passage, was indeed a 
dangerous toy as the balls, made of heavy hard plastic, would sometimes 
shatter when hitting each other, producing debris fragments with sharp 
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edges. In the United States, the toy was taken off the market in 1976. In 
spite of its seeming innocence, the image of clackers thus evokes unex-
pected violence, cuts to the flesh, and shrapnel resulting from a collision of 
bodies. The sense of looming danger and the nervous disquiet permeates 
Khan’s novel, resonating with the uncertainties of the post-9/11 universe. 
The sense of looming danger finds release, for the novel’s protagonist, in 
the event of the US embassy siege in Islamabad. Although she does not 
experience the burning of the embassy directly, she witnesses the crowd 
of Islamabad residents flooding the grounds of the American school com-
pound where she is a student, shouting “Amrika Murdabad” (“death to 
America”). Distant riots, such as the riots in revolutionary Tehran, mate-
rialize inexplicably, on the narrator’s doorstep, affecting her family, her 
servant’s family, and her American friend’s family in an immediate fash-
ion. A klick-klack universe is saturated with risk, rendering distant events 
witnessed through mass media astonishingly close as their reverberations 
reach Aliya’s hometown. And conversely, the events to which Aliya is an 
eyewitness carry in them a taste of the faraway—a specter of long-distance 
agencies and faraway rivalries. 
City of Spies is, unmistakably, a post-9/11 narrative. Khan notes that 
she first imagined telling this story in 1989; however, it was September 11 
and the wars that followed made her decide that she needed to address, in 
fictional form, this particular slice of her past: 
The Soviet Union retreated from Afghanistan before my first interna-
tional journalism assignment. Not long afterwards, the Berlin Wall 
came down and eventually marked the end of the Cold War. [. . .] 
But thirteen years ago, under a brilliant blue September sky, airplanes 
flew into buildings and the world spiraled in a War on Terror that will 
never end. The United States arrived to Afghanistan and then Iraq . . . 
and stayed. Today, its drones travel the skies of Pakistan. [. . .] On the 
ground, Pakistan’s cities are bursting with spies, but today they carry 
guns and do not drive cars with identifying license plates. (223)
By recalling the 9/11 moment, the passage contests the global significance 
of 1989, positioning it not as the end of history, but as a brief pause, per-
haps—a relatively insignificant interlude, overshadowed quickly by the 
rapid unraveling of a tsunami of new conflicts. The post-9/11 present—
defined by the long wars and the renewed sense of global interconnectedness 
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that brings a sense of looming danger, sheds new light, Khan discovers, on 
her childhood spent in the city of spies. Fittingly, she compares Pakistan 
to Berlin in the passage above, along with evoking Afghanistan twice: the 
Afghanistan of the Soviets of 1979 and the Afghanistan of the Americans 
of 2001. Afghanistan is the reason why, in the 1980s, Pakistan became 
a global place, competing with Berlin in the number of spies it attracted. 
General Zia’s Pakistan, capitalist-leaning and in need of financial support, 
was conducive to American efforts to gain access to the Soviet Union’s 
underbelly in Central Asia via North Pakistan. In the wake of the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan, Peshawar and Islamabad become the CIA’s 
most important assets. 
Khan’s 2015 story captures the atmosphere of suspicion and distrust 
that pervaded Islamabad in 1979. A daughter of a Dutch mother and a 
Pakistani father, Aliya describes her discomfort at the US embassy when 
she is invited there by her American classmates: “I didn’t know if their 
fathers were spies or if they had done anything to conspire against my 
country, but each time the embassy guard waved me through the gates, 
my Pakistani half surfaced and made me want to flee from the grounds” 
(122). Aliya suspects—and later is convinced—that her best friend’s father, 
who claims to be a health project manager and a malaria specialist, is a 
CIA agent who interferes in “the politics of our country” (127). The school 
principal, Mr. Hill, is revealed, Aliya believes, to be a spy when he is taken 
hostage in the US embassy in Tehran: 
Almost as an aside, Mr Mancini offered an explanation for Mr Hill’s 
departure to Teheran. He had taken one week of leave to retrieve some 
personal effects from his former school in Teheran, including a fountain 
pen that was a family heirloom. [. . .] The story sounded like a fairy tale 
to me. [. . .] Mr Hill was a spy, and the fountain pen was his Maxwell 
Smart or James Bond secret tool. (161)
Becoming attuned to the issues of privilege and power, Aliya notes 
the superior status of the Americans, who are able to “interfere” in her 
country’s affairs, affecting the course of events far away from their home. 
A hit-and-run accident in which the family servant’s son is killed by an 
American woman (Aliya’s best friend’s mother) becomes a figure of such 
interference. In its wake, Aliya struggles to understand the world of dif-
ferential grievability—a reality in which American lives are valued much 
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higher than Pakistani lives—and American impunity, which is evidenced 
by the fact that the killing of the child carries no consequences for the 
negligent driver. Aliya wonders how much an American life would be 
worth as compared to the life of a Pakistani child that was valued at 
50,000 rupees (about $1,000) in a quick settlement facilitated by the 
US embassy, which strikes her as an insignificant sum. Aliya’s mixed 
origin marks her point of access to the dynamics of power inherent in 
American-Pakistani relations. Adjacent to American privilege, she is able 
to witness it without identifying with it. This double insider view allows 
Aliya to understand, without condoning, the hatred toward Americans as 
the locals storm the American school compound—a place where she, as a 
daughter of a European mother, is allowed to study—as symptomatic of 
her countrymen’s sense of powerlessness. She recalls the game American 
boys play on the school bus where they spit on Pakistani pedestrians and 
cyclists. The game—an expression of racism—goes unchallenged because 
the Pakistani man, the bus driver, has no authority that allows him to 
restrain the white boys. At the end of the novel, as American person-
nel are evacuated from Islamabad on school buses in the middle of the 
night in the aftermath of the embassy siege, Aliya herself becomes the 
target of schoolboys, being spat on, marking her last encounter with the 
Americans in Islamabad. 
The servant’s child, whose death looms large in Aliya’s imagination, 
can be interpreted both as a figure of American interference in other coun-
tries’ affairs as well as a figure of the costs incurred specifically by Pakistan 
as a direct result of CIA-orchestrated proxy war against the Soviets in 
Afghanistan during 1979–1992. Describing the double process through 
which North Pakistan became not only the hub of transnationally funded 
Islamic militancy, but also the hub of jihad-financing heroin production 
and export, Mamdani points out that “[t]he Afghan jihad had a deeper 
effect on the Pakistani state and society than it did on any other country 
outside of Afghanistan” (149). As Aliya ponders the cost of the child’s 
death to the American family ($1,000 dollars) and to the child’s father 
(her servant), whose family falls apart as he suffers a mental breakdown, 
the parallel becomes particularly apt. The child whose life ends abruptly 
in 1979 connotes the lack of futurity, a historical rupture, the breakdown 
of intergenerational transmission, and the violent legacies bequeathed by 
that era. Khan draws a line from the servant whose family disintegrates to 
Pakistan that is left to endure the costs of the proxy wars: 
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My home is a barrage of headlines. You see, my country is at war. My cit-
ies are burning. My capital is a police checkpoint. My sector borders the 
Red Zone. My road is a sandbag bunker. My hills, my beautiful Margalla 
Hills, are an airplane crash site. My Kohsar Market is the site where the 
Punjab governor was gunned down. Later today, tomorrow, or not until 
next week (if we’re lucky), the list of headlines will have grown. (238)
The agglomeration of possessive pronouns in this passage evidences the 
narrator’s renewed identification with her Pakistani side at the end of 
the book, which is the direct result of her revisiting the formative events 
during the thirty fateful months in the city of spies. History, for Khan’s 
protagonist, began in 1979, but this genealogy is framed by the author’s 
knowledge of the post-9/11 state of her home country that has been, once 
again, drawn into proxy wars. To sum, Khan’s staging of memory presents 
the long 1979 as a period of both regional and global significance—thirty 
months that changed the world—bringing to the foreground the long 
legacies of antagonism and violence that eventually came to bear on 9/11 
and the crises that followed. 
Genealogies of Terror 
“History is the third parent,” an epigraph to Aslam’s 2013 novel (The Blind 
Man’s Garden) states. Aslam’s previous book, The Wasted Vigil (2008), is 
indeed a novel about history, addressing the ways in which historical forces 
amplify or circumscribe individual possibilities, inviting us, as with Khan, 
to examine the issues of culpability, power, and global interconnectedness. 
Through its choice of characters, who all come to Afghanistan to give 
proper burial to the traumatic past, the novel examines the ways in which 
the past acts as a force in the present, impinging, inexplicably, upon the 
future. Similar to Khan, Aslam returns to the dark era of proxy wars from 
the post-9/11 point of view, positing Afghanistan as the key to the global 
present—a key node in global interconnection. He states, “Pull a thread 
here, and you’ll find it connected to the rest of the world” (319). The Wasted 
Vigil is a work of hermeneutics—a hermeneutics of the post-9/11 present 
through a return to the recent past, which is to say that it is a hermeneutics 
of the world through the lens of Afghanistan’s history. 
Much of Aslam’s novel takes place between Usha—a town in 
Nangarhar Province in southwestern Afghanistan—and Peshawar, a 
frontier city in northwestern Pakistan. The plot switches back and forth 
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between the present (Operation Enduring Freedom era) and the past (the 
Soviet-Afghan War), most of the events occurring between 1979 and 2001. 
The reader’s access to the past is mediated through the memories of four 
central characters, all foreigners in Afghanistan: Marcus, an elderly British 
doctor, who has suffered many losses in Afghanistan, including the loss of 
his father, his wife, his daughter, and grandson; Lara, a Russian widow in 
search of her brother, who vanished during the Soviet-Afghan War; David 
Towne, a retired CIA agent, who had been responsible for coordinating 
anti-Soviet efforts during the war and who now returns to Afghanistan to 
try to locate his long-lost stepson; and finally, Casa, a young fundamen-
talist, an orphan who grew up in an Afghan refugee camp in northern 
Pakistan. The characters’ memories of the recent past are multiply refracted 
through the point of view afforded by their position in the present. Thus, 
Lara’s view of the Soviet-Afghan War is shaped by her awareness of its 
aftermath, including the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fallout 
in Chechnya that claimed the life of her husband. David’s memories are 
mediated by his knowledge of the attack on the World Trade Center in 
1993—an event that was traced to Pakistan-trained Afghan mujahideen—
as well as by the fall of the Twin Towers in 2001. Marcus, who has spent 
most of his life in Afghanistan, is aware of the British colonial legacy along 
with the role of the Western world in Afghanistan’s recent tragedies. The 
characters contemplate their culpability, albeit in different ways (David 
and Casa remaining intransigent), and their interconnectedness, as they 
serendipitously cross paths in Marcus’s house outside of Usha. 
Memory in Aslam’s novel is both palimpsestic and multidirectional. 
As the four characters converge in Afghanistan, they bear witness to past 
events through their interactions both with the landscape (loaded with 
material memory) and with each other. A complex memory ecosystem 
gradually emerges that allows for a careful articulation of multiple histories 
of suffering and loss. Taking as a point of departure Michael Rothberg’s 
definition of multidirectional memory as, first, “something that, while 
concerned with the past, happens in the present; and second, that memory 
is a form of work, working through, labor, or action” (Multidirectional 
Memory 4), I propose that the novel performs an important kind of memory 
work, one that brings to light the multifaceted, contested nature of 1979 as 
the node of conjunction for multiple national and transnational histories. 
In contrast to Khan, memory work performed by Aslam’s text is not tied 
to identity or group politics, but is profoundly nonidentitarian. Its chief 
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purpose is to hold the past open, resisting its foreclosure into an identity-
based narrative, either national (Afghan, Pakistani, Russian, British, 
American) or political (socialist, nationalist, liberal-capitalist, Islamist). 
It insists on the coexistence of multiple traumatic histories whose visions 
collide but do not cancel each other. Taken as a whole, Aslam’s text is 
a novelistic enactment of a nonidentitarian memory ecosystem—a form 
of memory that cuts across multiple social groups as well as across time 
periods, rendering simultaneous the present and the recent past. 
Echoing Cathy Caruth’s famous notion of interconnectedness 
through trauma,14 I argue that such memory work, while exposing a 
rift between self and other through conflicting memories, also binds us 
to others through shared histories of loss—the “kinship of wounds,” as 
Aslam puts it (318). Multiple resonances and reverberations of mem-
ory, distributed along the lines of the four characters, reveal a complex 
geography of liability and victimhood. We learn that Lara’s brother, a 
Russian soldier killed during the Soviet-Afghan War, sexually assaulted 
and impregnated Zameen, who happens to be Marcus’s daughter and 
later David’s lover. Subsequently, Zameen gives birth to a son who, while 
biologically related to his Russian father, acquires a stepfather in David, 
an American. These characters are thus bound together, uncomfortably, 
in traumatic kinship. This kinship allegorizes the history of Soviet inter-
vention and American support for the anti-Soviet jihad that are interlaced 
and grafted upon the landscape defined by British colonial history and 
interimperial rivalry. Aslam’s careful articulation of these intertwined 
pasts contrasts with many ahistorical, mythologizing representations of 
Afghanistan I have discussed in the previous chapters. More importantly, 
the novel attempts to introduce uncomfortable complexity into the nar-
rative of the recent US-led invasion of Afghanistan by illuminating the 
dark legacy of proxy wars that seal the region’s fate as a transnational 
terrorism hub in the period spanning 1979–1992. Addressing the issue of 
American culpability in Afghanistan’s tragedy is a necessary component 
of the work of truth and reconciliation that awaits us in the future, if we 
are to grapple, collectively, with the issue of transnational terror. Aslam 
models a possibility of such transnational memory work (“a kinship of 
wounds”) through the characters’ interactions, and points to David and 
Casa’s intransigence. Unlike Russian Lara and British Marcus, they con-
tinue to believe in the rightness of their respective causes. David believes 
in the rightness of the cause of defeating communism at all costs, while 
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Casa believes in purifying the world via a specific strand of Islamic mil-
itancy he has learned in a madrasa. Aslam’s attention to CIA-inspired 
violence in Afghanistan suggests that illumination of dark histories of 
that war is necessary for any process of transnational reconciliation to 
begin. 
My term “dark history” (as opposed to “bright history”) once again 
deploys the distinction materialist philosopher Levi R. Bryant makes 
between bright and dark objects. While a bright object is a visible, easily 
identified node in a specific network, a dark object is an obscure nexus 
of power. A dark object exudes a force without being seen. A dark his-
tory is the opposite of what Guy Dubord calls “spectacle”: dark histories 
are the histories of covert operations exerting influence in the present, 
without making themselves visible; illuminating such dark histories and 
legacies of violence is an important task, with literature offering a form of 
nonjudicial witness to the hidden past. According to Rothberg, the past 
that remains unseen, that is, “outside the circuits of memory and respon-
sibility” remains “unmastered” and effectively undead, exercising an even 
more powerful force in the present (Multidirectional Memory 285). Aslam’s 
attention to these muted, subterranean histories—“[r]ivers of lava emerg-
ing onto the surface after flowing many out-of-sight miles underground” 
(272)—indexes the novel’s truth-seeking impulse while at the same time 
gesturing toward the limitations of this impulse. Some pieces of the past 
will remain obscure, some evidence will not be revealed to the characters 
or to the reader. Not everything in the past can be put to rest, and it will 
continue to haunt the present. 
The history of ghost wars in Afghanistan is dramatized through David 
and Casa. Their lives are steeped in mystery. While David conceals his 
identity as a former CIA agent, Casa, an orphan, does not know his origin, 
and thus is a mystery to himself. Their respective biographies bear the mark 
of the era, revealing the interlacing of the two recent pasts: of Afghanistan 
and of the United States. Casa’s biography chronicles the emergence of 
transnational networks of jihad in the Afghan refugee camps around 
Peshawar, while David is featured as one of the masterminds who helped 
set up the infrastructure of terror to be unleashed on the Soviets (and later, 
the world). Casa’s character is first presented in the novel through his inner 
thought process that situates him as a child of the era, bred for the work 
of “intimidation,” “harassment,” and “sabotage”15 of the Afghan state by 
inflicting violence on (mostly) civilian targets: 
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Cyanide can be extracted from apricots, Casa knows. He had distilled it at 
a jihad training camp, injected it into the bodies of creatures. The memory 
comes to him as he walks past a flowering tree at the edge of a street in 
Jalalabad city centre, the flowers still not finished emptying themselves of 
scent this late in the afternoon. [. . .] Pencils. Lemons. Corn syrup. Die. 
As he walks through the street he knows he could fabricate explosives 
from many things on the cart and in the shops around him. Sugar. Coffee. 
Paint. He even knows how to make a bomb out of his own urine. (89)
Aslam does not sensationalize Casa’s mindset but presents him as a type—
characteristic of the generation of Afghans that was drawn into the whirlpool 
of proxy wars at a tender age. An orphan, he was raised to become a jihad 
fighter with a transnational reach, dreaming, in the early years, of killing 
Russians in Afghanistan, then in his adolescent years, of killing Serbs in 
Bosnia, ending up in his twenties fighting Americans and rival warlords in 
post-2001 Afghanistan. A child of war, he connotes the past’s monstrous 
legacies, the amputation of memory through forced displacement, and just 
as the dead child in Khan’s novel, the lack of futurity. He, and others like 
him, are the figures of the unburied past, the past that returns to haunt the 
present. A member of a transnational militant class, Casa is a foreigner in 
his own country that he neither loves nor understands; his point of origin 
is not a traditional Afghan village of which he has no memory, but a state-
of-the-art lab, where modern science is fused with the art of killing: 
In the laboratories of the camps, stocked with labeled drums of various 
acids, acetones, cellulose, wood composite and aluminum powder, he had 
learned to mix methyl nitrate, had hit a small drop of it with a hammer 
to see it shatter the hammer. He blew up a car with a sack of fertilizer 
and ammonium nitrate fuel oil, the burning chassis travelling in an arc 
through the air to land a hundred yards away. He crumbled a boul-
der with twenty pounds of U.S.-made C-4, and, for comparison, others 
with C-1, C-2, and C-3. And also with Czech Semtex. He knew the 
Americans were trying to get back from the Afghans the Semtex they had 
supplied for use in the Soviet jihad, so dangerous was the substance. (90) 
Glimpses into Casa’s mind offer an insight into David’s work as part 
of Operation Cyclone. This classified work is never described directly, 
but made visible through its consequences—the lives and landscapes it 
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transforms. Casa’s methodical, cataloguing mind exemplifies the mod-
ern scientific rationality—the science of terror—that the CIA added as 
a key ferment to Afghan guerilla uprisings—a ferment that transformed 
sporadic rural resistance into a highly skilled transnational army of pro-
fessional fighters. The refugee camps of Peshawar—home of the National 
Geographic’s Afghan girl—became a social laboratory where a new fig-
ure of the highly skilled, well-equipped, transnationally capable jihad 
fighter was selectively bred. By 1982, it became a recruitment zone for 
radical Muslim youth from around the Islamic world, with Osama bin 
Laden visiting the grounds. Through David and Casa, Aslam dramatizes 
Mahmood Mamdani’s poignant statement that “[t]he source of privatized 
and globalized terrorism in today’s world, the international jihadis are the 
true ideological children of Reagan’s crusade against the ‘evil empire’” 
(177). Contemporary recollections of 1980s Peshawar are striking, as many 
Afghans attempt to rethink the past from the view afforded by the 9/11 
crisis. In her memoir, written in the aftermath of 9/11, Nelofer Pazira, 
the star of the film Kandahar and a former member of the mujahideen 
movement who spent a few years in Peshawar, confesses to being surprised, 
upon arriving to Peshawar, by the transnational character of the “Afghan” 
jihad. She writes: 
While in Afghanistan, I dismissed any news about Arab fighters as 
propaganda from the communist government. When I saw the wives 
of some of these Arab fighters at the school in Pakistan, I realized the 
extent of their involvement in the Afghan jihad. But their presence 
seemed more of an anomaly than a cause of alarm. Like most Afghan 
mujahidin, they too were supported by the West. (320)
In spite of being defined by transnational forces and possessing a trans-
national vision of his own agency spanning Russia, Bosnia, Pakistan, and 
the United States, Casa’s vision of the world is limited, as he seems to 
have no sense of personal history or belonging. In fact, Casa seems to be 
a character without history. His, to use Wai Chee Dimock’s phrase, is 
“the shotgun time frame of military action”—the shallow chronology of 
war (138). War’s operational time—rapid and precise—preoccupies Casa 
as he plans and executes attacks under the command of Nadi Khan, a 
local warlord in Usha. Profound, however, also is Casa’s immersion into 
and identification with what Dimock calls deep time—the deep time of 
118 IMAGINING AFGHANISTAN
Islam. He was burning, Aslam writes, with “a fury many centuries deep” 
(184). Lacking personal memory, he is nevertheless an unconscious bearer 
of collective memory in the longue durée. If history, according to Aslam, is 
a third parent, in Casa’s case it is his only parent. 
While posing as a gem merchant, David is, like Casa, a professional 
of war. In his CIA days, he had lived through the siege of the US embassy 
in Islamabad in 1979 (the one described in Sorayya Khan’s novel), waiting 
to be rescued for hours with 140 others in a secure vault while the build-
ing burned to the ground. Several weeks later, in the wake of the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan, he was dispatched to Peshawar: 
David has heard that no other war in human history was fought with 
the help of so many spies. When the Soviet Army crossed the River 
Oxus into Afghanistan in December 1979, secret agents from around the 
world began to congregate in the Pakistani frontier city of Peshawar. It 
now became the prime staging area against the Soviet invaders, rivaling 
East Berlin as the spy capital of the world. By then seventeen thousand 
Soviet soldiers had been killed, and David had been living in the city for 
two years. [. . .] It has transformed into a city filled with conjecture, with 
unprovable suspicions and frenzied distrust. Everyone’s nerves were raw 
and everyone had something hidden going on. For most of its history it 
was one of the main trading centres linked to the Silk Road, and now 
the United States was sending arms into Afghanistan through here. 
Wherever David looked he could find evidence of the war in which those 
weapons were being used. (111) 
Aslam’s novelistic rendition of Peshawar’s transnational character during 
that era imbues it with gravity, asking the reader to slow down, consider 
the implication of the events described, and weigh their consequences in 
the lives of the other characters in the novel: for Lara’s brother, who will 
be tortured and executed by the mujahideen; for Marcus, whose daughter, 
suspected of socialist sympathies, will be abducted and killed by the CIA; 
and for Casa, who will be deprived of a childhood as a result of this war. 
The characters’ personal trajectories as described in the novel 
make obvious that the massive humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan was 
cocreated by the Soviet Union’s intervention, the United States seizing 
the opportunity to “bleed” the Soviets by fueling the jihad, and by 
extremist groups eager to achieve their own aims. There are many parallels 
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between David and Casa: both obstinate, uncompromising characters, 
fundamentalists, though of different kinds. David does not allow himself 
to experience doubt; he is referred to as “a believer.”16 His belief—that 
communism has to be defeated at all costs—is shaken, in spite of his 
CIA training, after his lover Zameen and his stepson Bihzad disappear, 
inexplicably, from their apartment in Peshawar. When he starts looking for 
them, he sees danger everywhere, and the signs of his own culpability—
sprawling refugee camps, bombs exploding in residential neighborhoods, 
poverty, hunger, and despair pervasive in refugee communities. The only 
moment when David—a believer—feels his faith is shaken happens as he 
combs through the refugee camps—home to millions of displaced and 
desperate Afghans—and witnesses a scene where two hungry children 
make a third child, who has just eaten a meal, vomit, to capture and eat 
his still-undigested food: 
The little boy stumbled away dazed and fell, his eyes bright with liquid 
even in the dusk. And David was hurrying through the four-foot-wide 
“street,” trying to find a way out of the maze. He had helped create all 
of this. 
No, this was the Soviet Union’s fault because . . . because. . . . He 
could not complete the thought. He had before and he would later but 
not just then. (135) 
Here, Aslam uses a humanitarian image from the refugee camp—the same 
camp, perhaps, that was home to National Geographic’s Afghan girl—to 
problematize the trope of Soviet brutality as the sole cause of Afghan suf-
fering. Here, the suffering child indexes the US’s interference—a causality 
disavowed by the very character who exemplifies it. This moment of recog-
nition proves unbearable to David and manifests only as a pause—a break 
in his habitual thinking—“because . . . because . . .”—as he realizes that 
his stepson is now lost to the whirlpool of the war he is helping to create. 
David never finds Zameen and Bihzad again. “What would become 
of the child in this place?” he asks himself, wondering about the fate that 
awaits his stepson (135). The question he needs to ask himself, but cannot, 
is: “What will become of my child in the world I am creating?” Twenty-two 
years later and in Afghanistan again, David crosses path with Casa who is 
“the child of this place,” thus having his question answered. He does not 
find “his” stepson, but encounters many sons of the war he helped create. 
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Casa, along with other young Afghan militants in the novel, could be—
and symbolically is—David’s stepson. When Aslam describes a scene in 
which David and Casa work side-by-side at Marcus’s house, he emphasizes 
their similarity. They resemble each other not only in their ideological 
intransigence, in their careers as professional militants, but also in their 
interest in technological know-how—a result of direct transmission of 
knowledge from one group to the other: 
Casa handles tools expertly and with grace, with perhaps a certain 
delight, and is an efficient mover in any given area. Of course the 
Afghan ingenuity with all things mechanical is a myth, encouraged 
by the United States and the West during the war against the Soviets. 
Most of the rebels were peasants who had little or no military expertise. 
They came from villages in distant pathless mountains and, contrary to 
historical romances, were not natural guerillas or warriors. They needed 
training in weapons and technology, they who were still afraid of eclipses 
and thought communications satellites circling the night skies were in 
fact stars being moved from here to there by Allah. [. . .] They knew 
little about camouflage or maps and would smash a radio in frustration 
when it stopped working because batteries had run out. [. . .] They cut 
a fuel pipeline with an axe and then set it alight, tried to break open 
unexploded bombs with a pistol or a hammer. (258–259) 
Casa’s technical prowess positions him as a faithful “son” of his Western 
“fathers.” What would become of a child in this place? Having sought 
shelter in Marcus’s house for a few days, Casa is then killed in a senseless 
attack of one warlord on another. Another young man who shares the name 
of David’s lost stepson—Bihzad—loses his life in a blast when he drives a 
truck full of explosives into a newly built school, taking hundreds of young 
lives with his own. The missing children in Aslam’s text thus become vehi-
cles of the past, “an uneasy site of memory” (Rothberg, Multidirectional 
Memory 321), representing the past that haunts and the unresolved issues 
that resurface. David recalls a moment in 1993, when, upon hearing the 
news of the attempted attack on the World Trade Center, he mutters: 
“They are there” (147). David’s “children” are indeed everywhere. By 
dramatizing the rise of the transnational jihad, by carefully drawing the 
portraits of its fighters, as well as by dramatizing the history of its inception 
in Peshawar, Aslam’s novel calls the reader to witness histories that must 
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no longer remain “dark.” Aslam’s novel constructs a legible history of 1979 
as a multidirectional point of origin of many traumatic histories that still 
haunt the world today. 
Humanitarian Jihad 
As historian Timothy Nunan demonstrates, 1979 marked not only 
the beginning of the Soviet (and the covert US-led) intervention in 
Afghanistan, but also the onset of another little-publicized endeavor that 
he calls the “humanitarian invasion.” From 1979 on, he argues, humani-
tarian agencies, among them Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans 
Frontières or MSF), the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, and others, 
engaged in creating in Afghanistan, using the frontier town of Peshawar as 
a base, a parallel system of humanitarian governance that effectively com-
peted with, and ultimately undermined, the infrastructure of the young 
socialist state.17 These humanitarian agencies, aside from providing aid to 
Afghan refugees in camps around Peshawar (where they had legal stand-
ing), also began to send humanitarian aid and medical teams illegally 
into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan’s (DRA) interior. Operating 
inside the DRA without visas or permission, they set up a network of clan-
destine medical clinics in insurgent-controlled areas, such as Badakhshan, 
the Panjshir Valley, and the Hazarajat. In addition, humanitarian agencies 
smuggled mining and industrial equipment across the border; paid for by 
European charities, this equipment was then given to local mujahideen 
commanders and used to augment the shadow economies that served to 
finance the war against the state. Other provisions, supplies, medication, 
and direct financial aid were distributed by European humanitarians in 
guerilla-controlled areas to ensure their sustainability during unfavorable 
weather conditions (such as the 1984 drought that caused a shortage of 
wheat), which further solidified the effective autonomy of these areas from 
the centralized socialist state while creating dependence upon Western 
funding. This parallel infrastructure, Nunan argues, served as a force mul-
tiplier for the anti-communist jihad, and enabled the fighters to continue 
and expand their attacks on the state-run infrastructure instead of seeking 
peace talks with the government. 
Nunan’s critique of this “humanitarian invasion” allows for a his-
torical contextualization of memoirs by Edward Girardet (a European 
American reporter) and Didier Lefèvre (a French photographer), who 
traveled into Afghanistan in the 1980s, illegally, with groups comprised 
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of insurgents and European humanitarians. Lefèvre’s and Girardet’s mem-
oirs provide ample material that brings into view the routine operations of 
the “humanitarian jihad”—the daily functioning of the assemblage that 
included mujahideen fighters, European doctors, and journalists, all of 
whom were also embedded into the vast transnational infrastructure of 
the anti-communist jihad. Without the optics provided by Nunan’s his-
torical contextualization, these memoirs seem like human rights reportage 
and are usually presented and interpreted as such. Juliette Fournot, who 
was featured on Rachel Maddow’s show after the memoir’s publication in 
English, speaks of the mission described in The Photographer in terms of 
witnessing and documenting suffering: 
Part of the drama and the tragedy of the Afghan population was this 
wall of silence and we were some of the very very few witnesses and 
Westerners to enter that zone. So we basically needed to do the work that 
normally the journalists and the reporters would do, and the Afghans 
had a keen understanding of the value of our witnessing and carrying 
the word out, of their suffering and what they were going through.18 
Similarly, literary critic Monica Chiu sees Lefèvre’s book as human rights 
reportage. She writes that the graphic memoir “archives the impact of the 
Soviet invasion on Afghanistan’s non-combat citizens—the indiscriminate 
horrors of war, especially those maiming innocent children” (33). Seen 
through Nunan’s optics, however, these memoirs become windows upon 
something else. Specifically, they inadvertently reveal how human rights 
reportage and humanitarian medical work functioned in tandem with the 
CIA-orchestrated weapons smuggling and Islamist militancy—not only 
contributing to the tremendous pressure these forces put on the Afghan 
state, but boosting the economy of violence whose victims they purport 
to be helping. Both Lefèvre’s and Girardet’s reportages are, supposedly, a 
channel through which the suffering of Afghan civilians is made visible 
in the global domain. Yet this witnessing of suffering is neither politically 
innocent nor neutral. As Nunan argues: “MSF had brought Afghanistan 
to the attention of a global public, but what began as a campaign against 
totalitarianism had enabled a quest to obliterate Afghan statehood” (235). 
After the collapse of the functioning state system in 1992, Afghanistan 
becomes, Nunan remarks, a “model of the ‘nongovernmentality’ about to 
define much of the former Third World”—and a site that the European 
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humanitarians and reporters then abandon (14). In other words, European 
humanitarians, in their desire to alleviate suffering brought by the Soviet-
Afghan War, contributed to the collapse of the Afghan state, which 
resulted in a humanitarian crisis on a much larger scale.19 
In this section, I will move back and forth between the two accounts, 
focusing on the authors’ descriptions of their clandestine trips into 
Afghanistan’s interior during the 1980s. I argue that their points of view 
are examples of embedded reporting (they are embedded with the mujahi-
deen)—a militarized perspective, which creates a one-sided understanding 
of the conflict. Furthermore, the authors’ complete lack of access to the 
other side—to ordinary Afghans who studied, worked, and lived in an envi-
ronment made increasingly unsafe by mujahideen harassment—resulted 
in a fragmented, deeply skewed understanding of Afghanistan, leading to 
an anti-statist bias. From the insurgent-controlled mountain bases, social-
ist Afghanistan—or the Afghan state more generally—cannot be seen; it 
figures, instead, only as a caricature. As a result, these authors equate the 
patriarchal jihad fighters and their culture with Afghan people as a whole, 
condemning to invisibility Afghans who fought on the side of the gov-
ernment against these insurgents. These two memoirs mythologize “real 
Afghans” as the rugged dwellers of remote mountain villages; they never 
portray Afghans as urban, educated, professional, and, perhaps, having a 
stake in preserving a functional Afghan statehood, socialist or otherwise. 
Since the mujahideen movement, ideologically, was an ultraconservative 
movement, this gesture erases the Afghan leftist, but also Afghan secular, 
liberal, and moderate-centrist political subjectivities. Finally, I will address 
the authors’ lack of reflection upon their own complicity in the very war 
they are trying to document. 
Edward Girardet, a European American correspondent, reported on 
Afghanistan extensively from 1979 into the 1990s, having returned to 
Afghanistan after 9/11 in the context of the new war. An author of a field 
guide for humanitarian workers (The Essential Field Guide to Afghanistan, 
1998, with coauthor Jonathan Walter), a book on the Soviet-Afghan War, 
and recently a memoir, Killing the Cranes, Girardet’s writing remains a 
rich source of information on westerners’ roles in the country’s unraveling 
during the 1980s and beyond. Girardet arrived in Peshawar in 1979, a 
few months prior to the Soviet intervention, and subsequently embarked 
on many clandestine trips into Afghanistan with various groups of jihad 
fighters and with MSF medical-humanitarian teams. Killing the Cranes is 
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a testimony to that era; it offers a close look into the day-to-day operations 
of guerilla warfare and provides portraits of people directly and indirectly 
involved in the war. Most chapters recount the author’s encounters with 
various militants, humanitarians, spies, and other reporters he met in 
Peshawar and in Afghanistan, among them prominent commanders, such 
as Osama bin Laden (who, Girardet claims, once threatened to kill him). 
The memoir is a work informed by the 9/11 crisis, and Girardet is both 
critical of the US support of the most radical Islamist factions in the 1980s 
and aware of the destruction the mujahideen brought to Afghanistan after 
the Soviet withdrawal. Yet even in the light of this awareness, Girardet 
seems unable to overcome his romanticization of the Afghan jihad and its 
capital, the city of Peshawar. “For many of us,” he writes, “[Peshawar] was 
the most exciting place on earth—a frontier city that exuded the atmo-
sphere of 1940s Casablanca intrigue combined with twentieth-century 
Cold War rock, emergency sex, and TV bravado. Everyone felt a part 
of history in the making. . . . By the early 1990s, with the departure of 
the Soviets in Afghanistan and the civil war in Kabul, this extraordinary 
atmosphere had disappeared” (228). 
French photographer Didier Lefèvre first traveled to Afghanistan in the 
summer of 1986, when the anti-Soviet jihad was already at its nadir. Unlike 
Girardet, Lefèvre was a rather naive, inexperienced traveler, only vaguely 
aware of the nature of the geopolitical gridlock he was stepping into by 
agreeing to document, through his photographs, the work of an MSF mis-
sion in Afghanistan. Cross-culturally inept yet open-minded, Lefèvre used 
photography to capture his clandestine journey into Afghanistan’s interior 
with a group of MSF doctors headed by Fournot—a major figure in the 
Peshawar-based humanitarian community. During this trip, he took four 
thousand photographs; only six of them were published upon his return in 
1986. The rest of the images make up the bulk of the 2006 graphic memoir 
based on his journey. A product of the collaboration between Lefèvre, 
illustrator Emmanuel Guibert and Frédéric Lemercier, The Photographer 
is a hybrid text that combines Lefèvre’s black-and-white photography with 
Guibert’s hand-drawn frames.20 The resulting mix is visually and concep-
tually rich; a sense of immediacy, conveyed via photographs, is augmented 
by the fictionality of drawings that fill the gaps in the photo reportage 
and stitch them together into a narrative. The book includes an introduc-
tion by Alexis Siegel who briefly explains Afghanistan’s role in the Cold 
War and the factors that led to Osama bin Laden’s rise to prominence, 
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thus reframing the story slightly for the post-9/11 era. Siegel suggests that 
Lefèvre’s naivete about the geopolitical quagmire he stumbled into, as well 
as his “innocence, openness, and eagerness to learn make him an ideal 
guide for us as readers” (v). And it is so indeed. Lefèvre’s images, as well 
as the stories he recounts, offer a slab of experience and are often open-
ended, contradictory, and revelatory, especially if the reader is willing to 
suspend, at least temporarily, the anti-socialist and anti-statist biases that 
frame the narrative. At times, these images, as direct glimpses into the 
past, are directly contrapuntal to the overall narrative, creating an opening 
through which one may question Lefèvre’s assumptions about the conflict 
he is witnessing. 
The Photographer is an early post-9/11 text; it was published in French 
in three installments between 2003 and 2006; its English version was 
released in 2009. As mentioned earlier, it invokes the genre of human rights 
reportage; specifically, the photographs are meant to tell a familiar story 
of Afghan victimhood and Soviet atrocity. By the time Lefèvre traveled 
to Afghanistan, the National Geographic cover featuring the Afghan girl 
had become iconic, and many of Lefèvre’s images—especially of suffering 
children—seem to mimic it. As Fournot explained in an interview with 
Maddow, the MSF wanted to provide an alternative to the official Soviet 
coverage of the conflict by giving visibility to the suffering of the regular 
Afghans caught in the mayhem of war. Once in Afghanistan, Lefèvre 
diligently focuses on this task. He photographs the refugees moving south 
to the Pakistan border as the MSF team pushes north; he also documents 
village life and photographs the Afghans who bring their children into 
makeshift MSF clinics. Most of the suffering he captures is mundane and 
is not a result of war—the majority of the MSF patients are casualties of 
accidents and disease. However, the suffering borne by the war—we see the 
first example halfway through the book—is foregrounded. The photograph 
of a child fatally injured during an air raid serves as the book’s anchor 
image (133). In this photograph, the boy, who will soon die, looks directly 
at the viewer with a pained, stunned expression. The image is striking, 
haunting; it seems to press demands on the viewer, who is expected to 
feel outrage, perhaps take action through supporting the MSF’s human-
itarian cause. Operations Chief Fournot (who was known as “Jamila” in 
Afghanistan) also films the death of the boy using her camcorder. When 
prompted by Lefèvre, she explains her reason for filming: “The mother said 
to me, ‘Film it, Jamila, people have to know’” (136).21 
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Images of suffering children in the book—the dying child, and on 
another occasion, a child whose jaw is shattered by an explosion—are 
striking, unbearable, impossible to forget. And yet, to understand what 
we are seeing, we need to force ourselves to pause. As Rebecca Scherr 
reminds us, it is precisely because of the visceral power of the human rights 
image that we need to be careful. She says, “the ethics of looking at human 
rights images requires that one adopt a vibrant, critical eye” (123). While 
Lefèvre’s anchor images are meant to tell the story of Afghan victimhood 
in the hands of the Soviets (which serves to justify the photographer’s 
presence in Afghanistan), many aspects of the memoir suggest that he 
is embedded in a much more complex media ecology. MSF’s focus on 
witnessing, as Nunan explains, was directly linked to funding: Fournot’s 
documenting the death of a child likely served the purpose of proving that 
the MSF mission in Afghanistan was warranted; such documents were 
central to securing funding for subsequent operations, although the book 
does not mention this.22 Moreover, as the memoir shows, Lefèvre and 
the MSF are not the only ones who take pictures or document atrocities. 
While in the city of Peshawar, Lefèvre recalls meeting a German man 
(allegedly a reporter for Der Spiegel) who talks about his work that involves 
distributing camcorders to mujahideen commanders in Afghanistan and 
then collecting footage six months later. He shows Lefèvre filmed record-
ings of Russian prisoners executed by the mujahideen, which leaves the 
young photographer both horrified and befuddled. While Lefèvre himself 
has no explanation for who this man is (he suspects he might be a secret 
agent) or what role these documented executions serve, this story reveals 
the complexity of the media landscape. There is clearly a purpose for doc-
umenting these atrocities. One might speculate that these documentaries 
were used by mujahideen commanders to prove their military successes 
to their Western sponsors in a competitive field of anti-Soviet militancy. 
Perhaps they also were used to recruit new fighters, similar to how ISIS 
and other militant groups use execution videos as recruitment tools. These 
images do not circulate as human right abuses in Western media; they are 
distributed through the secret channels of CIA-led ghost wars. 
Moreover, some of Lefèvre’s own frames included in the book unwit-
tingly work against the text’s narrative of Afghan victimhood and Soviet 
atrocity, as well as implicate the doctors, and Lefèvre himself, into the 
scene of suffering. While summoning the humanitarian gaze in his pho-
tography, Lefèvre remains unaware of his own complicity in the very 
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suffering he seeks to document. It is not accidental that the humanitarian 
gaze that brings evidence of Afghan victimhood into the global public 
sphere is embedded within the infrastructures of military action (the muja-
hideen) and is an important party in the landscape of violence. Indeed, 
the aesthetics of The Photographer is a militarized one. Lefèvre’s humani-
tarian team crosses into Afghanistan, concealed under burqas, through a 
mountain pass near Chitral, Pakistan, as part of a large weapon-smuggling 
caravan. The caravan is loaded with deadly weapons and is fully a part of 
the landscape of violence that unfolds in front of the reporter’s eyes. The 
caravan stays in villages along the way, expecting hospitality and shelter, 
and thus sets the villagers up for aerial bombardment and retaliatory strikes 
if the caravan is detected. Lefèvre describes the caravan in detail: 
The caravan is assembled, with about a hundred donkeys, some twenty 
horses, and roughly a hundred men, including some forty armed fighters. 
I’ll explain the system of caravans. They deliver weapons in Afghanistan 
and return empty to Pakistan to pick up more weapons, continuously, as 
long as the tracks are usable. [. . .] So we have a pretty substantial escort: 
forty AK-47s against would-be thieves, and two or three shoulder-fired 
missiles against the helicopters. (31)
One of the key myths crafted by the West during the Cold War era 
proffered the Afghan jihad as “a peasant army” fighting a technological 
superpower with nineteenth-century British rifles or captured weapons.23 
Within the parameters of this myth, the Afghan jihad was seen as a 
spontaneous, fully autochthonous movement with no support from outside 
forces, while the enormously complex logistical, political, technological, 
and military support that the fighters received from their outside sponsors 
was bracketed out. Even Girardet, in spite of his knowledge of how 
transnational jihad operations were organized, in his memoir, occasionally 
perpetuates this myth: “It was a bizarre conflict between a twentieth-
century superpower deploying the latest military hardware and a stubborn 
peasant people whose resistance profile consisted of customs spanning two 
thousand years” (161). Similarly, Anthony James Joes asserts: “Medical 
care for the mujahideen inside Afghanistan was poor, but most of the 
guerillas possessed hardy physiques and stoic attitudes, bequeathed to 
them by many centuries of Spartan living” (184). In both quotes, the 
insurgents’ success is attributed to their Afghan “character”—stubborn, 
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stoic, and hardy—mythologized as timeless, rather than to the extensive 
technological, logistical, financial, and medical backing they received. 
By contrast, Crews reminds of the massive footprint of the Afghan jihad 
circa 1985: 
The CIA had to import thousands of mules from China to transport the 
surge of weaponry sent to the Afghan fighters in 1985. This deluge of 
deadly hardware, manufactured in a dozen countries—the United States, 
Great Britain, China, Pakistan, Israel, Germany, Switzerland, France, 
and elsewhere—is but one illustration of the global arms networks that 
the superpowers unleashed with such lethal effects in Afghanistan. To 
take just one category of weapon, the landmines deployed by the millions 
in the country, a source of hundreds of thousands of civilian and animal 
casualties that persist into the present, were produced in Italy, Great 
Britain, the USSR, and the United States. To the frustration of the DRA 
[Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] and Soviet security forces, these 
weapons moved in large caravans interspersed with commercial goods 
and people from Pakistan and along inaccessible smuggling routes that 
only locals knew. (255)
This is precisely the landscape that Lefèvre enters. As his arms-smuggling 
caravan pushes through numerous mountain passes, his snapshots, often 
taken in a rush as he is reluctant to stop for more than a few seconds, 
capture dizzying mountain landscapes, scenes of river crossings, and most 
often, the backs of the mujahideen fighters walking directly in front of him. 
Horses, slow and reluctant under their heavy loads, and weapons strapped 
to the backs of the mujahideen dominate the frames: “In front of me walks 
a carrier of antitank shells. A man can carry a bundle of those. The heavier 
missiles are carried by donkeys, but sometimes one of the muj’ [mujahideen] 
will carry one too, in a bag or secured by ropes” (67). Lefèvre’s caravan 
also carries landmines into the DRA—weapons that will be buried in the 
land and will retain their lethal power for decades, maiming civilians and 
children. While the group leaders speak with fear of Soviet helicopters, they 
also are equipped with infrared homing anti-aircraft weapons, provided by 
the Reagan administration, that can shoot such helicopters down. These 
details from Lefèvre’s account thus grate against the myth of the rugged 
villagers fighting a twentieth-century superpower with a handful of old 
British rifles. A frame on page 56 shows Fournot paying the mujahideen at 
 Humanitarian Jihad 129
the end of the day. The caption to the photo says: “Juliette handles it like a 
troop review. The Afghan currency, afghanis, changes hands.” The caravan 
venture is a lucrative enterprise. Most likely the mujahideen pictured here 
are paid twice for the same journey—by the headquarters of their military 
organization in Peshawar for the smuggling of weapons and by Fournot 
for accompanying the MSF team. 
Surprisingly, many of the memoir’s readers fail to register the presence 
of an impressive arsenal of weapons (and fighters) in this humanitarian 
mission story. For instance, Maddow, introducing illustrator Emmanuel 
Guibert and Fournot to her viewers, says: “Prepare to be impressed, and 
maybe amazed. This is the story of a walk from Pakistan into Northern 
Afghanistan at the height of the Soviet-Afghan War. And the walkers 
were armed primarily with medicine and, in one case, cameras.” On the 
one hand, this statement is startling given the sheer frequency of images 
picturing guns and other weapons in the book. On the other hand, the 
memoir’s storyline shirks from addressing the issue of the deluge of weap-
onry brought into the country by the caravan. Lefèvre’s narrator never 
raises questions about his complicity with the very suffering the MSF team 
seeks to palliate—suffering that the weapons smuggled by the caravan 
will inevitably bring. Instead, he admires the rugged masculinity of the 
fighters. The following description is typical of his romanticization of the 
insurgents: “Najmuddin is in the corner of the room. . . . On his head he’s 
wearing a chapka taken from the Russians. Next to him a vase of plastic 
flowers adds a poetic touch to his AK-47. He’s handsome, this Najmudin. 
More than handsome, impressive” (44). 
Captivated by the romance of both the journey and the insurgency, 
Lefèvre indulges in photographing the militants as they trek through ver-
tiginously beautiful Himalayan landscapes with their signature AK-47s. 
Visual repetition here functions as a refrain—frame upon frame of the 
“muj” and MSF team members walking ahead of Lefèvre, crossing torrents, 
following narrow trails along mountain passes, ascending, descending, 
resting, and resuming the walk—underscoring the monotony and the 
strain of the passage. It takes the caravan close to five weeks to reach its 
destination, the village of Zaragandara in the province of Badakhshan 
where the team sets up a clinic. The narrative of this incredibly long, trying 
journey through the Himalayas thus creates an impression that the village 
is one of the most remote, inaccessible places on Earth—one that only 
the most physically able and morally committed individuals can reach. 
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Lefèvre’s commentary supports that impression. “I’d say that Evelyne is 
the bravest among us,” his graphic avatar remarks, “because she’s absolutely 
not cut out for the feats she is accomplishing. She is a normal woman and 
not a particularly athletic person. Everything she achieves is the result 
of sheer willpower and determination” (106). Doctors’ stories, offered in 
abundance, attest to their love for the country and its people, which, they 
claim, allows them to endure the punishing journey to the destination, 
as well as the daily strain of living and working in unsanitary, Spartan 
conditions at a makeshift hospital that seems to be perched, quite literally, 
on top of the world. The caption to the image on page 122 reads: “When I 
look up from the operating table, this is what I see. This magnificent and 
unchanging landscape doesn’t give a damn about war.” 
Given this context, the reader is conditioned to believe that MSF 
doctors bring health care services, at great expense to their own health 
and wellbeing, to places where none exist, because of the remoteness and 
inaccessibility of these places. Regis, an anesthesiologist, says: “I know 
perfectly well why I’m going back. I’m going back because I’ll be practicing 
surgery in a place where people have absolutely no access to healthcare. 
And I find it deeply fulfilling” (25). Yet, a few frames included later in 
the story reveal something unexpected, which directly contradicts Regis’s 
statement. A reader not attuned to the subtleties of the Soviet-Afghan War 
is likely to miss the significance of the photograph on page 150, which 
shows the skyline of Fayzabad seen from the mujahideen’s entrenched 
position on the mountainside, within walking distance of the MSF clinic. 
Fayzabad is a city of about 50,000 people and is a regional center and the 
capital of Badakhshan Province, located about one hour away by plane 
from Peshawar. A road following the river valley connects it to Kabul—
about 270 miles away. It is surprising to learn that the village where the 
team sets up the clinic is located within walking distance to this regional 
center that, as we find out from Lefèvre, has a fully functioning hospital 
equipped with doctors and imaging equipment. One MSF doctor’s story 
recalled by Lefèvre reveals, surprisingly, that the MSF team often sends 
patients to Fayzabad hospital for x-ray imaging (115). Readers might also 
miss the significance of a detail from another MSF doctor’s account of 
staying in the village over winter and developing symptoms of appendi-
citis. He recalls treating himself with antibiotics while monitoring the 
symptoms, having instructed the locals to bring him “to the Russians” if 
his symptoms were to worsen (146). 
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While the term “the Russians” here designates the state-run Afghan 
hospital in Fayzabad, likely staffed with Afghan rather than Soviet doctors, 
it again reveals the fact of the availability of medical care in the clinic’s 
vicinity—the care the doctors themselves rely upon for life-threatening 
emergencies. Going “to the Russians” is, of course, the last resort, but why? 
The lack of explanation within the memoir itself is intriguing. It leaves the 
question open, invoking preexisting notions of Soviet barbarity that would 
prevent a European doctor from seeking help from them, unless his very 
survival were at stake. However, another, much more plausible explanation 
is this: Because the MSF team operates in Afghanistan illegally, with-
out visas or permits, and provides assistance to terrorist groups, going to 
Fayzabad’s hospital would create an international scandal and compromise 
the MSF mission. The strenuous five-week journey undertaken by the 
MSF team through remote mountain trails, as well as their fear of “the 
Russians” downhill, therefore, indexes the illegality of the entire operation. 
The team and the clinic are located in a mujahideen-controlled area and 
tend to the insurgents who are wounded while fighting the state and thus 
are unable to use state-run facilities down in the city. 
The use of the phrase “the Russians” here is intriguing as well. Cold 
War mythologies, as I mentioned previously, presented the conflict as one 
between the Afghan people and the invading “Russians” rather than the 
conflict between different groups of Afghan people with varied politi-
cal orientations who were in turn supported by external parties (US/
Saudi Arabia/Pakistan on one side and the Soviet Union on the other). 
Invocations of “the Russians” (or “the Soviets”) in many accounts of that 
era are misleading as much too often this designation refers, quite simply, 
to Afghans who lived in cities and/or worked for the state. This slippage 
further contributes to the erasure of not only Afghan revolutionary leftist 
identities, but also, more generally, of Afghan secular, urban, moderate, 
generally pro-government population segments. When Western journal-
ists traveled to Afghanistan in the wake of September 11, this particular 
use of the term was still common. Jon Lee Anderson’s 2001 article “The 
Warlord” in the New Yorker tells a story of a former mujahid recounting 
how, toward the end of the Soviet-Afghan War, the Russians killed his 
mother. The article then clarifies that the term “the Russians” referred to 
Afghan villagers who supported the state and fought against the mujahi-
deen on the side of governmental forces (after the Soviets’ withdrawal). 
One of these pro-government villagers killed the mujahid’s mother in 
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retaliation for the mujahideen fighters killing his father. This slippage is 
important to keep in mind when reading texts about that era. 
Lefèvre’s embedded perspective (he, too, is in Afghanistan illegally) 
prevents him from imagining the point of view of Afghans caught on the 
other side of the conflict—for instance, the perspective of residents of 
Fayzabad, such as, say, Afghan nurses at the hospital whose daily lives are 
threatened by mujahideen-inflicted terror. Veterans of the Soviet-Afghan 
War recall that, during the 1980s, Soviet soldiers dreaded being sent to 
Fayzabad area—it was considered to be one of the most dangerous prov-
inces in the country.24 The Soviet troops’ main role in the area was to 
secure the safe passage of trucks carrying provisions, medication, and other 
vital cargo to the town of Fayzabad from Afghanistan’s central provinces, 
which was no easy task. Located low in the valley, Fayzabad, as well as 
the road leading into it, were defenseless against mortar attacks and sniper 
fire from the surrounding mountains, from where Lefèvre takes his pic-
ture of the city (150). Soviet soldier memoirs describe having to negotiate 
daily bombardment from above and numerous IED devices buried in the 
ground below. Due to the area’s geography, pro-government forces never 
achieved dominance in the area—in fact, Fayzabad only lasted three days 
before succumbing to the insurgents after the Soviet withdrawal.25 The 
MSF team neither sees nor treats the victims of mujahideen attacks—res-
idents of the town who are harassed by mortar and sniper fire from the 
surrounding mountains—from the very bulwark that the MSF members 
visit as part of their excursion. This embedded view results in a character-
istic mythologization of mountain villages as the “real Afghanistan,” while 
the urban dwellers in the valley down below remain abstract and not even 
Afghan—“the Russians.” Seen from the mountains of Badakhshan, these 
“Russians” appear to be a vague but powerful threat—indecipherable, and 
in their vagueness, irredeemable. 
Paradoxes of the embedded perspective abound in Girardet’s Killing 
the Cranes as well. While Lefèvre traveled to Badakhshan, Girardet 
describes frequenting another famous province—the Panjshir Valley that 
was the stronghold of insurgent commander Massoud. MSF teams were 
present there as well, and Girardet describes his encounters with them. 
He describes how, on one occasion, MSF doctors had to flee the area 
due to heavy fighting between Massoud and government forces but left 
their passports behind. When the government forces discovered the pass-
ports, it almost resulted in an international scandal, but since the doctors 
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themselves were not found, the incident dissipated (218–219). While 
critical of contemporary practices of embedding reporters with NATO-
affiliated troops in Afghanistan (Killing the Cranes 8), Girardet fails to see 
that he was an embedded reporter himself. Just like Lefèvre’s, Girardet’s 
view of Afghanistan is limited to the mountain ranges and villages held 
by the jihad fighters and to the path of weapon-smuggling caravans. On 
one occasion, curious to see the other side—urban life in socialist-era 
Kabul—but denied a visa, Girardet recalls having bought a ticket to Delhi 
with a transit via the Kabul airport, which, he had hoped, would permit 
him to catch a glimpse of life the capital. He does not see much from 
the windows of the airplane, of course, but one detail he describes is of 
significance. Specifically, he recalls noticing that the commercial airliner 
followed a corkscrew trajectory when descending, to avoid mujahideen 
anti-aircraft missile attacks. Provided by the Reagan administration from 
1985 on, anti-aircraft infrared homing missiles made airplanes and heli-
copters vulnerable to attacks from the ground, making air travel unsafe 
both for the military and for civilians. To avoid being struck, commercial 
airliners on descent followed a corkscrew trajectory and were often accom-
panied by fighter jets firing off fake heat targets to steer infrared-homing 
missiles away from the aircraft. Seeing the war, briefly, from the other side, 
however, has no effect on Girardet’s romanticization of the insurgency; 
no sympathy for Afghan civilians follows from this experience. In fact, on 
another journey into Afghanistan with the group of mujahideen, he takes 
part, as an embedded journalist, in an attack on the airport in Jalalabad—a 
major Afghan city one hundred miles south of Kabul. While this particular 
attack fails to inflict casualties in Jalalabad’s airport, the skirmish results in 
a retaliatory attack by the Soviet forces on the village that served as muja-
hideen stopover. One almost expects a David Towne moment—a pause, a 
realization of the author’s complicity with the forces that make daily life 
unsafe for Afghan civilians—but the moment never arrives. 
The following anecdote from Killing the Cranes is typical, yet telling. 
During one of his trips across the border, Girardet traveled to the 
mujahideen-controlled Panjshir Valley to spend time with Massoud, a 
commander he revered. Once there, Girardet noticed two men—both 
doctors—who were running one of the three clinics in this insurgent-
controlled area. The men, who he presumed were volunteers, revealed to 
him that they were captives, having been kidnapped from the nearby city 
by Massoud’s fighters. Gigardet then explains to his readers: 
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The Afghan doctors had been captured by the mujahideen, who accused 
them of being Khalqis [communists]. They may have been, but anyone 
who worked with the government was considered communist. Active col-
laboration was common, but for different reasons. Sometimes, this was for 
ideological gain or ideological commitment—or because they considered 
the “progressive” forces of the Moscow-backed factions less abhorrent 
than the specter of the fundamentalist mujahed government headed by 
the likes of Hekmatyar, the nightmare of many educated Afghans. (159)
This passage makes several things painfully clear: The author does not get to 
meet many, or perhaps any, so-called “Khalqis” (communists) from Afghan 
cities—Afghans who prefer regular work as doctors, teachers, police officers, 
firefighters, tradesmen, or businessmen to being in the mountains with the 
jihad fighters. He also finds it necessary to explain to the reader—who by 
that point in the book is conditioned to dislike the ferocious communists, 
and admire, with the author, Islamist commander Massoud (mythologized 
as the “Lion of Panjshir” or, paradoxically, as an Afghan Che Guevara)26—
the possible reasons for their choice to work in a city as doctors. He also finds 
it necessary to put the word “progressive” in quotation marks, to emphasize 
that there could be nothing truly progressive about the “Moscow-backed” 
Afghan socialists. The United States’ leading Afghanistan scholar Barnett 
Rubin writes: “Americans and other supporters of the mujahidin admired 
the Afghans’ resistance to an evil version of modernity, while still sharing, 
by and large, the view that the resistance represented ancient ways—per-
haps admirable, if doomed—resisting the modern, centralized state” (The 
Fragmentation of Afghanistan 4). Girardet’s captive Afghan doctors therefore 
need to be redeemed, rhetorically, for their choice to work for the evil, non-
capitalist modernity down in the city rather than joining the “ancient ways” 
of the resistance. Their captivity in the mountains, paradoxically, figures 
as redemptive, with Massoud restoring them to their proper Afghanhood. 
The reporter’s embedded point of view, as well as his set of biases—among 
them the bias not just against socialism, but against the third-world state—
remains unexamined in this otherwise gripping memoir. This does not mean, 
necessarily, that the reporter is an ardent supporter of Reagan’s policies in 
the region; for instance, he equally admires Massoud and Cuban revolu-
tionaries. Yet the author’s dislike for the third-world socialist nation-state 
(seen as oppressive, necessarily totalitarian, necessarily barbaric) and his 
romanticization of those who choose to subvert it frames his entire account. 
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1979 and the Aftermath
Earlier in this chapter, I argued that the triumphant narrative of the end 
of the Cold War in 1989 makes the history of its late era (1979–1992) 
illegible. It is precisely this problem that City of Spies and The Wasted Vigil 
set to engage, recovering in turn muted histories. The long 1979 is dra-
matized, respectively, through a figure of a Pakistani child who is killed 
(in Khan’s text) and through a figure of the Afghan child who is lost (in 
Aslam’s). While in Khan’s novel the truth of the child’s death is revealed, 
in Aslam’s, the truth is hidden and part of the evidence withheld from both 
the characters and the reader. By signaling the limits of the truth-finding 
impulse, Aslam suggests, perhaps, that the work of memory regarding 
this shared past is as of yet incomplete. By tracing these histories of vio-
lence, both novels inquire into genealogies of the 9/11 wars and the rise of 
transnational terror along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The complex 
memory ecosystem staged by these two novels offers a striking contrast 
to the simplistic remediations of the past offered in the texts discussed in 
chapters one and two. 
Why do the stakes of revisiting 1979 rise rather than diminish in the 
post-9/11 era, and what are these stakes? Literary critic M. Scott Phillips 
writes: 
The euphoria over the fall of the Berlin Wall, the first Bush administra-
tion’s declaration of the “New World Order,” and the emergence of what 
Benjamin Barber has referred to as “McWorld” seem naïve now, in the 
context of post-9/11 events, the recent collapse of the global economic 
bubble, the renewed hostility toward American economic and political 
hegemony, and the advent of a serious Islamist challenge to political and 
social liberalism. (7)
The myth of the spontaneous collapse of the socialist bloc and of the sub-
sequent bloodless triumph of Western liberal democracies unravels when 
considering the intensity of the late Cold War conflict in Afghanistan. Not 
only is the end of the Cold War far from being bloodless, but this history 
reminds us that the socialist project, at least in this part of the world, was 
defeated not by liberal democratic forces, but by ultraright, extremist forces 
who challenged it and then came to power in its wake. Moreover, revis-
iting the long 1979 suggests a coevolution of the covert CIA operations, 
transnational terror networks, and European humanitarianism—a revision 
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that prompts Western readers to ponder the uncomfortable yet necessary 
questions of historical responsibility that is shared across the political spec-
trum. Where The Kite Runner—the best-known text about Afghanistan 
to date—forges a poignant, visceral image of the Soviets as the killers of 
trees and sexual predators, and where some recent Hollywood blockbusters 
(such as Ben Affleck’s Argo, for example) hammer out a clean, heroic image 
of a CIA operative, one should stop and ask, what is at stake? Is it to, as 
in Hosseini’s case, foreclose the idea of socialism as a viable alternative 
to capitalist modernity? Is it to absolve the West of any blame, making 
sure covert and increasingly privatized wars continue into the foreseeable 
future? By contrast, by examining, via this chapter’s texts, the long 1979 
of Islamabad, Peshawar, and Badakhshan as casting a long shadow, we get 
a sense of a convergence of multiple national and transnational histories 
that must inform our view of the 9/11 wars era. These texts, intentionally 
(in Aslam and Khan) or unwittingly (in Lefèvre and Girardet), perform 
important work of remembrance and recovery, not only engaging with a 
historical archive, but opening up possibilities for a transnational recon-
ciliation process—through recounting traumatic histories from multiple 
points of view, with the purpose of creating what Aslam calls poignantly 
“the kinship of wounds” (318). 
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Witness: Modes of Writing the Disaster 
Writing the Disaster 
In his 2011 memoir, Donald Rumsfeld recalls 1989—the moment that 
heralds Afghanistan’s imminent catastrophic collapse—from an American 
official point of view: 
As the Soviets completed their retreat, the CIA station in Islamabad, 
Pakistan, cabled the headquarters in Langley, Virginia, two words: “We 
won.” [. . .] In the chaos of civil war that consumed the country after the 
Soviet departure, the United States embassy in Kabul closed its doors. 
[. . .] Few American policy or intelligence officials imagined that they 
would ever have to concern themselves again with that distant, poor, 
and abused land. (366) 
As evidenced by this passage, Rumsfeld’s memoir conveniently sidesteps 
questions of historical responsibility, divesting, in the same gesture, the 
ensuing tragedy in Afghanistan of global significance. Reinscribing 
Afghanistan’s tragedy as a world-historical event, in a Hegelian sense—
an event whose arrival changed the course of world history—remains an 
important ongoing task for twenty-first-century historians and cultural 
producers. The texts discussed in this chapter insist on the need for 
collective remembrance, safeguarding against the gesture of historical 
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erasure exemplified by Rumsfeld’s account. They inscribe the Afghan 
disaster as an object of memorialization, foregrounding its key role in 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries’ global affairs. Pushing 
against the limitations of the post-Cold War humanitarian imaginary, they 
forge new vocabularies for writing traumatic histories. They maintain an 
interest in documenting suffering; yet, in their attempt to capture long-
term political violence, armed conflict, and the resulting loss of life, they 
decenter the human as well as the humanitarian figure. Ultimately, these 
authors are interested not only in suffering, but in the human, cultural, 
and environmental resilience. It is at this juncture that the contours of new 
Afghanistan writing begin to emerge—texts that stand up to historical 
scrutiny, serve as a counterpoint to official accounts, and document past 
and ongoing violence without resorting to victimization. With its focus on 
tracing these new modes of representation, this chapter is transitional—we 
move from a critique of the humanitarian imaginary to finding, together 
with the authors of these texts, a way forward. 
The three texts grouped in this chapter—Kamila Shamsie’s Burnt 
Shadows (2009), Qais Akbar Omar’s A Fort of Nine Towers (2013), and 
Zia Haider Rahman’s In the Light of What We Know (2014)—share an 
interest in memory and in literature as a medium of memory. In relation 
to Afghanistan, they can be said to initiate what Jeffrey C. Alexander calls 
a trauma process—the work of assessment of a traumatic history in which 
the victims and the perpetrators of crimes are named, losses counted, and 
responsibility attributed. Alexander views the trauma process as a creative 
practice, in which cultural memory is not simply recovered, but conjured 
anew. He writes: “The trauma process does not simply return to buried 
memory; it creates new ones. It allows events to be seen in a different 
way, and repositions roles and responsibilities of actors, and suggests that 
the present must be repaired in a manner that makes it consistent with 
the newly remembered past” (154). The aim of this process, therefore, is 
repair—a kind of truth and reconciliation process that occurs through 
excavating relevant truths about the past. For the trauma process to occur, 
Alexander suggests, carrier groups (groups with symbolic capital) have to 
emerge “with the resources, authority, or interpretive competence to pow-
erfully disseminate these trauma claims” (30). Writers and other cultural 
producers play a key role in the trauma process—initiating discussions, 
conducting investigations, or creating fictional characters who become 
spokespersons for historical ills. 
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Alexander’s framework can be viewed as a productive means for con-
ceptualizing contemporary Afghanistan writing as a work of repair, with 
a caveat that, in this case, this work occurs in the global, rather than a 
national milieu. It must be noted, however, that the language of trauma 
has limitations as it has been associated, since Cathy Caruth’s major inter-
vention, with fast violence—an unexpected event that then produces gaps 
in memory, language, and representation. While scholars have pointed 
out that the notion of trauma is capacious enough to include other forms 
of violence that are cumulative and recurrent,1 the view of trauma as a 
rupture—an event that rips time apart—remains strong. In 9/11 cultural 
production the attacks in New York have been inscribed as a major national 
(and occasionally as a global) trauma, with a resulting interest in the failure 
of memory and representation, and the nature of the event as a rupture that 
signals a complete break with the past is foregrounded. Jean Baudrillard 
famously wrote in 2002: “With the attacks on the World Trade Center in 
New York, we might even be said to have before us the absolute event, the 
‘mother’ of all events, the pure event uniting within itself all the events 
that have never taken place. The whole play of history and power are dis-
rupted by this event, but so, too are the conditions of analysis” (4). This 
indictment makes use of Caruth’s notion of trauma as a breakdown of one’s 
analytical and linguistic capacities. Richard Gray in After the Fall: American 
Literature Since 9/11 observes that writers who attempt to engage with the 
9/11 tragedy manifest a fixation on the failure of linguistic articulation. He 
writes, “If there was one thing writers agreed about in response to 9/11, 
it was the failure of language; the terrorist attacks made the tools of their 
trade seem absurd” (1). “‘Nothing to say,’” he adds, “became a refrain, a 
recurrent theme with writers, as they struggled to cope with something 
that seemed to be, quite literally, beyond words” (15). 
To distance myself from the language of rupture and exception as 
prevalent in 9/11 cultural texts, I suggest that Afghanistan’s prolonged 
strife is better captured by the term “disaster.” I propose this term to delin-
eate a crisis that cannot be reduced to any single iconic image of extreme 
violence. Unraveling over the course of four decades, it includes both fast 
and slow forms of violence—manifesting as loss of life, infrastructure col-
lapse, habitat diminishment, environmental toxicity, hunger, disease, and 
proliferation of terror and poppy fields. Involving many global actors and 
networks, such a disaster is so distributed in time and space that its con-
tours are hard to grasp. Signaling a crisis that is long-term, continuous, 
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enfolded into the very fabric of the everyday, such disaster never ends; 
one is ensconced in the disaster and carried forth by its forces, subjected 
to the slow catastrophe of its rhythm. “The disaster ruins everything, all 
the while leaving everything intact,” writes Maurice Blanchot (1). What 
does it mean to make the disaster legible? In his essay “How to Write the 
Disaster,” Joshua Schuster presents the disaster as profoundly enigmatic 
and ambiguous. “Disaster,” he writes, “is the mark of an event that refuses 
revelation or redemption even if other conditions are made possible in its 
wake” (168). In contrast to an apocalypse—a catastrophic end that deliv-
ers revelation and, ultimately, salvation, the disaster does not offer such 
closure. Instead, the disaster delivers nothing. It cannot be absorbed into 
a narrative of either progress or collapse; it cannot be viewed as epiphany, 
restitution, or productive purge. The disaster is not the end of history: 
Schuster pronounces that “other conditions are made possible in its wake” 
(168). To a survivor’s dismay and disbelief, historical processes continue 
unabated in the disaster’s aftermath. On the one hand, this tentative con-
tinuation testifies to life’s resilience as weakened forms of life struggle 
yet persist in the ruins. On the other hand, it attests to human failure to 
learn from history. When a survivor looks ahead in search of solace and 
atonement, she finds the seeds of new catastrophes brewing. 
Here, I propose the term “writing the disaster” as better suited to 
describe global Afghanistan writing than “trauma fiction.” The three texts 
grouped together in this chapter resist the trope of language failure (asso-
ciated with trauma), conjuring, instead, divergent yet powerful modes of 
speaking about their crises. While including the 9/11 attacks, these texts 
contest the motif of exceptionality by decentering the 9/11 events and 
placing them in the light of other—both prior and subsequent—histor-
ical catastrophes. In contrast to Patrick Fuery, who calls 9/11 “a terror 
unlike any other” (182), they all insist that 9/11 is an event connected with 
many others, woven into the very fabric of the interconnected world we 
inhabit.2 These texts’ characters experience the disaster as a process that 
unfolds. They are depicted as living in the wake of an anterior crisis and 
in the shadow of another that is already looming on the horizon. To live 
through the disaster, for Blanchot, is to persist beyond survival, is to lose 
the grounds for making sense of things, is to lose a world (2). Yet to survive 
a disaster does not mean to be exempt from history. Carried from the jaws 
of one catastrophe to the next, these texts’ characters survive the end of 
not one, but multiple, worlds. 
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The three works grouped here focus on Afghanistan’s catastrophic 
history from a South Asian perspective.3 Omar’s text is a memoir that 
takes readers into the very heart of the Afghan disaster. It narrates the 
period of the collapse of the state, dramatizing the country’s catastrophic 
unraveling in the era of the civil war that followed the overthrow of the last 
socialist government in Kabul in 1992. Following publication in English 
by Picador, the memoir was translated into twenty other languages and 
deserves the attention it is receiving. By describing what it meant to have 
lived through the destruction of Kabul as it was captured by the warring 
jihadist groups in 1992, the memoir gives us a glimpse into what it means 
to have survived the sieges of Fallujah, Mosul, Palmyra, Raqqa, or Aleppo 
in the twenty-first century. In the vast corpus of works that have been 
written about Afghanistan in recent years, Omar’s text is unique insofar 
as it is a work of a survivor who was an eyewitness to the entire crisis of 
the 1990s—the crisis that lasted nine long years before the 9/11 attacks, 
during the time when the larger world, as Rumsfeld’s quote reminds us, 
was not watching. 
The other two authors examined here—Shamsie and Rahman—center 
the Afghan tragedy by placing it in the context of other twenty- and 
twenty-first-century catastrophes. Both novels write the Afghan disaster 
by having foreigners drawn into its vortex—a mixed-race polyglot 
translator in Shamsie’s novel and a Bangladeshi human rights lawyer in 
Rahman’s. At first glance, Shamsie’s and Rahman’s novels are not directly 
about Afghanistan—their storylines move freely between countries and 
continents. This movement is symptomatic and is designed to draw attention 
to the permeability of Afghanistan’s borders, as well as its enmeshment 
with multiple histories—the Cold War rivalry, the War on Terror, the 
infrastructures of global capitalism, and so on. Yet their main storyline 
culminates in Afghanistan, as if to emphasize that Afghanistan is a place 
where things come to a halt, where rival parties finally face a standoff, 
where various independent lines of flight intersect. Rahman underscores 
the idea of Afghanistan as a site of such fierce fighting by comparing it 
to a board game “in which players fight to set down the very rules” (363). 
Of the three writers discussed here, Shamsie is the most established 
figure in the newly emerging canon of South Asian works written during 
the 9/11 wars era. An author of six acclaimed novels to date, Shamsie 
was born in Pakistan, yet her trajectory of transnational migration and 
travel marks her as a novelist of the global age. A dual citizen of Pakistan 
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and the United Kingdom, she is defined by what we could call trans-
national trigamy, straddling Karachi, Pakistan, where she grew up, the 
United States, where she went to college (Hamilton College, University 
of Massachusetts Amherst), and London, where she lives now. In Burnt 
Shadows, she thrusts into center view the less publicized, non-Western 
catastrophes of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The novel’s four 
sections mark four catastrophes: the atomic bombing of Nagasaki in 1945, 
the Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, the intensification of the Cold 
War in Afghanistan in 1982–1983, and the War on Terror of 2001–2002 
with its epicenters in New York and Afghanistan. The novel’s mode of writ-
ing the disaster can be called constellational—by putting several historical 
catastrophes side-by-side, the author opens each event up in a manner 
characteristic of multidirectional memory staged by Nadeem Aslam (as 
discussed in the previous chapter). Her method can be called “amplifi-
cation”—gaining an understanding of hidden aspects of one catastrophe 
through its echoes and resonances in another. 
Rahman boasts a similar transnational trajectory. Born in rural 
Bangladesh, he was raised in poverty by immigrant parents in London, 
and later studied and worked in both England and the United States. His 
ambitious first novel draws parallels between the War on Terror and the 
financial crisis of 2008, foregrounding the opaque, distributed, techni-
cal nature of both catastrophes. The novel’s recursive-digressive structure 
foregrounds the nontransparency in the heart of such crises. Afghanistan, 
in the book, provides a focal point through which to bring to light the 
complexity of contemporary wars, staging Kabul as a site of collision and 
confluence of multiple military and nonmilitary networks. With its atten-
tion on the question of knowing, Rahman’s novel suggests that disaster is 
unthinkable, resisting our epistemic thrust. The catastrophic effects—such 
as deadly acts of terror—are apparent to an eyewitness, but the causes 
remain obscure—not because they exceed the capacity of ordinary lan-
guage, but because they are massively distributed in space and time, and 
ultimately, like the 2008 financial crisis, too technical for any single person 
to comprehend. 
Taking as a point of departure Debjani Ganguly’s assertion that the 
world novel offers a mode of witnessing that makes historical events and 
traumas legible (as opposed to mass media that make them visible), I 
propose that the three selected texts construct three modes of witness, 
and therefore three modes of writing, and making legible, the Afghan 
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disaster.4 Both Omar’s and Shamsie’s texts offer a long-term witness as 
a main device that allows them to document the protracted crises that 
span years to decades. Shamsie’s witness spans sixty years, straddling 
many countries and continents, dramatizing, through her migrations, the 
catastrophic history of the long twentieth century. Similarly, Omar’s mem-
oir offers a long-term witness, embedded with the enfolding disaster in 
Afghanistan, providing a continuity necessary to understand the Afghan 
crisis, its causes and consequences, as well as its long-term global effects. 
By contrast, Rahman’s novel, through both its plot and its formal aspects, 
argues against the primacy of eyewitnessing, claiming, instead, that, due 
to its complexity, the disaster is beyond human witness. The disaster, in 
Rahman, is not a single event or an object, but numerous interrelated 
events and objects (one can say, it is a hyperobject). It cannot be perceived 
but can only be accessed through mathematics (computer modeling), and 
even then, certain things remain opaque. As the indeterminacy at the very 
core of the world continuously thwarts our epistemic thrust, the disaster, 
in fact, calls for a nonhuman witness. 
While situated in NATO-centric contexts (England and the United 
States), these diasporic South Asian writers engage in a critique of 
American imperialism and indict the ruthless profiteering at the heart 
of the interventionist program. All three writers underscore the enmesh-
ment of the War on Terror with the infrastructure of global finance 
capitalism—an imbrication that problematizes the moral dogmas of the 
battle of “good versus evil.” “Many of the foreigners who came here [to 
Afghanistan] claiming to help us left very rich,” writes Omar bitterly in 
his last chapter (375). “Meanwhile,” he adds, “the Afghanistan that we 
had dreamed about during all those years of bombs, whips, and stonings 
still has not returned to us” (378). In turn, Rahman underscores the greed 
that drives many humanitarians and developers. He writes, sardonically, 
that in 2002 no explanation was necessary for why someone would come 
to Kabul: “There were already numberless new arrivals in Kabul, would-be 
development wonks, skulking about the city waiting for a Western devel-
opment agency to throw some meat their way, and they, like all hyenas, 
needed no explanation when the smell of meat was in the air” (384). 
In Shamsie, the reader is conscripted into probing and questioning the 
morality of the shadow infrastructure of private military contracting—a 
business that “outsources death” (Zinck 50) to third-country nationals 
(TCNs) in what can only be called a necropolitical business enterprise. 
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And yet, in spite of these critiques of the continuing Western interfer-
ence in Afghanistan, the authors resist the paralyzing discourse of us 
versus them. Instead, they foreground the fact that the lasting legacies of 
colonial violence that persist in the era of the 9/11 wars create ambigu-
ities and polarizations far more complex than this hegemonic discourse 
suggests. Shamsie and Rahman feature characters who are caught, to use 
Harleen Singh’s words, “on both sides of the War on Terror” (“Insurgent 
Metaphors” 36)—becoming, unwittingly, complicit with acts of violence, 
and although by no means terrorists, cannot be absolved of blame either. 
Taken together, the three texts illustrate the increasing complexity of 
global Afghanistan writing as seen over the two decades of the 9/11 wars: 
by shifting of attention from fast to slow violence, by focusing on infra-
structures and conditions that enable it, and by bringing into view the 
global networks of power. 
Reverberations Across Time 
The first sentence of Burnt Shadows invokes an image that came to define 
9/11 writing early on—the image of the clear blue sky5: “Later, the one who 
survives will remember this day as grey, but on the morning of 9 August 
itself both the man from Berlin, Konrad Weiss, and the schoolteacher, 
Hiroko Tanaka, step out of their house and notice the perfect blueness of 
the sky” (5). 
The “perfect blueness of the sky” here both summons and interrogates 
the image that became the trope ubiquitous in 9/11 writing—the clear 
blue sky out of which the planes came, signifying the age of innocence 
prior to the attacks. Here, the perfectly blue sky is the sky over Nagasaki 
on August 9, 1945, minutes before the city would be seared by an atomic 
bomb dropped by an American pilot, Major Charles W. Sweeney, resulting 
in 75,000 deaths. The capture of Nagasaki’s tragedy through a 9/11 trope 
forces the reader into a shocking recognition of an earlier catastrophe by 
way of the more recent one, creating a powerful resonance between the 
two. Moments prior, the novel’s six-sentence-long enigmatic prologue 
describes a scene in a prison cell, invoking another color—orange—the 
color of Guantanamo Bay and thus a potent signifier of the War on Terror’s 
many catastrophic failures. The prologue’s last sentence, “How did it come 
to this,” implies that the novel will provide a possible answer by writing a 
genealogy of “orange,” illuminating the long trajectory that leads the yet 
unnamed character to Guantanamo. 
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One of the most prominent features of Burnt Shadows is its architecture. 
The novel is divided into four sections that mark four catastrophes. Starting 
in Nagasaki on the day of the atomic bombing, the book then moves to 
the Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, the war in Afghanistan in the 
1980s, and finally, into the early days of the War on Terror, 2001–2002. 
These different scenes of violence are connected through the figure of 
an eyewitness—Hiroko—a Japanese woman who experiences all of these 
catastrophic events during her life span. Plagued by survivor guilt, she lives 
across several eras, straddling different countries and continents and incur-
ring many losses. Implicitly, by means of its architecture, the novel makes 
an argument against the centrality of the 9/11 attacks in the contemporary 
imaginary, ending with the War on Terror that the book positions as the 
end result of the catastrophic long twentieth century. Shamsie therefore 
resists “the mythologizing that has taken place around 9/11 and given it a 
narrative primacy over all other world events of the last few decades,” as 
noted by Singh in “A Legacy of Violence” (159). Additionally, by embed-
ding the War on Terror into a broader temporal framework, the novel 
argues against what Georgiana Banita calls “the exclusion of anteriority 
in the War on Terror”—the erasure of its genealogy in the Af-Pak region 
in the 1980s (227). 
The novel’s title invokes the shadows of the incinerated victims of 
the atomic bomb that were etched into the concrete, evidencing the 
instantaneity of their extinguishment. Cast by invisible bodies, these 
shadows are a potent allegory of the disaster that remains unseen, 
incomprehensible, yet forever imprinted into the landscape. It also evokes 
the shadow-like radiation burns etched into Hiroko’s back—the trace of 
the bomb inscribing itself for posterity on her body. If someone asked 
Shamsie whether the book was about writing the disaster, she would 
probably ask, which disaster, and whose disaster? The choice of historical 
catastrophes she writes about is significant. All four catastrophes occur 
in non-Western spaces, spanning several sites in Asia: Nagasaki, Delhi, 
Afghanistan (with a spillover of the conflict into Pakistan’s cities Karachi 
and Peshawar), and again Afghanistan, which becomes the epicenter of the 
War on Terror. Sidestepping the Euro-American disasters of the Shoah 
and the 9/11, Shamsie seeks to assert the significance of the catastrophic 
events that cross into global mainstream visibility far less often. With 
this, she attempts to write a history of the catastrophic twentieth century 
from the point of view of the subaltern—a project that she also pursues 
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in her 2014 novel A God in Every Stone, where she brings into view the 
experience of World War I by a soldier from the colonies (Pakistan) and 
also describes the long-forgotten massacre that occurred during the anti-
colonial riots in Peshawar in 1930. The catastrophes in Burnt Shadows are 
all global catastrophes that pose lasting, unresolved ethical questions that 
Shamsie interrogates. For instance, she chooses to write of Nagasaki, not of 
Hiroshima (the first city that was bombed), because of the ethical question 
the second bomb poses. “Why a second bomb?” Hiroko exclaims, “Even the 
first one is beyond anything I can . . . but a second. You do that, and you 
see what you’ve done, and then you do it again. How is that . . . ?” (100). 
Similar to centering the ethical question posed by the second bomb, 
Shamsie seeks to position the unraveling of Afghanistan as one of the 
main catastrophic events of the twentieth century—one that poses lasting 
ethical questions as well. It is telling that some critics do not “see” or skip 
over some of the catastrophes that Shamsie seeks to make central, in spite 
of the book’s very structure foregrounding the resonance between the four 
events. Singh, in her introduction to the interview with Shamsie, men-
tions only three events—Nagasaki, Partition, and 9/11, thus omitting the 
Afghanistan section and replacing the War on Terror with 9/11: “Though 
Hiroko is not the narrator of the novel, the viewer is positioned to view 
Nagasaki, Partition, and 9/11 from her perspective” (157). Similarly, Zinck 
speaks of the bombing of Nagasaki and 9/11 as the two events that frame 
the novel, thus skipping over both Partition and the Afghan crisis and, 
once again, substituting 9/11 for the War on Terror. Yet Shamsie is ada-
mant that Burnt Shadows is not a 9/11 novel and that it is not one of the 
four disasters it narrates. After emphasizing that the books in fact “‘skips’ 
9/11 and picks up with the war in Afghanistan and the Indo-Pakistan 
stand-off,” she adds, “I continue to be quite annoyed when people say—and 
a lot of people say this—that my novel starts with the bombing of Nagasaki 
and ends with 9/11. It ends with the War on Terror. That is an important 
distinction” (159). 
Shamsie’s decision to focus on these non-Western disasters is deter-
mined not only by her commitment to writing history from the point 
of view of the subaltern, but also by her long-term interest in what she 
calls “the missing pictures”—photographs of atrocities that do not enter 
into mainstream visibility because of ideological or political constraints 
or because photographs were never taken in the first place.6 As a novelist, 
she believes it is her duty to recover these missing pictures, bringing into 
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visibility the hidden crimes and their unmourned victims. The War on 
Terror as well as the Afghan jihad of the 1980s are paradigmatic examples 
of covert wars—long-term disasters of which many pictures, and records, 
are missing. 
The architecture of resonance, the polycentric approach of the 
novel that has not one but four centers, works multidirectionally, as one 
disaster informs our understanding of another. The story of a Japanese 
schoolboy—an adolescent kamikaze pilot who steers his plane into a US 
warship—invokes, in the first pages of the book, the horrors of the 9/11 
attacks that would occur fifty-six years later. And in 2001, the discourse 
of saving American lives in the context of the War on Terror reminds 
Hiroko of an American GI who told her that “the bomb was a terrible 
thing, but it had to be done to save American lives” (61)—a statement 
that proves to be intolerable (more so than the bombing itself) and makes 
her flee US-occupied Japan in desperation. By creating an architecture of 
transhistorical and transborder reverberation, Shamsie seeks to amplify 
the less visible disasters, giving voice to their victims and critiquing the 
troubling complicity of the citizenry steered by nationalist sentiment. In 
doing so, she seeks to counteract Western solipsism and amnesia, both of 
which are exemplified in the novel by a young American engineer, Kim 
Burton—for whom the 9/11 attacks is the only world historical event she 
has ever experienced.7 The narrative forms a loop from the bombing of 
Nagasaki that claimed the lives of Hiroko’s fiancé and her father, to the 
War on Terror, in which Hiroko loses her son, Raza, a Pakistani citizen 
and a US green card holder, to government sweeps, when he is reported 
to the authorities by Burton and arrested under suspicion of terrorism. 
Although Raza is not killed, the novel’s ending (foreshadowed in the 
Prologue) conveys the sense that mother and son will never meet again 
and that Raza will be disappeared, tortured, and lost in the global shadow 
network of CIA black sites. It is in the context of the War on Terror, with 
its climate of anxiety and paranoia that Hiroko, the survivor of the atomic 
bombing, finally finds the answer to the question that haunted her for 
fifty-six years: Why was there a second bomb? The reaction of wounded 
Americans who support the invasion of Afghanistan and the rounding 
up of foreigners exemplifies for the protagonist how citizens buy into the 
polarizing logic of “us” (whose lives need to be protected) and “them” 
(whose lives are expendable), and come to support their governments’ 
atrocities committed in their name. 
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A long-term witness and a survivor of multiple catastrophes, Hiroko 
is able to bear witness to fast violence, such as the atomic blast itself, and 
to “long dyings,” toxic aftermaths, and violent blowback. Nixon notes “the 
representational bias against slow violence” (13), especially in mass media 
with its short attention span, and the problem slow violence and the result-
ing “long dyings” pose for memorialization. “In the long arc between the 
emergence of slow violence and its delayed effects,” he writes, “both the 
causes and the memory of catastrophe readily fade from view as the casu-
alties incurred typically pass untallied and unremembered” (8–9). Burnt 
Shadows is committed to bringing slow violence into view in multiple ways. 
Though her bird-shaped radiation burns are numb to the touch, they are 
a vehicle of memory, a part of Hiroko that refuses to let go and forget: 
“Some days she could feel the dead on her back, pressing down beneath 
her shoulder blades with demands she could not make sense of but knew 
she was failing to meet” (50). The long-term suffering of the body that 
keeps the memory of the disaster in its genes, its tissues, and its bones, 
manifests, among other things, in a miscarriage that prevents the birth of 
a deformed child. The novel does not describe the extent of the deformity, 
but addresses it indirectly: “The doctor never told her precisely what was 
so wrong with the foetus, she only said some miscarriages were acts of 
mercy” (208). Slow violence also manifests as the mental torment that 
drives Hiroko out of her country where she is perceived as hibakusha—the 
irradiated one—into the unknown world, Delhi, Karachi, and later New 
York, making her homeless, a perpetual foreigner. Similarly, the novel 
demonstrates that the full extent of the Afghan crisis of the 1980s takes 
decades to manifest—in the transnational jihad “blowback,” and more 
prosaically, as the long-term human cost of the collapse of the Afghan 
state—the event that propelled millions of Afghans out of their homeland 
into the larger world, condemning them to the bleak prospect of living as 
illegal migrants on inhospitable foreign shores, or as perpetual refugees. 
In his discussion of post-9/11 writing, Gray describes how American 
authors, in the aftermath of 9/11, grapple with “imagining what it feels 
like to survive the end of the world” (17). Burnt Shadows brings into view 
the fact that the twentieth-century crises created countless survivors who 
know a thing or two about losing a world. When Hiroko meets an Afghan 
man named Abdullah in the public library in New York, there is an instant 
recognition of such shared experience of loss. As Abdullah shows Hiroko 
the book he is looking at, she recognizes the yearning for a homeland that 
 Witness 149
no longer exists. “‘Kandahar. Before the wars.’ He ran his palm across the 
photograph, as though he could feel the texture of the ripening pome-
granates pushing up against his skin. [. . .] Hiroko nodded, touching the 
page as reverently as Abdullah had. It was difficult to find photographs 
of Nagasaki that preceded the bomb” (317). She sees in him “a man who 
understood lost homelands and the impossibility of return. He had looked 
at the photographs of Kandahar’s orchards as Sajjad used to look at pic-
tures of his old moholla in Dilli” (319). Sajjad, Hiroko’s Muslim Indian 
husband, was ejected from his beloved Delhi (he calls it “Dilli”) after the 
Partition of 1947, having the family resettle in Karachi, Pakistan, where 
they gradually rebuilt their lives as refugees. 
Centering the unraveling of Afghanistan as one of the key disasters 
of the twentieth century, examining its legacy—the legacy made mani-
fest during the War on Terror—is the main trajectory of the book’s two 
last parts. Shamsie dramatizes this long conflict through three characters 
who reside in Pakistan in 1982–1983: Harry Burton (English American), 
Hiroko’s son Raza (a Japanese Pakistani “bomb-marked mongrel” [194]), 
and Abdullah (an Afghan boy growing up in an Afghan refugee neigh-
borhood in Karachi). Shamsie traces their stories into the post-9/11 era, 
making audible the reverberation of the American-assisted Afghan jihad 
of the 1980s in the US-led War on Terror of 2001–2002. Harry Burton—
Hiroko’s family friend—is an allegory of Anglo-American interference in 
South Asia, and also of colonial legacies of privilege and power. He is a son 
of James Burton, a colonial administrator in British India at the time of 
the Partition. Having attended an elite boarding school in England, Harry 
later immigrates to the United States and becomes an instant convert of 
the American dream. A passionate hater of communism, and due to his 
colonial education, a fluent speaker of Urdu (Hiroko’s husband was his 
childhood Urdu teacher), he joins the CIA, returning to Pakistan in 1983 
to assist with the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. A figure reminiscent 
of Aslam’s CIA operative David Town (The Wasted Vigil), Harry supervises 
a complex operation of weapon smuggling via the port city of Karachi 
into Peshawar and the adjacent jihad training camps along Afghanistan’s 
border.8 The novel shows that the Burtons, ultimately, are a destructive 
presence in Hiroko’s and her family’s lives. Harry becomes indirectly 
responsible for the death of Hiroko’s husband in 1983 (he is killed by 
one of Harry’s local CIA assets). Post-9/11, he draws her son, Raza, into 
the murky world of military contracting—an endeavor that in time will 
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seal Raza’s fate resulting in his arrest as a terror suspect (he is reported to 
the authorities by Kim Burton, Harry’s daughter). Harry’s world is one 
of “lies and manipulation” (Singh, “A Legacy of Violence” 161); Harry’s 
most problematic feature is that he does not hold himself responsible for 
the tragedies unfolding in his wake. Like Aslam’s David Town, he is an 
ardent believer in American hegemony: “Communism,” he says, “had to 
be crushed so that the US could be the world’s only superpower” (175). 
In his pursuit of this goal, he is pragmatic, strictly utilitarian in relation 
to the means of conducting war: “rape is off limits, children are off limits, 
but aside from that, whatever works, works” (289). 
The “Afghan” jihad Harry supervises is a complex, transnational affair; 
although somewhat skeptical about foreign recruits (and anticipating blow-
back sometime in the future), he welcomes the internationalization of the 
infrastructure of terror. Weapons that arrive to Karachi docks in Pakistan 
in shiploads come from all over the world, and so do the recruits in need 
of training: 
[N]ow, the war was truly international. Arms from Egypt, China and—
soon—Israel. Recruits from all over the Muslim world. Training camps 
in Scotland! There was even a rumor that India might be willing to sell 
some of the arms they had bought from their Russian friends—even 
though it might prove to be little more than a rumor, Harry couldn’t help 
enjoying the idea of Pakistan, India, and Israel working together in an 
American war. Here was internationalism, powered by capitalism. (207)
By referring to the Afghan jihad, throughout the book, as an American 
war, Shamsie seems to suggest a causal relation between Afghanistan’s 
catastrophic unraveling and the actions of the United States, exemplified 
by Harry Burton. Yet, her argument in the end is more complex. To assign 
such a causal relation would be to sidestep complex questions of coagency 
and responsibility, as well as to blur the difference between actions and 
conditions for action—a distinction outlined by Judith Butler in Precarious 
Life—a book written shortly after September 11. In this text, Butler argues 
against an explanation that links the rise of global terror and the attacks 
of 9/11 to US actions by ways of direct causation: 
No doubt, there are forms of Left analysis that say simply that the United 
States has reaped what it has sown. Or they say that the United States 
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has brought this state of events upon itself. These are, as closed expla-
nations, simply other ways of asserting U.S. priority and encoding U.S. 
omnipotence. These are explanations that assume that these actions orig-
inate in a single subject, that the subject is not what it appears to be, 
that it is the United States that occupies the site of that subject, and that 
no other subjects exists or, if they exist, their agency is subordinated to 
our own. (9)
In other words, Butler warns the reader against seeing the United States 
as a direct (and only) cause of the spread of transnational terror—a move 
that ultimately leads to a deterministic view and contributes to the fantasy 
of Western omnipotence. Other parties, she underscores, extremist net-
works among them, were also responsible for the rise of terror. Offering 
a distinction between actions and conditions for actions, Butler proposes 
that the United States’ imperialism bears responsibility for setting up the 
conditions, without being the sole cause, for the spread of terror—the acts 
of terror, nevertheless, committed by independently “acting and deliber-
ating subjects” (11). 
This distinction between the conditions (the infrastructure of war, the 
political groundwork, media coverage, destabilization, and other activ-
ities that pave the way to war) and individual agency is central to the 
way in which Shamsie unpacks the Afghan jihad as it arrives to Hiroko 
and her family’s doorstep in Karachi. While Harry, along with his CIA 
colleagues, works to put in place the infrastructures of terror, it is up to 
the Afghan refugees who live on the outskirts of Karachi to make use of 
them. The fate of Abdullah—a fourteen-year-old Afghan boy—drama-
tizes personal agency and the power of structural conditions. It is made 
clear that Abdullah is expected, but not coerced, to join the jihad once he 
turns fourteen. In fact, he hesitates and tells Raza, his friend, of his doubt: 
“Afridi is going to Peshawar next week. My brother Ismail said I should go 
with him, and he’ll meet me and take me to the camp. But I don’t know. 
You said once, there are other ways to fight the Soviets. Maybe I’d be more 
useful here, with Afridi” (214). And yet, Abdullah’s individual agency is 
circumscribed—both by the lasting legacies of colonial subjugation and 
powerlessness that limit his choices in the world, and by the new structural 
conditions, among them gun trade, jihad training camps nearby, the pros-
pect of well-paid work as a fighter, and religious indoctrination embedded 
with the refugee community. These infrastructures make Abdullah’s path 
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to jihad seamless, just as the infrastructures of elite British and American 
education, as well as racial privilege, carry Harry into a successful career 
at the CIA and his becoming a formidable agent of the new Empire. 
Raza, in particular, dramatizes the enduring legacies of colonial privi-
lege and power. An intellectual and a polyglot, coveted for his multilingual 
translation skills in a transnational job market, he remains marked by his 
race (as Pakistani Japanese), which leads to his downfall in 2002 when he 
is arrested as a terror suspect. Having been recruited by Harry Burton into 
the lucrative business of private military contracting, Raza finds himself 
in Afghanistan in 2002, on a military contract firm payroll, assisting in 
the US-led operation. His fate illustrates, once again, the power of struc-
tural conditions; once the post-9/11 infrastructures of suspicion are put in 
place, detection will inevitably follow. Following a shooting at the base, 
during which Harry and several TCNs are killed, Raza is “detected” by 
a hypervigilant CIA agent on the military base, realizes that he cannot 
prove his innocence, and has to flee. A Pakistani citizen with links to the 
Afghans (while in Afghanistan, Raza attempts to find his childhood friend 
Abdullah), he is seen as a terror suspect, his phone conversation with an 
Afghan man days prior to the shooting serving as proof of his guilt. Raza’s 
entrapment in the post-9/11 global terror hunt parallels his earlier journey 
along the shadow military infrastructures of the Afghan jihad when, as 
a seventeen-year-old boy, he unwittingly travels with Abdullah to a jihad 
training camp in Peshawar, even though he is not an Afghan and has no 
reason to join the war. While young Raza is quickly uncovered by an ISI 
agent (Pakistani intelligence) supervising the camp and sent back home 
to his worried parents, his journey illustrates how easy it is to follow the 
infrastructures of terror once they are put in place. The last pages of the 
novel have him on the run from the CIA, smuggled by human traffickers 
out of Afghanistan and across the world, and finally arrested in Canada. 
Thus, the figure in the Prologue—a naked prisoner waiting in his cell for 
an orange suit turns out to be Raza. Raza’s arrest exemplifies “the poten-
tial of the War on Terror to cause miscarriages of justice by vilifying the 
innocent” (Banita 31), his extraordinary rendition adding to his mother’s 
long list of losses incurred during the catastrophic twentieth century. 
The figure of Abdullah—whose story the novel picks up again in its 
concluding pages—exemplifies the ambiguous position of the Afghan 
mujahid in the post-9/11 American imaginary. Having joined the terror 
force against the Soviets as a fourteen-year-old boy and having driven 
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“the last Soviet out of Afghanistan” (210) by means of jihad (as Raza 
and Abdullah fantasized in their youth), Abdullah inherited not a free 
and independent Afghanistan, but a ruined country, weakened, first, by a 
decade and a half of mujahideen-inflicted terror and government retalia-
tions, and, destroyed, finally, by the victorious mujahideen factions fighting 
each other for spoils. In the end, Abdullah inherits a ruined world; having 
lost his country, he has lost everything. An overthrow of the socialist 
government heralds the country’s joining not the free, liberal First World, 
but the army of dispossessed in the Third World readable to its former 
benefactors as a disposable army of cheap labor. Reduced to an expendable 
body without the means of subsistence and a passport that bestows no 
privileges yet marks his belonging to a failed state, he travels to America 
illegally, smuggled by human traffickers in conditions that invoke the 
horrors of the middle passage. The reader gets a glimpse into the shadow 
geography of human trafficking—another infrastructure in place in today’s 
world—when Shamsie describes Raza’s journey from Afghanistan to 
Canada while on the run from the CIA. When Raza crosses the Gulf of 
Oman—a short trip in comparison to crossing the Atlantic—in a small 
wooden boat packed with countless other bodies in the searing inferno of 
the hidden compartment, he cannot but think of the mass graves he had 
seen in Bosnia. Illegal and effectively stateless, Abdullah then settles for a 
precarious life as an illegal immigrant and a taxi cab driver in New York 
city, yearning for his lost homeland, missing his family, and dreaming of 
the gardens of Kandahar as they existed before the war. To add to all this, 
the political winds in America have changed; in the climate of the War on 
Terror, the former Afghan jihad fighters are no longer viewed favorably, as 
exemplifying “the invincibility of the ideals we in this country hold most 
dear, the ideals of freedom and independence” (Reagan), but as terror 
suspects to be detained, tortured, and disappeared. As the FBI knocks 
on Abdullah’s door, the circle is complete. Having escaped through the 
window, he is destined for another passage across the Atlantic, back to 
Afghanistan, that is, if he survives the journey’s horrors. 
Long-Term Witness 
“Could a grave be as big as a whole city?” the narrator of A Fort of Nine 
Towers asks himself (21). While Shamsie’s novel ends with the story of a 
former Afghan mujahid who left the country after the mujahideen vic-
tory, Qais Akbar Omar’s memoir tells the story of someone who stayed 
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in Afghanistan to witness the horrors of the “victory’s” aftermath. Omar’s 
memoir is, in fact, one of the very few texts that tell this story, taking us 
into the very heart of the Afghan disaster. Published in 2013, the text 
reflects upon the legacies of the mujahideen and the Taliban, suspending 
judgment about the ideologies that fuel them and focusing instead on the 
real-life consequences on people’s lives in Afghanistan.9 The early years 
of the civil war are seen through the eyes of a child whose father tries to 
protect him and his siblings from the horrors of that war, moving them 
from one place to another to save their lives, “like a cat carrying kittens 
in its mouth” (231). The memoir provides a gripping account of a country 
ravaged by fighting, yet manages to deliver unforgettable scenes of human 
kindness and heroism, bringing into relief people’s ability to care for each 
other while in the jaws of the disaster. In its desire to understand what has 
happened, the memoir seems surgical in its work of dissecting the crisis, 
as compared to the generalizations and myths perpetuated by many of 
the human rights best sellers discussed in earlier chapters. For someone 
interested in teaching a text on Afghanistan’s epoch-defining crisis, this 
would be a powerful and accessible source. 
An insider’s account, it is nevertheless an example of global writing. 
Written in English and for the Western audience, the memoir assumes a 
didactic approach, proffering its Boston University MFA-adorned author 
as a bridge between cultures. Omar’s personal trajectory is unique: Having 
survived the civil war, the Taliban rule, and the War on Terror, he became 
an exile in the late period of the American intervention era, while com-
pleting his MFA degree in Boston. “I wrote an op-ed for The New York 
Times [in 2014] about ghost money that the CIA was giving to President 
[Hamid] Karzai at the time,” he explains in an interview with WGBH 
News. “As soon as that one came out, we got a lot of visitors coming to our 
shop [in Kabul] trying to take me to lunch, and of course you go to that 
lunch and you never come back.”10 Omar’s memoir, although based on the 
events he witnessed and experienced, reads like fiction. Its gripping plot 
is guaranteed to keep readers on the edge of their seats while offering an 
array of colorful characters—both Omar’s family members and people he 
meets while the family flees the war in their old Soviet-made Volga. 
In contrast to Shamsie, whose protagonist straddles different conti-
nents during her lifetime, Omar’s memoir offers a witness who is trapped 
in warring Afghanistan and witnesses the entire era, in fact, multiple eras, 
thus providing continuity of memory from the early days of the conflict 
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well into the era of the 9/11 wars. In contrast to many other diasporic 
Afghan texts that are stories of escape and exile, Omar’s witness is embed-
ded with the unfolding disaster, submitted to the agony of its monstrous 
pulse. The book is fueled by the testimonial imperative in which to nar-
rate the disaster means to open pathways toward redress, reconciliation, 
and healing. “While this book focuses on my family’s experience, every 
Afghan family has stories similar to ours,” writes Omar in his Author’s 
Note. “They all need to be told. They need to be heard. They must not 
happen again” (393). In an interview, Omar confesses that the memoir is 
a personally therapeutic work that allowed him to mitigate the long-term 
effects of PTSD—recurring nightmares and flashbacks that used to haunt 
him—through sharing his story with others. 
Omar further underscores the importance of testimony and witness-
ing through his poignant address to the reader in the postscript, where 
he hails the reader as a witness: “I have long carried this load of griefs 
in the cage of my heart. Now I have given them to you. I hope you are 
strong enough to hold them” (postscript). Here, the author is aware that 
the consumption of his text might turn toxic—or, as Banita puts it, “the 
eye of the spectator [. . .] may be damaged in the process of witnessing” 
(35). He thus expresses hope that the reader is strong enough to “hold” his 
grief, showing care for the reader as witness—an act of reciprocity that is 
routinely sidestepped in humanitarian writing, where the victim is seen 
as having nothing to give back, except for the story of his or her suffering. 
Importantly, this act of care for the reader is supplemented by Omar’s set of 
qualifications that indicate the nature of witnessing desired—compassion 
without victimization of the survivor of the crisis. Expressing a desire to 
be seen as an Afghan who suffered, the author also talks of loving being an 
Afghan, of loving Afghanistan (4). Early pages of the memoir speak of the 
joy of growing up in a tightly knit Afghan family in 1980s Kabul. A sense 
of joy permeates descriptions of his childhood, serving as an antidote to 
victimization. Even later, when the violence of war makes the family flee 
Kabul, Omar talks about experiencing the pleasure of seeing various parts 
of Afghanistan, road-trip style, of the elation of learning (such as learning 
how to weave traditional Afghan carpets), and finally, of the joy of teaching 
others (teaching Kuchi nomad children to read and write while seeking 
shelter with the Kuchi caravan). The statement about the happiness of 
being an Afghan contrasts with Yasmina Khadra’s problematic declaration 
in which he asserts that his novel—The Swallows of Kabul—is supposed to 
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incite “the joy of not being an Afghan.”11 Where Khadra’s novel constructs 
a victim, setting up the conditions for assistance and intervention, Omar’s 
book shirks such a gesture. Rather than proffering his memoir as an appeal 
for external aid, he assumes agency for his country’s future by saying, “I 
am the embodiment of this world-spanning mixture of peoples we call 
Afghan. . . . I want to help rebuild what so many others destroyed” (4). In 
short, the memoir’s emphasis on Afghan self-determination, agency, and 
access to happiness signals Omar’s awareness of, and opposition to, the 
literature of victimization, best exemplified by the human rights best seller. 
The historical moment that marks the advent of the disaster in Omar’s 
text is the cry “Allah-hu-Akbar” that permeates the city on one dark night 
circa 1990, a year after the Soviet’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. The 
haunting howl is a spontaneous manifestation of collectivity united by the 
expectation of imminent change; composed of many voices, it announces 
the inevitability of the coming of the mujahideen to Kabul. The howl is 
accompanied by a failure of electricity, which drowns Kabul in darkness, 
prompting Omar’s mother to say, prophetically: “Oh, it’s as dark as a 
grave” (21). The darkness that enveloped the city that night heralds the 
forthcoming eclipse of Afghan modernity: “I had never seen it before,” 
remarks the narrator. “Kabul always had electricity” (21). The memoir 
thus starts one year after the end of the Cold War, after the demolition 
of the Berlin Wall, in short, after the spectacle. The story provides a 
counterpoint to the triumphalist NATO-centric visions of 1989. It is also 
in tension with the clichéd view that Afghanistan, in the aftermath of 
the Cold War’s end, simply returns to its “natural state,” so to speak—an 
insular, archaic place that presumably it had been before becoming a Cold 
War hot spot.12 
It is true, in fact, that the suffering that followed was to be globally 
invisible. What happened in Afghanistan after 1989 was not considered 
a world-historical event; it was to be viewed as a local tragedy in a distant 
zone of suffering—until September 2001. This attitude is exemplified not 
only by Rumsfeld (as quoted in the beginning of this chapter), but by other 
American officials as well. Consider, for instance, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
who in a 1998 interview said: “What is more important to the history 
of the world? The end of the Soviet empire or the Taliban? The end of 
Soviet control of eastern Europe and a free Europe, or a few disgruntled 
Muslims?”13 To this day, the Afghan tragedy has remained unmourned 
and insufficiently memorialized by all involved parties. 
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As I’ve already discussed in chapter two, the dating of the Afghan 
crisis by both fiction and nonfiction writers reveals their ideological invest-
ments and global positioning. Hirsh, for instance, dates the beginning of 
the crisis from 1973—the overthrow of the monarchy—speaking of the 
pre-1973 era as “the Golden Age of Afghanistan.”14 Khadra points at the 
vices and excesses of the Taliban’s theocratic regime (starting in 1996) as a 
chief culprit. Hosseini in The Kite Runner points to the Soviet invasion of 
1979—the Russians—as the single defining cause of the disaster, capital-
izing on the long-standing anti-Soviet sentiments of his American readers. 
By providing yet another genealogy of the crisis, Omar reveals his own set 
of investments. Free of an anti-statist bias, he is more invested in having a 
well-functioning state system rather than in a particular set of ideological 
beliefs (royalist, communist, capitalist, Islamist, etc.). While Hosseini in 
The Kite Runner paints socialism as unnatural and predatory by creating 
a strong set of associations between socialism and rape, socialism and 
failure, socialism and the assault on nature (as in the image of the ruined 
trees in Kabul), Omar associates socialism with a functioning state and 
improvements to infrastructure. Notably, he also associates it with fecund 
gardens and the natural rhythms of nature. 
Prior to the civil war, he writes, “[w]e lived well. Time moved gra-
ciously with the pace of the seasons, and nudged us gently through the 
stages of life. But then one night the air was filled with the unexpected 
cries of ‘Allah-hu-Akbar,’ and nothing has ever been the same since” (20). 
For Omar, Afghanistan is a joyful place until 1992, until the last socialist 
government is deposed and the power is taken by “men with big turbans 
and long beards” (27). This difference in periodization is important, for 
Omar’s temporality is not NATO-normative. Socialist government, well 
in place at the time of his birth, does not spell disaster, brainwashing, 
or economic ruin in the form of expropriation of his wealthy family’s 
property. Instead, they “live well,” enjoying the fruits of their prospering 
businesses, the opportunities provided by the state, and the cosmopolitan 
mentality resulting from being a part of a multinational socialist world. 
Omar’s father, a schoolteacher, a businessman, and a professional boxer, 
frequently travels to boxing championships in other socialist counties. His 
mother wears short skirts and works at a bank. His grandfather—a beloved 
patriarch—is a successful, respected businessman and an intellectual who 
equally enjoys reading Freud, Dostoyevsky, and Rumi. This is how Omar 
describes his childhood in an interview to CBC: 
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“I was born in year 1982, three years after the Soviets invaded 
Afghanistan.”
“So tell us about life in Kabul for you as a little boy.” 
“Oh, it was really joyful, you know, this is one of the things that people 
don’t understand is that Kabul was a small city, a city of 200,000 peo-
ple—now it is a city of 6 million people—and it was like a garden, the 
whole city was like a garden with tall trees along the roads, with parks, 
people having a normal life—I mean, it is exactly what you have in this 
[American] part of the world.” 
[. . .]
“So when you were growing up, when the Russians were in charge, 
where did you live, what was your house like?” 
“Oh, it was in Kote Sangi, which is in the newly developed part of Kabul; 
our courtyard ran for three acres, we had about one hundred and twenty 
Macintosh apple trees in our courtyard, there were fields of grass every-
where, and flowers, we used to grow vegetables, and sometimes we had 
so much that we shared with all of our neighbors—that was the kind of 
a community we had.” 
In his memoir, Omar documents the early months of the mujahideen rule 
with a sense of humor, the following anecdote capturing the paradoxes 
of Islamization of the country overnight, after the socialist government 
falls: 
Two months before the arrival of the Mujahedin, we had been taught in 
school that we are related to monkeys. 
Our teacher said, “Humans are a kind of animal, and animals were 
created by nature.”
“Who created nature?” I asked. 
“Nature was self-created,” our teacher said. 
[. . .] After the Mujahedin came to Kabul, our same teacher now 
taught us from a new textbook called The Creation of Adam. It did not 
say anything about monkeys. [. . .] 
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Our teacher started saying things like, “The history of humans 
started from Adam and Eve, and the earth existed long before them. 
Do not let Shaitan [Satan] be your guide; he misled Eve and Adam and 
drove them out of paradise.” 
I was confused. “What happened to the monkeys?” I asked our 
teacher, “And nature?” 
The teacher sat on the edge of the desk, and for a minute he did not 
say anything. “The monkeys and nature are Communist perceptions.” 
(29)15 
Omar’s narrative also differs from numerous NATO-centric accounts 
with respect to how the Taliban era is assessed. The author resists the 
wholesale demonization of the Taliban, examining their contested legacy 
and posing questions about what would have happened had the Taliban 
been allowed to stay in power. The “strange peace” (359) brought by the 
Taliban as they evicted the warring jihadists from Kabul is welcomed by 
Omar’s family who use this time to recover and rebuild from the carnage 
of war; yet the plight of women—especially widows and orphaned women 
who are not allowed to work under the Taliban law—is exposed by Omar 
as one of the chief ills of the Taliban theocracy. His astute observations 
about life under the Taliban illustrate the distinction that Mahmood 
Mamdani makes between “lawful dictatorship” (such as the Taliban) and 
“terror outside the law” (such as the era of the warring mujahideen [176]).16 
There is a strong suggestion in the memoir that the Taliban could have 
become acculturated and profoundly changed through its members’ long-
term encounter with the worldly, urban culture of Kabul. To no small 
degree, the success of Omar’s memoir is attributable to his commitment 
to ideological neutrality (he does not condemn any of the regimes on ideo-
logical grounds) and to the fact that it is narrated by someone who stayed 
in Afghanistan throughout the entire era of conflicts, thus being attuned 
to the minutia of survival and recovery. 
The memoir’s title, A Fort of Nine Towers, summons the image of the 
tower—a poignant symbol in post-9/11 writing. A figure of both resilience 
and shattering, it instantly evokes the 9/11 attacks, resonating with iconic 
post-9/11 texts, such as Art Spiegelman’s In the Shadow of No Towers. 
Richard Gray notes the mythologization of the tower in the post-9/11 
imaginary, stating that “[t]he fall of the towers [. . .] and, for that matter, 
the fall of people from the towers—has become a powerful and variable 
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visual equivalent for other kinds of fall” (7). The fort of nine towers in 
Omar’s memoir is a paradoxical image. Serving as a refuge for Omar’s 
family after they flee their home in Kabul in 1992, the fort is both a 
shelter and an image of disfigurement: Out of nine towers invoked by 
its name, only one tower remains standing. The fort thus signals not the 
catastrophic fall that is sudden, but references the catastrophic longue durée 
history of Afghanistan—a land crossed by many imperial armies causing 
much destruction. The image of the last tower is particularly poignant; it 
represents a hope for salvation and betokens stubborn resilience amidst 
unfolding catastrophe. Although many rockets fall in the fort’s courtyard 
during the periods of heavy bombardment by warring mujahideen fac-
tions, the last tower remains intact. The tower also represents the site from 
which to observe and survey the terrain, signaling the role of the writer 
as a chronicler of a catastrophe. If to write of an atrocity means to initiate 
a form of a nonjudicial hearing, making the villains accountable for their 
crimes, Omar’s memoir does it particularly well. 
The memoir’s first seventeen chapters document the collapse of the 
Afghan state and the downward spiral into a full-fledged urban war. Set 
in the four years between the fall of the last socialist government (1992) 
and the arrival of the Taliban (1996), the main part of the memoir offers 
a macabre look into the deadly cartography of urban warfare, aimed at 
dissecting the anatomy of violence and naming the perpetrators. The cri-
sis takes the family and thousands of other families in Kabul off guard. 
Having spent weeks in one room of the house while rockets rained on 
their neighborhood, the family uses the few hours of ceasefire to flee to 
the Fort of Nine Towers—a walled compound two miles away from their 
home—and the residence of a family friend. Situated on the other side of 
what becomes known to Kabulis as “snipers’ hill,” the fort is sheltered from 
most of the rockets and from sniper fire. As they leave the house for the 
first time in weeks, the family sees firsthand their city disfigured by war: 
What we saw, I will never forget. Thousands of people like us were tak-
ing advantage of the ceasefire to flee from our part of the city. Thousands 
and thousands of people, all walking in near silence. [. . .] 
For the first time in two months since the fighting had started, all 
of us were seeing the destruction it had caused. [. . .] 
There were big craters in the road where rockets had fallen. This 
was the best road in Kabul. There were still many half-exploded rockets 
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standing in the middle of the road, like nails that had been banged half-
way through a piece of wood.
Hundreds of dead bodies were scattered all over the pavement, on 
the sidewalks, and in the park in the middle of the road. Some looked 
like they had been there for a long time. Blood was matted all over 
their bodies. Most were on the main road. Maybe they had been hit by 
a rocket while they were trying to cross it. But many of them had been 
shot with bullets to the head, chest, or back. This was the work of the 
snipers. I could not believe my eyes; I thought I was seeing an American 
horror movie, especially when I saw parts of bodies, like arms and legs 
or even heads, lying by themselves. (40) 
The main part of the memoir is a narrative of entrapment, the family learning 
to survive as refugees in the Fort, while their city is being destroyed. The 
family’s predicament recalls Nixon’s term “displacement without moving” 
(19)—a displacement that occurs not via migration but via a destruction of the 
conditions that sustain life in one’s environment. This term, Nixon argues, is 
a more radical notion of displacement, one that, instead of referring 
solely to the movement of people to their places of belonging, refers 
rather to the loss of the land and resources beneath them, a loss that 
leaves communities stranded in a place stripped of the very characteristics 
that made it habitable. [. . .] Such a threat entails being simultaneously 
immobilized and moved out of one’s living knowledge as one’s place loses 
its life-sustaining features. (19, emphasis my own)
Omar’s family’s immobilization and entrapment is accompanied by 
the removal of the very infrastructures that sustain life beneath them. As 
intense fighting continues, the family’s wealth is looted. Hundreds of car-
pets warehoused by Omar’s father in their family compound are stolen 
by armed militias (it takes days and multiple truckloads for the looting 
to be complete), and the compound itself is mined by a Hazara faction 
that controls the neighborhood. Macintosh apple orchards are destroyed 
by rocket-propelled grenades. Trees are cut and wooden beams are taken 
out of houses for firewood. Streets are emptied and littered with corpses 
by snipers who terrorize the city from the hills. Water pumps, telephone 
lines, electric supply infrastructure, banks, schools, and everything else 
that makes their neighborhood livable is destroyed. 
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Set in 1992, the memoir might have its reader recall the siege of 
Sarajevo (concomitant with the battle over Kabul) and the unraveling of 
Kashmir, another concomitant catastrophe, dramatized vividly by Salman 
Rushdie’s Shalimar the Clown. When considered in the context of the sec-
ond decade of the 9/11 wars era, marked by the siege and destruction of 
many cities, the memoir is chilling and timely; it gives the reader a glimpse 
into what it means to be trapped in a city overcome by warring militants. 
Fallujah—a city occupied by militants for two years—became a death trap 
for the residents who did not manage to flee. On June 9, 2016, three weeks 
prior to the city’s liberation by the Iraqi army, an Independent correspon-
dent reported on the population’s plight: 
Families fleeing Fallujah have told how they were forced to eat animal 
food to stave off starvation during a brutal siege of the Isis-held city. A 
woman who managed to reach a refugee camp with her children said 
they moved from one home to another to avoid battles until they were 
caught in the crossfire. “We have witnessed tragedies that no one should 
ever witness,” she said in an interview with the Norwegian Refugee 
Council.17 
Omar’s memoir reverberates with news reports from these cities—besieged, 
occupied, utterly destroyed during the 9/11 wars era—Mosul, Raqqa, 
Palmyra, Tikrit, Tripoli, Aleppo, and many others. Memory becomes mul-
tidirectional as remembering Kabul resonates with remembering Mosul, 
casting a new light onto the Middle East destabilization in the aftermath 
of the wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen. Omar’s account 
of the siege of Kabul becomes especially gripping when he recalls three 
failed missions from the Fort to the family compound to retrieve family 
gold buried in the courtyard. Being the oldest son, Omar accompanies, 
first, his grandfather, and on subsequent two missions, his father. Each 
mission provides a glimpse into what it means to be caught in a gridlock 
of urban warfare—a window into the horrors that, to use the words of a 
woman from Fallujah, “no one should ever witness.” 
During their first mission, ten-year-old Omar and his grandfather 
are captured by Hazara fighters and brought into a courtyard of the house 
that used to belong to their neighbors—a site where, Omar recalls, he 
once attended a party with musicians playing. Omar recalls a chilling, 
Conrad-esque sight: 
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In the center of the courtyard where the platform for the musicians had 
been, there was now a ditch filled with the heads of men and women. 
Dozens of them. I looked at them with their eyes open, staring at me 
with their shabby hair matted with blood. I started to vomit but con-
trolled myself. (77) 
The Hazara commander explains the slaughter to the horrified wit-
nesses—an old man and a boy—who are frozen in anticipation of their 
own death: 
“I want revenge.” He said those words very slowly. His voice was getting 
higher and higher. “I want revenge! My whole family has been killed by 
Gulbuddin, Masoud, and Sayyaf [rival mujahideen commanders]. Their 
commanders raped my sister and my mother before they killed them. 
Do you know how I know that? They made me watch them! . . . [B]efore 
I die, I’ll kill as many people as I can. I will rob them, rape them, and 
murder them,” he said, getting even louder. (86) 
Although Omar and his grandfather are unexpectedly released after the 
Hazara commander realizes he used to be Omar’s father’s boxing student, 
the memories of that day will haunt the narrator forever. The second failed 
mission to retrieve the family gold buried in their courtyard—an asset that 
would allow the family to get smuggled out of Afghanistan—results in an 
even more bone-chilling experience. As the brief ceasefire draws former 
residents of the neighborhoods to their houses to retrieve their possessions, 
or simply into the streets, they are captured and enslaved by another sadis-
tic commander who uses their slave labor to build an underground tunnel 
to fortify the positions of his faction that controls the area. Omar and his 
father are caught and enslaved for several weeks, digging the earth in the 
darkness of the tunnel, chained to other captives, witnessing, day after day, 
scenes of unspeakable violence that Omar narrates in the calm, controlled 
voice of someone who gives testimony at a tribunal: 
Days passed. The routine was the same every day. The commander and 
his men used the women during the night in the presence of all of us, 
and forced the men to work as slaves in the day. . . . Those who did not 
work were whipped like donkeys. . . . By the end of about two weeks, 
only seven men and two women were left besides us. (106) 
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The last surviving slaves are eventually liberated by another commander, 
who kills the sadistic militiaman, explaining that he was a convicted crim-
inal, released when the mujahideen opened all the prisons in the city. 
Having returned to their family after several weeks of absence, Omar and 
his father do not share their experience with their loved ones. Omar, once 
again, hails the reader as the first witness to his story of the atrocity. He 
writes: “[My cousins] had no idea what had happened to me, and until now 
I have never told them, or anybody” (115). 
Looking back at his childhood experiences of war, Omar calls 
this period in his life “living in the time of Shaitan, the devil” (227). 
Displacement without moving turns into actual dislocation as the family 
decides to flee Kabul and seek shelter in the countryside or smaller towns 
that are still free of war. Temporarily palliating the family’s suffering, this 
road trip in the time of violence is eventful, terrifying, but also joyful, as 
the parents do their best to shield their children from seeing violence. The 
road trip offers a repertoire of positive, life-affirming images painting a 
breathtaking panorama of Afghanistan’s ethnic and cultural diversity, and 
its natural beauty. The trajectory of the journey spans half a country—
from Kabul to Mazār-i-Sharif to Tashkurgan to Bamyan to Kunduz back 
to Mazār-i-Sharif and Kabul—as the family flees war that continuously 
threatens to catch up with them. One of the journey’s highlights for Omar 
is an experience of “living inside the Buddha’s head”—in a cave made by 
ancient Buddhist monks behind the great Buddha statue in Bamyan (169). 
During the long months of flight and homelessness, Omar recalls 
his family history of nomadism, framing their uprooted existence as the 
return to and a reenactment of their ancestral ways, embedding the idea of 
itinerant lifestyle as a new identity core—“[we were] modern nomads with 
a beat-up old car” (157). Exemplifying Banita’s claim that a nomadic sub-
ject is a permanent “human contact zone,” Omar finds that he is enriched 
by experiences of encountering others with lifestyles dramatically differ-
ent from his own (223). While in Bamyan, the narrator befriends an old 
Buddhist monk living in one of the caves behind the great Buddha’s head. 
Later, in Mazār-i-Sharif, he learns how to design and weave traditional 
carpets by spending time with a Turkoman family—knowledge he makes 
use of during the Taliban era as he starts a carpet-weaving factory. The 
family’s modern nomadism eventually morphs into actual caravan-style 
travel when their car unexpectedly breaks down. As the family has no 
money left, they join a Kuchi caravan, staying with them for the next two 
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months before returning to Kabul. Kuchi hospitality, aside from saving 
Omar’s family from peril, offers them a glimpse into the lifestyle of their 
ancestors, some of whom were Kuchi nomads: 
We ate Kuchi bread-cake, spiced rice, kebab, and thick Kuchi-style 
yoghurt. I could see that my new uncles and cousins were very fond of 
meat. Amir Khan said a Pashto proverb as his mouth was full of kebab: 
“Even burnt meat is better than vegetables.” And the rest laughed. After 
dinner we drank green tea and ate dried melon until midnight. In every 
sentence they used a proverb. Some of them started their sentences with 
a verse or two from a famous poet. (203) 
As the war strips away the thin layer of modernity, a traditional Kuchi 
nomad lifestyle—one that follows the seasons in a slow-paced migration 
tried by centuries—proves more resilient than modern life. Through this 
experience, nomadism becomes incorporated into the narrator’s identity: 
“we [are] Kuchis and wanderers by nature,” Omar announces to his father 
toward the end of the book (358). 
The time of Shaitan comes to a close unexpectedly with the arrival of the 
“strange” Taliban to Kabul in 1996 (281). Omar attends high school and later 
the Faculty of Journalism at Kabul University during the Taliban era. It will, 
no doubt, take decades to process the legacies of the mujahideen takeover and 
the Taliban rule. As Adam Klein writes in his Introduction to the collection of 
stories written by Afghans under age thirty, “The Taliban and the mujahideen 
are more prominent in this collection, more problematic than Americans or 
Russians, their legacies more contested” (xiii). Omar’s account of the Taliban 
era is fascinating as he points to both the further losses incurred by the family 
(“We have no photos [because they were burned]” [9], and “I buried the ashes 
of my beloved books under a mulberry tree in the garden” [319]) and gains 
(“Now we had peace in Kabul, and we did not see blood and corpses and 
body parts on streets anymore” [286]). As Omar observes, Taliban-era Kabul 
was “strange, but stable” (359)—filled with the paradoxes brought forth by a 
theocratic rule, as well as the cultural difference between the ruled (residents 
of Kabul) and the rulers (graduates of rural madrassas, unaccustomed to city 
life). For the narrator’s family, the Taliban brings a chance to recover from 
the poverty and strife brought on by the four years of war. Eighteen-year-old 
Omar divides his time between the small carpet-weaving factory he founded 
in the Fort and his studies at Kabul University: 
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For the next two years, I studied hard and worked hard. The cred-
its I needed for my degree slowly accumulated, as did the profits from 
my carpet factory. The strange peace brought by the Taliban made it 
safe for foreign buyers to return to Kabul, and my sales increased. A 
woman might be beaten for leaving her home alone, but in other ways 
the Taliban regime provided a sense of security. Many things worked. 
The banks. The mail delivery. Offices. Safe transportation all over the 
country. (359) 
The coming of the Taliban, in spite of their installment of an oppressive 
theocratic state system, thus marks the winding down of the disaster. The 
narrator seems to suggest that by 2001, the Taliban, by virtue of their 
day-to-day interactions with Kabul’s residents, may have started to trans-
form, perhaps losing some of their most radical traits. Omar describes 
teaching his Taliban classmates to read and write, to use the gym, and to 
play basketball: 
A few of them quit being Taliban. They were not bad guys after all. 
They were just guys who wanted to have a chance in life. They wanted 
to marry Kabuli girls and to continue living in Kabul. We told them that 
they would have to share all the housework with their wives. At first, 
they thought we were making fun of them. Then they realized that we 
were serious. (363) 
The memoir ends with a brief description of the 9/11 attacks—news that 
shocks Omar’s family and puts a halt on their plan to leave the country. 
The memoir decenters the 9/11 attacks, presenting them as a gravitational 
wave that reaches New York nine years after the destruction of Kabul and 
the disaster of Afghanistan’s complete implosion. The narrator observes: 
Now the horrors that had filled our lives for so many years were happen-
ing even in America. We felt as if something had been taken away from 
us. “What hope can we have for Afghanistan if this is what is happening 
in America?” we asked each other. (364) 
While Omar’s family is deeply saddened by the global spread of violence, 
they see the attacks as a continuation of a tragic history rather than the 
beginning of a new era, unlike Giovanna Borradori’s “the first historic 
 Witness 167
world event in the strictest sense.”18 When the Taliban leave the city in 
anticipation of the American invasion, Kabul erupts into a party, with 
dancing and music. Omar writes: “Winter was approaching and the 
weather was turning cold. Daily life went on. We were so used to war. 
There was little left to be disrupted in Afghanistan” (369). 
Nonhuman Witness 
While Shamsie’s and Omar’s texts make ample use of an eyewitness (spe-
cifically, a long-term witness), Rahman’s debut novel dramatizes the limits 
of eyewitnessing by staging its protagonist’s incapacity to comprehend 
the events in which he takes part. The novel divests the human subject 
of its authority and import, suggesting that contemporary disaster has no 
eyewitness—is beyond what we conventionally refer to as witnessing—not 
because of its horrific nature, but because of its tremendous complexity and 
distributed qualities. Using analogies drawn from mathematics, theoretical 
physics, and finance, the novel dramatizes epistemological uncertainty, 
pointing to the limits of individual agency within an ambiguous moral 
universe where responsibility is widely distributed among not only indi-
viduals, but numerous overlapping systems and networks. The financial 
crisis of 2008 is placed in proximity to the War on Terror, bringing into 
relief the infinitely complex, dispersed, technical nature of both crises. 
Attempting to understand the disaster, Rahman seems to propose, is the 
task of a gifted mathematician trained in complex systems modeling—that 
is, if she knows all the facts. And all the facts, of course, are not known. 
The novel’s basic structure centers on a multi-week conversation 
between two friends—an unnamed narrator and his friend, Zafar, in the 
narrator’s house in London. As Zafar is trying to process the events that 
took place when he was in Kabul in 2002, the narrator—an investment 
banker—is coming to terms with the financial crisis of 2008. It is Zafar—
an Ivy league-trained mathematician-turned-human rights lawyer—who 
most poignantly exemplifies the insufficiency and the inadequacy of the 
eyewitness as he unwittingly gets drawn into the War on Terror in 2002 
Kabul, indirectly causing loss of life yet emerging from it having under-
stood nothing. The conspiracy he gets inadvertently conscripted into is 
orchestrated by at least two networks working in tandem—the American 
military and ISI (Pakistani intelligence agency), and although Zafar is able 
to reconstruct some of its logic in retrospect, the entire conspiracy, along 
with its contingencies, causes, and consequences, remains opaque. Both 
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characters’ personal lives are deeply affected by the events they take part 
in. Zafar’s career and personal life, upon his return from Kabul, appear 
to be in shambles; similarly, the narrator’s life is unsettled by the financial 
crisis—turned into a scapegoat by his partners in the firm, he is requested 
to appear in front of the congressional committee to be questioned about 
subprime mortgage industry protocols. Both characters ponder what per-
sonal responsibility means at a time when individuals function within 
complex networked systems that exceed their understanding; in doing so, 
they try to decide whether to condemn or absolve themselves of guilt. In 
the Light of What We Know has a distinct post-9/11 flavor, in that it com-
municates a sense of widespread crisis and emotional fatigue radiating 
from the novel’s multiple centers of gravity. 9/11 itself is an event described 
only circuitously; similar to Shamsie’s and Omar’s texts, the novel evokes 
the attacks only to decenter them by focusing on other crises, such as the 
War on Terror and the 2008 financial crisis, which in turn frame the 
characters’ personal unraveling. Instead of domesticating these crises, the 
novel intensifies them through defamiliarization, slowly and painstakingly 
rendering them more and more opaque.
The novel’s formal aspects foreground epistemic uncertainty and 
ambiguity. Its maze-like structure is purposefully confusing, as it is com-
posed of citations, flashbacks, fragments of Zafar’s narration and excerpts 
from his journal, footnotes, and meandering dialogue between the two 
central figures. The novel’s recursive-digressive structure leads the reader 
down many false paths. At the end, the text does not cohere into a plot 
that delivers all the answers, probing and thwarting the reader’s expec-
tations of finding out the truth. The basic story of Zahar’s involvement 
in a conspiracy is reconstructed post factum by the narrator (who is also 
a mathematician), foregrounding the opacity in the heart of the disaster, 
and suggesting, perhaps, that mathematics is one of the tools that may 
give us an insight into the complexity of the contemporary condition. The 
novel itself is conspicuously featured as a technical construct—an obscure, 
unwieldy artifact that underscores its own constructed nature, at times 
offering too much (too many details to keep in mind, too many clues to 
follow, too many footnotes) or too little (not providing the answers in 
the end). The text includes an intimidating array of facts and data—on 
finance, law, mathematics, quantum physics, and world history—as if 
comprising an assemblage that forms a miniature model of the contem-
porary universe. The reader is conscripted into data mining and pattern 
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recognition—for instance, into seeking a pattern among several long 
quotations that serve as epigraphs to each chapter—to deduce the possi-
ble meaning of what is to come. The vicissitudes of the reader’s journey 
through the book parallels the strife of the protagonist, who, despite 
having a shrewd technical mind, cannot follow the permutations of his 
own journey. 
Central to the text is the issue of knowing—what can and cannot be 
known—its evocation of “the unknown unknowns” referencing Donald 
Rumsfeld’s famous epistemological exertions. In the post-9/11 context of 
the War on Terror, Rumsfeld distinguished, famously, between known 
unknowns and the unknown unknowns: “The idea of known and unknown 
unknowns recognizes that the information those in the positions of 
responsibility in the government, as well as other human endeavors, have 
at their disposal is almost always incomplete” (Rumsfeld xiv). The novel’s 
epigraph—a quote from Sebald—announces the concern with truth-
finding, as well as the truth’s elusive nature: “Our concern with history 
[. . .] is a concern with preformed images imprinted on our brains, images 
at which we keep staring while the truth lies elsewhere, away from it all, 
somewhere as yet undiscovered” (1). This concern with truth, especially 
the hidden nature of it, is similarly signaled by Zafar’s own sentiment: 
“In order to catch even a fleeting glimpse of the world, we must break 
with our familiar acceptance of it” (196). To journey into the realm of 
truth, one has to abandon the domain of the customary, routine, intuitive 
forms of comprehension. Further probing the limits of our epistemic 
drive, the novel returns, over and over, to Zafar’s obsession with Gödel’s 
Incompleteness Theorem. The Incompleteness Theorem brings into view 
the limits of mathematical reasoning: “[w]ithin any given system, there 
are claims which are true but which cannot be proven to be true” (11). 
The truth remains withdrawn; the world would remain nontransparent 
even to an omniscient mind (there are truths that cannot be proven). The 
Incompleteness Theorem resonates in powerful and problematic ways with 
Rumsfeld’s assertion of the same point when formulating his preemption 
strategy: “[it is wrong to think that] if something could not be proven to be 
true, then it could be assumed not to be true” (xiv); “[instead we] need to 
prepare for the likelihood that we would be attacked by an unanticipated 
foe in ways we may not imagine” (xv). This resonance brings into view the 
interconnectedness of mathematics and contemporary warfare (a fact also 
emphasized by forensic architect Eyal Weizman). 
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These epistemological issues are woven into the novel’s discussions 
of postcolonial history—such as the history of Bangladesh, where Zafar 
was born. Zafar is a postcolonial subject marked by the traumatic story of 
his conception. He is a child of rape that occurred during the Bangladesh 
Liberation War of 1971, during which, as the novel explains, many 
Bangladeshi women were raped by Pakistani soldiers. This traumatic origin 
story marks Zafar as a subject in search of personal redemption, as well as 
in a search for belonging. Brought up by adoptive immigrant Bangladeshi 
parents in a rat-infested basement apartment in England, Zafar’s world is 
from the very beginning a migratory, nomadic one—the pattern he per-
petuates in his adulthood defined by intercontinental travel and multiple 
migrations, becoming “a human being fleeing ghosts while chasing shad-
ows” (16). The events of 2001 find Zafar in Bangladesh, where he works as 
a human rights lawyer. He gets conscripted into coming to Kabul where, 
he was assured, he “could make such a difference” (32), and he agrees in 
part because his British ex-girlfriend—now a prominent humanitarian 
worker in Kabul—insists that he come there. On his flight to Islamabad, 
he is assigned a seat near a Pakistani army colonel whose generous offer of 
hospitality in Islamabad he cannot refuse. Through tracing Zafar’s expe-
riences in Islamabad and Kabul, the novel weaves together postcolonial 
histories and the global War on Terror, illustrating Zafar’s unique set of 
vulnerabilities that make him an easy target for Pakistani intelligence. The 
guests at the colonel’s house party—all Pakistani military—earn Zafar’s 
trust by complaining about the British and their imperialism, hint that 
Zafar is a “coconut” (a “South Asian who has become white in all but skin 
color” [321]), tease him for having a soft spot for the British elite, while 
at the same time hailing him as one of them: “You’re one of us, dear boy. 
You’re one of us. Welcome home” (321). Zafar’s position in the world—his 
homelessness—makes him particularly vulnerable to both their benign 
criticism and the offer of instant belonging, to the extent that this makes 
him obey the colonel’s enigmatic request before Zafar leaves for Kabul: 
“Find out what’s in the envelopes” (328). 
Both a privileged transnational knowledge worker and a postcolonial 
subject imperiled by his traumatic origin, he wants to do good but ends 
up following the infrastructure of the military-humanitarian networks laid 
out for him. Zafar’s notebook suggests persistent anxiety about identity. He 
felt he belonged to “that buffer class of native informants” (375) and “lived 
beyond his psychic means” (358). His is a divided self; Zafar lives in a state of 
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“continuing civil war” being “a man going forward as many selves contained 
in the same, shoulder to shoulder,” “partitioned into people who hated each 
other, and to side with one was to scorn the other” (379). A part of him feels 
affinity with the British elite (his ex-girlfriend, Emily, belongs to a prominent 
aristocratic family), while another part feels that by associating with these 
elites, he is betraying his origins. In Afghanistan, these tensions become 
unbearable. Condemning the humanitarian workers whom he compares to 
hyenas who come to Kabul as if they smell meat in the air, he feels affinity 
with the residents—people who, like his mother and his adoptive parents, 
suffered personal injuries and historical injustice: “Something was gathering 
in me, as if armies had been summoned from all corners and the ground bore 
the first tremors of their approach. Now I might call them armies of injustice, 
humiliation, and defeat, but at the time I felt them as only the beginning 
of a kind of end” (388). Further, he writes, “I felt I wanted to apologize to 
someone, to the Afghanis [sic] here and there, the drivers waiting by the 
gates, the attendants, the cleaners and cooks, the staff, the servant class” 
(379). As it turns out, Zafar’s psychic unraveling, his mounting hatred for 
Westerners in Afghanistan, and his bonding with the locals is predictable, 
and calculable, something that the Pakistani agents expect and know how 
to capitalize upon. He plays exactly the part written for him by the military, 
the script culminating in the bombing of the Café Europa minutes before 
his arrival there for a meeting with Crane, a military contractor and a minor 
player in the conspiracy, who is summarily eliminated through the bombing. 
If on his way to Kabul, Zafar believed he understood a few things 
about Afghanistan and its tragedy, recasting in his mind some of the well-
worn facts about the history of clashing imperialisms in the region, on the 
way back from Kabul he concedes that he, in fact, understands nothing. 
In the mess of Central Asia there are as many sides as there are oppor-
tunities to steal a match. There are no sides to tell us who is doing what, 
for whom, and why. There are only exigencies, strategies, short-term 
objectives, at the level of governments, regions, clans, families, and indi-
viduals: fractals of interests, overlapping here, mutually exclusive there, 
and sometimes coinciding. (481) 
In Islamabad, the Pakistani army colonel explains some of the conspiracy 
plot details to Zafar, retrospectively filling in some of the blanks that Zafar 
had already deduced. The colonel emphasizes that he, Zafar, will not be 
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harmed. However, many people have been harmed—specifically, a collat-
eral damage in the Café Europa bombing orchestrated by the agencies to 
eliminate US contractor Crane. Zafar is aware of these deaths because he 
was in the proximity of the bombing, delayed by a few minutes by coordi-
nated actions of the intelligence agency’s proxies. He describes the scene: 
First came the sound. People crying, not women but men, a wailing, the 
sound of cries for God, Hai-Allah groans, and American voices on mega-
phones. [. . .] I felt sick, my gut convulsing like a caught fish. But what I 
remember most vividly is the sensation behind my eyes, an extraordinary 
pressure pushing my eyeballs out, as if they were no longer mine, as if 
my body were rejecting them. Did I want to cry or did I want to keep 
myself from crying? I wanted both. (473) 
Through Zafar’s unwitting involvement in the conspiracy, the novel dra-
matizes the degree to which an individual is exposed to military and 
paramilitary surveillance systems, while at the same time being oblivious 
to the complex infrastructures of control that track (and predict) one’s 
actions in the post-9/11 universe. An individual’s hyperexposure to these 
surveillance systems is at odds with her or his ability to comprehend the 
networked world—one that becomes progressively more opaque and 
impenetrable. Zafar is monitored and closely followed, all the minutia of 
his movements, all of his conversations transparent to the Pakistani mil-
itary (and, likely, other military and intelligence networks as well). Once 
Zafar gets a glimpse of the complexity he is entangled in, he is overcome 
by an intellectual vertigo. Failures to know and understand—epistemolog-
ical failures—result in events that cannot be remedied through individual 
action. 
This nontransparency in the heart of the disaster is made even more 
poignant through a parallel Rahman draws between the War on Terror 
and the global financial crisis of 2008 triggered by the subprime mortgage 
crisis. The level of abstraction at the core of the contemporary finance 
system requires highly specialized, expert knowledge. Rahman explains 
the prehistory of the 2008 crisis expounding, for pages on end, how the 
very specific financial innovations going back to the 1989 Exxon Valdez 
environmental disaster (the oil spill in Alaska) laid the foundation for the 
contemporary crisis. Credit default swaps, synthesized securities, hedge 
funds, special investment vehicles, collateralized debt obligations, security 
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tranches, equity tranches—“that stuff is so esoteric,” says Zafar, “that the 
only people who understand it are in the business” (263). Within this 
system, the responsibility is widely distributed. The narrator says: “I feel 
no guilt for what I did in finance. [. . .] People will lose their homes, their 
jobs. But tell me how I can feel guilt for something that was not only legal 
but actively encouraged by governments everywhere” (38). With multiple 
individuals, firms, institutions, and governments implicated, how would 
one weigh one’s own contribution to the disaster that ensued? In the nar-
rator’s own words, “How much should one foresee the consequences of 
one’s own actions? And how much do other cases that combine with one’s 
own actions, and thereby muddy one’s role, exonerate one?” (51, emphasis 
in original). The novel then draws the War on Terror in Afghanistan and 
the infrastructure of global capitalism into an even tighter loop, noting the 
connection between the global financial system (the real estate bubble) and 
war financing: “[Suleiman] pointed out other houses, formerly belonging to 
Talibs but that had been acquired by Westerners for their rocketing mar-
ket value, including diplomatic missions and their staff, whose real estate 
purchases had boosted Taliban funding. Property in 2002, even in Kabul, 
was booming, as it was the world over” (34). By bringing the two crises into 
proximity, the novel brings into view a tension between manifest violence 
and hidden terror, echoing Slavoj Žižek’s distinction between subjective 
and objective violence: “The subjective violence of the real world, the vio-
lence that takes the form of mass murders, genocide, and rape, masks the 
underlying objective violence of capital, systemic, anonymous, that informs 
real-life developments and catastrophes throughout.”19 Subjective violence, 
such as a mass murder in Café Europa or the tragedy of a family losing 
a home, is observable by an eyewitness. Objective violence—the truly 
obscene violence—remains hidden, the visible disaster just a screen for 
larger subterranean processes that an individual cannot imagine or know. 
To sum, the three texts in this chapter offer three types of witness—
each of them serving as a lens through which to narrate and memorialize 
the Afghan crisis. Shamsie’s long-term witness creates resonances between 
multiple historical catastrophes to amplify them, bringing the Afghan 
disaster into the orbit of global history. Omar’s lasting entrapment in 
the very heart of the disaster offers another long-term witness—one able 
to provide an insightful take on the Afghan tragedy, foregrounding the 
importance of the functional state as the value most of us take for granted. 
Rahman underscores the permeability of Afghanistan’s national borders, 
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inscribing the Afghan disaster as one of the global crises that is opaque, 
resisting our epistemological thrust. In doing so, he exposes the limita-
tions of eyewitnessing. Rahman’s text suggests that a nonhuman witness, 
such as a mathematics that “like Spinoza’s God, won’t love us in return” 
(195), is an imperfect but valuable tool that gives one an insight into the 
nature of twenty-first-century catastrophes. All three texts offer powerful 
alternatives to the humanitarian mode of writing traumatic histories. They 
draw attention away from a human figure to infrastructures, conditions of 
possibility, and long-term and distributed processes. Shamsie and Omar 
foreground slow violence as processes of ruination that unfold over decades. 
Rahman’s nonhuman witnessing, with its attunement to the complexity 
of contemporary warfare, decenters the human figure entirely. In the next 
chapter I will discuss Nadeem Aslam’s work as further decentering the 
human by invoking the trope of deep time (as opposed to the short time 
span of human life) and by extending the notion of witness to nonhuman 
species and, ultimately, to the earth itself. 
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The Deep Time of War: Nadeem Aslam 
and the Aesthetics of the Geologic Turn  
The Deep Turn 
In a 2013 interview, Nadeem Aslam, a Pakistani British writer, explains 
that he prefers to write in multiple stages, with the entire first draft of each 
manuscript written by hand: “Words seem to be flowing from my mind 
into my hand, then down the pen, and onto the page—blood becoming 
ink” (“An Interview,” par. 9). This statement exemplifies a complexity that 
characterizes his writing. Traversing the mind-body dualism by connecting 
together mind and hand, the sentence then converts blood into ink, the 
image of a reverse transubstantiation gesturing toward Aslam’s magical, 
alchemical aesthetic. Moreover, the image of blood and ink summons 
Islamic history, specifically, the inscription in the House of Wisdom in 
Abbasid Baghdad that once read, “The ink of the scholar is holier than the 
blood of the martyr.” This reference embeds Aslam’s writing within the 
longue durée of the Islamic intellectual tradition. His writing’s fluid move-
ment between divergent realms and timescales positions him as a writer 
of the era of the Anthropocene—a concept that calls for vertiginous shifts 
in scale and binds humanity with the planet’s history.1
The term “Anthropocene” was introduced in 2000 by Paul 
Crutzen and Eugene F. Stoermer to signify an era in which human-
kind becomes a geological force in its own right (17). It designates 
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the era of large-scale human impact on Earth’s ecosystem as well as 
the blowback that will result in the form of unforeseen consequences 
and future risks neither calculable in advance nor preventable in 
the long term. Tobias Boes and Kate Marshall observe that the term 
“Anthropocene” brings attention to the presence of human traces in 
Earth’s stratigraphic record as a form of “writing,” the unique geological 
signature of human presence on Earth (62). In turn, the Anthropocene 
and the public debates surrounding it influence literary production in 
numerous ways, placing a premium on what Adam Trexler calls climate 
change fiction (5). In this chapter, I extend the line of Boes and Marshall’s 
inquiry by asking, what would it mean to write about humanitarian disas-
ter in the new geologic era? How does the new Anthropocene aesthetic 
inform and influence the writing of traumatic histories? In what follows, 
I return to Aslam’s work as exemplifying what I call the aesthetics of the 
geologic turn—an aesthetics that draws on the sensibilities and imagery 
that have emerged in the era of the debates about the Anthropocene. 
More specifically, I address how Aslam stages a new mode of writing 
traumatic histories by examining, in his two post-9/11 novels, the four 
decades of war in Afghanistan, dramatizing the proximity of human and 
nonhuman suffering as well as bringing into focus the geological signature 
of contemporary warfare.
At first glance, the rhetoric of climate change and the documentation 
of human suffering in distant zones of conflict seem entirely unrelated. 
Yet, the new set of concepts, images, metaphors, and frameworks that 
developed around issues of climate and environment are bound to change 
the way we see warfare from our post-anthropocentric, post-9/11 moment. 
Contemporary warfare must be addressed as a dramatic instance of terra-
forming, a force that changes habitats for both humans and nonhumans: 
redefining inter- and intraspecies relationships, affecting established 
ecologies, and enabling new forms of slow and fast violence.2 The mul-
tispecies ecology of war must become a field of study and concern. The 
hunt for Osama bin Laden revealed how birds can become instruments 
of warfare. When birdsong was heard on a bin Laden video released 
after September 11, 2001, ornithologists were consulted to determine 
his location.3 Birds threaten planes and are themselves threatened during 
the time of war when the skies fill with fighter jets and bomber aircraft. 
Bountiful orchards (as in the case of Jalalabad orchards in Afghanistan) 
and entire forests are cut down to provide heat for refugees fleeing zones 
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of violence.4 Aslam’s work in particular exemplifies how the new mode 
of writing war in the era of the Anthropocene must also reframe the 
questions of witnessing and the mediation of suffering by drawing in 
the nonhuman as witness to the disaster, mediating our knowledge, and 
providing evidence that adds to established forms of witness, such as 
testimonial and forensic modes.
Born in Pakistan, Aslam moved to England when his father—a com-
munist—had to flee Zia’s dictatorship in 1980. Bilingual and bicultural, 
Aslam has devoted his career to exploring South Asian Muslim identities 
and histories. Having emerged as a postcolonial writer with his first novel, 
Season of the Rainbirds, Aslam has grown into a global novelist with his 
midcareer Maps for Lost Lovers—a novel that traces the shifting landscape 
of radicalism, memory, and trauma in South Asian immigrant communi-
ties in England. Drawing on a planetary dimension while writing about 
localized histories of violence and conflict, Maps testifies to its author’s 
commitment to exploring traumatic histories as exemplifying and insepa-
rable from larger global processes. Yet, it is Aslam’s two latest novels, The 
Wasted Vigil and The Blind Man’s Garden, that make visible his impact in 
forging a new vocabulary for writing about the conflicts of the post-9/11 
era, which is, coincidentally, the era of the debate on the Anthropocene. 
United by a set of common themes and aesthetic sensibilities, both novels 
trace the lives of characters caught in the mayhem of war in Afghanistan 
some time after the beginning of the coalition-led operation of 2001. 
Refraining from victimization of their characters, the novels depict human 
suffering and violence as part of a larger geological and social landscape 
defined by human and nonhuman forces. In The Wasted Vigil, Aslam’s 
portrayal of the conflict in Afghanistan is refracted through the prisms of 
geology and archeology, with the overarching motifs of earthwork (exca-
vation, unearthing, burying) dominating the plot. Characters’ interactions 
with the earth bring into view the earth as a medium of memory where 
it serves as a conductor of messages from the deep past and into the deep 
future. The Blind Man’s Garden continues the project of writing by way 
of the earth, further incorporating the geologic and the lithic into the 
story of the war. While The Wasted Vigil is set entirely in Afghanistan, The 
Blind Man’s Garden is a cross-border novel set in an area spanning north-
west Pakistan and southeast Afghanistan, which effectively suspends the 
boundaries of nation-states by revealing the two countries’ deep historical, 
cultural, and ecological connections. 
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These novels’ attention to the earth as a medium and a witness exem-
plifies a larger set of sensibilities that I call the aesthetics of the geologic 
turn. The geologic turn designates the surge of interest in geology and 
earth sciences that has recently swept through many disciplines in the 
humanities.5 More specifically, the geologic turn crystallized around the 
idea of deep time, “a domain of inquiry that extends millions of years 
into the past” (Shryock and Smail ix). Key works by Wai Chee Dimock, 
who proposed the deep time framework for the study of literature, and 
media theorist Siegfried Zielinski, who offered a vision of deep media 
studies in the longue durée, have been followed by a multitude of texts that 
use the concept of deep time to open up new perspectives or reinvigorate 
established fields. In media studies, Zielinski’s concept of deep media was 
extended by Jussi Parikka to carve out a new area of study—the geology 
of media—that takes interest in the geological substratum of media (the 
rare earths and metals that are used to make it) and the geological “after-
glow” of e-waste (60). Similarly, the deep turn in sound studies bolstered 
the field through the study of “long sounds,” as well as by drawing atten-
tion to the earth and the ocean as material mediums of sound conduction 
(Khan, Earth Sound, Earth Signal 162). Andrew Shryock and Daniel Lord 
Smail extend the study of human history into deep time by proposing a 
distinction between recorded history and deep history. In contrast with 
text-based recorded history, deep history requires working with nontextual 
forms of evidence. Bones, genes, and the brain become deep history’s data: 
“Histories can be written from every type of trace, from the memoir to 
the bone fragment and the blood type” (13). Moreover, the study of deep 
human history makes obvious that it is intertwined with the deep past of 
other species, whereby human-nonhuman “coevolutionary spiral[s]” (19) 
expose what Thomas R. Trautmann and colleagues have called “deep kin-
ships” that complicate our notions of the boundaries between species (160). 
The deep turn in the humanities takes advantage of the new geological 
sensibility of the Anthropocene while also incorporating and extending 
the idea of longue durée, a framework proposed by Fernand Braudel in 
1958 for the study of history. Working within the longue durée frame in 
world-systems analysis allows a historian to detect patterns emerging 
over centuries and sometimes over millennia instead of focusing on rap-
idly changing events occurring within a short chronological span.6 For 
Zielinski, who describes the history of media as unfolding over thou-
sands of years, deep time is largely synonymous with the longue durée. 
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By contrast, Parikka—who is interested in the geological substratum of 
media—extends the term “deep time” into geological time, incorporating 
the slow geological scale in the study of fast-paced contemporary media. 
In his A Geology of Media, recorded human history (thousands of years) is 
placed into dialogue with immeasurably long geological cycles (delivered 
through layers of rock) spanning millions and billions of years, provoking 
imagination by triggering, as Jeffrey Jerome Cohen puts it, “the vertigo of 
the non-human scale” (24). Dimock similarly positions deep time as reces-
sional frames or scalar expansions ranging from the scales traditionally 
associated with the longue durée to geological timescale. From the geolog-
ical standpoint, deep time is seen as a vertical compression—its dominant 
image being not the timeline, but the stratigraphic column. As Shryock, 
Trautmann, and Gamble observe, geological time is “neither linear nor 
cyclical but vertical and layered. It must be dug into rather than traced 
with a finger or walked as a timeline. Deep time presents itself as sequen-
tially compressed slabs composed of different materials, both organic and 
inorganic; it is compacted, oppressively heavy, and impenetrable; it is hid-
den from public view” (26–27). A vertically presented layering of organic 
and inorganic deposits, geological time extends human history into the 
history of the earth and the universe. Deep time in the geological sense 
requires a dramatic scaling up—more intense than in studies concerned 
with the longue durée—but involves more than just the issue of scale. The 
dug-up vertical slab reveals a partial, deeply flawed record that appears 
to be nonlinear (with older layers folded into or intruding on the newer 
layers), containing fissures and breaks with entire eras missing altogether. 
It can thus function as a figure for a nonlinear model of time resonant with 
many contemporary interests in the humanities (parallel modernities, his-
tory as recurrence, multiple temporalities embedded within each historical 
moment, and so on).
What does it mean to write about human-made catastrophes and 
traumatic histories in a deep time framework—a framework that brings 
attention to the recursive cycles of acting and being acted on, the inter-
lacing of geological, evolutionary, and recorded histories? What kind of 
optical shifts does this transition entail? First and foremost, this new 
framework brings into focus the issue of material memory, in which envi-
sioning new forms of memorialization and recovery must go beyond the 
language-mediated therapeutic model—a model prevalent in conceptual-
izing traumatic histories since Cathy Caruth and Dori Laub. In Aslam’s 
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novels, excavation is not just a metaphor for truth-seeking, but a material 
practice that resists translation into psychological work (or psychoana-
lytically informed terminology). Second, describing humanitarian crises 
often involves representing fast violence that takes place within the short 
chronology of war. By contrast, writing traumatic histories in deep time 
should incorporate slow violence, “a violence that is neither spectacular 
nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous 
repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales” (Nixon 2). 
Finally, as this chapter will demonstrate, accounts of witnessing and 
mediation must extend into nonhuman traumatic histories, thus decenter-
ing the human figure. War must be viewed as impacting not only humans 
or nations, but multispecies habitats, too—it is a multispecies ecology.
Imagining Afghanistan in Deep Time
More often than not, Afghanistan is featured as a landscape of extinc-
tion. What is old (that is, what was destroyed a long time ago) and what 
is new (that is, what has been turned into rubble and dust only recently) 
are not easy to distinguish. Shortly after the start of Operation Enduring 
Freedom in the fall of 2001, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
described Afghanistan as “not a ‘target rich environment,’ either mili-
tarily or symbolically.”7 In contrast to the war in Iraq that would follow, 
with the images it produced of toppling monuments and stunning air 
strikes, Afghanistan crossed into mainstream visibility as a land that was 
impoverished to such a degree that there was nothing to apply a spec-
tacular act of violence to, nothing left to destroy. To paraphrase Freud, 
who discusses the “horror of nothing to see” in relation to femininity 
(Irigaray 26), Rumsfeld, it seems, was presented a similar horror: a war 
with a country with nothing left to bomb. Preempting Rumsfeld by less 
than a year, Lynsey Addario, a war photographer who traveled to Taliban-
ruled Afghanistan in 2000, wrote, “Afghanistan looks bombed out even 
when it hasn’t been bombed” (103). Similarly, texts discussed in chapter 
one featured the country as a depleted terrain that serves as a stage for the 
loss of humanity, a landscape so dark that Joseph Conrad would have been 
envious. In The Swallows of Kabul, Yasmina Khadra writes, “Kabul! Hidden 
amidst the wreckage of her avenues, she seems at best a tragic joke” (110), 
and later, “There’s nothing to see, except for utter dereliction, and nothing 
to hope for” (112). In Homebody/Kabul, Tony Kushner echoes: “The streets 
are as bare as the mountains now, the buildings are as ragged as mountains 
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and as bare and empty of life, there is no life here only fear” (23). To these 
onlookers, Afghanistan appears to be a land without history, flat Earth 
containing nothing but rubble, minefields, and shallow graves, capable of 
producing nothing but dust. Discussing the Taliban’s detonation of the 
Buddha statues in the Bamyan Province—arguably, the last “target rich” 
locale—Zahid Hussain observes that Afghanistan is a land with no past 
(38). Afghanistan is similarly evoked as a signifier of negative heritage by 
Pakistani writer Hasan Altaf, who exclaims, “At least we in Pakistan are 
not yet blowing up our Buddhas.”8
Yet could it be that the lack of visible targets—for a bomber plane 
or a photographer—conceals the wealth of submerged history, perhaps 
inaccessible to militarized cultural optics? Could it be that, by presenting 
an agglomeration of images of desolation, these onlookers fail to properly 
register and decipher the evidence these ruins contain of long histori-
cal processes of fast and slow violence? In the context of recent writing 
about Afghanistan, Aslam’s approach is unique as it undoes the discourse 
of impoverishment by summoning the land’s hidden riches. Aslam’s 
writing—lyrical and infused with geological and archeological details—
produces new optics for regarding landscapes of loss and a unique way of 
writing the disaster. In contrast to the flat-Earth imagery—flat because it 
has no landmarks and no history—Aslam works with depth, excavating 
the deep memory stored in the land’s stony archive. If stones for Addario 
and Rumsfeld are silent and poor, for Aslam the stones are expressive and 
eloquent. His lithic cartographies trace destinies of Afghanistan’s famous 
gems and uncover the deep meaning of insignificant rocks. Engaging trau-
matic stratigraphy as a mode of excavating memory, Aslam’s deep time 
framework renders simultaneous the deep past and the present, modern 
fossils and ancient relics. His books argue, ultimately, against a narrow 
national focus that foregrounds Afghanistan’s material and symbolic pov-
erty as a nation-state devastated by half a century of war in favor of a deep 
time approach that excavates inter- and intracontinental connections. They 
make visible the dense enmeshment and interlacing of human and nonhu-
man histories, and restore Afghanistan to its role as a rich, inexhaustible 
node in planetary interconnection.
In The Wasted Vigil—a novel that I already discussed, briefly, in chap-
ter three—Aslam examines Afghanistan’s history through four central 
characters from different corners of the world: Marcus, an elderly British 
doctor; Lara, a Russian widow in search of her brother who went missing 
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during the Soviet-Afghan War; David, a retired CIA agent; and Casa, 
a young fundamentalist and orphan who grew up in an Afghan refugee 
camp. This international cast of characters allows Aslam to draw attention 
to the global nature of the conflict in Afghanistan and, especially, to the 
often overlooked role of the West in the Afghan tragedy. Marcus, who has 
been in Afghanistan longer than the other characters, says, “But, you see, 
the West was involved in the ruining of this place, in the ruining of my life. 
There would have been no downfall if this country had been left to itself 
by those others” (64). The novel abstains from assigning blame, however; 
each invasion, in Aslam’s narrative, inflicts trauma both on the Afghans 
and the intruders—a trauma from which recovery is difficult—creating, 
as I mentioned, a “kinship of wounds” (318). 
The Blind Man’s Garden extends the project of examining Afghanistan’s 
conflict by shifting attention to the areas on both sides of the contested 
Durand Line spanning southeast Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan.9 
Known as FATA (the Federally Administered Tribal Areas), the region has 
a long history of being represented as ungovernable and prone to violence, 
having been the site of a massacre of 16,000 British troops during the first 
Anglo-Afghan War of 1838. The novel explores Afghanistan’s tragedy as 
seen from Pakistan, as the book’s multiple Pakistani characters are drawn 
into the quagmire of the post-9/11 war in Afghanistan. The story centers 
on Mikal, who is trying to find his way home from Afghanistan to the 
town of Heer, Pakistan. His journey takes on epic proportions, mapping 
the landscape of Operation Enduring Freedom—a landscape defined by 
the fleeing but still dangerous Taliban, the warlords regaining power, 
American detention camps and torture, bombed-out valleys, weapon-
trading villages, and other paraphernalia of war—all of which is placed in 
the horizon of deep time, both deep human history and geological history. 
Throughout the novel, Mikal’s character in particular is framed by the 
deep time of liberal Islam—the Islam of the golden age—with its love of 
science and, in particular, astronomy. The slow gyration of the sky that 
Mikal knows how to read, and the deep geological time of the landscape 
he inhabits, makes him appear larger than life, giving him an aura of 
invincibility. During the last part of his journey, he has two fellow travelers 
whom he rescues—a wounded US Navy SEAL and a snow leopard cub—
signifying the interlacing of US and Pakistani national histories as well as 
bringing into focus interspecies connections.
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Memory as Material Excavation 
Dimock proposes that deep time be understood as “a set of longitudinal 
frames, at once projective and recessional, with input going both ways, and 
binding continents and millennia into many loops of relations, a densely 
interactive fabric” (3–4). Deep time is thus presented as a connective tissue 
and a medium of lasting attachments, nonlinear as well as constitutive of 
many asynchronous nodes of association. Dimock proposes “restoring” 
American literature to deep time (4); we should ask, in turn, what does the 
term “restoring” entail? And what would it mean to restore Afghanistan 
to deep time? Deep time, Dimock maintains, “nourishes a politics as well 
as an aesthetics: a devotion to ancient beauty that can lend itself to the 
charge of treason” (123). The charge of treason, no doubt, is a result of 
the unfaithfulness induced by the vertigo of deep time—unfaithfulness 
to conventional chronology and unfaithfulness to the nation. One of the 
consequences of Aslam’s restoring Afghanistan to its deep past is doing 
away with the recent boundaries of the nation-state. Nations have not only 
spatial but also temporal borders; as we move back in time, these borders 
eventually disappear and there emerges a world of blurry boundaries, shift-
ing alliances, the movements of conquering and conquered armies, and 
radiant centers of power.
Disinterested in the logic of the nation, Aslam develops a vision that 
is both paleoscopic and syndetic, attuned to the logic of interconnect-
edness that exists in deep time. “At any given moment,” he writes, “we 
are entangled in all the past of mankind. Our hearts encircled by the 
echo of every word that has ever been spoken” (Blind Man’s Garden 190). 
In the two novels, Aslam works with several vast archives that consti-
tute Afghanistan’s deep past, incorporating them into the narrative of 
its recent history dramatized through the characters and plot. The first 
“recessional frame,” or archive, is one of tricontinental Islam with its great 
cities (Dimock 3). To use Dimock’s words, it is an “archive dating back a 
millennium” (1). In fact, the Islamic world system emerged between 1000 
and 1500 AD, although one can also trace its advent to the glorious days 
of the eclectic and cosmopolitan Umayyads, who moved the capital of the 
Muslim world from Mecca to multicultural Damascus around 685 AD.10 
In The Blind Man’s Garden, the house in north Pakistan (which also serves 
as a school for boys) figures as a material signifier of the deep time of Islam. 
Before building the foundation, Rohan, the school’s founder, collected the 
soil from the six great cities of Islam—Mecca, Baghdad, Cordoba, Cairo, 
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Delhi, and Istanbul—and planted it in the garden, each room thus built on 
a mixture of Pakistani soil and the soil of one of the six cities. The mixing 
of the soils, the act of transplanting, signifies interpenetration and the 
crosspollination of cultures (which each of these cities also, in fact, rep-
resents). Rohan’s house in the novel is an unstable metaphor of belonging 
but also of exile and violent displacement, a contested site connoting both 
roots and uprootedness. Envisioned by Rohan as a house of knowledge 
(representing the ink of the scholar), the school later becomes the breeding 
ground of militant Islamism (representing the blood of the martyr). Rohan, 
the school’s founder, is evicted from its grounds.
The multiple temporal scales in Aslam’s work can be compared to 
discrete orbits. The slow orbit of the longue durée time of Islam draws 
the characters into its gyrational movement, imbuing them with gravity. 
Behind each character there is a multitude of relevant pasts; in fact, each 
character is a host of stories and lives lived before him or her. While some, 
such as Rohan, draw strength from Islam’s cosmopolitan history, others 
dream of martyrs and armies. Rohan’s son, Jeo, who travels to Afghanistan 
in the aftermath of 9/11 to help the wounded only to be killed in an anti-
Taliban raid within days, remembers hearing stories of martyrs as a child: 
“the ghostly thousands stretching back through the generations [,] and 
as he slept they imparted things to him not just of life and death but of 
eternal life and death” (Blind 12). Beyond tricontinental Islam, there is 
yet another orbit and an archive of even deeper histories: the archive of 
Eurasia. Drawn into the orbit of Eurasian history, Afghanistan’s past 
enters a new recessional frame, within which it appears as a node in 
the network of ancient merchant economies, such as the history of the 
Silk Road. While the previous frame is indifferent to Afghanistan’s pre-
Islamic past, drawing it into the orbit of Mecca, this new frame brings 
its pre-Islamic past into relief, drawing Afghanistan into the orbit of the 
Ganges and ancient Tibet. In The Wasted Vigil, Marcus—in the process of 
digging up an underground chamber for his perfume factory—uncovers 
a fifteen-foot-tall carved head of the Buddha lying on its side. Too large 
to move, the head is left where it was found; the life of the factory simply 
happens around it, installing a “face from another time” into the fabric 
of the present (17). The Buddha gestures toward the region’s Buddhist 
heritage (second to seventh centuries)—the past that came under attack 
in the Taliban’s war on stones in 2001 when the ancient, 150-foot-tall 
Buddha statues in the province of Bamyan were dynamited in an act 
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of iconoclastic violence. The Buddha’s head discovered underground is 
a portal to Afghanistan’s history in the longue durée, a signal received 
from a pre-Islamic era—an asynchronous bond between distant eras 
reasserting itself during the time of the Taliban-induced strife. Buddha’s 
head signifies a part of the past that is indestructible; it comes alive when 
the Taliban attempt to destroy it, gold rays of light streaming from the 
bullet holes, chasing the attackers away. The Taliban’s war against the 
stony archive, their desire to extinguish the material traces of the past, 
gestures to the agency of such found remnants, their function as doorways 
into alternative historical paths not taken yet still possible. The opposite 
of the ideological foreclosure induced by the Taliban’s iconoclasm, these 
remnants open up the past. Afghanistan’s Buddhist heritage heralds the 
potentiality of Buddhism-to-come, a Buddhist path neither exhausted 
nor diminished by the subsequent layers of history, being still active and 
vibrant with energy. Extending Bergson’s theory of duration, Elizabeth 
Grosz theorizes deep time as an energy reserve of a sort, never depleted. 
She writes that 
every actual present is subtended by the virtual entirety of the past. 
So deep time, the time of the universe’s unfolding, the construction of 
the earth and all that appears on it, the eruption of life forms, all the 
momentous and unpredictable emergences never cease; they function 
both as an historical horizon but also as unspent forces, forces whose 
effects have not been used up by all the time that has separated the 
present from its primordial past. (133, emphasis my own) 
The deep time of Afghanistan arrives intact through the wreckage and 
debris, revealing a landscape of riches testifying to its remarkable history 
as a node in a trans-Eurasian network spanning many thousands, even 
millions, of years, dating back to the great migration of ancient humans 
from Africa into Asia and beyond.11 
Although Aslam’s Afghanistan is, unmistakably, a land after mass 
extinction—a ruined place—the images of depletion and exhaustion are 
juxtaposed with images of agency and potency stored in the remnants 
of the past. The past is presented as an active potentiality, imbued with 
energy—sometimes toxic or deadly (as when one uncovers a landmine or a 
water source contaminated by depleted uranium) or sometimes nourishing 
and vibrant. Forging a form of memory that is palimpsestic, the novels’ 
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ethos calls for the incorporation of all the preserved layers, from the very 
old to the very recent.12 The Wasted Vigil presents Afghanistan’s recent 
history as a vertical column with historical layers sitting compressed on 
top of each other (a stratigraphic column of a sort): “Afghanistan had 
collapsed and everyone’s life now lies broken at different levels within the 
rubble. Some are trapped near the surface while others find themselves 
entombed deeper down, pinned under tons of smashed masonry and shat-
tered beams from where their cries cannot be heard by anyone on the 
surface” (29). Afghanistan’s history, for Aslam, thus needs to be handled 
through a process of excavation—through the unearthing of material 
objects and bodies trapped at various levels. Such excavation is an ethi-
cal imperative (that is, the cries from the deep layers need to be heard); 
excavation and restoration here take the place of testimony as a mode of 
handling traumatic history. The layer of deposits associated with Taliban 
rule contains buried art and media objects—audiotapes, books, paintings, 
family photographs—everything prohibited by the iconoclastic regime. 
Aslam refers to buried audiotapes found in Marcus’s garden as “sound 
fossils” (16), thus insisting, rhetorically, on a certain simultaneity of the 
recent and the deep past. The Taliban’s era is best presented and under-
stood through what the regime has buried and tried to render extinct. 
Memory has to be recovered from the fossils, which entails the material 
labor of clearing earth and caked mud to reveal the objects underneath. 
Such work in Aslam’s novels is done with great attention and focus. A 
layer of mud that conceals the murals on the walls of Marcus’s house (he 
covered them up during the Taliban era) is now being slowly removed, 
piece by piece; it will take years to perform this work with a level of 
care that does justice to the concealed past. The Soviet-Afghan War era 
left its own residue of fossils: rusting tanks, scraps of metal identifiable 
by their Cyrillic inscriptions, landmines, and contaminated land. In a 
striking scene in The Blind Man’s Garden, Mikal, hypothermic and near 
death as he struggles to find his way home, stumbles on a field of aban-
doned Soviet fighter jets: a sea of rusting carcasses resembling prehistoric 
birds, a burial ground of extinct technology. In a moment of ingenuity 
prompted by his survival instinct, Mikal then turns the airplanes into 
fuel by setting them on fire, one by one, their rubber interiors providing 
him temporary warmth as they go aflame. Remnants of the extinct war, 
these rusted jets literally become fossil fuel, their unspent bits of energetic 
value extracted by fire.
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Aslam shows how the US-led invasion is creating its own deposits—
an archive of deadly media—in the form of unexploded cluster bombs, 
depleted uranium contaminants, and more prosaic traces in the form of 
American footprints in the mud, recognizable by their large size: “the soles 
of several boots have left deep imprints on the muddy ground of the bend. 
America is everywhere. The boots are large as if saying, ‘This is how you 
make an impression in the world’” (Blind 129). The progress of Operation 
Enduring Freedom is made visible as well through the shaved-off beards 
of escaping Al-Qaeda militants as they appear in the water many miles 
downstream—woolly messages sent down the river. In The Wasted Vigil, 
as if attempting to counteract the toxic deposits of war by leaving some-
thing of value, David begins building a Native American-style canoe (a 
technology 14,000 years old) on Marcus’s property: a gift from American 
deep time, an image of transplantation. To preserve it Marcus drowns the 
canoe in the lake, hiding it from view and instantly fossilizing it for future 
Afghan generations to discover.
Lithic Cartographies
Aslam’s aesthetics of the geologic turn is most visible in his use of imag-
ery that draws on the petrous, creating vast cartographies of human-lithic 
enmeshments. The writer refers to historical processes as “[r]ivers of lava 
emerging onto the surface after flowing many out-of-sight miles under-
ground” (Wasted 272). Lava is a paradoxical image: rock in its liquid state, 
actively forming (and terraforming), creating conditions for the formation 
of emeralds and rubies as it cools down13—objects that are then capable of 
setting in motion artisanal miners, instigating envy, and financing wars.14 
In A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, Manuel DeLanda attests, similarly, 
“From the point of view of energetic and catalytic flows, human societies 
are very much like lava flows; and human-made structures (mineralized 
cities and institutions) are very much like mountains and rocks: accumu-
lations of materials hardened and shaped by historical processes” (55). For 
both DeLanda and Aslam, geology is not simply a source of metaphors for 
writing about human life; geology, whether it is understood as a landscape, 
a source of energy, or the process of mineralization, is an active force that 
contributes to shaping human history—nonlife forming alliances with life.
Both novels feature stories of gemstones that, having originated in 
the depths of the earth hundreds of millions of years ago, have rich pasts 
that both precede humans and overlap with human history. Through these 
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gems, multiple epochs are bound together. Cartographies that trace the 
life of a gem uncover multiple relations distributed in space and time. 
This relation-generating capacity of stones has been noted by Cohen, who 
observes that stones can lead to a “proliferation of relations most obvious 
over long distance” (24). The Wasted Vigil invokes a story of the famous 
diamond Koh-i-Noor (“Mountain of Light” in Persian)—a gem so pre-
cious it warranted its own name. Having originated in India, the fabled 
diamond changed hands many times. Its owners include Babur, an empire 
builder who conquered Afghanistan and India and established the Mughal 
Empire in 1526; a Persian shah, Nader Shah, who captured Koh-i-Noor 
and brought it to Persia in 1739; and later an Afghan emir, Ahmad Shāh 
Durrānī, who came into possession of the stone in 1747. As Durrānī is 
credited with founding the Afghan state that same year, Koh-i-Noor can 
be viewed as the foundation stone for Afghanistan as a modern state. 
Eventually ending up in Queen Victoria’s crown, the diamond remains in 
England, weaving together the multiple forces that ruled over and passed 
through the land that is now Afghanistan.15 A witness to interimperial 
rivalries and conquests no single human could witness, the gem did not 
emerge from this turbulent history unscathed, its size diminished from 
the original 793 to 105 carats due to multiple cuttings and polishings to 
increase its luster. Having invoked Koh-i-Noor, Aslam then introduces his 
own equivalent of the legendary gem: a miniature spinel attached to one of 
the metal plates inside David’s watch. Similar to Koh-i-Noor, the spinel is a 
stone that travels; weaving distant continents together, it recalls and reveals 
the cartographies of the Cold War era. Having originated in Afghanistan, 
the spinel was brought to Vietnam inside the watch that belonged to 
David’s brother, who had been drafted and killed in the Vietnam War. 
Having inherited the watch, David brought it back to Afghanistan during 
his CIA days. Posing as a gem merchant, he sought to avenge his brother’s 
death by helping to organize the anti-Soviet jihad (the Soviet “Vietnam”), 
while also tracing the history of the precious stone. A material medium of 
memory, the lasting gem thereby ties David’s family history to geopolitical 
history and to the deep geological time of the earth’s productivity.
Stones thus become vehicles of communication between asynchronous 
generations, as well as mediating distant epochs. A gem exhibits an espe-
cially strong binding force because of the particular qualities that enable it 
to enter into human history, becoming an integral part of it: “A diamond 
becomes a precious gem because its rarity, lucidity, and density can sustain 
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strong confederation with human and inhuman forces, tools, economic and 
aesthetic systems—coalitions friable stones cannot support” (Cohen 33). 
In The Blind Man’s Garden, larger lithic landscapes frequently are invoked 
to reframe our understanding of the post-9/11 moment in Afghanistan. In 
the passage below, Peshawar Valley figures as a vertiginous landscape, a 
petrified signifier of the maelstrom of the post-9/11 universe. Elderly Rohan 
travels through it with the ancient ruby in his pocket, grieving for his son 
lost to war just days prior, and thus willing to help a stranger whose son has 
just been kidnapped and held for ransom by an Afghan warlord. Serving as a 
stage for contemporary human tragedy unfolding in real time, the landscape 
also reveals traces of a remote catastrophe—one that predates humans—
the changing of places of land and water: “The valley of Peshawar has the 
appearance of having been, centuries ago, the bed of a vast lake, whose 
banks were bound by the cliffs and peaks of the surrounding Himalayas, 
and Rohan has the feeling of being submerged within that vast inland sea” 
(111). The lithic landscape is a time machine, transporting Rohan into the 
prehistoric times when the valley was underwater. The valley is not just a 
human cemetery, but also a graveyard for other life-forms, plants and ani-
mals, now extinct in this area—an ancient seabed, rich in fossils. The present 
is rendered simultaneous with the past via a rock, submerging and drowning 
him, the two catastrophes appearing concurrent. The passage then draws 
the reader into an even thicker agglomeration of lithic imagery focusing 
on the shapes of the rocks as cocreated by natural and human forces, the 
immemorial effort of currents echoed by the engravings of the Quran:
He crosses the road and enters the graveyard that contains about a hun-
dred souls, a few decaying tombs and thorn trees. The mountains loom 
overhead vertiginously, the land and slopes marked with evidence of the 
lost sea, the effort of currents, waves, springs, streams and rivers. Verses 
of the Koran are on every headstone—as though the graves are quoting 
them, carrying on a conversation with one another using nothing but 
holy words. (111)
Rohan’s personal tragedy (the loss of his son) is mirrored by the landscape, 
which contains vestigial memory of many catastrophes—the eternal dance 
of ocean and land as they change places over millennia. Extinctions and 
erosions are followed by periods of recovery, in which the landscape is 
reclaimed by life:
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How did Mikal’s body end up here? The mayhem and chaos of war. He 
looks up at the cliffs. The vegetation everywhere is profuse; after the 
level of the sea decreased this was a tropical marsh, the resort of rhinoc-
eros, flamingo and tiger, thick with reeds, rushes and conifers. Under 
his breath he reads the verse of the Koran that is etched onto the ruby. 
Wealth and offspring are transitory adornments of the nearer life. (113)
Repeatedly, and with great insistence, the passage moves from a description 
of landscape to linguistic inscriptions and back again, making obvious 
that language achieves its lasting quality by entering an alliance with 
a stone; this renders it a material part of the landscape, a palimpsestic 
plate in its own right. Quranic verses are carved into stone just as the 
streams and rivers carved passageways through the rock: both an intricate 
calligraphy, both a material presence capable of affecting, as well as 
being affected by, the humans entering the landscape. The catastrophe 
that shaped the landscape a long time ago rendered extinct many life-
forms; the contemporary catastrophe creates a new layer of extinction 
over the ancient one, insignificant by comparison. The inscription on 
the ruby is ironic; while gesturing toward the impermanence of wealth 
represented by the ruby, it mocks the human life span. It is Rohan who 
is a transient adornment of the gem, not vice versa; the ruby, whose 
luster speaks of the deep time of the Himalayas, will soon change hands, 
continuing its journey through human history, while Rohan will perish, 
his gravestone his only durable mark. A lasting mode of memory and 
an object of multigenerational attachments, stones are ancient media 
forging connections, creating kinship across time and space. A wondrous 
palimpsest of three forces—earth’s work, divine creativity (the Quranic 
verse), and human craft—the ruby creates a kinship between Rohan and 
the poor man whose son he saves with his precious stone.
Aslam’s lithic cartographies are deep maps—contemporary charac-
ters follow ancient routes of migration, travel, and trade, disregarding 
recent borders as mere fictions. Rendered simultaneous in deep time, the 
past and present are placed in conversation with each other. Seen from 
the scale afforded by the stone, Afghanistan emerges not as modernity’s 
failure, but as a source of worth, enabling a lasting economy of stones 
and creating continental connections. Uniquely rich in rocky matter, 
Afghanistan’s land produces rubies, spinels, diamonds, and lapis lazuli, 
among others. This productivity is only visible when the scale is large 
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enough to both incorporate societies that developed their economies along 
the Silk Road and include the geological time of the earth’s productiv-
ity. The two nonhuman registers—the slow timescale of the earth (the 
time it takes to produce gems) and the rapid regrowth of flowers—frame 
the middle register of the human in Aslam’s world, the register that is 
seen as particularly vulnerable to the mayhem of accelerated destruction 
that is contemporary war. In fact, the stones and the flowers are what 
remain in the aftermath of catastrophe. Flowers flourish as they recolonize 
minefields abandoned by humans, war technology impeding one life-form 
while enhancing another. The mountains register the aerial attacks as a 
brief moment in their immense history. These scales of the rapid and the 
very slow in Aslam frame and protectively envelop the human characters 
whose environment is destroyed, presented as a source of strength and 
nourishment for these humans whose present is impoverished. Just as 
stars become visible during an eclipse of the sun, deep time resurfaces 
during the eclipse of modernity produced by war.16 The multiscalar aes-
thetics forged by Aslam not only reflects the Anthropocene-era turn to 
multiscalar thinking, but in the context of writing about Afghanistan’s 
tragic history, restores worth to exhausted lives and depleted landscapes. 
Although it decenters human tragedy via a scalar change, it also signals 
a possibility of healing for humans by way of the earth.
Earth-Witness
In The Writing of Stones, Roger Caillois proposes that “in a stone the image 
. . . is an immortal witness, recorded for a long period of time: forever, 
measured against the brief human season” (100). The stone’s longevity, 
beyond being a medium of communication between asynchronous gen-
erations, is here imbued with the authority of a witness who can be called 
to testify in some remote future, asked to provide a record of epochs long 
gone. Beyond the purely metaphoric dimension or the assumption of pan-
psychism, how can the idea of witnessing be extended to the nonhuman 
domain? What kind of witness may be commensurable, for instance, with 
the deep time of environmental destruction, a scalar process occurring 
beyond the human mode of perception? Recent discussions of witnessing 
suggest the possibility of expanding the figure of the witness beyond the 
human observer. More specifically, there has been considerable interest 
in extending the notion of witness to technological apparatuses that are 
capable of bypassing the human observer.17 For instance, Eivind Røssaak 
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writes: “If witnessing has to do with seeing and insight of some sort, then 
the figures of the eye and the technologies of the eye become import-
ant. . . . Human optics are increasingly being extended and even replaced 
by technological instruments of seeing and measuring devices . . . [pro-
ducing] visions and surveillance systems of such complexity that they 
are readable by computers only” (224). Here both the work of recording 
and interpreting/reading bypass the human altogether, with technology 
producing a record to be read by a nonhuman interpreter. Contemporary 
popular culture is attuned to this shift that incorporates nonhuman wit-
nessing. A Black Mirror episode titled “Crocodile” is set in a near future in 
which the police can tap into nonhuman animal memory to solve crimes. 
And yet, as Ulrich Ekman, the editor of Witness: Memory, Representation, 
and the Media in Question, points out, “[in regard to witnessing,] we seem 
quite a bit more willing to consider ourselves technical or technological 
than animal and animistic” (19). Ekman continues: “Could an animal, 
could a machine do what I do here in welcoming myself as host and witness 
at once?” (20). Here I propose the term “earth-witness,” or “geo-witness,” 
to capture the nonhuman witnessing described by Aslam—a type of wit-
nessing registered by an ecosystem, as nonhuman (insect) perception, as 
a deep species-memory (the species-memory of demoiselle cranes), or as 
a geological trace. This type of witnessing and registering the disaster is 
different from both human eyewitnessing and witnessing mediated by 
technology. 
The motif of the earth or landscape as mute witness to a human-borne 
catastrophe is a relatively common feature, including the writing set in 
zones of conflict and humanitarian suffering. For instance, Nelofer Pazira, 
in her memoir about the Afghan wars, exclaims as she gazes on the terrain 
outside of Kandahar, just after the Taliban have been driven away from the 
city by coalition forces in 2001: 
Could this place have looked the same more than a hundred years 
ago, in July 1880, when the British and Afghan armies fought here? 
Could this place have been the same twenty years ago, in January 
1980, when the Russians tried to fight their way into this bastion of 
resistance to foreign invasion? How did this place look a year ago, in 
December 2001, when the Arabs, Pakistanis and their Afghan allies—
the Taliban—were running for their lives under the American B-52 
bombers? (333)
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Here, Pazira invokes the idea of a landscape as a silent witness to wars 
fought by humans. Yet her vision of such witness differs significantly from 
the one provided by Aslam; this difference is important if we are to register 
what is new in Aslam’s aesthetics of geo-witnessing. It is significant that, 
in Pazira, the landscape described goes through an imagined immobili-
zation—indeed, an abstraction—as a result of which it is positioned as a 
stable, unchanging signifier against which the agency of humans, capa-
ble of both violence and suffering, is brought into relief. The rhetoric of 
the passage, with its structure of repetition and its foregrounding of the 
words “the same,” insists on the earth’s immutability, foregrounding its 
presumed immemorial presence and constancy. Intriguingly, while poten-
tially bringing the earth-witness into view, this rhetorical move reinscribes 
the division between nature and culture, seeking in immutable nature a 
respite from the drama and strife of human history.
Dipesh Chakrabarty’s “The Climate of History: Four Theses” famously 
undercuts such separation, insisting on the inseparability of human and 
natural history. In Aslam’s novels, the earth-witness is the very site of such 
interlacing. Instead of a signifier of mute stability, the landscape in Aslam’s 
novels is a dynamic force—acting, as well as being acted on—a full-fledged 
participant in, and not just an immobile observer of, human history. Even 
geologic landscapes are imagined by Aslam as both affected by human 
action, and in turn, affecting the human witness who arrives, belatedly, at 
the site of a catastrophic event. And humans, in line with Anthropocene-
era discussions, are depicted as a geologic force: 
[T]he journey to the destination in Afghanistan takes seventeen hours. 
In deep twilight they cross a broad flat valley with a river and river flats 
in it, every bit of it scorched black where a Daisy Cutter bomb had been 
dropped, reducing everything to ash, pumice, lava, the sides of the hills 
torn up into segments, and scattered over it all is the yellow haze of 
the unrisen moon, the cold night falling on them out of the east, the 
stars beginning their slide through the black slopes. It looks like the 
site of a cosmic incursion such as a meteorite, not the work of men. The 
US casualties number twelve in the two-month war, whereas countless 
thousands of Afghanistanis have perished, fighters as well as bystanders, 
and Rohan doesn’t know who will speak the complicated truth, and he 
watches with attention as though at some point in the future he himself 
will be asked to tell what he has seen. (Blind 112)
194 IMAGINING AFGHANISTAN
This passage stages an irreconcilable tension between eyewitness and 
earth-witness. Ironically, Rohan is an elderly man who is almost blind and 
thus unlikely to carry the memory of the disaster into posterity. His fra-
gility and sensory inadequacy is juxtaposed with the landscape’s ability to 
record and carry forward its own memory. The geologic agency of humans 
whose conspicuous act of terraforming through warfare is equated with 
“a cosmic incursion” here is registered by the landscape itself. Evocatively 
called “a Daisy Cutter,” this 15,000-pound bomb—the largest nonnuclear 
weapon in the US army inventory—was used in Vietnam to clear forests 
for helicopter landings and has been referred to as a “mammoth” bomb 
due to its size and impact force (Spitzer). In Afghanistan, Daisy Cutters 
have been used to penetrate Al-Qaeda’s underground cave complexes in 
Tora Bora. The astronomical scale invoked by the passage is telling. Here 
Afghanistan figures not as a nation-state, but as a geo-body struck by an 
extraterrestrial force. That force turns solid rock back into the quagmire 
of lava, pumice, and ash, reversing the natural processes that originally 
created the landscape and thus bringing into the foreground the scalar 
consequences of human actions. A semi-blind human witness is rendered 
trivial compared to the cosmic forces he struggles to comprehend—forces 
that, by changing the valley’s geological history, create a nonerasable record 
of their own violence.
Moreover, earth-witness in Aslam’s novels is not just rock, but a 
dynamic ecosystem, inhabited—aside from humans—by multiple life-
forms and technological objects. Aslam’s plots incorporate vegetation, 
insects, birds, and animals, adopting a multispecies approach that brings 
into focus “the host of organisms whose lives and deaths are linked to 
human social worlds” (Kirksey and Helmreich 545). Demoiselle cranes, 
whose migratory paths have been severely affected by decades of war in 
Afghanistan, are often featured in The Wasted Vigil as not just part of the 
setting, but as a nonhuman witness whose gaze is contrasted with and 
frames the agency of human protagonists.18 These nonhumans are revealed 
as actors who have a stake in the ongoing war in Afghanistan. In one strik-
ing scene, the two characters most defined by the shallow chronologies of 
war—David (ex-CIA) and Casa (the young Afghan militant)—are placed 
in the vicinity of a flock of migrating cranes, “the million-year-old gaze of 
the demoiselles watching them from far away” (Wasted 187). This faraway 
gaze from a long-gone epoch—from deep time—beckons and accuses, 
testifying to migratory histories a million years old—histories that have 
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been disrupted by aerial warfare. The demoiselles’ gaze contests ideological 
boundaries as well as the boundaries of nation-states, calling into view a 
length of Eurasia as experienced through history by a particular species. 
Connecting Siberia and India, the cranes’ migration calls for a peaceful 
Afghanistan—a land that serves as a connecting node, a locum of respite 
and nourishment during the arduous journey across the Himalayas. Stored 
in the birds’ muscle memory, genes, and brains, this deep species mem-
ory—threatened by contemporary wars—once again reveals the scalar, 
incalculable, long-lasting consequences of individual actions. David, who 
has been fueling the fire of the Soviet-Afghan War, is cast as accountable 
not only for human, but also for these nonhuman casualties, his legacy 
extending into the deep future summoned by this nonhuman gaze.
If the nonhuman gaze of the cranes speaks from the depths of 
millennial time, another form of nonhuman perception—insect percep-
tion—exemplifies nonhuman witnessing at the microtemporal register. 
Contemporary media theories bring into focus the microtemporality of a 
machinic sensorium.19 Yet microtemporalities predate the contemporary 
digital universe as they also are found at the level of microbial evolu-
tions, viral replications, insect perception, and particle time. In Aslam, 
human perception appears slow in comparison to insect sensing—a type 
of creature-witness occurring at a swarmic microregister. The Blind Man’s 
Garden features a scene where a swarm of flies signals the arrival of Jeo’s 
(Naheed’s husband’s) body to the gate of her compound. A few moments 
before hearing the knock at the gate, Naheed notices a sudden stop to the 
buzzing of a swarm of flies around a bird carcass to which she is tending; 
the flies’ attention has been redirected to a larger human body. The flies’ 
disappearance remains illegible to Naheed until, having heard the knock 
at the gate, she steps outside her walled compound and sees the decaying 
body that attracted the flies. The multiple ways in which Aslam’s writing 
incorporates nonhuman witness thus situates this witness as neither mute 
nor immutable, as in Pazira. Rather, it comprises multiple forms of regis-
tering and perception: from memory stored in landscape to the swarmic 
perception of flies to the changes in the muscle memory of migrating birds. 
Depicting the war as a multispecies ecology serves the purpose of uncover-
ing multiple forms of environmental violence (such as habitat destruction) 
that affect both humans and nonhumans. By decentering the human fig-
ure, its temporal scale, and its mode of perception, such a view reveals that 
the destinies of human and nonhuman actors are deeply interlinked.20 The 
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snow leopard cub—who is rescued by Mikal and then travels with him 
as Mikal navigates his way home—becomes a metaphor of a historical 
journey shared by two different species. Ultimately, Aslam’s writing of 
the nonhuman witness promotes what Cohen calls the ethics of scale: 
“a cautious living with that looks deep into time, that stresses enduring 
ecomaterial affinity and rejects the devaluation of matter as self-evident 
asset, inert commodity, or resource for extraction” (41, emphasis my own).
Aslam’s mode of writing the disaster in the era of the Anthropocene 
brings to the foreground what Grosz calls “an excess of life over death in 
the existence of species” (137)—a multitude of unspent forces and vitali-
ties found in landscapes commonly seen, as in the case of Afghanistan, as 
landscapes of depletion and loss. Such excess becomes visible when these 
landscapes are restored to multiple recessional frames of deep time: the 
deep time of Islam, Eurasian time, and geological time. Moreover, such 
a view forces us to consider the ethical implications of warfare through 
the prism of the deep future, bringing into view the long-term geological 
and environmental aftermath of contemporary warfare. Aslam’s writing 
thereby exemplifies the benefits of the geologic turn for writing traumatic 
histories in the era of the Anthropocene, the era in which human actions 
have consequences that span well beyond their terrestrial temporal scale. 
Those benefits, as well as the aesthetics of this mode of writing, are most 
noticeable when contrasted with humanitarian mode of representing 
Afghanistan—one that foregrounds Afghanistan’s symbolic and material 
poverty and focuses on extreme forms of spectacularized human suffering. 
Aslam’s works emphasize systemic and slow violence, habitat diminish-
ment, and ecosystem degradation while upholding the earth and human 
resilience in the longue durée, insisting on planetary fragility and, simulta-
neously, highlighting the earth’s persistence. In a striking gesture at the 
end of The Blind Man’s Garden, Aslam takes advantage of the astronomical 
perspective opened up by the narrative and compares Afghanistan not to 
Earth, but to Jupiter—the brightest planet in the solar system, character-
ized by violent surface storms that can rage “for hundreds of years” (367). 
This astronomical inscription offers a paradoxical vision of hope—that the 
lasting storm will eventually subside—and affirm the undepleted potency 




The Kabubble: The Humanitarian 
Community Under Scrutiny  
The Kabubble 
In the opening pages of her 2015 memoir Farewell, Kabul, Christina Lamb, 
a seasoned British reporter with decades of experience in Afghanistan, 
describes the closing of Camp Bastion in the Helmand Province in 2014. 
It was a billion-pound British base, the largest since World War II, with an 
airfield that had become “Britain’s third busiest airport” (4). The withdrawal 
of the British forces, who had failed to achieve their mission in the unruly 
province, signaled the end of Britain’s fourth war in Afghanistan. It was 
marked by a somber mood and did not compel a celebration. Having lost the 
hope of defeating the devious Taliban; weary of endless, pointless clashes 
with the local narco-barons and their private militias; demoralized and 
losing public support at home, the British forces retreated quietly. “Lofty 
aims of transforming Afghanistan were forgotten,” Lamb writes, “Now it 
was about damage control” (6). The year 2014, the end of the NATO-led 
large-scale operation in Afghanistan, no doubt, marked a moment of reck-
oning—a quiet one, because no one wanted to publicize the failure of the 
so-called peacebuilding and “reconstruction.” The year was further tainted 
by the advent of the Islamic State—a horrific consequence of the US war in 
Iraq. Lamb’s memoir’s subtitle, From Afghanistan to a More Dangerous World, 
captures her assessment of the state of the world in the aftermath of the War 
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on Terror. Both Afghanistan, the subtitle suggests, and the larger world, 
have become less stable and more (rather than less) dangerous. Assessing 
the early days of reconstruction in Kabul from the perspective afforded by 
the war’s inglorious end and NATO forces’ retreat, Lamb, like others, tries 
to figure out what went wrong. In the memoir, she condemns the West for 
double-dealing, the secret services for propping up the widely hated Afghan 
warlords with cash, thus allowing them to spring back to power, the expats 
for partying senseless in houses rented for astronomical sums of money from 
the Taliban leaders (400), and the aid community for “helping itself rather 
than Afghans” (146).1 The era of enchantment with humanitarian-military 
interventions that were supposed to liberate and transform target societies 
ended with vast disillusionment and a profound loss of faith in such projects. 
In this chapter, I discuss a trio of cultural texts that reflect, from 
Kabul, on the era of the humanitarian wars—Tina Fey’s 2016 film Whiskey 
Tango Foxtrot (directed by Glenn Ficarra and John Requa); Kim Barker’s 
2011 memoir The Taliban Shuffle that served as an inspiration for Fey’s 
movie; and Nicolas Wild’s graphic novel series Kabul Disco (2009; 2013). 
In their assessment of the Western presence in post-9/11 Afghanistan, they 
use comedy to capture the idiosyncrasies and the overarching absurdity 
of the foreign-led “Afghanistan Reconstruction” project. Their comedic 
pedagogies prompt laughter—a reaction to the farcicality contained in 
the very concept of humanitarian wars. Henri Bergson writes, in his book 
Laughter, that a “humourist is a moralist disguised as a scientist”; humor, he 
contends, is “the more emphasized the deeper we go down into an evil that 
actually is, in order to set down its details in the most cold-blooded indif-
ference” (127). These three cultural texts are designed to entertain their 
audiences through humor; yet they also are critical projects that expose the 
sinister side of foreign presence in Afghanistan—“the evil that actually is.” 
They offer up a repertoire of anecdotes, comedic situations, absurd images, 
and impossible characters, giving us a vocabulary in which to talk about the 
encounter between Afghanistan and the international community tasked 
with rebuilding it in its own image. Their narrators are self-deprecating 
and lack the hubris that permeated the early Afghanistan-based fictions 
discussed in chapters one through three. As such, they index a long journey 
from the early years of the War on Terror—from the era when foreigners 
viewed and portrayed Afghanistan as a site of oppression, destitution, and 
female captivity—to the war’s second decade, characterized by a sense of 
the West’s exhaustion, impotence, and cynicism. This sense of cynicism 
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can be captured by Costas Douzinas’ pronouncement about humanitar-
ian interventions in the twenty-first century: “Whatever the ideology,” he 
writes, “humanitarianism has become a job opportunity” (64). In all three 
texts, Kabul is reimagined as “Kabubble”—a paradoxical site of transna-
tional career building, an inflated economy zone, and as a new kind of 
ruin—a ruin of late neoliberalism.2 
Weary of the clichéd portrayals of Afghanistan that precede them, 
these texts are remarkably self-aware; engaging stereotypes only to mock 
them, they rewrite conventional geographies of power and privilege, and by 
doing so, manage to dislodge the coordinate system by which we map the 
differences between the global South and the global North. These texts are 
most notable because of what is absent in them—first and foremost, absent 
is the trope of rescue of the suffering Afghans by a benevolent subject from 
the West—the likes of Kandahar’s protagonist Nafas, The Kite Runner’s 
Amir, or the heroic leaders of the MSF team in The Photographer. These 
newer works show no interest in deploying the humanitarian imaginary 
to justify Westerners’ presence in Kabul; instead, the clichéd narrative 
of Western-borne salvation is repeatedly ridiculed. In all three texts, the 
narrators move to the Afghan capital in search of a career opportunity, 
driven primarily by economic forces. Self-serving and opportunistic, the 
narrators are “good subjects” not in the moral but in the Althusserian 
sense, insofar as they embody the spirit of neoliberalism that requires prop-
erly interpellated individuals to constantly reskill, improve, and reinvent 
themselves—in their case, by relocating to a conflict zone. In these texts, 
corporeal vulnerability becomes a symbol of late neoliberalism; bodily 
wounds index other injuries and risks that affect subjects of globalized 
market economies in crisis. Collateral damage proliferates, producing new 
ruins—ruined bodies, bankrupt companies, busted economies, and failed 
states. Geographies of victimhood—economic violence, physical and mil-
itary violence—here are not limited to Afghanistan, but span the globe. 
These texts also push back against the convention of turning Afghan 
cultural difference into a spectacle for Western consumption. They do 
not traffic in images of Afghan insularity and backwardness (unless they 
want to mock them); they also keep the pseudo-ethnographic impulse to 
document and explain Afghan cultural difference to their Western audi-
ences firmly in check. Instead, these texts turn their gaze on the members 
of the international cohort of expats who gathered in Kabul after 9/11. 
In doing so, they scrutinize the lifestyle, habits, dietary preferences, and 
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mating practices of these folks, as well as question their motives and make 
fun of their “humanitarian” endeavors. In sum, they examine these expats 
with the curiosity of a trained anthropologist, treating them as if they 
were members of an exotic tribe. In all three accounts, raucous parties are 
presented as the international community’s prime habitat and thus become 
a particularly rich source of “data.” Such parties represent the true face 
of the humanitarian project in reconstruction-era Afghanistan: Western 
professionals, many of them middle-aged, like Barker or Fey’s protagonists, 
become intoxicated, literally, by consuming large quantities of booze and 
drugs, and figuratively, by being transported into a carnivalesque space3 
where cultural norms are suspended. Barker writes: 
Often, the reality of Afghanistan interrupted the fun. A security guy 
shot up a bar; an attention-seeking journalist tossed a stun grenade at 
a party, blowing out all the windows. A consultant company threw a 
dance and trampoline party with camels and actual Afghan nomads—a 
measure of authenticity, I guess, that had become legendary with Afghan 
nomads, who spread rumors across the region of a foreigner trampoline 
orgy. . . . The brothels and over-the-top parties were only a symptom of 
the absurdity that this war had turned into by the fall of 2005. (73–74) 
Here, westerners in Kabul are called out on their exploitation of Afghan 
traditional culture (hiring Afghan nomads to pose as exotic props at a 
party) and on their reckless behavior, such as throwing a stun grenade at 
a party. What is more notable, however, is the reversal of the direction of 
the gaze in which the westerners themselves are repositioned as objects of 
scrutiny—examined by both Barker and the Afghans who marvel at the 
misbehaving foreigners and then spread rumors of “the foreigner trampo-
line orgy.” The Afghans in Barker’s passage are well aware of their status 
as exotic objects in Western media; westerners, however, are not cognizant 
of their own status as being observed, and judged, in multiple ways, by 
culturally more competent Afghans, who are used to having foreigners in 
their environment. And this is where the irony lies. Set in Afghanistan, 
Barker’s memoir is an ethnography—not of Afghans, but of transnational 
workers of the late-neoliberal era, a class to which she herself belongs. 
This comedic reversal, where Afghans are situated as self-aware objects 
of exploitation, and simultaneously, as the subjects of the gaze, while the 
expat humanitarian community, lacking self-awareness, is put on display, 
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disrupts familiar representational frames and causes anxiety in some crit-
ics. Tina Fey’s film, which generally follows Barker’s assessment of the 
expatriate community in Kabul, has been subjected to a harsh criticism 
in the liberal-leaning media. Feminist reviewers condemned the film for 
focusing too much on its white protagonist’s trajectory (a forty-plus-year-
old journalist played by Fey herself) and thus for using Afghanistan as a 
mere setting. Stephanie Abraham, for instance, contends that the film 
“champions a white, middle-class American feminism that sees Western 
women as free and other women, in this case Afghan women, as oppressed” 
(par. 2). Anne Helen Petersen condemns the film’s treatment of race in 
her review, concluding that “Whiskey Tango Foxtrot ’s racism and exoticism 
are not novel. . . . It’s neither the worst nor the best of its genre” (par. 1). 
In similar vein, reviewer Glen Dunks bemoans the shortage of scenes 
depicting Afghanistan and Afghans. The film, he argues, is not interested 
“in the race relations on screen, which is odd considering where it’s set. 
The locals are mostly secondary to Barker’s story” (par. 10).  
Some of that criticism is fair: A Hollywood production, the film 
indeed suffers from flaws not found in the memoir that inspired it. Most 
significantly, the film raises immediate concerns about the widely criticized 
Hollywood practice of whitewashing; the two main Afghan characters are 
played by Caucasian actors, Christopher Abbott (a white American actor) 
and Alfred Molina (born in Britain, of Spanish and Italian parentage).4 
As such, the film lacks cultural authenticity. No native speakers of Dari 
or Pashto are featured. Barker herself, upon visiting the set outside Santa 
Fe, New Mexico, observed that, while the dusty-beige, windswept terrain 
reminded her of Afghanistan, the actors proved less realistic: “[T]he extras 
playing Taliban members . . . seemed to be mostly of Mexican heritage, 
their turbans were tied like Christmas bows and they were eating Kind 
bars. This was definitely not Ghazni Province” (“My ‘Kabubble,’” par. 7). 
On the level of the plot, the film modifies the memoir’s storyline in 
at least two significant ways: It adds the romance between the protagonist 
named Kim and the male lead (played by Martin Freeman), and ends with 
Kim achieving career success as a news anchor in Washington. The film’s 
upward trajectory is at odds with the storyline in the memoir where Barker 
starts her assignment in Afghanistan fully employed and in a relationship 
and ends up single (her relationship cracks under the pressure of a foreign 
assignment) and jobless (as her job is eliminated by the newspaper in the 
aftermath of the 2008 recession). Regrettably, an inscription of the romantic 
202 IMAGINING AFGHANISTAN
and career success in the film positions the film as a personal empowerment 
story for a white American woman—a problematic trope that has not gone 
unnoticed by critics. To make matters worse, Fey’s own interpretation of 
the film likely added fuel to the already raging fire—in a New York Times 
interview, she told Melena Ryzik: “I just found it fascinating, the weird mix 
of Kim having this freeing, wild experience privately, in the middle of a 
place where women are so oppressed” (par. 7). Fey’s uncritical deployment of 
an opposition between the white American protagonist’s growing freedom 
and Afghan women’s lack of such is, however, a misreading of Barker’s story, 
which works against such an opposition by bringing into view Kim’s depres-
sion, disenfranchisement, loneliness, and extreme burnout by the end of her 
stay in Kabul. Moreover, Fey seems also to be misreading the very film she 
stars in. The film, in fact, follows the memoir in carefully navigating away 
from the tropes of female oppression in the Muslim world, which is most 
notable in its treatment of the contentious burqa issue. 
During the first wave of writing/screening Afghanistan (treated in 
chapters one and two), the burqa functioned as a material instantiation of 
Afghan women’s extreme oppression under the Taliban rule. The burqa 
repeatedly has been inscribed as tomb-like, suffocating, pinching, stifling, 
and violating the innate human dignity of women.5 Accordingly, the trope 
of unveiling, ubiquitous in these early texts, signaled liberation and res-
toration of human dignity. Consider, for instance, the significance of the 
trope of unveiling in the film Kandahar (chapter one), which begins and 
ends with the protagonist lifting the burqa to reveal her face. Feminist the-
orist Malini Schueller recalls the ritualistic unveiling performed on Zoya, 
an Afghan women’s rights activist, by Oprah in 2001 as designed to stage, 
for the American-based audience, “the transformation from archaism to 
modernity, objecthood to subjecthood” (par. 19). As NATO troops entered 
Kabul in the fall of 2001, Western media outlets were awash with stories 
of jubilant unveilings. A Newsweek reporter wrote, in November 2001, “as 
soon as she heard about the Taliban’s defeat, Azimi joyously burned her 
burqa at home. ‘I felt so depressed wearing the veil,’ she said. ‘Now I see the 
sunlight and it’s so beautiful.’”6 This obsession with Afghan women’s dress 
and, correspondingly, a focus on saving these “women of cover” (as George 
W. Bush called them) has been subjected to feminist critique early on, most 
famously in Lila Abu-Lughod’s 2002 article “Do Muslim Women Really 
Need Saving?” and also in numerous other texts.7 
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In Fey’s film, the two scenes that feature the burqa signal a playful, 
self-conscious reversal of that early trope. The first scene takes place in 
the context of Kim’s embed with a group of marines tasked with repairing 
a village well that has been destroyed by an improvised explosive device 
(IED). As a burqa-clad village woman signals her wish to talk to Kim 
privately, away from the soldiers, Kim follows her into a house where she 
is met by a large group of women who lift their burqas to greet her. At 
the moment of unveiling, the film cuts to Kim’s surprised face instead of 
revealing the faces of the women. These women, then, enlist Kim as a 
mediator. They wish to instruct the marines to stop repairing the well as 
its presence in the village prevents the women from enjoying their daily 
hike to the stream in each other’s company, away from the men. They also 
reveal that they have been destroying the well, each time it was rebuilt, 
using IEDs they had created using old Soviet-era land mines. The scene 
thus not only interrupts the viewer’s voyeuristic desire to look underneath 
the veil, but also endows Afghan women with rebellious agency, autonomy, 
and technological skill needed to manufacture IEDs. The second burqa 
scene features Kim herself donning the garment to conceal her identity 
on a trip to a dangerous assignment. Invoking, and immediately reversing 
the connotations between the burqa and Afghan culture’s repression of 
female sexuality, the scene depicts Kim being liberated by the burqa to 
greater sexual expression. In contrast to her usual awkward, inhibited self, 
Kim turns flirtatious and seductive as she walks across the courtyard of 
her expat compound, turning the gaze of all her male team members. In 
this scene, white expat men are, paradoxically, hailed by the burqa into 
responding to fully covered Kim—who commands attention—as a sexual, 
and empowered, being. Their faces reflect awe rather than a predatory 
response, further inscribing the donning of the burqa as Kim’s taking 
charge of her sexuality. To argue, as the reviewers above do, that Fey’s 
film is simply a repetition of the old “racism and exoticism” perpetuating 
tropes of Afghan women’s oppression, is to misrecognize the film’s work 
of evading and subverting these tropes. 
That said, we can now turn to what I believe is the film’s key contribu-
tion. While I am sympathetic to the feminist critique of some of the film’s 
flaws, I believe that these initial polemics failed to register precisely what 
is new in Whiskey Tango Foxtrot (and in Barker’s memoir): a critique of the 
Western-led humanitarian enterprise in Kabul and a desire to expose the 
preposterousness of its mission. As in the memoir, Fey’s protagonist does 
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not have her experiences privately, but is portrayed as part of a habitat of 
international development workers and foreign correspondents—a habitat 
that is toxic and exploitative both of westerners and their Afghan helpers. 
Her personal liberation begins when she manages to extricate herself from 
this toxic community. To decipher the film’s place in the conversation about 
Afghanistan and US-led humanitarian wars, we need to situate it within 
an ecosystem of similar works—the memoir that inspired it as well as 
other texts written by transnational knowledge workers as they reflect on 
the era of massive foreign presence in the aftermath of the 2001 invasion. 
These texts focus on the crowd of expats, mostly, though not exclusively, 
white; however, it is not to celebrate their achievements, but to expose their 
irredeemable shortfalls. Unlike early post-9/11 texts, these newer works 
are not concerned with examining—or delivering to western audiences—
stories of Afghan cultural difference, which explains the relative paucity 
of scenes depicting Afghans in their own environment. These texts’ prime 
object is not Kabul—an Afghan city—but the “Kabubble”—an incubator 
of a specific kind of expatriate microculture. In all three texts, Afghans 
who are featured are multilingual, cross-culturally competent, sometimes 
quirky, but overall well adjusted; they are not in need of rescue or pro-
tection. These Afghans bring into further relief the cluelessness of the 
monolingual transnational “humanitarians” as a group. It is the reckless, 
clueless foreigners with no prior training or knowledge of Dari who need to 
be protected from the dangers they do not know lurk in the environment. 
The trope of rescue characteristic of the first wave of writing and screening 
Afghanistan is also reversed. Afghans featured in these texts—even in 
Fey’s film—are no longer victims: cross-culturally competent and effective, 
they observe, assist, lust after, or take care of the floundering foreigners 
who make a provisional home in the Afghan capital. 
While it is important to continue to be vigilant, critiquing narratives 
that “champion middle-class white feminism,” it is equally necessary to 
acknowledge the trajectory of self-learning and self-critique indexed by 
the cultural texts written in the second decade of US-led war and recon-
struction in Afghanistan. This crop of texts offers “Kabubble” as a mirror 
for diagnosing the pernicious problems of our shared neoliberal present 
characterized by the universal precarization of labor, increased competi-
tion for resources, the prevalence of short-term thinking and short-term 
contracts, and the diminishment of state and community support sys-
tems—both in Afghanistan and in the global North. The failures of 
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Afghan reconstruction, these texts suggest, are not accidental but embed-
ded in the neoliberal project itself. Their characters embody its spirit and 
faithfully act out the roles that are offered to them. The expatriate fail-
ures are the failures not of individuals but of systems—the neoliberal 
regimes imposed, in the aftermath of the invasions, in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. These regimes involve the dismantling of existing infrastructures of 
community sustenance and protection with nothing to offer in exchange, 
except for the opening of these vulnerable communities to volatile global 
market forces. And the massive project of neoliberal revamping of these 
invaded economies, as Michael Schwartz explains, required a “robust 
civilian presence” (215), a large cohort of western professionals, in these 
sites. Fey’s, Barker’s, and Wild’s texts show what this robust civilian pres-
ence looked like. 
Life Is a Party 
Whiskey Tango Foxtrot opens with a scene at a party. Half-naked bodies, 
loud music, people of all ages drinking, snorting cocaine, smoking hashish, 
making out, and scream-singing in and out of tune frame our first view 
of the main character—news reporter Kim Baker, played by Tina Fey. A 
forty-something professional woman, she is shown jumping up and down 
in a crowd of bodies, drinking hard liquor from a bottle (Figure 6.1). The 
raucous party is then interrupted by the sound of a nearby explosion. The 
music stops as the explosion reaches the dancing crowd in the form of dust 
shrapnel that comes down from the ceiling. A moment later, some party 
members—reporters—rush to their cell phones to file a report to their 
news agencies, and Kim, on her cell phone with her editor, hurries to the 
site of the bombing. This opening scene, which takes place in 2006 Kabul, 
presents reconstruction-era Afghanistan as a site of extreme partying and, 
simultaneously, a site of violence. The visual-sonic resonance between 
descending shrapnel and a mad chorus of ringing cellphones is evocative; 
shrapnel invokes corporeal injury, while cellphones connote connectivity 
and globalization. The focus on the international community carousing in 
a conflict zone sets the tone for the critique offered in the film: It will focus 
on this group’s predictable failures. The film then flashes back to 2002, the 
time when Kim—a cubicle-bound news writer for a television network in 
Chicago—is offered the opportunity to go to Kabul as a correspondent. 
Feeling stuck in a rut and even “moving backwards” in her life, she sees 
this as an opportunity for adventure and positive change. 
206 IMAGINING AFGHANISTAN
Quite similarly, Wild’s Kabul Disco—named after a party mix CD—
foregoes the theme of Afghan cultural difference and focuses, instead, 
on the party scene, expatriate life, and the extravagant habits of inter-
national community members. In book one, Nicolas, a comic book artist 
and illustrator residing in France, is hired by an international communica-
tions company based in Kabul to work on the Afghan election awareness 
campaign. The company, we are told, has humanitarian roots—it is a for-
mer NGO that grew rapidly in post-9/11 Kabul, prompting its founding 
members (two Frenchmen and one Argentinian) to turn it into a private 
communications and public relations firm. The book follows Nicolas as 
he relocates to Kabul, initially for a three-month term, describing what 
it means to be a foreigner working in post-9/11 Afghanistan. Images of 
Afghan culture play a modest role in the first book. Mostly, Nicolas’s life 
is limited to his guesthouse, the office, and the expatriate scene, with a 
French restaurant, La Joie de Vivre, at its center. Nicolas is surprised, upon 
his arrival to Kabul, to find a vibrant Western community there. The reader 
is conscripted into both admiring and detesting his bosses who are prom-
inent fixtures on the expatriate scene. World-savvy enterprising socialites 
with designer sunglasses, they boast an impeccable sense of fashion, a taste 
for foie gras, and a knack for making money in a war zone (Figure 6.2). 
Upon arrival, Nicolas feels out of his element not because of his unfa-
miliarity with Afghan culture, as one would expect, but because he does 
not quite know how to behave around the so-called “bobos”—French 
Figure 6.1. A foreigners’ party in Whiskey Tango Foxtrot.
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bourgeois bohemians—abundant in Kabul. “They miss the high society 
so much,” Nicolas’s politically savvy and ascetic fellow designer Tristan 
says, “they’ve rebuilt parts of Paris in the middle of Kabul. La Joie de Vivre, 
it’s appalling” (KD1 38). By contrast, Nicolas and Tristan call themselves 
“momos”—moneyless morons (38), a term that indexes class difference 
between the precariously employed pair of graphic designers and their suc-
cessful entrepreneurial bosses. Tristan’s condemnation of the international 
community eventually causes him to leave Afghanistan. He says, “I think 
what we are doing here sucks. We are taking the piss out of the Afghans. 
It’s worse than neocolonialism” (KD2 56). Nicolas, by contrast, is more 
than ready to be seduced by the little privileges afforded by the expat life, 
and at the end of his term he asks for a contract extension (Figure 6.3). 
After all, he has no other prospects. 
Barker’s memoir—published in 2011 as The Taliban Shuffle—is the 
most nuanced and the most direct of the three texts in its critique of 
the “Kabubble.” She gives reconstruction-era Kabubble other nicknames 
too, calling it terrordrome, Kabul High (74), and Hotel California (72) 
to capture the state, and the mood, of the expat community. The mem-
oir is rich in detail, chronicling the various depravities incubated in the 
community that is supposed to secure neoliberal peace and prosperity 
by ensuring the “robust civilian presence” of westerners in Afghanistan. 
Barker brings into relief a sense of excitement, opportunity, and risk that 
permeate the international scene, painting an unforgettable picture of a 
community of foreigners out of touch with the culture and people they are 
Figure 6.2. Graphic designers and their boss Valentin. 
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supposed to be helping. Barker underscores 
the ruthless opportunism of the group. For 
most, humanitarian aims are part of their 
job description; yet the motives and the 
behavior of these humanitarians are at odds 
with their organizations’ aims. She writes: 
For most [foreigners], Afghanistan was 
Kabul High, a way to get your war on, an 
adrenaline rush, a resume line, a money fac-
tory. It was a place to escape, to run away 
from marriages and mistakes, a place to 
forget your age, your responsibilities, your 
past, a country in which to reinvent your-
self. . . . 
How out of touch were they? 
Employees of the Department for International Development (DFID), 
the British equivalent of USAID, decided it would be a good idea to 
throw a going-away party just before the election, with the dress code 
specified as “INVADERS—Alexander the Great, Hippies, Brits, 
Mughals, Russians, and general gratuitous fancy dress. Gorillas wel-
come.” . . . Well, at least it wasn’t the Tarts and Talibs theme party, 
thrown the year before. (284) 
The image of a prominent humanitarian agency throwing an “Invaders” 
or a “Tarts and Talibs” party in a city that struggles to rebuild itself after 
decades of horrific wars captures the essence of Barker’s critique. The cul-
tural appropriation here is more than scandalous—it is so outrageous that 
it becomes comical, absurd. It calls for an ethnographer to document it, 
an anthropologist to explain its logic. 
Such scenes suggest that the international community in Kabul does 
not coalesce into a collectivity with a political or moral consciousness of any 
kind. Transnational nomads, these members of the creative, humanitarian, 
and paramilitary class behave like invaders insofar as they enjoy the spoils 
of a neoliberal “conquest” of Kabul, rebuilding the city in their own image, 
yet unaware of their large footprint. They bring with themselves bars, 
brothels, and gated communities, as well as short-term thinking, a lack of 
cultural memory, and a lack of investment in or a vision for the future. They 
Figure 6.3. Nicolas express-
ing happiness at the sight of 
a new short-term contract in 
a war zone.
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are post-utopian, capitalist-realist, competitive, and homeless, belonging 
neither to Afghanistan nor to their home nations. Geographer Jennifer 
Fluri, in her study of the post-9/11 expatriate community in Kabul, found 
that short-term assignments were indeed the norm: “Short-term assign-
ments (i.e., three months to one year) provide workers a crucial line item 
on their resumes as part of longitudinal career trajectory” (990–991). This 
short-termism, she argues, explains these international workers’ sense of 
impunity: “behavior, desires, and personal freedoms are chosen and are 
often determined by the temporality of their assignments and the inabil-
ity of local governance to enforce the rules of law on internationals who 
engage in illegal activities” (991). In short, this community, by its very 
design, acted as an extraterritorial force that was not subject to any law; 
instead of helping to support the weak Afghan state, they made evident its 
lack of real power. In fact, like the European humanitarians two decades 
prior (MSF and the like), these twenty-first-century Western civilians 
establish a system that runs parallel to, and often in competition with, the 
Afghan state. 
By describing the over-the-top parties in guesthouses, the over-the-
top prices in restaurants and bars catering to foreigners, the inflated rent 
tags, and the overheating economy swelling up with reconstruction money, 
Barker mines the disconnect between the humanitarian community’s 
lofty aims and their largely destructive economic and cultural footprint 
in Afghanistan. Instead of attempting to close the gap between foreign 
helpers and locals, the international community revels in their own bubble, 
not noticing that the gap eventually turns into a major rift. Again, Barker 
turns to extravagant parties as a symptom of this disconnect: 
More than a hundred people crammed into the house and the yard out-
side. We had Marilyn Monroe, a pirate, Death, the Quaker Oats guy, 
Cat Woman, a convincing Kim Jong Il, and a belly dancer, along with 
various sexy witches. Tom bought all the bandages from various pharma-
cies in Kabul and wrapped himself like a mummy. We danced in a large 
group, until Tom started to sweat through his bandages, which produced 
a stench similar to either an antibiotic paste gone bad or dead people. 
A shady Afghan American with an Elvis hairdo showed up at about 2 
am—the month before, he had crashed a barbecue at the Fun House and 
peddled toothpaste tubes full of cocaine for $150 each, snapped up by 
many foreigners who judged it bad cocaine but minty fresh. (129) 
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The bandaged partygoer here allegorizes international aid—instead of 
offering it to the ones in need, the humanitarian community uses it up 
on itself, wastefully—an act that results in the stench of death. While the 
humanitarian imagery discussed in chapter one relied on the incommen-
surability of (immense) need and (insufficient) aid, here the aid does not 
reach its destination, but is wasted in an act of extravagant expenditure, 
by the helping community itself.8 
I Am Extraordinary 
Barker’s, Fey’s, and Wild’s critical focus on the expat community indexes 
the trajectory of learning from 2001 to the second decade of the 9/11 
wars. To make this trajectory even more obvious, in this section I revisit, 
briefly, two early post-9/11 Afghanistan travelogues—The Places In 
Between (2004) by Rory Stewart and The Bookseller of Kabul (2002) by 
Åsne Seierstad. These works indulge, without self-irony, in the tropes 
of exceptionalism and benevolent humanitarianism, showing none of 
the self-awareness or self-critique that characterizes Barker’s, Fey’s, and 
Wild’s works. Instead, authors of these widely known travelogues deploy 
neocolonial fantasies and position themselves as lone explorers of a terri-
tory that is both uncharted and exceptionally dangerous (as if there were 
no international community present). In The Places In Between, Stewart, 
a British citizen and now a Tory MP and Minister of State, describes his 
three-week journey on foot from Herat to Kabul shortly after the ousting 
of the Taliban by coalition forces in 2001. In the book’s opening para-
graphs, he presents his journey as a one-of-a-kind solitary experience in 
a place that is perilous and wild: “I was alone and a stranger,” he writes, 
“walking in very remote areas; I represented a culture that many of them 
[the Afghans] hated” (from the book’s dedication). Invoking colonial 
tropes of exploration, this framing bestows an aura of exceptionality upon 
the narrator, who appears to have exclusive access to an extraordinary 
experience. Throughout the book, Stewart continues to portray himself 
as an exception by quoting Afghans who either marvel at his endeavor or 
ridicule it: “[You are] the first tourist in Afghanistan,” Stewart reports 
being told by an Afghan government official in Herat, “You will die, I 
can guarantee. Do you want to die?” (3). 
Susan Kollin, in her analysis of travel writing, proposes the term 
“redemptive unmapping” to capture a neoimperial fantasy that prompts 
contemporary travel writers to present the landscapes they journey through 
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as in some way uncharted, as terra incognita. This imaginary unmapping 
allows travel writers to present themselves as first-time explorers rather 
than simply tourists. Collin reads this desire as “a response arising in the 
era of late imperialism when the West began to perceive that new global 
conquests were no longer available to be claimed” (14). Having been closed 
to westerners from 1979 to 2001, post-9/11 Afghanistan presented a per-
fect opportunity for such unmapping. In The Places In Between, the reader 
is conscripted into seeing Stewart as a brave, solitary, Western explorer 
of an exotic, Eastern country, where he acts as a self-fashioned anthro-
pologist and a collector of unique experiences and facts. “Every night, in 
over five hundred villages, I interviewed people about their possessions, 
communities, and history,” he writes. “My notebooks were filled with facts 
about places I could rarely find again on the map” (73). Later in the book, 
Stewart quotes an Afghan village elder comparing him to Dr. William 
Brydon—the famed survivor of the 1842 ambush outside Jalalabad that 
wiped out the entire British Army during the first Anglo-Afghan War, 
an event that sent shivers throughout the Empire, prompting the myth 
of Afghanistan as unconquerable. “Do you know Dr. Brydon?” the elder 
says. “He was English. We killed you all but we left him alive to ride into 
Peshawar. . . . I think Afghans shall send you alive like Dr. Brydon” (131). 
Here, Stewart unabashedly positions himself alongside a heavily mythol-
ogized historical figure who witnessed an unspeakable atrocity and lived 
to tell the world about it. 
In The Bookseller of Kabul, the author creates a similar narrative per-
sona—solitary and heroic. She opens her book with the following: 
I had spent six weeks in Afghanistan with the commandos of the 
Northern Alliance—in the desert by the Tajikistani border, in the 
mountains of Hindu Kush, in the Panjshir Valley, and on the steppes 
north of Kabul. I have followed their offensive against the Taliban; I 
have slept on stone floors, in mud huts, and at the front; I had traveled 
on the back of trucks, in military vehicles, on horseback, and on foot. 
When the Taliban fell, I made it to Kabul with the Northern 
Alliance. (ix) 
In these early post-9/11 texts, the solitary “I” of an adventurer figured as 
a legitimizing fiction that gave credence to the extraordinary-experience 
claim. The themes of courage, danger, solitude, and unique access are 
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interrelated; claims to extraordinary experience can be viewed as trust-
worthy only if the reader believes that the author is the only one with 
access to this experience. Correspondingly, the claim to unique access is 
substantiated by painting the terrain as extremely dangerous, which would 
prevent others from traveling there. To bring into view, by contrast, the 
existence of a vast, entrepreneurial, opportunistic, international commu-
nity in post-9/11 Afghanistan is to undermine such claims. Stewart’s and 
Seierstad’s texts skirt the topic of a massive international presence in post-
9/11 Afghanistan, the presence that made it possible, and relatively safe, for 
the first time since 1979, for westerners to travel there. Lamb, in her own 
memoir, restores some of this context; she recalls, for instance, Stewart as a 
memorable fixture on the expatriate scene in Kabul, referring to him as an 
eccentric old Etonian who roamed Kabul “in a long velvet coat” and “was 
always entertaining company” (407).9 A former tutor to Prince William 
and Prince Harry, she writes, Stewart “was living in a mud-walled fort 
running a foundation inspired by Prince Charles to revive traditional craft. 
In 2010 he would be elected to Parliament as a Tory MP” (399–400). In his 
memoir, Stewart is vague about his reasons for traveling to Afghanistan, 
implying, however, that the trip was prompted by his love for Afghan 
history and archeological heritage. To bring into view, as Lamb does, the 
author’s elite connections, his extravagant lifestyle in Kabul, and possibly, 
his opportunism, is to undermine his claims of exceptionality, courage, and 
selflessness. Seierstad, whose memoir became an international best seller, 
selling more than 1.2 million copies worldwide (it was translated into 29 
different languages), was sued for defamation by the Afghan book sales-
man whose life story she dramatized in her text. The bookseller claimed 
the book violated his privacy, exposed his family to threats, and ruined his 
reputation. In 2010, Seierstad lost her case in the Norwegian court and 
was required to pay 250,000 kroner (about $32,000) to the bookseller’s 
second wife for privacy violations.10 Yet, in spite of the moral controversy 
surrounding her book, in the epilogue Seierstad positions herself not as a 
beneficiary, but as a benefactor of Afghanistan as she talks about donating 
$300,000 from her book’s royalties to an Afghan development fund. “I 
have seen so much misery,” Seierstad says. “That’s why I donated so much 
of the money from the book back to Afghanistan. It’s not that it makes me 
feel good, but it makes me a bit happier that now hundreds of boys and 
girls are going to school because of the book. Many babies are being saved 
because I’m supporting midwives and nurses, who are needed because 
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the birth mortality rate is so high” (5). In sum, Steward and Seierstad are 
deeply invested in their own image as benefactors; as such they skirt the 
topic of themselves having benefited from the opportunities provided by 
traveling to Afghanistan after 9/11. 
In sharp contrast to these early works, Barker, Wild, and Fey do not 
boast about their generous donations to Afghan funds, do not position 
themselves as especially courageous, and make no claims to an extraordi-
nary experience. Instead, they use humor to portray their incompetence; 
foreground their lack of uniqueness, special skills, or courage; and high-
light their embarrassing belatedness to the country that has been in the 
epicenter of many global wars for nearly half a century. Barker empha-
sizes, right away, that Kabul in 2002–2006 was not a place of danger. She 
explains that when she first arrived to Kabul in 2002, the war seemed over, 
people flocked to the streets, the Taliban had retreated into Pakistan, and 
the insurgency was not yet a problem. This calm period lasted, she explains, 
until 2006. She writes, for instance: 
In Kabul that spring of 2005, the lack of war was as obvious as the 
bikinis at the pool of L’Atmosphère, the restaurant of wicker chairs, 
glass-topped tables, and absurdly priced wine that had become the 
equivalent of the sitcom Cheers in the Afghan capital. How quiet was 
it? It was so quiet that an award-winning correspondent would spend 
the summer filming a documentary about a Kabul school for female  
drivers. . . . It was so quiet that I went to a brothel for fun. (47) 
Journalist Jason Burke echoes Barker’s assessment in his own rec-
ollection, referring to this period as “happy early days in Afghanistan” 
(77). Reassured by the rapid retreat of the Taliban and by the presence of 
international troops, émigrés and refugees returned to reclaim their homes. 
Bolstered by the international crowd, businesses flourished. Schools for 
girls reopened. Kabul, almost overnight, turned into a rapidly globalizing 
city. Burke thus recalls this era: 
Journalists filled the coffee-shot-cum-bar at the Mustafa Hotel in 
Shar-e-Nau, watching DVDs of Russell Crowe in Gladiator on a new 
flat-screen brought from Dubai, and held impromptu parties on the 
roof that provoked complaints about late-night noise from the newly 
refurbished Interior Ministry. NGOs poured in international staff. . . . 
214 IMAGINING AFGHANISTAN
Thousands of often young, usually highly educated, largely white 
Western people arrived. Many were experienced, serious, and highly 
qualified; others were not. . . . One new adviser cheerfully complained of 
being hired on a Tuesday, and arriving to Afghanistan, a country he had 
never visited before, on a following Sunday. . . . One evening in 2002, 
as off-duty Italian soldiers, Dutch and French NGO workers, British 
anti-narcotics experts, American journalists and a gaggle of recently 
hired consultants to the newly created ministries drank and danced, the 
author was offered ecstasy by a development specialist who had flown in 
that day from Frankfurt. (79–80) 
These accounts mock the trope of extreme danger by explaining that 
these early years (2001–2006) were the safest for travel to Afghanistan, 
safety afforded by the presence of NATO troops and the general support 
of the civilian population.11 Moreover, instead of deploying neoimperial 
explorer fantasies, Barker, Wild, and Fey go through great pains to show 
that the territory they arrive to “discover” has not only been thoroughly 
charted, but extensively colonized by the hordes of other expats, among 
them humanitarians and NGO workers, advisers, troops, military con-
tractors, entrepreneurs, sex workers, and genuinely seedy characters. They 
introduce many side characters to paint a fuller picture of the milieu as 
well as to reveal the absurd. Consider, for instance, an American vigilante 
in Barker’s book (also mentioned by Lamb) called Tora Bora Jack who, as 
she explains, pretended to be a US special services agent, set up a makeshift 
jail, kidnapped Afghans off the streets, and locked them up on suspicion 
of terrorism (he was later convicted, spent some time in prison in Kabul, 
and was then quietly released and allowed to go back to the United States). 
The change of focus—from a lone westerner to the habitat she shared, 
inevitably, with thousands of other do-gooders and fortune-chasers, paints 
a portrait of a community whose cultural and economic impact was sig-
nificant and whose moral compass was flawed. It prompts us to ask new 
questions—not about Afghan cultural difference, but about what brings 
all these expats to Kabul, and about the culture that they create there. 
Anthropologist Barbara Heron, in her book-length study of white 
female humanitarians, is critical of what she sees as her subjects’ invest-
ment in the image of themselves as moral subjects; she also notes the 
pernicious presence of the savior trope in their autobiographical stories 
(110). She writes that “virtually all participants tell stories of our overseas 
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experiences that inevitably, and to some degree inadvertently, have the 
effects of casting ourselves as heroic figures” (107). This, however, is not 
true in the narratives discussed here. From beginning to end, Barker’s, 
Wild’s, and Fey’s protagonists are critical about their own role and posi-
tionality in the Afghan reconstruction project; they are not at all sure they 
are making a difference, not at all certain they are making things better, 
and not at all convinced their behavior is ethical. In fact, they are ready to 
condemn themselves. Heron’s “[c]laim to goodness and a moral self ” (98) 
does not exist in these stories; also missing is “the ‘know-better’ devel-
opment worker stance” (102). Barker, for instance, describes a moment 
of self-consciousness and shame when she finds herself in a Chinese-run 
brothel getting drunk, singing karaoke, and watching monkeys copulate 
in a cage on the eve of Eid—an important Islamic holiday marking the 
end of Ramadan. Reflecting upon this evening in her memoir, she says: “I 
was no longer just observing the bad behavior of the foreign community. 
Within weeks of my breakup [with my boyfriend], I had fully signed on” 
(78). Not only do these texts dislodge the belief in development workers’ 
moral integrity, but there is also something important about the way in 
which these texts bring attention to their own status as commodities and 
to their authors as entrepreneurs. As cultural products, they lack inno-
cence—the 9/11 wars created a worldwide market for stories from Kabul 
and Baghdad. These texts are the result of their authors’ entrepreneurial 
efforts as they try to amass cultural capital in a struggle for survival in 
the cutthroat race for ever-diminishing resources in the austerity-era first 
world. Kabul Disco, for instance, both mocks itself and brings attention 
to itself as a commodity by noting that westerners writing about their 
Afghan experience are a tiresome cliché. On a flight from Kabul to Herat, 
coworkers tease Nicolas who is scribbling in his journal: “Are you writing 
a novel? . . .” “Most foreigners who live here write about their lives. As if 
the air in Kabul gives them writing skills” (84). 
Further bringing into relief and mocking the trope of exceptionality 
deployed unabashedly in Stewart’s and Seierstad’s texts, Barker, Wild, 
and Fey use self-deprecating humor to highlight their narrators’ lack of 
extraordinary qualities, cross-cultural competence, or even basic train-
ing in the international milieu. Traveling to Kabul in the aftermath of 
Operation Enduring Freedom, all three suggest, required no exceptional 
skills. Barker remarks that, in 2002, to go to Kabul, one needed only to 
be single, without children, and therefore “expendable” (16). She is explicit 
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about her complete lack of qualifications to be a foreign correspondent, 
and instead of foregrounding courage, paints herself as being risk-averse: 
“I was convinced that death lurked behind every corner, perhaps the most 
unlikely foreign correspondent ever born” (16). She also admits to an utter 
lack of cross-cultural training: “I was hardly qualified to go anywhere, even 
Canada. I had never been to Europe. I spoke only English. I knew little 
about Al-Qaeda or Osama bin Laden. I knew about as much about Islam as 
I knew about Christianity, given my hippie infidel upbringing” (18). Kim 
Barker (Fey’s character), similarly, is sent to Afghanistan because all expe-
rienced correspondents have gone to Iraq, and because she is unmarried 
and childless—“no one will sue if I die,” she explains to a fellow passenger 
on the flight to Kabul. Kim’s monocultural identity, her whiteness, and 
her lack of international experience is a source of comedy throughout the 
film. “‘Kim’ is American for ‘white lady,’” she says, introducing herself to a 
world-savvy Lebanese correspondent. In this dialogue, whiteness indexes 
a monocultural identity rather than privileged status.
The lack of training or prior knowledge of Afghanistan that all three 
narrators manifest exemplifies the paradoxes of neoliberal development. 
Kabul Disco’s Nicolas receives no instruction, either prior to or upon his 
arrival to Afghanistan. Yet his first assignment is to draw an illustration 
of the Afghan parliament, and the deadline for the project completion is 
fast approaching. As he scrambles to find images of the Afghan parliament 
to imitate, he is baffled to discover that none exist, since the parliament 
itself does not yet exist. His boss explains that the illustration should be 
a symbolic representation of what the parliament might look like in the 
future. He advises: 
Make it symbolic by respecting the ethnic balance: 45% are Pashtuns, 
36% are Tajiks, 12% are Uzbeks, 14% are Hazaras. And then there are 
a few Nuristanis, of course. Draw some wearing shalwar kamiz with 
turbans, patoos, and pakol. Then others wearing three-piece suits. Out 
of the 300 members, 25% are women. (48) 
Nicolas walks away only to return after a few minutes. He asks, sheepishly: 
Sorry for my stupid questions but I just wanted to know, what do 
Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Nuristanis, a shalwar kamiz, a 
patoo, a pakol and women look like? (48) 
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The incompetence and lack of training of the arriving foreigners position 
the reconstruction project as a morally questionable enterprise that is des-
tined to fail. As one reviewer puts it, “what really struck me about Kabul 
Disco is Wild’s ambivalence about his role as a Westerner teaching Afghans 
about their new Afghan reality when he can’t quite grasp it either” (“Kabul 
Disco by Nicolas Wild”). This comedic portrayal of clueless foreigners trying 
to educate the Afghans and transform the Afghan culture is supported by 
research that suggests that the overwhelming majority of foreigners (nearly 
98 percent in one study) had no prior knowledge about Afghanistan prior 
to their arrival.12 The irony is further compounded by the fact that out of 
the remaining 2 percent many mentioned reading fiction, mainly The Kite 
Runner, as their only cultural background training (Fluri 993).
From Tragedy to Comedy 
Martha Lauzen notes that “comedy requires the comic to call attention to 
one’s self ” (107). The self-deprecating comedy of Barker, Fey, and Wild 
stands in sharp contrast with scenes of tragedy, terror, and humanitar-
ian crisis that permeate early post-9/11 global Afghanistan writing and 
film. What necessitates this turn to comedy in the second decade of the 
9/11 wars? Barker writes: “[A]bsurdity was the only frame that helped 
me make sense of what I saw: a military operation dubbed Operation 
Turtle, a Tarts-and-Talibs-themed party” (“My Kabubble”). Perhaps, the 
move from tragedy to comedy in the wars’ second decade is prompted by 
the need for self-reflection and self-critique. Comedy, like the Owl of 
Minerva, arrives at dusk, offering a sense of detachment from which to 
examine one’s actions. 
Aside from foregrounding the absurd, comedy in these texts might 
have another purpose—disturbing familiar frames of reference by bringing 
together elements that seem to not belong together. It thus becomes a ped-
agogy that prompts us to rethink what we consider self-evident—providing 
a mirror that distorts familiar shapes to foreground an important detail by 
exaggerating it. Lauren Berlant and Sianne Ngai suggest that “comedies help 
us figure out distances and differences. . . . In the comedic scene, things are 
always closer to each other than they appear. They are near each other in 
a way that prompts a disturbance in the air” (248). In all three texts, dis-
tances and differences between phenomena that we regard as separate are 
blurred, as objects are brought into uncomfortable, laughter-inducing prox-
imity. Perhaps the most notable of such unexpected proximities is the one 
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between Afghanistan’s socialist past and the new Western neoliberal present. 
In Whiskey Tango Foxtrot, during Kim’s first embed with the US Marines, she 
travels with them to an Afghan village to repair a village well. As the mili-
tary convoy arrives to the village in their Humvees to examine the well that 
has been damaged by explosives, an elder approaches an African American 
marine to ask if they were Russians (or “shouravi,” communists, to be precise). 
The baffled soldier responds, with indignation: “The Russians? No sir, that 
was, mm, 20 years ago.” “We are here to help,” he offers after a pause. Upon 
considering it further, he chooses to add: “And I am black.” The elder goes 
back to the villagers and says: “The Russians are black now” (Figure 6.4). 
Figure 6.4. A village elder talks to a US Marine via an Afghan translator.
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The expression on the elder’s face suggests a possibility that he is sim-
ply messing with the soldier. The elder’s question, while perplexing to the 
marine, isn’t out of bounds, however, as the socialist government twenty 
years prior quite similarly tried to improve the infrastructure of villages 
and towns by building wells and water supply systems. Comedy material is 
derived from the fact that the foreigners seeking to liberate and civilize the 
Afghan population are mostly unaware of the long history of development 
and modernization efforts behind them. 
A similar case of unexpected, laughter-inducing proximity between the 
disavowed socialist past and the neoliberal present is found in Wild’s sec-
ond book in the series. During his second term in Kabul, Nicolas is tasked 
with drawing a series of posters for the Afghan campaign against opium 
production, tentatively titled “Opium is bad” (19). Upon brainstorming, the 
team of designers settles upon the key message of the campaign: “Opium 
is an insult to the values of Islam” (KD2 42). Weeks later, billboard signs 
are produced and distributed. Nicolas feel tremendous pride as he sees the 
poster he designed—one that features Shaitan (the Devil) holding poppy 
stems in his hand—on a billboard in the city of Jalalabad (Figure 6.5). 
However, his feeling of success is short-lived. Soon after, Nicolas 
spots another image—a wall-sized fresco featuring an Afghan man and 
an Afghan woman with a sickle and a hammer, trampling poppy plants—a 
remnant from the socialist era (106). The caption, the Afghan translator 
explains, reads: “Opium insults the values of Islam” (Figure 6.6). A laugh-
ing fit that follows the discovery is Nicolas’s reaction to two disparate 
things brought, uncomfortably, into unexpected closeness: the communist 
efforts to rid the country of narcotics and the team’s present-day PR cam-
paign. It is laughter-worthy that a team of precariously employed creative 
workers, laboring under the pressure of three-month contracts, employ-
ment uncertainty, and back-breaking deadlines in a war zone comes up 
with an “innovative idea” to brand opium production as un-Islamic only 
to discover that images such as theirs already exist in the Afghan land-
scape as remnants from the communist era. This discovery disturbs the 
comforting sense that the new international community is better equipped 
than the former socialist community to transform Afghanistan. It also 
directly contradicts Nicolas’s understanding of Afghanistan’s socialist past 
that he recasts for his readers’ benefit in the first book, in which the com-
munist government is depicted as banning Islam in Afghanistan (26).13 
Significant, also, is the difference in the iconography. The image from the 
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socialist era provides an alternative to what it condemns: It is confident 
in its orientation toward a better future where a strong society based on 
the values on gender and economic equality, in Islam, trumps the opium 
production enterprise. The neoliberal-era poster, by contrast, emphasizes 
the harm (the Devil is foregrounded), while offering, iconographically, 
no alternative to the economies of inequality and exploitation powered by 
poppy cultivation. 
Precarity: Contesting the Privilege Hypothesis 
Fey’s, Barker’s, and Wild’s accounts suggest that the humanitarian com-
munity in reconstruction-era Afghanistan should not be understood 
exclusively as a community of privileged first-world consumers. While 
many researchers and lay observers paint an image of the dramatic asym-
metry between the expats and the locals in post-2001 Afghan cities—and 
that asymmetry, no doubt, existed—I would like to push against the priv-
ilege hypothesis somewhat by drawing attention to the fact that not only 
privileged members of global humanitarian and business elites, but also 
members of the global precariat are drawn to zones of conflict in the 
Figure 6.5. “Opium is an insult to the values of Islam.”
 The Kabubble 221
advanced neoliberal economy. In current research on reconstruction-era 
Afghanistan, the privilege hypothesis predominates. In her insightful 
article “‘Foreign Passports Only’: Geographies of (Post)Conflict Work in 
Kabul, Afghanistan,” Fluri distinguishes between citizens of sovereignty 
(expats from the global North) and citizens of exception (such as local 
Afghans). Citizens of sovereignty are defined as “individuals who may 
live and work in spaces marked by a continual state of exception, while 
retaining benefits associated with their legitimate and ‘acceptable’ sover-
eign citizenship (confirmed by one’s passport or visa)” (987). Such benefits 
include transnational mobility, including the ability to leave Afghanistan 
and access to state protection in the case of an emergency. Citizens of 
exception, however, do not enjoy such protection. Kabul’s post-2001 neo-
liberal economy, Fluri argues, was marked by such global inequality and 
worked to reinforce rather than ameliorate it. Extreme inequality, indeed, 
is a hallmark of neoliberalism—and all three texts, but especially Wild’s 
and Barker’s, bring into view the eccentric consumption practices of the 
Figure 6.6. “Opium insults the values of Islam.”
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expatriates, contrasting them to the endemic poverty that surrounds them 
in Afghanistan. At the same time, however, they also make visible their 
narrators’ economic precarity, and by doing so, insert some nuance into 
the privilege claim and thus problematize a clear-cut divide between the 
global North and the global South. 
Wild’s narrator, a French creative professional (a graphic designer and 
illustrator of children books), unemployed and without a permanent living 
arrangement, in the opening chapters of the book, bemoans his inability to 
come up with an idea for a graphic novel. Aspiring to greatness but unable 
to make ends meet, he temporarily stays in the house of his more successful 
friend—an entrepreneurial comic book author who works incessantly and 
has published thirteen books. In the book’s opening frames, Nicolas opens 
an email with an ad forwarded by a helpful acquaintance that says: “Afghan 
communication agency needs comic book author to work in Kabul” (6). 
Having dismissed it quickly—“Kabul? You have to be desperate to take 
a job like that” (6)—Nicolas is then confronted by the roommate who 
reminds him that it’s time for him to move out and get his own place. 
The scene concludes with Nicolas feigning enthusiasm and long-standing 
passion for Afghanistan as he promptly applies for the advertised job. The 
economic precarity established from the beginning marks Nicolas as a 
transnational nomad not entirely by choice—his relocation to a conflict 
zone is prompted by a lack of economic opportunities in France. His eco-
nomic and career prospects are bleak enough (as he himself admits, “one 
must be desperate to apply for a job like this”) to chase a three-month 
contract in a distant country about which he knows nothing.14 
Along the same lines, Barker describes her long-term struggle to find 
full-time employment as a journalist in the United States. Her career trajec-
tory is typical for a creative-class professional in a late neoliberal economy 
defined by job scarcity and the prevalence of freelancing—precarious labor 
that carries no benefits. Barker’s time in Afghanistan coincides, mostly, 
with the era of her being employed full-time by the Chicago Tribune, which 
makes her a member of a privileged class that Guy Standing calls “salariat.” 
However, the memoir as a whole makes evident her continuous struggle 
to find and maintain steady employment, as well as the stress associated 
with labor precarity: 
I studied journalism at Northwestern University outside of Chicago and 
slogged away on newspaper jobs in various meth-addled towns before 
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landing my dream job at the Seattle Times, where for two years I wrote 
serious stories about the downtrodden and afflicted and won awards for 
investigative reporting. . . . 
But then came the newspaper strike in Seattle and impending 
financial ruin. I cobbled together rent money by carrying a picket sign, 
dealing blackjack, and parking cars as a valet. . . . 
I stuck with newspapers, all that I really knew, landing at The 
Chicago Tribune in early 2001, at age thirty. (17) 
Thereby, the path to full employment, difficult to begin with, is riddled 
with further difficulties and setbacks: a period of stability (having a salaried 
job in Seattle Times) is then followed by a period of crisis (financial ruin) 
through no fault of her own, when she is, once again, reduced to temporary 
work and forced to take odd jobs outside her field. This backstory, which 
positions salaried full-time employment as a hard-won victory—an excep-
tion rather than the norm—foreshadows another crisis: During Barker’s 
term in Afghanistan, the Chicago Tribune starts flailing, suffers a takeover, 
files for bankruptcy, and during the restructuring phase, eliminates thou-
sands of jobs, including Barker’s. By the end of the memoir, Barker is, once 
again, unemployed. Facing financial uncertainly and personal crisis, she 
has to reinvent herself and rebuild her life from ruins. Writing this memoir, 
it is implied, is a part of this self-reinvention.
Wild’s and Barker’s accounts, set in a war zone, bring into focus another 
war—an economic one that takes the form of flexibilization of labor power 
and the downgrading of full-time work to temporary and freelance jobs in 
the global North. As many have pointed out, twenty-first-century first-
world economies are characterized by the dissolution of the wage relation 
that has been central to the Fordist economy—full-time salaried jobs with 
benefits are progressively replaced by a combination of “voluntary” unpaid 
effort, technology, and part-time labor. Jodi Dean notes that what was pre-
viously considered labor requiring wages now gets recast as a competition 
in a contest in hopes of winning a prize (139). Wendy Brown talks of the 
post-Fordist era as one where “responsibilized” individuals are “required 
to provide for themselves in the context of power and contingencies rad-
ically limiting their ability to do so” (134)—an exorbitant effort resulting 
in epidemiological rates of depression and generalized anxiety disorder. 
The withdrawal of state protection affects citizens of the world unevenly; 
however, the boundaries between the first world and the third world are no 
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longer as clear-cut as they once were. In fact, they might be collapsing, as 
Gordon Lafer shows in his insightful article that details how the War on 
Terror not only opened up Iraq to neoliberal exploitation, but also enabled a 
full-frontal assault on labor unions and public sector employees in the post-
9/11 United States. He calls the War on Terror “neoliberalism by other 
means” (325). “[I]f we continue to follow the logic of [neoliberal] capitalist 
globalization,” Lafer writes, “the fate of most Americans is to become 
much poorer, until we balance out at the level of typical or middle- and 
working-class people in the rest of the world, i.e. the third world” (332). 
Notably, in all three texts, reconstruction-era Kabul figures as an 
open playground for international corporations. It also figures as a zone 
of self-refashioning for enterprising individuals—a personal and a career 
opportunity. Neoliberalism, Brown observes, reconfigures individuals as 
private enterprises who are expected to continuously improve themselves 
by treating themselves as objects of investment and sites of capitalization: 
“Human capital’s constant and ubiquitous aim, whether studying, intern-
ing, working, planning retirement, or reinventing itself in a new life, is 
to enterpreneurialize its endeavors, appreciate its value, and increase its 
rating or ranking” (36). Brown explains that “actual or figurative credit 
rating” is assigned “across every sphere” of existence (33). In Fey’s film, 
both implicit and overt ranking systems are deployed as a source of com-
edy. To her amusement, Kim’s rating literally goes up with her relocation 
to Afghanistan. Her attractiveness score increases from her usual six (in 
the United States) to nine or even nine-and-a-half in Kabul, due to the 
shortage of women in the expat community. As a result, she is able to 
capitalize on the increased attractiveness rating by having a selection of 
available sexual/romantic partners. The rating system, of course, applies 
also to the work the characters perform. Fey’s protagonist has to participate 
in the cutthroat competition for the desirable jobs in the global North by 
putting herself, literally, in the line of fire. She captures her audience in 
the United States (thus increasing her company ratings) by capturing on 
camera the Taliban’s attack on a military convoy, but later has to face the 
fact that “Afghanistan does not rate anymore.” She loses this race, even-
tually, to a more aggressively competitive Tanya who outranks her both 
in terms of her story ratings and in her attractiveness (she is considered 
“a fifteen” in Kabul). Tanya gets a coveted job in London after subjecting 
herself to extreme danger by traveling to meet with the Taliban in tribal 
areas. This encounter has massive human costs: Her cameraman loses an 
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eye and her Afghan fixer gets killed. Tanya herself, remarkably, walks away 
with only minor bruises, and manages to sell the story well to negotiate a 
high-paying contract with the network. The film makes it clear: It is not 
enough to travel to the war zone—one has to travel further into the heart 
of darkness, chasing danger and bullets, and sacrificing other people’s lives 
to deliver a good scoop.
Similarly, Barker focuses on corporeal injury as a mark of creative 
professionals’ need to compete for airtime and funding. Her friend Sean, 
a freelance documentary film director, gets kidnapped as he travels to the 
tribal areas to meet with Taliban commanders in hope of making a movie. 
Having spent months in captivity, he is released after his government 
pays ransom money and returns to England. Sean himself, Barker reveals, 
suffers irreparable psychological damage; furthermore, the ransom money 
(paid by British taxpayers to the Taliban) will finance more violence and 
kidnappings. By forcing the properly interpellated enterprising individuals 
to take undue risks, Barker suggests, neoliberal economies set up structures 
that create a spiral of violence. Barker herself, in spite of relocating to a war 
zone, facing corporeal risks, and facing the psychological risks associated 
with addiction-prone expat culture, is not safe from failure, but has to 
continuously struggle for her ever-diminishing share of resources. In a race 
to compete for success and survival, she and other expats face what Brown 
calls, poignantly, “employment unto death” (218)—an unrelenting drive 
to produce more (more news, more clicks, higher ratings) while having to 
do so with fewer resources. By the end of her term in Kabul, Barker no 
longer has a place of her own but resorts to couch surfing, paying out-of-
pocket for incidentals, and is unable to pay for her Afghan fixer’s help. “I 
was a newspaper reporter working for a bankrupt company in the middle 
of a war on terror,” she says. “I was standing in line like a dumb steer in a 
chute in Montana, and I didn’t even know it” (256). 
In the climate of austerity, unemployment, and recession in the global 
North, the famed dichotomy between first-world privilege and third-world 
destitution is no longer clear-cut. For instance, Barker’s highly effective and 
in-demand Afghan contact, Farouq, by the end of her stay in Afghanistan, 
charges $300 per day (whereas she can afford to pay him only $125), owns 
a business (an internet café bringing in $1,500 per month), gets married, 
and has children, while Barker has to give up on relationships, never sees 
her family, and does not get vacation time, running a race for a job that 
will be cancelled in matter of months anyway. This situation is brought 
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into comic relief as various Afghan and Pakistani officials (men who lust 
after Barker) keep offering her jobs: as a PR-consultant in Kabul with a 
$100,000/year salary, as a hospital manager in Pakistan, as a secretary 
for a major political figure. Even though these positions require having 
an affair with the men who offer them, Barker admits to considering the 
offers, because her employment prospects look so bleak. 
The Ruins of Neoliberalism 
In these texts, the ruins of Afghanistan are reconfigured, paradoxically, 
as the ruins of late neoliberalism—a baneful system that ruins human 
lives worldwide while enriching a select few. Many contemporary 
researchers criticize neoliberal development schemes for being grounded 
in what Astri Suhrke calls “destructive forms of development” (1293). 
Producing large-scale transnational corruption, “markets without 
investors” (Schwartz 256), and infrastructures with no purpose, these 
forms of development trigger progressive cycles of immiseration of 
the local population, and are seen by many as structural adjustments 
imposed via military conquest. Throughout her memoir, Barker picks 
apart the reconstruction process by offering snapshots of such destructive 
development and critiquing the inflated bubble economy that follows 
the US-led invasion. Reconstruction-era Kabul enjoys a construction 
boom—ornate narco-mansions, blast walls, barricaded-off international 
agencies’ buildings, and overpriced venues catering to the international 
development-and-reconstruction crowd pop up everywhere. She is critical 
of the economic bubble created by the presence of foreign businesses and 
agencies in the Afghan capital—a bubble that distorts the local economy, 
impeding post-conflict recovery: 
[F]or an average Afghan, life still consisted of a mud hut, an outhouse, 
and a couple of hours of electricity a day. Renting a decent concrete 
house in Kabul now cost at least $1,500 a month. Afghan teachers and 
police officers made between $60 and $125 a month. The only changes 
most Afghans had seen in Kabul had been negative—higher rent and 
food costs, higher bribes, greater hassles. Traffic jams were regularly 
caused by convoys of Land Cruisers with dark windows and no license 
plates, by U.S. soldiers screaming out orders and pointing their guns, 
by concrete barriers set up by foreign aid groups and companies worried 
about suicide bombs. (92) 
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While in the early NATO years, she observes, Kabul still bore the mark of 
the war-borne destruction—it “looked like someone had shaken a giant box of 
crackers and dumped them out” (20)—the subsequent years produce ruins of a 
new kind. These ruins are deteriorating shells of new buildings—unfinished or 
made through corrupt development schemes that allow large companies from 
the global North to pocket taxpayers’ money by subcontracting to local busi-
nesses who employ cheap labor and use cheap materials. Barker thus recalls a 
story of visiting a site of such neoliberal “reconstruction” that left behind a ruin: 
On one patrol, we visited a clinic built through the U.S. schools-and-
clinics program. . . . The program was largely considered a debacle. The 
new buildings came in shoddy, late, and over budget. The lead USAID 
contractor, the Louis Berger Group of New Jersey, reportedly charged 
U.S. taxpayers an average of $226,000 for each building—almost five 
times as much as Afghans and European nonprofit groups had paid for 
similar buildings. . . . Corners were cut. Many buildings were already 
falling apart. Some roofs had caved in from heavy snow. 
We sat with elders at their new clinic. 
“Do you use it?” an American staff sergeant asked. 
“Well . . . we have no medicine,” an Afghan answered, then added, 
almost as an afterthought, “And we have no doctor.” (116) 
Here, Barker shows how the neoliberal development economy, with its 
intricate forms of transnational corruption and profiteering schemes is 
flawed by design, out of touch with the real needs of the people, and leaves 
behind new infrastructures that already are derelict. She recalls seeing such 
new ruins everywhere in Afghanistan: “We drove south to Kandahar on 
a highway that the Americans had built in 2003,” she writes, “already, the 
road was falling apart, and entire chunks had crumbled away, due to poor 
design, poor execution, and really poor asphalt” (101).15 In his “Military 
Neoliberalism: Endless War and Humanitarian Crisis in the 21st Century,” 
Schwartz argues that it was not the lack of funding, but the overall “neolib-
eral orientation” that was the cause of these massive failures. An opening 
of Afghanistan to international markets involved dismantling repairable 
existing infrastructures and replacing them with proprietary new tech-
nology installed by “imported, unsupervised, profit-seeking contractors” 
(255) in a business climate where the only sanction for failure was “a small 
monetary fine and the danger of losing the next contract” (254). 
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A 2015 BuzzFeed News investigation  by Azmat Khan in Afghanistan 
found that “the overwhelming majority of the more than 50 US-funded 
schools it visited resemble abandoned buildings—marred by collapsing 
roofs, shattered glass, boarded-up windows, protruding electrical wires, 
decaying doors, or other structural defects” (par. 17). An image by Khan, 
“The ruins of Nahre Karez Primary School,” shows an elder in front of a 
building that looks as if it has been abandoned for decades—except it is a 
new build. Such ruins continue to serve as instruments of profit extraction; 
a BuzzFeed correspondent found that such “ghost schools . . . are being 
used to embezzle teacher salaries” (par. 20).  
It is significant, however, that Barker’s book does not present the ruinous 
“development” in Afghanistan as an exception (related, one might assume, 
to endemic corruption), but contextualizes it by tying these processes to the 
concomitant crisis in the global North. As Barker travels back to Chicago for 
a weeklong visit in 2006, she finds evidence of an ongoing war—an economic 
one—in her own homeland. Her verdict—“I flew back to the States, where 
things would be even worse” (208)—reminds us of Christina Lamb’s book 
subtitle, “From Afghanistan to a More Dangerous World.” The processes of 
ruination and crisis have come home. While Barker was away, the company 
suffered a takeover and thousands of jobs were eliminated. “Walking into 
the newsroom,” she writes, “now felt like walking into the newsroom during 
Christmas—it was depressing, and most of the desks were empty. Only it 
was June, and many desks were empty because of layoffs and buyouts” (211). 
The empty desks of her media company were as glaring as the emptiness of 
the ruined schools and clinics in Afghanistan. Barker’s job would soon be 
eliminated as well, but not until the company launched its “Ultimate Fight 
Challenge” in which journalists have to compete with each other for the few 
jobs that were left. Barker thus writes of accepting the fight for her job: 
I focused on work, on cultivating new sources, on winning Ultimate 
Fight Challenge [to keep my job]. I vowed to do embeds, blogs, video, 
interviews, cartwheels, breaking news, long features, recipes, algebra. 
If there was going to be some kind of contest over my job, I was going 
to fight as hard as possible to win. I channeled the theme from Rocky. I 
would cancel all holidays, write at all hours, say yes to every editor. (262) 
When her job was eliminated, Barker decided to stay in Afghanistan 
“to have a quiet place to figure out what [she] wanted to do next” (281). 
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Paradoxically, the United States and Afghanistan seemed to have switched 
places: Afghanistan here figured as a quiet place where Barker would have 
the time to think and plan her future, while the United States figured as 
an economic war zone and a site of ongoing destruction of people’s liveli-
hood. This, again, pushes back against the privilege hypothesis, suggesting 
that many expatriates flocked to Kabul in search of a break, a respite from 
the hyper-competition for diminishing resources in their home coun-
tries. While one can rightfully argue that their transnational mobility 
marks them as privileged, their lack of economic stability, entrapment in 
the downward cycle toward looming unemployment or part-time work, 
mental fatigue, and diminishing prospects continuously chip away at that 
privilege. 
Through their comedic pedagogies, Barker, Wild, and Fey prompt us 
to ask new questions about the humanitarian efforts that take place as part 
of twenty-first-century NATO-led wars. They begin to develop a vocabu-
lary for talking about the global precariat in a time of widespread economic 
and political crisis. The attempt at a new language starts by bringing into 
view these transnational workers as a group, thus making visible the struc-
tures underlying their individual choices. We can finally say what has 
shifted: These workers no longer think of themselves as saviors. Nor do 
they have what Heron describes as “a sense of obligation and entitlement 
to intervene so as to ‘help’ in the world—a scope of action sanctioned by 
the planetary consciousness of bourgeois subjectivity” (121). Development 
work, indeed, has become simply a job opportunity in a recession-era world 
where jobs are scarce. However, having lost the sense of moral righteous-
ness that permeates early Afghanistan writing and film, these new texts 
have not yet developed a sense of class consciousness or a politics that 
would respond to the conditions they describe. While comprising a weak 
form of collectivity (party culture), the precarious humanitarians of these 
cultural texts do not coalesce into a political body that is able to advocate 
for itself (or for Afghanistan, for that matter). Transnational, and lacking 
a sense of home, belonging neither to Afghanistan nor fully to their own 
nations, they congregate without coalescing into a citizenry. They are a 
party without a Party. Seeming to accept their lot as inevitable, they also do 
not seem to have any beliefs or subscribe to any ideology. Unable to think of 
itself as a class, the expatriate community in Barker, Fey, and Wild’s work 
is not able to think of the common good either; they congregate without 
being able to reflect on their own conditions, let alone devise alternatives to 
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the destructive development they are unwittingly conscripted into. What is 
the alternative? There does not seem to be one. Theirs is an anemic collec-
tivity that consists of individuals interpellated as entrepreneurs, as having 
their own economic interest, and survival, in mind. 
As such, there is something incomplete about these critiques—these 
texts are diagnostic of the present moment but do not offer any solutions. 
They represent the no-alternative attitude of the “capitalist realism” gen-
eration described by Mark Fisher (Capitalist Realism). Many precarious 
laborers are either still invested in anti-socialism, as Wild’s graphic novel 
series demonstrates, or lack real knowledge about socialist histories. In 
Afghanistan, they find the ruins of socialism and the ruins of neoliber-
alism side by side; they laugh at the sight of this proximity, yet no new 
vision manifests itself. At the same time, what becomes strikingly clear 
is that the very surfacing of these stories marks the end of an era—the 
NATO-led era in Afghanistan, and with it, the era of the humanitar-
ian imaginary’s dominance. The initial promise—that Afghan modernity 
would be restored through Afghanistan’s integration into, and submission 
to, the neoliberal present, did not materialize. The US Afghan reconstruc-
tion project ended with the massive loss of faith in military-humanitarian 
interventions. Having begun with a call to liberate (by unveiling) Afghan 
women, it ended with another kind of unveiling—the unveiling of the 
dead-end of the late neoliberal moment. 
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Conclusion: The End of an Era
As we have seen throughout this book, Afghanistan serves as a mirror upon 
which contemporary cultural producers project their values and beliefs, as 
well as their presumptions and biases. The two decades of the 9/11 wars 
have seen a production of thousands of titles on Afghanistan, all of which 
tried to respond, make sense of, and provide a witness to the Afghan crisis. 
Some of them became purveyors of myths, while others sought to revise or 
dispute them. There is no single aesthetic that unites all of these works. They 
all seek to bring Afghanistan and its turbulent history into mainstream vis-
ibility. While doing so, they struggle with how to articulate various aspects 
of its past: its socialist history, the invasion by the Soviet Union, the role 
of the United States in the “Afghan” jihad, and the failures of the US-led 
intervention that followed the Taliban ouster. While early works deploy the 
humanitarian narrative to create a victim that needs saving (in particular, 
Afghan women), there is a clear shift away from this approach toward the 
end of the first decade of the war. This is partly due to the criticism that the 
discourse of saving Afghan women received in transnational feminist circles 
and partly due to the failures of the NATO-era Afghanistan that started 
to manifest since 2006—rapidly deteriorating security, the squandering of 
money that amounted to transnational corruption, and the overall lack of 
vision for the country’s future. At the end of the second decade of the 9/11 
wars, the global Afghanistan corpus of works is a case study in the human-
itarian imaginary, but also, as I argued in this book, offers a way out of it. 
As I demonstrate in chapters four through six, global Afghanistan 
writing and film cannot be captured through the framework of humanitar-
ianism alone; while creating a witness to suffering and crisis, cultural texts 
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discussed in these chapters work to decenter the human figure and seek 
to develop a vocabulary and an aesthetic alternative to the humanitarian 
imaginary. Qais Akbar Omar in his memoir creates the figure of a joyful 
survivor—a witness to unspeakable darkness that overwhelms Afghanistan 
after the defeat of the socialist state who nevertheless resists victimization 
and feels the joy of being an Afghan. Kamila Shamsie shifts focus away 
from the individual and makes visible the infrastructures—of jihad as well 
as of the War on Terror—both of which are racialized, reflecting colonial 
power structures. Zia Haider Rahman’s epistemological novel decenters 
the human by imagining a nonhuman witness in mathematics. With its 
focus on deep time, Nadeem Aslam’s aesthetics of the geologic turn situate 
the drama of human history between the microtemporal register (insect 
perception, flowers promptly recolonizing minefields) and the immemo-
rial time of geology, further recontextualizing the human via multiscalar 
optics. To add, his works foreground two processes—excavation and burial 
as opposed to language-mediated testimony—as two modes of working 
through traumatic memory—memory that does not belong to a human 
alone. Finally, the texts discussed in chapter six shift focus from victims 
of the disaster to the humanitarian community that arrives to the zone of 
crisis. By making visible, and making fun of, in a comedic reversal, the 
infrastructures of humanitarian labor, these works dramatically change the 
way we see humanitarian work in the twenty-first century. Texts discussed 
in chapters four through six thus conjure powerful new vocabularies that, 
no doubt, will be useful for analyzing texts outside the global Afghanistan 
corpus as well. 
When I started writing this book, many of the works I discuss in this 
book hadn’t been published yet. It was the time prior to the creation, and 
the eventual, tentative defeat of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. The 
disastrous failures of the Iraq War weren’t yet fully known. It was prior to 
the proxy war that tore apart Syria and that saw an uncanny repetition of 
some of the patterns of the Cold-War-era conflict in Afghanistan, with 
the United States, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iran’s involvement (among 
other parties). The deployment of the humanitarian imaginary to frame the 
Syrian war to the US public bore an uncanny resemblance to the mytholo-
gies created in the Western press around the Afghan jihad, with images of 
suffering children used to stir up bipartisan support of the strikes against 
the Syrian state. I hope this book will provide an alternative to NATO-
centric imaginaries that dominate, quite understandably, Western media 
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and academic contexts. In these contexts, the bipartisan romanticization 
of anti-statist insurgency persists in spite of the fact that the echoes of 
Afghanistan’s unraveling reached the United States and the world in the 
form of transnational terror, and in spite of the knowledge of the tremen-
dous human costs of the state collapse in Iraq, Libya, and Syria that has 
reached Europe in the form of an unprecedented refugee crisis. Still, the 
deeply held suspicion, even disdain toward the third-world state, a per-
ception of the third-world state as irredeemably totalitarian (engaged in 
wholesale oppression of its people and thus a legitimate target for insur-
gency), over and over again makes it easy for Western governments to 
use unverified stories of human rights abuses to gain the Western public’s 
endorsement of invasions and bombing campaigns. A reader of this book 
should note, for instance, the conspicuous absence in NATO-centric media 
of voices of Iraqis, Libyans, or Syrians who were invested, for multiple 
reasons, in the preservation of their nation-states and opposed US-led 
attempts to weaken these states. This is not to mount a defense of particular 
regimes; it is, however, to remind readers of the paradoxes of humanitarian 
imaginary that Afghanistan’s history teaches us. Given the tremendous 
human costs of a third-world state collapse, which are visible in the history 
of post-Cold War Afghanistan, one should weigh such costs against the 
costs of such state’s preservation. Once again, we need more than one story, 
as there exists, in all these cases “the danger of a single story.”1 
Curiously, the last years of the second decade of the 9/11 wars also 
saw the return of virulent anti-Russian rhetoric in the American media. 
Suddenly, the anti-Russian tropes that I discussed by analyzing The 
Photographer or The Kite Runner became instantly recognizable to my 
undergraduate students who haven’t live through the Cold War. Of course, 
this time around they are a result of a geopolitical rather than ideological 
rivalry; however, it is remarkable how easy it was to tap into this reper-
toire of tried and tired tropes, especially during the legitimacy crisis that 
followed the 2016 election in the United States. There are other shifts 
taking place. America’s war in Afghanistan (the longest war in US his-
tory) did not end in victory, but in “a grinding stalemate” for which there 
is no end in sight.2 The promise of complete withdrawal of US troops 
from Afghanistan by 2014 did not materialize. In 2017, President Donald 
Trump announced a reengagement in Afghanistan and promised to add 
thousands of American troops in an attempt to change the course of the 
war against the Taliban and other insurgents; in 2018, however, he reversed 
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his decision and announced a withdrawal. Security in Afghanistan is at its 
worst. Aside from the Taliban, there is now a contingent of Islamic State 
insurgents in eastern Afghanistan, growing since the defeats that ISIS 
forces suffered in Syria and Iraq. The stakes are high and so is the death 
toll: May 2017 saw the deadliest terrorist attack in Kabul to date, where a 
truck bomb exploded in the middle of a busy intersection killing over 150 
and injuring 413, mostly civilian, people. The attack is attributed to the 
Haqqani network—a successor to the CIA-funded, anti-Soviet guerilla 
network of the 1980s founded and led by mujahid Jalaluddin Haqqani in 
1978. Echoes of the long 1979 are still heard around the planet, and will 
continue to be, for the foreseeable future. 
As we consider, through texts conjured by contemporary authors, the 
fallout of Western policies and operations in 1980s Afghanistan, we also 
must begin taking stock of the legacies of the twenty-first-century US-led 
war. What will this recent war in Afghanistan bequeath to the world—the 
war that started in response to the attack on the Twin Towers and hasn’t 
ended, trapped in an uncertainty of a seemingly perpetual cycle of with-
drawal and return?3 What problems became obvious, what paradoxes came 
to the surface, and what, if anything, was learned from this engagement? 
Journalist Jason Burke writes, in The 9/11 Wars, of his impressions during 
the first days of Operation Enduring Freedom. He recalls: 
Watching the aerial bombing of Tora Bora in the mountains of eastern 
Afghanistan in December 2001, with vapour trails from B-52s slic-
ing across the pale sky above the snowy peaks and row upon row of 
rocky ridges successfully lit by the slanting rising sun, a fellow journalist 
commented as a scene of untold horror and violence and extraordinary 
aesthetic beauty unfolded before us that only a vast novel could make sense 
of what was happening. He was probably right. (xxi, emphasis my own)
Without doubt, it will take decades to understand this war fully, just as it 
is taking many decades to weigh the full impact of US involvement in the 
“Afghan” jihad of the 1980s. As this book shows, however, this process has 
begun, and new texts keep emerging that add more nuance and texture to 
that work. In 2019, as I am writing this conclusion, there is a vast corpus 
of texts that try to make sense of what happened. To comprehend this war, 
as Burke intuited, we need multi-scalar optics. Nadeem Aslam’s geological 
imagery serves to capture precisely the violence and the beauty of warfare 
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on the geological scale, as if answering Burke’s call for an optics that can 
absorb something as tremendous as the bombing of Tora Bora—an event 
that seems to approximate a meteoric incursion, an extraterrestrial assault. 
Aslam’s novels make audible the echoes of this geological warfare through 
his vision of planetary interconnection. 
A commemoration, an epistemology, a political debate—the global 
Afghanistan corpus is still a work in progress, but some of its contours 
are already visible. In the 2018 Hollywood Afro-futuristic blockbuster 
Black Panther—a movie that takes place in Wakanda, a site of a pros-
perous and technologically advanced African civilization—the antagonist 
who challenges the king for the throne is an African American veteran of 
the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Nicknamed “Killmonger,” he defeats the 
king in ritual combat and assumes the throne. Allegorizing American-led 
“humanitarian” invasions of the twenty-first century (Killmonger wants 
to be a liberator of the oppressed), his immediate effect is the collapse of 
the Wakandan state; he divides the people, starts a civil war, and orders 
shipments of Wakanda’s secret weapons to countries worldwide, thus 
exporting the crisis. It is explained (appropriately, by a white CIA agent) 
that Killmonger was trained as a black ops specialist to undermine govern-
ments, destroy nation-states, and start civil wars. He is not good at state 
governance, caring for citizens’ needs, building consensus, or long-term 
planning—all hallmarks of a good statesman. The film’s diagnosis of the 
9/11 wars is this: Humanitarian interventions of the 9/11 war era were 
successful at destroying, dislodging, and dividing, but failed when it came 
to building a better, safer, more just world. 
Exemplifying the anxieties about the long-term legacies of the US-led 
intervention, Donald Rumsfeld writes, in his 2011 memoir: 
the United States did not “break” . . . Afghanistan, a land that had been 
broken, at least by Western standards, for centuries. . . . Solving corruption 
in Afghanistan or building a secular democracy in the Middle East are not 
America’s problems to tackle. They are not our broken societies to fix. (724) 
This gesture of resignation—“they are not our societies to fix”—of course, 
contradicts the very ethos of humanitarian wars, one that takes for granted 
the right to intervene precisely because distant countries are brought into 
focus, via humanitarian imagery, as ours to fix. Rumsfeld’s rhetoric indexes 
a sense of failure that is in stark contrast with the sense of triumph this 
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former secretary of state felt when he first arrived to Kabul in 2001, firmly 
believing in the success of “American liberation” (see chapter 2). Fey, Wild, 
and Barker’s accounts, among many others,4 also register this sense that 
the US-led war and reconstruction in Afghanistan have ended in failure. 
While Rumsfeld’s refusal to take responsibility for this failure obfuscates 
the processes that led to it, these other accounts seek to make them legible. 
The era of optimistic belief in the moral rightness of humanitarian 
invasions seems to have ended.5 As we transition, tentatively, out of the 
age of weaponized human rights into a new as yet undefined era, the 
case study in global NATO-centric Afghanistan writing and film allows 
us to decipher representational matrices that persist and still structure 
our perceptions. As the global Afghanistan corpus of works teaches us, 
sometimes we need to combat the deployment of humanitarian imaginary 
by inquiring about the ideology or dogma that structures such represen-
tations. At other times, we might need to respond to it, like Fey, Barker, 
and Wild, with laughter. My hope is that we can put the post-Cold War 
humanitarian imaginary to rest, and that Afghanistan and its history will 
no longer be sutured to a humanitarian image—a green-eyed refugee girl 
from a 1985 National Geographic cover. Afghanistan is not simply a defiant 
relic of socialist barbarity. We need to hear other stories—the story of the 
Afghan revolutionary subject, the story of Afghan modernity, of Afghan 
cosmopolitanism, the story of its people’s desire for peaceful development, 
their long quest for political and economic justice. In spite of all its fail-
ures, and against all odds, “red Afghanistan” has to be inscribed as an 
important chapter in the global history of the struggle for women’s rights 
and for economic justice. And it has to be done in a meaningful way, to 
sufficiently recognize the people (many of them revolutionary women) 
who held these dreams dear. The National Geographic’s Afghan girl, in the 
Western imaginary, has been asked to bear a burden that is too heavy for 
one child—to be a synecdoche for the nation at large, to be a cause for 
moral outrage, a reason for the increase of weapons being smuggled into 
her country, all of which brought additional suffering until her country was 
no more. With kindness and respect, we need to put this image to rest. We 
need other images and other stories—not of Afghan victimhood on behalf 
of which the global West has to interfere, again and again, against the 
Afghan state, but of Afghan revolutionary dreaming, self-determination, 
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 13. An anti-veiling narrative, The Swallows of Kabul is likely to have been written 
during the era of the hijab wars in France; it interpellates the European reader 
as a compassionate liberal subject who might be able to intervene on behalf 
of the women oppressed by fundamentalist regimes yet yearning to be free. 
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 14. See Kushner’s interview with Taft-Kaufman 45.
 15. See Kolhatkar and Ingalls, Bleeding Afghanistan 169. 
 16. See Kolhatkar and Ingalls, Bleeding Afghanistan; Stabile and Kumar, “Unveiling 
Imperialism: Media, Gender, and the War on Afghanistan”; Schueller, 
“Cross-cultural Identification, Neoliberal Feminism, and Afghan Women”; 
Khan, “Afghan Women: The Limits of Colonial Rescue”; and Puar, 
“Feminists and Queers in the Service of Empire,” among many others. 
 17. Douzinas 72. 
 18. Humanitarianism also has a prehistory—primarily, in the eighteenth-century 
narrative as well as in the imaginary associated with the abolitionist move-
ment. See Baucom; Lacquer; and Slaughter, “Humanitarian Reading.”
 19. The book was first published in French in 1993; the English version, from 
which I am citing, came out in 1999.
 20. For a critique of such hierarchies of humanity, see Butler, Precarious Life: 
The Power of Mourning and Violence, in which she introduces a distinction 
between grievable and ungrievable lives. 
 21. See Fisher, Capitalist Realism. 
 22. The failures of these wars are now acknowledged even by those on the more 
conservative end of the political spectrum. See, for instance, Zakaria’s “The 
Long Road to Hell: America in Iraq.” Aside from Fassin, Slaughter, and 
Douzinas, see also critiques of contemporary humanitarianism by Weizman, 
Ganguly, and Oliver, among others. 
 23. In his essay on making the film, Makhmalbaf says that “the Afghan woman 
[is] the most imprisoned woman in the world” (“Buddha”). 
 24. The “doctor,” self-admittedly, lacks medical education; he claims that most of 
the sick he tends to suffer from simple causes, such as poverty and starvation, 
thus not requiring specialized medical knowledge. 
 25. On humanitarianism as spectacle, see, for instance, Lacquer’s analysis of the 
eighteenth-century anti-slavery narrative and Ganguly’s discussion of the 
YouTube-mediated Kony campaign to raise awareness of violence in Uganda 
in 2012 (“The World Novel”). 
 26. For a detailed account of how such humanitarian triangulation works, see 
Slaughter, “Humanitarian Reading.”
 27. See the discussion of ethics versus morality in Chaudhuri, “Documenting the 
Dark Side.” 
 28. See Taylor, “‘Kandahar’ Actor Accused of Being Assassin.” 
 29. Feehily, “Yasmina Khadra: Tools in the War for the Truth.” 
 30. See Burke 82. 
 31. See Nunan 207. 
 32. “The Challenge of Afghanistan’s House of Warlords,” The Scotsman.
 33. The fact that Atiq, the main character of the novel, is a mujahid, is symptom-
atic. Once again, he is a member of the group who emerged victorious at the 
end of the Soviet-Afghan War but is overcome by melancholy and a sense of 
meaninglessness. 
 Notes 241
 34. While certainly a stylistic feature characteristic of Khadra’s writing more 
generally, this mode of representing Afghanistan is typical of the early 
post-9/11 era. In her reading of post-9/11 media coverage of Afghanistan, 
Fowler demonstrates how the country’s geographical features were used as 
symbols of cultural backwardness and danger. Fowler remarks on the simi-
larity between post-9/11 journalist accounts and old British colonial tropes 
in which Afghanistan’s landscape is personified as a devouring force: “The 
instant the protagonist crosses into Afghanistan, the landscape tends to 
assume a sinister aspect. In travel narratives, Afghanistan’s mountain ranges 
frequently resemble implements of harm: they become saws, jagged blades 
and gaping jaws waiting to devour the unfortunate traveler. [. . .] Metaphors 
of teeth abound, particularly when the landscape is conflated with the fabled 
hostility of Afghans to the British” (33). 
 35. Jeffries, “Reader, I Am a He.” 
 36. After 2005, it became widely known that Yasmina Chadra was a pen name for 
Mohammed Moulessehoul. 
 37. See, for instance, Marks, “For Tony Kushner, an Eerily Prescient Return” and 
Reston, “A Prophet in His Time: Premonition and Reality in Tony Kushner’s 
Homebody/Kabul.” 
 38. I disagree with Anker’s suggestion that homebody’s obsession with guide-
books “imaginatively relegates Afghanistan to a space outside modernity, or 
a condition of stasis and immaturity,” drawing attention to the guidebooks 
as a kind of “false intelligence” (“The Spectacle of Our Suffering” 211). By 
contrast, the guides dated 1965 would be likely to present Afghanistan as a 
model image of successful modernization, heralding a possible future that 
was cancelled by the subsequent wars. 
 39. These old guidebooks are an intriguing image as they hold the potential to 
contest the tyranny of the present by projecting a ghost image of this present 
as it was imagined in 1965 (imagined, that is, as a future of 1965). Novak 
proposes the term “paleofuture” to designate a fantasy of the future as imag-
ined in a certain moment in the past. Such paleofutures can open up the 
actual history for questioning and investigation, providing access to what 
no longer is, and more importantly, what can be no longer imagined. This 
potential, however, is not sufficiently explored by the play. 
 40. Out of the three works discussed in this chapter, Kushner’s play received the 
most scholarly attention. See Phillips, Manis, Minwalla, and Anker, among 
others. 
 41. Here I refer to Butler’s argument about the existing differential grievability of 
Western and non-Western lives. 
 42. Anker proposes a similar reading of homebody, suggesting that she allego-
rizes the multiple contradictions underpinning human rights rhetoric (“The 
Spectacle of Our Suffering”). I came across Anker’s essay having already 
finished writing this chapter and discovered that our readings are similar 
in some ways, especially insofar as Anker, too, reads homebody as “an 
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armchair humanitarian” manifesting “a position of luxury with which the 
audience-reader is complicit” (211). The details, examples, and conclusions we 
draw from our critique are different, however, as Anker is primarily motivated 
by exploring the paradoxes of human rights rhetoric as imbricated with the 
liberal notions of embodiment and selfhood, following the trajectory outlined 
in her book-length project, Fictions of Dignity: Embodying World Literature.
 43. The term “postcolonial exotic” was introduced by Huggan in The Postcolonial 
Exotic: Marketing the Margins. 
 44. “Gharbi” here most probably signifies “Western”; “Ferengi” are an alien race 
in Star Trek (from planet Ferenginar). 
 45. Phillips suggests that Kushner’s play contains at its core an apocalyptic ide-
ation: “we are left with an endless cycle, in which the present, seeming to be 
the horrific culmination of some ultimate event, is actually the latest in an 
ongoing cycle—an apocalyptic loop, an apocalyptic leveling without benefit 
of eschatological closure” (10). 
 46. For a detailed timeline of women’s history in Afghanistan, see Ahmed-Ghosh, 
“A History of Women in Afghanistan.” 
 47. For a distinction between ontic and ontological trauma, see Edkins, “Time, 
Personhood, Politics” 131. 
 48. For an in-depth discussion of the image of Cain’s grave in the play, see Manis, 
“Cain’s Grave.” 
 49. In my reading of the play, I have benefited from a discussion with the partic-
ipants in the Northeast Modern Language Association (NeMLA) seminar 
I organized in 2015, titled “Imagining Afghanistan,” among them Derek 
Gingrich, Caitlin Forbes, Meryl Borato, Irene Martyniuk, and Tracy Dale. 
I also am grateful to the audience member whose name I do not know, who 
brought our attention to the fact that the last lines of the play were likely an 
allusion to T. S. Eliott’s The Waste Land. Dale’s discussion of the imagery 
related to Cain was instrumental in my thinking through the issues of on-
tological trauma in the play. 
 50. See Anker, “The Spectacle of Our Suffering” 219–224, for a discussion of the 
theme of European multiculturalism in the play. 
 51. Mirzoeff talks about weaponized images in his book on the US invasion of 
Iraq, Watching Babylon. 
 52. Weizman’s term introduced in The Least of All Possible Evils. 
 53. Consequently, when Kandahar and The Swallow condemn the forces of funda-
mentalist repression represented by the Taliban, they have no other place to 
turn to for a solution, but an intervention from the West. 
2  Imagining the Soviets 
 1. For an in-depth discussion of Brodsky’s Afghanistan poems, “On the Winter 
Campaign of 1980” and his 1992 poem “On the Talks in Kabul,” see Sandler, 
“The Poetry of Decline: On Joseph Brodsky, ‘On the Talks in Kabul.’” 
 Notes 243
 2. For a more in-depth discussion of the global leftist response, see Nunan 147.
 3. As stated on the book’s back cover, Zinky Boys “brings us the truth of the 
Soviet-Afghan war: the beauty of the country and the savage Army bully-
ing.” Characteristically, the blurb evokes Cold War-era anti-Soviet rhetoric 
as a marketing tactic. 
 4. See, for instance, Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan. 
 5. See Starosta, “Perverse Tongues, Postsocialist Translations”; Suchland, “Is 
Postsocialism Transnational?”; Kovačević, Narrating Post/Communism: 
Colonial Discourse and Europe’s Borderline Civilization; Nikolchina, “The 
Seminar: Mode d’emploi Impure Spaces in the Light of Late Totalitarianism”; 
and Tlostanova, “Postsocialist ≠ Postcolonial? On Post-Soviet Imaginary and 
Global Coloniality,” among many others.
    6. See Nowicha, “Statement from the Non-Region.” 
 7. Trees in Afghanistan were among the many nonhuman casualties of war. See 
Rubin, “Severed Trees in Orchards Mirror Afghan History,” and Pearce, 
“The Wasteland.”
 8. Other countries in the region watched the Afghan revolution carefully with an 
expectation that its outcomes would have transnational significance. “If the 
Khalqi [communist] regime succeeds in taming the mullahs, it will have re-
percussions in other Muslim countries. This logic is exercising the minds of 
conservative forces throughout the Islamic world,” wrote Karadia in India 
Today in 1979. 
 9. In doing so, I do not seek to downplay the horrors of the Soviet-Afghan War. 
Memoirs of veterans of that war, from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Tajikistan, 
and other post-Soviet countries paint a chilling panorama of this war and do 
not gloss over the violence that all parties unleashed on each other. Seeing 
violence, however, is not the same as seeing an abstraction of barbarity—a 
specter of the Cold War propagandist apparatus that obscures more than it 
reveals. 
 10. See Gibbs, “Reassessing Soviet Motives for Invading Afghanistan.” Also 
useful is Halliday’s analysis of the events in his two articles, “Revolution in 
Afghanistan” (1978) and “War and Revolution in Afghanistan” (1980) both 
published in the New Left Review. 
 11. Quoted in Grigory, Lenin’s Brain and Other Tales from the Secret Soviet Archives 
121.
 12. Quoted in Maley, The Afghanistan Wars 31.
 13. The Soviets suspected that Amin might have started working with the CIA, 
effectively switching sides and betraying the revolution (Gibbs 256). 
 14. Since the CIA operation in Afghanistan was covert, the actual training of jihad 
soldiers was conducted via Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)—Pakistan’s intel-
ligence agency that served as a proxy for the CIA throughout the entire war. 
As the Soviets suspected, CIA support of the mujahideen started before the 
Soviet intervention, as early as 1978 (Gibbs). At the time, Pakistan’s spokes-
men denied such allegations calling them “preposterous” (see Karadia). 
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 15. Slaughter, Human Rights Inc. 321.
 16. See, for instance, reviews by Taylor, “Grounded: Controversy Aside, This Just 
Won’t Fly” and Miller, “‘The Kite Runner’ Critiqued: New Orientalism Goes 
to the Big Screen.” Most literary scholars, among them Anker (Fictions of 
Dignity), Gray, Keshavarz, and Chan emphasized the novel’s neo-imperial 
investments. Jefferess and Aubry provided nuanced readings of the text 
seeking to account for novel’s unprecedented popularity with readers. 
Jefferess reads the novel as an allegory that is reflective of “contemporary 
discourses of humanitarianism” (394) as articulated in the liberal West, 
exemplifying both their ambition and their tensions (395). He notes that 
the novel reinforces the distinction between the “good” Muslim, with whom 
the reader identifies with, and the “bad” Muslim, whom the reader must 
reject—a binary that affirms the problematic “contemporary constructions 
of transnational humanity and benevolence” as they are articulated in the 
West (394). In turn, Aubry explores the avenues of reader-identifications with 
the novel’s characters (as evidenced by Amazon reader-generated comments) 
that might explain the novel’s unprecedented bipartisan success in the United 
States. Aubry points out that the novel appealed to American readers on both 
sides of the political spectrum (as well as to nonpartisan readers), allowing 
them to “feel right” in the midst of the War on Terror. 
 17. Muntz, “Front Porch Lessons”; Angelo and colleagues, “Afghanistan and 
Multiculturalism.” 
 18. The novel’s deployment of all-American imagery suggests that The Kite Runner’s 
target audience was, initially, American. See note 19. 
 19. Hosseini’s Afghanistan is created in America’s image. Amir’s father is a 
Mustang-driving, whiskey-drinking businessman who gives generously to 
local charities and loves sports competitions. The flaws of prewar Afghan 
society, the novel suggests, could have been addressed through a healthy dose 
of the culture of diversity and inclusion, US-style. Representations of race in 
The Kite Runner are more akin to the film The Blind Side (set in Mississippi) 
than to that in Hosseini’s own subsequent works. 
 20. Kovačević in her book Narrating Post/Communism develops the notion of 
“nested orientalisms” (originally introduced by Bakić-Hayden) that, she 
argues, complicates Said’s initial insight into how Orientalizing discourses 
work. For instance, nested Orientalism can be deployed strategically to si-
multaneously portray certain types of empires as either colonial or Oriental 
themselves. Specifically, her analyses of Cold War-era portrayals of the 
Soviet Union as an Oriental (despotic) aggressor are pertinent to my argu-
ment about Hosseini. 
 21. Consider, for instance, internet memes depicting President Donald Trump as 
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s bride, among others. The meme can be 
seen at http://knowyourmeme.com/photos/1154781-trumpolympics. 
 22. Puar, “Queer Times, Queer Assemblages” 127. 
 Notes 245
 23. Accounts of the exact role the CIA played in Afghan mujahideen training vary. 
Burke, for instance, asserts that while instruction manuals for mujahideen 
fighters were provided by the CIA, most of the training was done through 
the ISI: “any U.S. contact with mujahideen of any background was indirect, 
with the Pakistani ISI acting as intermediary” (514). 
 24. My search returned only one review of this 450-page novel and no critical 
commentary or analysis. 
 25. As of June 2018, Amazon lists 12 reader reviews of Kabul and 5,988 reviews of 
The Kite Runner. Goodreads contains 21 reviews (and 163 ratings) of Kabul 
and 63,122 reviews (and over two million ratings) of The Kite Runner. 
 26. Benjamin, “On the Concept of History.” 
 27. Söderbäck, “Revolutionary Time: Revolt as Temporal Return” 311. 
 28. The notion of “a revolutionary situation” is discussed by Lenin in his 1913 
“May Day Action by the Revolutionary Proletariat” and is defined as 
twofold: The lower classes no longer want the old ways and the ruling class 
is no longer able to rule as it used to. Lenin writes: “Oppression alone, no 
matter how great, does not always give rise to a revolutionary situation in 
a country. In most cases it is not enough for revolution that the lower classes 
should not want to live in the old way. It is also necessary that the upper classes 
should be unable  to rule and govern in the old way” (par. 13, emphasis in 
original). 
 29. While there is no evidence that the USSR was involved in the coup in any 
direct manner, the presence of Soviet advisers in Kabul was considerable at 
the time immediately preceding the coup. While Taraki and Amin insisted 
on the Afghan Revolution being homegrown, it is clear that they also 
expected to be backed by the USSR (Gibbs). Nevertheless, Crews insists, 
the revolutionaries who seized power in 1978 were “staunch nationalists, 
[who] resisted the accusation that they were merely Trojan horses for 
the USSR” (232–233). Crews demonstrates that Afghan revolutionaries 
were influenced not just by the USSR, but by multiple movements—by 
Soviet and Cuban socialists as well as by Iranian Tudeh Party, whose 
texts were circulated widely. Stories of Algerian revolutionaries, as well 
as nineteenth-century French literature (such as Victor Hugo), were 
formative for the generation of Afghan revolutionaries. Taraki, the first 
socialist head of state, for instance, had lived in Washington, as well in 
India and in China. 
 30. “President George W. Bush Press Conference on 11 October 2001,” Johnston’s 
Archive.
 31. See Halliday, “Revolution in Afghanistan” 21. 
 32. “Interview with a RAWA activist on Afghanistan,” ZNet.  
 33. See Kushner’s interview with Taft-Kaufman 45. 
 34. Nunan 202.
 35. See Jefferess and Slaughter (Human Rights, Inc.). 
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3  Humanitarian Jihad 
 1. See Reagan, “Proclamation 5033—Afghanistan Day, 1983.” 
 2. See Gibbs. This fact is important: During the 1980s, the West’s support for the 
jihad was framed as a response to the Soviet intervention; documents show, 
however, that US involvement, having predated the dispatch of Soviet troops, 
was an attempt to undermine and halt the socialist revolution. 
 3. I use the concept of multidirectional memory as introduced by Rothberg in his 
eponymous book. 
 4. See Horn and Kenney, Transnational Moments of Change: Europe 1945, 1968, 
1989.
   5. See Horn and Kenney or Cohen and Frazer (“Scale: Exploring the Global 
1968”). See also Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis. 
 6. See Horn and Kenney.
 7. See Lawson, “Introduction.” 
 8. See Rorty, “Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality”; Fukuyama, “The 
End of History?” 
 9. See Dubmadze and Hudson, Contemporary Art: 1989 to the Present. 
 10. See Eshel; Ganguly, This Thing Called the World. 
 11. Rabinow, in Marking Time, provides a non-epochal definition of the contem-
porary as a shifting point of view that allows for the construction of different 
genealogies from various continuously morphing moments in the present (2).
 12. In The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Barnett Rubin talks about his inability to 
participate in the triumphalism of the 1989 moment during a celebration of 
the fall of the Berlin Wall with his colleagues (278–279). 
 13. For a discussion of humanitarian violence, see Weizman, The Least of All Possible 
Evils. 
 14. Caruth writes: “history, like trauma, is never simply one’s own, . . . history is 
precisely the way we are implicated in each other’s traumas” (24). 
 15. As Mamdani shows, these are the terms frequently found in the documents 
from that period. 
 16. Aslam writes: “By the time he came to Peshawar as an employee of the CIA, 
his opposition to Communism was the result of study and contemplation. 
Not something that grew out of a personal wound. He was in Peshawar as 
a believer” (112). 
 17. Nunan 221–233. 
 18. Emmanuel Guibert and Juliette Fournot were interviewed on The Rachel 
Maddow Show, June 12, 2009. The interview can be viewed at https://www 
.youtube.com/watch?v=eSK_zN-Ne8Y. 
 19. Omar, whose gripping memoir I discussed in chapter four, narrates the horrors 
of the collapse of the state that followed the end of the Soviet presence in 
Afghanistan. 
 20. For an analysis of the memoir’s hybrid form, see Daniel Lawson. 
 21. Jamila was the name Juliette Fournot used in Afghanistan. 
 Notes 247
 22. See Nunan’s discussion of the funding structure, as well as his discussion of 
how the MSF’s mission was reframed with the focus changing from treating 
patients to serving as a witness (221–233). 
 23. Barnes writes, in 1988 Reader’s Digest: “the Soviets began to withdraw, their 
war machine defeated by a peasant army, their dreams of a new colony shat-
tered” (88). 
 24. See, for instance, soldier memoirs by Bobrov and by Usolcev. 
 25. Badakhshan and Panjshir Valley were mujahideen strongholds throughout the 
entire Soviet-Afghan War. After Taliban forces captured Kabul in 1996, the 
allied mujahideen forces (a.k.a. the Northern Alliance) retreated to these 
provinces with Fayzabad becoming the informal capital of the mujahideen-
controlled areas (see Anderson, “In the Court of the Pretender”). 
 26. Girardet (Killing the Cranes) writes that Massoud’s fighters reminded him 
of Cuban revolutionaries. However, ideologically, these two group could 
not be further apart from one another. Massoud espoused a patriarchal-
conservative, Islamist, anticommunist point of view; when his faction 
came to power in Kabul in 1992, veil laws were reinstituted and a religious 
curriculum was adopted in the school system. 
4  Witness
 1. See, for instance, Rothberg, “Decolonizing Trauma Studies.”
 2. For a discussion of the experience of terror from the subaltern perspective, 
see, for instance, Boehmer and Morton. In a similar vein, Westad writes: 
“the crime against the people in the Twin Towers of New York City was no 
bigger, or smaller, than those committed against the people of Luanda or 
Kabul during the Cold War. In light of the history of the recent past, the 
greatest shock of 11 September 2001 was certainly where it happened, not 
the murderous act itself ” (406). 
 3. These texts are, to use O’Gorman’s phrase, “not only global but self-consciously 
globalized: working within—while at the same time challenging—a lucrative 
global market for Anglophone fiction by South Asian authors” (Fictions 112, 
emphasis in original).
 4. See This Thing Called the World. While I agree with Ganguly’s assessment, the 
capacity to produce legibility is not limited, in my view, to the novel form, 
as evidenced by Omar’s memoir.
 5. Consider, for instance, such titles as Out of the Blue: September 11 and the Novel 
by Versluys. 
 6. See Shamsie, “The Missing Picture.” 
 7. As Bowers points out, the name “Kim Burton carries associations with the Irish-
Indian character Kim from Kipling’s eponymous novel set in the North-West 
Frontier region, as well as remind us of Richard Burton, the 19th-century 
orientalist explorer, and translator of Arabian Nights” (194). 
 8. He also reminds of Rushdie’s Max Ophuls (Shalimar the Clown). 
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 9. In the Epilogue, Omar briefly discusses the American invasion of 2001, similarly 
suspending judgment about the possible long-term effects of the American 
chapter in Afghanistan’s history.
 10. See Ross, “Qais Akbar Omar: Boston’s Afghan Writer Who Cannot Return 
Home.” 
 11. See my discussion of Khadra in chapter one. 
 12. See Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan 2. 
 13. Brzezinski’s 1998 interview with Le Nouvel Observateur, quoted in Gibbs 242. 
 14. See note prefacing the book, no page number. 
 15. Many textbooks used in mujahideen-run schools during the Soviet-Afghan 
War, such as the one that Omar describes as being adopted by his school 
after the mujahideen capture of Kabul, were paid for by US taxpayers; some 
of them were printed in the United States as well. These books promoted 
jihad and violence more generally, espoused an Islamist worldview, and 
taught hatred of communism. These books were later used in Taliban-run 
schools as well. See, for instance, Stephens and Ottaway. The US Agency 
for International Development at the University of Nebraska Omaha played 
a key role in developing, printing, and shipping such textbooks to Afghan 
refugee communities and into Afghanistan. 
 16. Mamdani writes: “State-centered Islamist political movements should not be 
equated with terrorism. As long as authoritarian movements remain confined 
within national borders and adhere to even a semblance of rule of law—as 
with the Zia dictatorship in Pakistan, the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia, 
and the Taliban in Afghanistan—the potential for terror remains sheathed. 
The emergence of terror goes along with the erosion of the rule of law. The 
distinction between a lawful dictatorship and terror outside the law will help 
us distinguish between the Taliban, on the one hand, and the mujahideen, 
on the other. In Afghanistan, after the Soviet Union was defeated, terror 
was unleashed on the Afghani people in the name of liberation” (176). 
 17. See Dearden. 
 18. Borradori 28; quoted in Gray 7. 
 19. Quoted in Boehmer and Morton 6. 
5  The Deep Time of War
 1. Aslam’s essay “Where to Begin” speaks directly to his interest in the geological 
aspect of human history.
 2. For a discussion on the short- and long-term effects of Afghanistan’s protracted 
war on the environment, see Schultheis and Pearce.
 3. A decade later, the US military also considered using crows in its search for 
Osama bin Laden. See Neurophilosophy, “US Military Planned on Using 
Spy Crows to Find Osama bin Laden.” 
 4. As I mentioned earlier, trees are among many nonhuman casualties of war in 
Afghanistan. See Rubin (A6). 
 Notes 249
 5. Ellsworth and Kruse’s edited collection Making the Geologic Now is one example 
of a productive infusion of geological thought into the field of cultural 
studies.
 6. As Lee explains: the longue durée, as “the time of the long-term structures of 
social reality, was privileged [by Braudel] over the time of events (only ‘dust’ 
for Braudel)” (2).
 7. Cited in Mitchell, Cloning Terror 3. 
 8. On the Bamyan Buddhas as negative heritage, see Meskell 561–566. Negative 
heritage, according to Meskell, preserves the memory of violence inflicted 
on the site through a conspicuous absence.
 9. The Durand Line is a border established in 1896 between Afghanistan and 
British India (now Pakistan). It was drawn by British diplomat Sir Henry 
Mortimer Durand when Afghanistan was an area effectively controlled by 
the British; it has been contested since then as it cuts through tribal Pashtun 
territories. It is not recognized by the government of Afghanistan as a legit-
imate international border. 
 10. For an in-depth discussion of the Islamic world system, see Irwin.
 11. For the importance of Eurasia as a framework for thinking recent postso-
cialist histories, see Suchland. Additionally, a collection of essays edited by 
Lieberman provides useful insights on the limitations of binary divisions 
(such as the East-West dichotomy and other, similar historiographic divi-
sions based on geographic region), proposing Eurasia as a framework for 
discussing such regional histories as interconnected.
 12. For a discussion of Aslam’s memory as palimpsestic, see Frawley 439–443.
 13. Emeralds and rubies emerge in hyperthermal veins formed when hydrother-
mal fluids escape the magma or in pegmatite deposits. A granitic magma 
serves as a source of beryllium, a rare element that is necessary for emerald 
formation.
 14. On the war-financing gem trade in Afghanistan, see Adnan Khan.
 15. On the history of Koh-i-Noor, see Streeter and Hatten 63–78.
 16. For a discussion of contemporary warfare as demodernization, see Graham, 
“Urban Metabolism.” 
 17. In Creating the Witness, Torchin offers the term “media witnessing” to capture 
a mode of witness brought into existence by the presence of the camera: 
witness via imaging (7).
 18. Spanning four decades, the conflict in Afghanistan is now known to have af-
fected multiple species of migratory birds, among them pelicans and several 
species of cranes (such as the demoiselle crane and the endangered Siberian 
crane). Migratory birds travel from Siberia across eastern Afghanistan, 
an area deeply impacted by military operations (especially aerial warfare). 
Smith reports that the number of birds safely surviving winter migration 
to the south fell by 85% in 2001–2002, with the birds likely affected by 
coalition bombing. See also “Afghan Danger for Migrating Birds.” For dis-
cussions of environmental damage and the issues of wildlife preservation 
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in Afghanistan, see also Kanderian et al., Simms et al., Smallwood et al., 
Welsh, and Schultheis. “Kabul’s Lion King” offers a view of the fate of 
captive nonhumans (Kabul Zoo animals) during the protracted crisis. 
 19. I borrow the term “machinic sensorium” from Hansen, who introduces it to 
capture the specificity of machine-mediated perception as a “technical dis-
tribution of sensibility rooted in an expansion of perception beyond [human] 
consciousness and bodily self-perception” (128).
 20. Swarming as a form of collective action has been adopted in military strategy, 
as Kosek demonstrates. Kosek brings into focus “emerging insectoid forms 
of warfare” that involve not only modeling swarmic behavior, but also inte-
grating live bees and other insects into the military-industrial complex; live 
bees have become a key component of chemical-detection cartridges (653).
6  The Kabubble
 1. Lamb writes: “Some of the drug lords [in Kabul] had invested in building large 
houses in wedding-confection style known as ‘narcitecture’ or ‘bling houses,’ 
and these were perfect for parties” (400). 
 2. “Kabubble” is a term frequently used in expat writing in relation to foreigners’ 
Kabul. It is used by Lamb and Barker in their memoirs and by Fey in her 
film. Lamb writes: “throughout the war, Kabul had always been a safe haven. 
People called it ‘Kabubble.’ As often among expat communities on the edge 
of a war zone there is a raucous social life fueled by illicit alcohol, cheap hash 
and the adrenalin of fear” (399). 
 3. I borrow the idea of international development as a carnivalesque space from 
Heron 112. 
 4. See Hornaday, “‘Whiskey Tango Foxtrot’ and Hollywood’s enduring problem 
with whitewashing” and Rosen, “Tina Fey: Whiskey Tango Foxtrot Casting 
Controversy Addressed.” 
 5. See, as an example, Seierstad’s chapter “Billowing, Fluttering, Winding” in her 
2002 The Bookseller of Kabul.
 6. Liu, “Now I See the Sunlight.” 
 7. See chapters one and two for additional sources. 
 8. It is estimated that as much as 40 percent of funds pledged for Afghan devel-
opment returned to originating countries in the form of contract payments, 
consultant salaries, and so on (see Lutz and Desai). What is more, a sig-
nificant portion of the money that stayed in the country enriched powerful 
local strongmen or was spent on projects that remain unfinished or were not 
functional to begin with—ghost infrastructures. See, for instance, Rose, 
“Afghanistan Waste Exhibit A: Kajaki Dam, More Than $300M Spent 
and Still Not Done” and Khan, “Ghost Students, Ghost Teachers, Ghost 
Schools.” 
 9. Eton is one of the most prestigious private boarding schools in England. Tuition 
is about USD $51,452 per year. 
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 10. See Al Yafai, “The Ruling against Bookseller of Kabul Author Asne Seierstad.” 
 11. Burke further recalls: “for eighteen months it was possible to travel anywhere 
without concern for anything except the appalling state of the roads” (78).
 12. See Fluri 998. 
 13. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was not anti-Islamic even at its in-
ception (see Halliday, “War and Revolution in Afghanistan” 31). Throughout 
the 1980s, the moderate socialist government of Babrak Karmal tried to in-
corporate Islamic worldview as part of the socialist worldview. This can be 
clearly observed in the evolution of the flag of the Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan from its inception in 1978 to its end in 1992. The early version 
is red, and includes no Islamic elements. In subsequent years, Islamic colors 
(green and black) and symbols are incorporated into the flag and the socialist 
elements recede into the background. Halliday writes: “the Soviet position 
on Islam was that it was, if not inherently progressive, then at least capable 
of socialist interpretation. On visits in the 1980s to the then two commu-
nist Muslim states—the now equally-forgotten Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen—I was able 
to study the way in which secondary school textbooks, taught by lay teachers 
rather than clerics, treated Islam as a form of early socialism. A verse in the 
Qur’an stating that ‘water, grass and fire are common among the people’ was 
interpreted as an early nomadic form of collective production; while Muslim 
concepts of ijma’ (consensus), zakat (charitable donation) and ‘adala (justice) 
were interpreted in line with the dictates of the noncapitalist road” (79). 
 14. Wild’s graphic novels overlapped with the economic slowdown and the sub-
sequent austerity period in France. Following the global financial crisis of 
2008, France implemented austerity measures by raising taxes, raising the 
retirement age from sixty to sixty-two, and cutting into multiple social pro-
grams and benefits (see Nicola Clark). 
 15. The failures of most infrastructure improvement projects were immediately 
visible to both residents and foreign observers. Chandrasekaran in his 
memoir Little America recalls: “Another prized project was a highway from 
Kabul to Kandahar. President Bush demanded that it be completed in less 
than a year. USAID met this goal, but in order to do so, it allowed contrac-
tors to deposit such a thin layer of asphalt that in some areas it washed away 
when the snow melted the following spring” (103). 
Conclusion 
 1. Adichie’s phrase; see chapter two. 
 2. “After 16 Years, Afghanistan War Is ‘At Best a Grinding Stalemate,’ Journalist 
Says,” Fresh Air from NPR, 6 Feb. 2018. 
 3. Zakaria voiced his critique of President Trump’s plan for reengagement in 
Afghanistan, stating that it locks the nation into “its forever war” (“Trump 
Locks America into its Forever War”). 
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 4. See, for instance, Bolger, Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and 
Afghanistan Wars; Gall, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan 2001–2014; 
and Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War Within the War in Afghanistan.
 5. See Hogood, The Endtimes of Human Rights. 
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